The Pilot Online Edition » Features

Feature: The Pivot Point Revisited: Captain Paul Butusina

JCB — Wed, 11 Jan 2012 08:39:23 +0000

“OK Captain, she’ll pivot round the fender now: hard to port and slow ahead”. Photo: JCB

Many of you will recall Hugues Cauvier’s excellent article on the pivot point in the October 2008 issue of The Pilot. Paul Butusina’s article covers much the same ground but due to the importance to pilots of understanding this elusive point I felt that it was well worth revisiting the topic. JCB

The aim of this paper is to add few corrections to the pivot point theory as it is presented in seafarers books, because understanding the pivot point is such an important element of safe manoeuvring of the vessel.

Introduction

The pivot point of the ship turning is defined in seafarers publications more or less accurately as follows: The pivot point is the point which traces the turning curve of a ship. It is located in the fore section of the ship, abaft of the stem at 1/6-1/3 of ship’s length. However other factors such as acceleration, shape of hull and speed may all affect its position.

It should be noted that when at anchor the pivot point moves right forward and any forces acting on the hull, such as wind or current, cause the vessel to move about the anchor position or the point where the chain lies on the sea bed although a sudden change will initially cause the vessel to pivot around the hawse pipe.

The available literature on ship manoeuvring and handling does not cover all aspects of the pivot point in a systematic way since it is the point in the diametrical plan of the vessel or in the prolongation of this plan, around which the vessel swings on the trajectory which she describes. This trajectory can be a circle arch with its own centre of rotation on the traject (momentary centre of rotation) which can result in the pivot point being located outside of the ship’s shape.

The Queen Mary 2 turning at speed Photo: Cunard

At speed, a more accurate description of the pivot point is a Tactical Point of Turning (TPT) which is located at the point of intersection between the ship’s diametrical plan and the perpendicular from momentary centre of rotation. This is important for ships’ operators because it gives some indications regarding the equilibrium of the forces acting on the vessel and consequently provides an indication regarding space swept during turning and the possibility to predict the ship’s orientation.

Movements of a vessel: Water Resistance and Pivot Point

It is important to remember the three degrees of freedom of a vessel (Fig 1):

1. Longitudinal, along axis X-X’

2. Transverse ,along axis Y-Y’

3. Swinging to starboard or to port.

To find PP position we will simplify the factors which affect ship’s handling to the mechanical physics although the hydrodynamic effects have a considerable importance.

During straightforward movement, water-resistance force is applied right on the stem, which creates high pressure in front and around the bow (fig.2).

The same effect occurs for astern movement but in both cases the shape of underwater hull is very important in determining the high pressure effect.

As soon as a controlled or uncontrolled horizontal force acts on the vessel the ship will start to turn and she will expose a larger section of the hull to the water flow. The peak of water-resistance and pressure will therefore shift from axe X-X’ to the geometrical centre of underwater hull section area perpendicular on the new direction of the movement and the direction of the water-resistance (R), could be anywhere between longitudinal axis, X-X’ and transversal axis,Y-Y’.

Depending of the direction of the movement, the vessel’s speed, hull shape, trim and heel, etc the application point of the water-resistance force will be in different points along the vessel, changing continuously during complex manoeuvres.

To analyse the influence of horizontal forces applied on the vessel (ie rudder & wind) we have to relate these forces to the water-resistance force where it acts. This force will be present as long as vessel is floating and moving. The arm lever of these forces is the distance between their supports and Water-Resistance Force.

The resultant effect of several forces acting on a stopped vessel can generate all three movements. For our purpose, the rotation and the sideway movement are considered. The rotation movement has a centre of rotation which is the pivot point where the fore and aft extremities of the vessel are turning with the same angular speed inside of ship’s shape in all situations.

Besides the pivot point, the vessel’s trajectory has its own centre of curvature called the Momentary Centre of Rotation. In fact all forces acting upon a vessel have, more or less, momentary effects in ship’s dynamic movement.

Water Resistance and Pivot Point of a vessel stopped

Considering a ship stopped in the water we can find a point situated near its mid length, from where if a tug pushed with a force F the fore and aft extremities of the ship will move with same speeds V1= V2 (Fig.3).

fig 3

The force F is applied on the same support as water-resistance force R. Its centre of application is the Centre of Water (Lateral) Resistance (CLR). The lever F -R is therefore zero and the ship will move from position 1 -2 without any rotation.

If equal but opposite forces are now applied equidistant from the CLR then the ship will pivot around that point (Fig 4).

fig 4

Returning to the situation in Fig.3, if the force (F) is moved slightly aft of the CLR then the resultant will be a sideways movement coupled with a slight ahead movement which will cause the ship to start rotating but in this condition the pivot point will be ahead and well outside the ship shape (fig 5).

fig 5

From position 2, if our force (F) is now applied further aft and on the starboard 1/4, the speed of rotation is increased but the forward movement is reduced and the pivot point moves closer to the bow of the ship (fig 6).

fig 6

Moving this force right aft onto the rudder area ( i.e. with a pod proplsion unit) the pivot point may move back within the ship shape (Fig 7).

fig 7

The bow thruster will have opposite effect of moving the effective pivot point to the stern of the vessel (Fig 8). Obviously these are very approximate locations but at least serve to help anticipate where the pivot point might be.

fig 8

Getting Underway

If the engine is now put ahead with the rudder amidships with two tugs pushing up with equal power equidistant from the CLR the vessel will start to move ahead and sideways (Fig 9).

fig 9

Due to lateral resistance RL and the longitudinal resistance RI a resultant water resistance force RT acts on the starboard bow. The pivot point moves forward in the direction of the movement and consequently the levers of F1 and F2 related to RT change and d2 > d1. In consequence V2 >> V1 resulting in an accelerating swing to port. Even with a short “kick ahead”, this increasing of rotation speed can be seen. The same effect of course occurs when a vessel in a tideway is stopped over the ground parallel to the berth and the stronger the tide the greater is the effect. It is important to note that in this scenario the pivot point may again move ahead of the ship shape.

Likewise, if a vessel is moored with a current from astern, the pivot point will be aft at the moment the lines are cast off and ship will start to want to pivot around the stern with the bow moving away from the jetty faster than the stern if 2 tugs are alongside pulling off with equal power.

Fig 10 helps to explain why bow thrusters become useless for turning a vessel as the speed ahead increases.

fig 10

As the thruster (T) tries to swing the vessel towards the jetty, the water resistance on the CLR increases and with such a small lever (d) there is virtually no turning moment.

If we take the same ship and berth it stern to tide ( or approach the jetty stern first) ( Fig 11) then the lever (d) is long and the vessel will swing readily.

fig 11

The “Donkey Effect”

One of the most spectacular examples of applying an external force upon a vessel and getting the opposite result to that expected (donkey-like) is the movement of the vessel when a tug is acting on the support of water resistance force against it (Fig12).

If the tug starts to push on a vessel moving at speed in position M1 it cannot turn the vessel due to the short turning lever. She will drift to starboard but will maintain the heading as in position M2. As soon as the tug stops pushing in position M3, the vessel will start to turn towards the tug. She will continue to turn in that direction as is shown in position M4 until the forces stabilise and the heading stability is restored.

In real time trials with escort tugs this effect has also been observed when the tug stays pushing on the hull. This effect along with those explained in Fig 9 are most important for pilots using tugs on a vessel making way through the water. The higher the speed the more pronounced the effect.

JCB

The following link is to Paul Butusina’s full research paper from which the above article was edited:

ECDIS PART 4

JCB — Wed, 09 Nov 2011 21:20:12 +0000

Location, Location, Location ( With Apologies to Kirsty & Phil)

There is a general misconception that ECDIS is entirely dependent upon the satellite Global Positioning System (GPS) to function but this is not the case since every ECDIS must be capable of being used to plot positions from any source be it visual bearings, radar or even stellar observations. The major problem to date is that on the majority of ECDIS currently on the market the manual option is not obviously available and not always user friendly and I have certainly yet to come across any navigator who has managed to plot a stellar observation on an ECDIS! Mind you it’s becoming increasingly rare to find any navigator who has plotted a position from a sun sight or stellar fix on a paper chart!

GPS has been fully operational with its constellation of 24 satellites for nearly 20 years and the developed world’s infrastructure is now almost totally dependent upon its constant availability so why would anyone bother trying to navigate without it? The answer is that GPS is so vulnerable that in many ways it is pretty miraculous that it works at all!

The signal strength from the satellites has been likened to someone in New York shining a 60 watt light bulb and someone in London having to see it, so it is not surprising that many are deeply concerned about developing back up systems to take over in the event of a GPS outage.

What might cause GPS outage?

There are several potential causes for GPS outage and the two most likely to affect shipboard GPS are sunspot activity and jamming.

Solar activity

The sun is always active in producing electromagnetic emissions which have the potential to disrupt GPS and historically this activity peaks and troughs in 11 year cycles. 2008 was the quiet trough and the activity is currently increasing again with the next peak anticipated in 2013. Alarmist stories of satellites being totally knocked out resulting in Armageddon for the developed world seem to be unfounded but, given the number of articles raising concerns over the effects of solar activity on GPS, it is evident that a quantifiable risk exists. GPS outage problems resulting from increased solar activity were anticipated for June but although I have read some reports of relatively minor positional errors of around 5m it seems that not all satellites are affected equally and I have been unable to find any reports of problems sufficiently severe to render GPS unusable so it is possible that the effects may not be as great as feared. Additionally, advances in receiver technology using the dual frequencies transmitted from the GPS satellites are also reducing the possibility of severe disruption. Only time will tell if this is really a serious threat but if it is then it is probable that the effects on the world’s shipping will be well down the impact list!

GPS jamming

In contrast to the solar activity, the jamming of the satellite signal is a real and very significant problem in that it generally results in the total failure of the GPS receiver. Jamming can be unintentional or deliberate but in either case it is always serious. An example of unintentional jamming occurred in Moss landing, California where a faulty TV aerial amplifier blocked out GPS over the whole harbour area and there are other examples of faulty electrical equipment having a similar effect on GPS.

Currently in the USA there is a major scandal arising out of a start up broadband company called “Lightsquared” which has been granted a license to create a high power cellphone network to bring high speed broadband and mobile phone coverage to remote areas. The problem is that since its initial application for a license there were major concerns that the $14bn network used frequencies too close to the GPS frequencies which would interfere with the GPS signal. The license was granted on the condition that no such interference would be detected. However, the Government body responsible for granting the license (FCC) commissioned a test which revealed that GPS was seriously affected as per the following extract from a report on the trials:

“Last month, the National Executive Committee for National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation & Timing, and the Federal Aviation Administration tested the LightSquared systems and found them disrupting the signal strength to all GPS devices in the test area”.

In some tests, all GPS-based receivers including those used by the U. S. Coast Guard lost their ability to navigate. Some GPS systems used by space agency NASA for scientific use were also seriously impacted due to LightSquared’s service.

So, that would appear to be conclusive, or is it? The FCC hasn’t withdrawn the license ( this is a massive infrastructure project) but seems to be accepting assurances from Lightsquared that the problem can be resolved by technological fixes. The large opposition lobby group, the Coalition To Save Our GPS, has countered that the technical fixes haven’t yet been invented. At the time of writing this article the mess hasn’t been resolved and, as can be imagined, the “blogosphere” is running red hot over the issue. The lawyers are no doubt rubbing their hands with glee as well!

Deliberate GPS jamming

This is where the greatest potential for GPS disruption lies, especially in port and near coastal waters. The use of such jammers is mainly for criminal activity such as car and lorry theft and for avoiding road tolls but they can also be used to provide privacy in an office environment. Currently the laws are being updated all the time but generally such units are illegal to buy in the UK or to use but it isn’t actually against the law to own one! The fact is that these units are readily available and can be purchased for around £25 for an in-car unit with a declared range of 5 – 10 metres and around £100 for a high power lorry unit with a range of around 100 m. However, these ranges are misleading since such units can cause severe disruption over a much wide area.

In the USA in 2009 such a unit wreaked havoc twice per day with.. a two hour disruption to air traffic controllers’ monitors, failure of doctors’ emergency pagers, ATMs refusing to dispense cash, confused maritime traffic management and a cell phone blackout. It took two months to identify the source which was a lorry driver using a cheap jamming unit to avoid tolls on the New Jersey turnpike.

Although there haven’t been any such disruptions recorded so far here in the UK, many are concerned that as the tracking and monitoring of road users increases it is inevitable that such devices will be increasingly used. More serious is the potential use of jammers in a terrorist attack and consequently both the US and British Governments have conducted jamming trials to assess the potential disruption and this has included specific maritime trials.

Here in the UK two major trials have been carried out by the General Lighthouse Authorities (GLA’s) using equipment provided by the Ministry of Defence (MoD)

for the first trial the NLV Pole Star was used to monitor the effects of a directional jammer operating at 1.5watts placed on Flamborough head under strictly controlled conditions. The effects of this trial were dramatic resulting in:

Numerous alarms on the bridge

Erroneous GPS positions

Failure of GPS fed equipment

Erroneous information presented on the vessels ECDIS

Misleading information presented by the vessels AIS

Reduced situational awareness.

GPS track during the jamming trial. All GPS devices failed. Image courtesy of Dr Alan Grant, GLA

One important aspect of this trial was to ascertain the effects of GPS jamming on a back up navigation system known as e-Loran which the GLA’s have been developing during the last decade. As anticipated, the e-loran input was unaffected by the GPS jamming so a further trial involving a wider group, including UK and EU Government representatives, was arranged off the Tyne in December 2009 using the THV Galatea. These trials confirmed the findings of the Pole Star trials with both the on-board GPS and the hand held portable devices carried by the visitors being rendered useless. The on board ECDIS had been set up to receive the e-loran signals and again this system was unaffected with a positional accuracy of within 9 metres being achieved throughout the trial.

The e-LORAN track during the jamming trial. Image courtesy of Dr Alan Grant GLA

E-LORAN

All of you will be familiar with the Long Range Navigation (LORAN) system that was developed in the USA during WW2 based on the British GEE radio navigation principle. Using long wave transmitters LORAN had a range of around 1200 miles but whilst useful in open ocean it was never sufficiently accurate for reliable position fixing in coastal waters. The arrival of satellite navigation in the 1980’s saw a gradual decline in LORAN usage and the arrival of GPS in the 1990’s basically rendered it, along with the Decca navigation system, obsolete. The Decca system was shut down in 2000 but the LORAN chains were maintained.

Recognising the importance of a totally independent back up for GPS, work was undertaken to make LORAN sufficiently accurate to provide a back up for GPS and the result was an Enhanced LORAN or e-Loran. In the UK the importance of a system independent of GPS was recognised by the Government and in 2007 the DfT awarded the GLA’s a 15 year contract to provide and maintain e-LORAN. Other EU countries along with Russia and a few Far East countries have also agreed to maintain funding and there are currently 16 transmitters with coverage being particularly comprehensive in the seas around Europe and the Mediterranean.

In contrast to the UK & Europe, in the USA, somewhat surprisingly, the arguments in favour of e-LORAN have been rejected and in 2010 the USA chains were shut down and are being dismantled, all to save just $20m per annum! The US Defence Department’s solution to the problem of jamming is apparently to create a smartphone “app” that will detect GPS jammers which the public will be asked to download and leave running. It is anticipated that this will create a high density network to quickly identify the jammers! I did check to see if the article reporting this was dated 1st April because surely if GPS is jammed a smartphone won’t work?

Although the UK and Europe have been supporting e-LORAN, so far there aren’t many combined GPS/ eLORAN receivers available and so far as I am aware no ECDIS manufacturer is offering e-LORAN as part of their installation.

ECDIS & Radar alignment

In part 3 ( issue 302), I suggested that, where a radar overlay is incorporated into ECDIS it should be perfectly feasible in the event of the failure of GPS input for an “intelligent” ECDIS to recognise a coastline’s features and align the ENC to the radar input. Although I am not aware of any systems that can perform this automatically, it has been pointed out to me that manual alignment of the ECDIS to a navigational feature such as that provided by radar overlay is actually a requirement contained within the ECDIS performance standards and I understand that at least one manufacturer is working on automating this function.

Back to the plot!

As previously mentioned, all ECDIS can be used for plotting bearings taken visually or from radar but there are three major problems associated with this.

Firstly, the vast range of ECDIS operating systems means that there isn’t a standardised procedure for manual plotting so instead of a simple button on the screen marked “manual plotting” that would bring up a set of standardised and familiar plotting tools, the facility is generally hidden in a sub menu and even once found may not be logical to use. The good news though is that once located and understood, manual plotting on an ECDIS is far quicker than on a paper chart. Taking the manual plotting facility further, ECDIS would provide an ideal platform for including different chartwork tools such as a vertical sextant angle. The ECDIS database knows the height of all objects and the height of tide at the time of the observation. The navigator takes the vertical sextant angle, enters it in and “click” a range circle appears around the object and an ECDIS could also easily combine that with the echo sounding to highlight an area of position probability. Simple, it’s what computers can do!

The small screen size means that the navigator may have to scroll and zoom the display to find the land or sea marks being used for the position fix, a factor that I found particularly frustrating when I did the ECDIS course. Zoom out and the names, or even the marks themselves might disappear, zoom in and you have to hunt around to find them. The good news here is that large chart displays are gradually appearing on the market although the bad news is that many ECDIS only vessels have dispensed with the chart room so there’s now nowhere to locate a large horizontal display!

Conrac’s digital chart table

The third and probably most crucial factor is mindset and experience. Most of the traditional chartwork skills have been lost even with paper charts since the advent of GPS with many of the latest generation of navigators having got into the bad habit of just plotting the latitude & longitude from the GPS display onto the chart. ECDIS compounds this problem by showing a reassuring dot where the ship is and when the GPS signal is lost the ship will continue to update its position in Dead Reckoning (DR) mode and there is a recognised problem of a reluctance by some navigators to accept that this may not be where the ship actually is! This factor is compounded by the failure of the alarm systems on ECDIS to seriously alert the navigator that the GPS input has failed. The GPS failure alarm sounds the same as any other ECDIS alerts so it is very easy for a navigator to merely accept the alarm and take no further action. What I believe is required is a large red warning to be placed on the screen stating that the GPS has been lost and that the ECDIS is operating in DR mode which, even when acknowledged will reappear on the screen at regular intervals. Another alert could be set to appear if no manual position has been input at intervals determined by whether the vessel is in open or coastal waters or even better, have the magic ship position circle replaced by a flashing red “lost position” symbol similar to the lost target function on the radar.

Conclusion

The myth that if GPS fails the ECDIS becomes unusable has largely grown out of the manufacturers’ concentrating on GPS as the input and failing to provide the navigator with simple, easily accessible alternative positioning options However, with a back up such as e-LORAN, the potential need to for resorting to manual plotting will be reduced and further non GPS positional accuracy could be achieved by including the increasingly available Inertial Navigation Systems into ECDIS.

How missiles do it!!

Whilst researching this article I came across the following explanation of missile guidance from the US Airforce which I couldn’t resist including!

The missile knows where it is at all times. It knows this because it knows where it isn’t. By subtracting where it is from where it isn’t, or where it isn’t from where it is), it obtains a deviation. The guidance subsystem uses deviations to generate corrective commands to drive the missile from a position where it is to a position where it isn’t, and arriving at a position where it wasn’t, it now is. Consequently, the position where it is, is now the position that it wasn’t, and it follows that the position that it was, is now the position that it isn’t.

In the event that the position that it is in is not the position that it wasn’t, the system has acquired a variation, the variation being the difference between where the missile is, and where it wasn’t. If variation is considered to be a significant factor, it too may be corrected. However, the missile must also know where it was.

The missile guidance computer scenario works as follows. Because a variation has modified some of the information the missile has obtained, it is not sure just where it is. However, it is sure where it isn’t, within reason, and it knows where it was. It now subtracts where it should be from where it wasn’t, or vice-versa, and by differentiating this from the algebraic sum of where it shouldn’t be, and where it was, it is able to obtain the deviation and its variation, which is called error.

Hmm! I wonder what Captain Cook would have made of that? JCB

ECDIS Part 3 : Problems!!

JCB — Thu, 21 Oct 2010 13:45:25 +0000

For Sale: One careful owner!! Photo: JCB

In part 2 I mentioned that one of the key problems of ECDIS was the lack of training, especially type specific training. I have now piloted around 20 vessels which are navigating solely on ECDIS with no paper charts and only on four of these have I found all officers fully conversant with the functions and confident that they could safely navigate their vessel without the familiar paper chart as a back up. Somewhat unsurprisingly these four vessels were Scandinavian tankers from the top companies and all the officers had attended type specific courses for their particular ECDIS in addition to the generic ECDIS course offered by the training colleges. However, in contrast to these examples of “best practice”, on five of these vessels there was only one officer who understood the ECDIS and its functions and on all of these this was the second officer and he alone seemed to be totally responsible for planning the voyage and plotting the route on the ECDIS. So far as I could ascertain, none of the officers, including the 2nd Officer, on these ships had received any type specific training but had been expected to glean the full operating functions of their particular ECDIS from the manufacturer’s manual. The manuals from all the manufacturers seem to run to 500 pages or more so it’s hardly surprising that responsibility for wading through it and getting to grips with the functions is delegated to the 2nd Mate who is officer traditionally responsible for chartwork and navigation. Of the remainder of the vessels Admittedly 20 ships is a very small sample and my data collection methodology probably wouldn’t stand up to scrutiny but as a very rough indicator it would suggest that 20% of vessels have good understanding and good procedures in place, 60% have a reasonable working knowledge but worryingly around 20% are at high risk of being involved in a navigational incident either as a result of ignorance of the ECDIS features of display modes or as a result of single person error by the navigating officer in planning the passage. This may seem an alarming statement but the dangers are real.

When is a chart not a chart?

Navigation by use of ECDIS requires a totally new thought process which expects navigators to forget the traditional paper chart and chartwork practice. This revolutionary change to the way ships are navigated has been neatly summarised by Christian Hempstead, Associate Professor at U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, who states that “ECDIS-based navigation requires the mental integration of all the displayed digital and graphical information with the visual scene and with the projected motion of the vessel and with the surrounding situation as it unfolds”.

Photo JCB

The vector chart is a highly complex three dimensional interactive chart which requires not only detailed knowledge of the vector chart concept but also detailed knowledge of how to access essential functions, many of which may be hidden away in menus and sub menus. This menu based system for hiding information is just one of the many operational minefields associated with ECDIS because, as with radar, the information displayed has not been “user led” but decided by the whims of the multifarious manufacturers! This manufacturer led development of ECDIS has in effect created one of the most serious problems with ECDIS because of the conflict it causes with the chart familiarity contained within the STCW95 requirements. There have been concerns in some quarters that whilst the carriage of ECDIS is due to become mandatory between 2012 and 2018 there is currently no requirement for officers to be trained since the IMO model course has yet to be incorporated into the STCW requirements. However STCW 95 is quite specific in that it states that a navigating officer must possess “a thorough knowledge of and ability to use navigational charts and publications…” He must show “…..evidence of skills and ability to prepare for and conduct a passage, including interpretation and applying information from charts”. Therefore If ECDIS is used in place of a paper chart, the navigator must demonstrate the same degree of knowledge and competency concerning the use of ECDIS as with a conventional chart. I have recently piloted a Finish Ro-Ro vessel fitted with ECDIS and all the officers had been on a 4 day course for the model fitted to their company’s fleet of vessels. This course was in addition to the 5 day generic ECDIS course that they had already attended but would not be valid if they transferred to a vessel fitted with a different system. Whatever happens, all this reveals a fundamental weakness in the ECDIS concept whereby although the official Electronic Navigation Chart (ENC) displayed by the ECDIS can only be produced and updated by authorised hydrographic offices to very strict performance standards, the way in which this official chart data is accessed for use has been left to the manufacturers! As to how officers would be trained to use the system wasn’t given much consideration thus leaving the hapless mariner to muddle along the best he can!

Different ECDIS = Different Screen & Menus! Photos: JCB

With so many different manufacturers and so many different operating systems how is the shipping industry going to cope? Just getting officers through the generic course is going to be a serious challenge within the time frame but getting the type specific training as well is a potential quagmire! In order to clarify the training requirements for ECDIS a revision to the STCW 95 was adopted by the IMO at the Manila conference in June this year which will come into force on 1st January 2012. So, are we going to see ships delayed because no officer has had the appropriate type training? I very much doubt it because, the way I interpret the amendment, the IMO requirements stop short of actually making the ship owner responsible for ensuring that their watchkeepers are fully type specific trained! Indeed the wording contained within the Manila amendment seems to pass the ultimate responsibility onto the seafarer! The responsibilities of companies is contained in section B-1/14 ;

1. Companies should provide ship-specific introductory programmes aimed at assisting newly employed seafarers to familiarize themselves with all procedures and equipment relating to their areas of responsibility It seems that its the interpretation of “introductory programmes” that’s important here! This could be merely to ensure that training manuals are put on board since the same B-1/14 also states under “crew members” that:

4.“Immediately upon arriving on board for the first time, each seafarer has the responsibility to become acquainted with the ship’s working environment, particularly with respect to new or unfamiliar equipment, procedures or arrangements.

5 Seafarers who do not promptly attain the level of familiarity required for performing their duties have the obligation to bring this fact to the attention of their supervisor …. and to identify any equipment, procedure or arrangement which remains unfamiliar”.

Note that for companies the requirement is that they “should provide” but the seafarer “has responsibility”. Could this mean that if a company ensures that appropriate instruction manuals are placed on board but the new crew member fails to read / understand them and then fails to notify anyone that he hasn’t then he is at fault rather than the company? Perhaps I’m just getting cynical in my old age!

MV “CFL Performer”

Photo: MAIB

So, is all this ECDIS training necessary or are the concerns just alarmist exaggerations? The answer is provided by the MAIB who have already investigated several ECDIS related groundings of which the most revealing is the grounding of the CFL Performer. This vessel is a general cargo ship built in 2007 fitted with an approved ECDIS and therefore doesn’t carry any paper charts. In April 2008 the ship was carrying 6020 tonnes of Bauxite from Paramaribo to the Humber and because the Master was concerned about arriving in time for the tide the route was amended on the ECDIS to take a short cut through the Haisborough Sands to the pilot boarding ground. However, an error was made whereby the course was set to pass over a sand bank rather than in the adjacent channel and the vessel duly went aground. It was daylight at the time with good weather. Fortunately, the Master was able to refloat the vessel using the engines and there was minimal damage and no pollution.

The subsequent investigation by the MAIB highlighted several failings, all directly attributable to unfamiliarity with the ECDIS on board. Firstly, it is almost certain that had the passage been amended by re-drawing the courses on a paper chart, the course across the shoal would have been immediately evident but this initial error was compounded by the 2nd Mate who was on watch at the time. Quoting from the report, shortly before the grounding, “the master, who was in his cabin, felt a change in the vessel’s vibrations. He called the second officer and instructed him to check the depth of water. The second officer looked at the ECDIS display and reported to the master that there was no cause for concern. The depth sounder was not switched on”. Since he didn’t put the echo sounder on it seems that the 2nd Mate glanced at the ECDIS and seeing that the vessel was on track was satisfied that no danger existed! Whilst alongside at Grimsby the vessel was detained due to deficiencies by Port State control and one of the deficiencies was that the ship’s officers weren’t trained in the use of ECDIS and one of the non conformities found during an ISM audit of the vessel by Lloyd’s was the navigating officers’ lack of familiarity with, and incorrect use of, the ECDIS system on board.

When the vessel had been commissioned, the owners had ensured that the Captain and 1st Mate received type specific training but this wasn’t provided for officers who subsequently joined the ship and the MAIB found the following:

Of the officers on board at the time of the grounding, neither the chief officer nor the second officer was trained in the operation of ECDIS, but both had used such equipment on previous ships. The master had no previous experience or training on ECDIS or any other form of electronic navigation system. None of the officers were aware of the significance of the safety contour, the safety depth, and the shallow and deep contours, and did not know how to establish a watch vector ahead of the vessel, or its significance. They also did not know how to use the ‘check page’ to ensure that all course lines and associated channel limits were clear of navigational dangers. With reference to type specific training, the report makes the following observation:

The chief and second officers on board CFL Performer had used an ECDIS on previous ships. However, the factors listed in Paragraph 2.2 indicate that neither had an acceptable working knowledge of the operation of the Furuno FEA-2107. Although ECDIS’ must meet the specific performance standards set by the IMO, manufacturers inevitably vary aspects of equipment operation in order to remain commercially competitive. This has led to differences between systems in terms of menus, terminology and equipment interface. Such differences can be marked and, although operations manuals are provided, these are not always easily understood. A mariner’s proficiency in the use of a particular system is therefore undoubtedly best served by the provision of equipment-specific training, regardless of any previous training and experience.

To me that statement seems to confirm that the commercial interests of the manufacturers rather than the needs of the mariner have been allowed to dictate ECDIS development! The other aspect of ECDIS use highlighted in this report is the change in mental attitude of a watchkeeper using ECDIS and the report makes the following observation with respect to this:

“…the OOW relied on ECDIS alarms to warn when the vessel was approaching an alteration of course or was more than 185m off the intended track. In effect, the monitoring of the vessel’s progress was undertaken by the ECDIS, while the OOW spent much of his watch preparing for forthcoming audits and passage planning. The second officer presumed that the vessel would be safe providing she remained within the channel. Consequently, he paid little attention to where the vessel was heading, and did not:

-Investigate the significance of the South Haisbro’ cardinal mark and the Mid Haisbro’ starboard conical buoy, which the vessel passed at a distance of about 1 mile;

-Check the new course before altering

-See the eddies or disturbed water…

-Ensure that the echo sounder was switched on, particularly when the master raised concern regarding the depth of water.

Such actions are fundamental to the duties of an OOW, and would have undoubtedly helped to identify the shallows ahead of the vessel in sufficient time for successful avoiding action to be taken. ECDIS provides a potentially invaluable asset to passage planning. However, there is a danger that many bridge watchkeepers will increasingly trust what is displayed without question. As this case demonstrates, such trust can be misplaced. The need for bridge watchkeepers to remain vigilant and continuously monitor a vessel’s position in relation to navigational hazards remains valid, regardless of the electronic aids available.

Feedback from deep sea pilots and concerned masters suggests that such practices are alarmingly commonplace amongst the younger officers!

112th Annual Conference: Swansea 13th -14th May

JCB — Thu, 21 Oct 2010 13:20:08 +0000

The 2010 conference was organised by S E Wales pilot, Gordon Harries and Milford Haven pilot John Pearn at the Village Hotel, Swansea which was attended by 44 delegates representing 22 districts. As usual with the two day conferences, the conference sessions were enlightened by an evening dinner / dance where a raffle was held in support of the Marine Society & Sea Cadets which raised £650.

The conference session was formally opened by UKMPA President, Lord Tony Berkeley.

Chairman’s Report: Joe Wilson (Tees)

Joe explained how frustrating and non productive the last year had been as a result of all the key personnel within the DfT, MCA and Port Skills & Safety having left. Progress on National Occupational Standards (NOS) and pilot qualifications had remained stalled but the UKMPA continued working on this issue PNPF: Joe explained the history of the PNPF to which every UK pilot had originally been a member and in 1972 there had been 1318 active members with 715 pensioners but the 1987 Pilotage Act had resulted in new pilots tending to join their port’s scheme and consequently the current membership stood at 181 actives with 1340 pensioners. Despite the low numbers, PNPF pilot trustees were still elected by the UKMPA and the UKMPA also dealt with general pension enquiries from non PNPF members and for this reason Joe felt that it was important that Pensions remained as part of the conference proceedings.

Membership: The current membership is 459. Joe estimated that there were probably around 200 pilots working in the UK who weren’t members and this was an area that the UKMPA was currently addressing. UNITE, continued to offer an excellent service and the Regional Officer (RO) should be the first point of contact for employment issues. Joe advised that all members should establish contact with their RO. Recent months had seen changes within the UKMPA Section Committee (SC) who continue to undertake an enormous workload on behalf of members. SC are all volunteers and much of the work isn’t evident to the majority of members but the work is vital to protect every pilot’s interests .

Insurances: Rob Watt ( Forth)

With Simon Campbell having been unable to attend conference, Rob, who has taken over as Treasurer from John Pretswell, gave the insurance presentation. Rob detailed the various policies and their benefit to members. In particular Rob explained that the compulsory Royal & Sun Alliance (RSA) legal protection policy for members was a unique policy tailor-made for pilots which offered unparalleled protection for UK pilots. Having detailed the aspects of the cover, Rob warned delegates that as a result of some cases currently being processed, the current highest cover of £1m may need to be revised upwards.

With respect to the DAS policy, Rob explained that this didn’t just cover pilots when piloting but also other members of their family and provided examples of this. At less than £15 per annum this policy is extremely good value. Rob also detailed the benefits of the optional accident insurance policy available. This wasn’t restricted to accidents whilst piloting and members could opt in or out at any time. Several pilots had benefitted from this policy Rob concluded by explaining that this presentation had been given to the EMPA conference and had resulted in many requests for further details since it represented a level of cover and protection which was considered to be “Gold Plated” by European standards.

Q&A

This topic generated considerable debate regarding the policies and cover provided. A question was raised regarding what might happen if the legal defence costs exceeded a member’s level of cover. This was uncertain but historically, in serious cases, UNITE had agreed to underwrite the continuation of the case. With respect to the legal protection of a pilot by a CHA which some pilots considered provided sufficient cover, a legal opinion had been provided to London that the Cavendish case had effectively removed any legal protection that a CHA might provide whilst a pilot was on board piloting because he was legally no longer employed by the CHA and therefore even if a CHA wished to represent a pilot they were legally unable to do so. Therefore any pilot who didn’t have personal insurance was potentially dangerously exposed to possible personal ruin. The Cavendish ruling has never been challenged and it was pointed out that in the case of the Sea Empress, it was the CHA themselves that took legal action against the pilot. There were currently three major cases being handled by the RSA insurance, one of which looked as if it would exceed the £1m cover. Another case which had been successful involved a pilot who had had his authorisation downgraded by his CHA. The policy had paid the difference to restore his salary.

A resolution from Harwich proposed that insurance cover should not be a compulsory requirement for UKMPA membership and that clause 4(d) should be deleted. In the subsequent debate, no delegates spoke in support of the resolution. The reason for the insurance cover being compulsory is in order to be able to obtain group cover at a reasonable rate for members. Alistair Gibson (Forth) explained that whilst he could understand the reasoning behind the resolution, historically, the group insurance policy had been introduced as a result of members having incidents and then turning to the UKMPA / T&G for legal assistance which had been a drain on the Association’s finances. A formal ballot was held over the resolution which resulted in

3 votes in favour, and 44 Against. The resolution was therefore defeated

Full details of the insurance policies are avaialable on the UKMPA website in the members’ area

MCA & DfT Peter Wylie (Tees)

The MCA Brief includes: the Port Marine Safety Code Steering Group (PMSCSG), the UK Safety of Navigation (UKSON) meetings, The VTS steering group, and work towards a pilots Certificate of Competence with Port Skills and

Safety (PSS). Unfortunately the key persons with whom the UKMPA had been dealing in these groups have moved on or been replaced, so much of the hard work put in over the years is having to be redone.

UKSON: This meeting was attended with a deep sea pilot as traffic schemes and coastal problems were on the agenda. Recent work had included updating IMO resolution A486 on the use of qualified North Sea Pilots and getting a dedicated anchorage for Aberdeen approved.

ECDIS: Mandatory carriage of ECDIS starts in 2012 and the MCA are getting increasingly concerned regarding the safety implications of poor training.

VTS: The MCA have expressed concern over the closing down of the Severn Estuary Coastal VTS by ABP but are powerless to insist on continuation.

IALA: Guidelines on the provision of Navigational Assistance by VTS have been published and provide a well written set of advice. (Electronic copies are available from Peter on

request).

PSS: The latest news is that recruitment is underway and that work towards pilotage Certificates of Competency is still high on the agenda. They are aware that our Technical and Training committee have all necessary documentation

ready.

PMSC: A refreshed code was launched this year It is more compact and user friendly than the original and is available on the DfT Website.

MAIB: The report on the Vallermosa has caused much debate. In particular the following paragraph caused concern that the MAIB considered pilots to be a “weak link” in the safety chain:

“ Evidence from this, and previous accidents, demonstrates the potential for Serious accidents to occur once pilots become the weak link in the safety Chain. “ [2.6.1]

Peter raised this at the last PMSCSG meeting and the “weak link” interpretation was completely refuted by all members and Peter provided the following extract from the minutes which clarify the MAIB statement:

• It was felt that manning levels were not a significant cause of this incident; rather, it was the crew’s lack of attention and willingness to transfer vessel safety to the pilot.

• With pilots being a single point of expertise, a breakdown could allow them to become a weak link in the safety chain.

• It was not easy for a pilot to decide if the crew are sufficiently engaged or not.

Peter considered this to be a positive and reassuring clarification. The other outcome of this incident is that as a result of the recommendations within the MAIB report, the MCA are discussing safe manning with the MAIB and the UKMPA are currently working with the UK Major Ports Group and the British Ports Association on the pilot / bridge team issues.

Q&A

A question was asked regarding pilotage qualifications and Peter explained PSS had confirmed that a pilotage qualification was still on the agenda and that they were pleased that the UKMPA were prepared to input. PSS had also now accepted that a “Foundation Degree” was insufficient as a pilotage qualification.

Passage planning was also raised and in the subsequent discussion it was revealed that different ports had vastly differing interpretation of the requirements for both ship and pilot plans. Concerns were raised that the failure of the MCA to have a coherent inspection and regulatory system in place, coupled with the requirement for pilots to report any defects, resulted in the onus being placed on pilots to police ship board navigational safety practices.

EMPA: Peter Wylie (Tees)

Romania: Here competition is the norm and at the EMPA conference the Romanian representative had explained how, despite being government funded, pilotage was controlled by several different companies supplying pilots of varying qualifications and competence who were authorised for all ports. The major shipping companies controlled the contracts and attempts to form a united group had resulted in the suspension of pilots.

Holland: Peter was pleased to report that plans to introduce competition had been abandoned.

CHIRP Don Cockrill (London)

Don is the UKMPA representative and attends the quarterly meetings of this Government sponsored investigation body.. Although most of CHIRP’s investigations involve the leisure sector, it plays a very important role in navigation safety. Unfortunately, the budget is under threat Don referred delegates to his written report which detailed this funding crisis.

IMPA: Don Cockrill (London)

Currently IMPA had concerns regarding IALA who had been issuing documentation and stating policies outside the established IMO forum In particular IMPA were closely monitoring the e-navigation agenda and would be producing a common “position” statement on e-navigation for all pilots to refer to if asked what pilots’ opinions were. IMPA were also working with EMPA on the Romanian situation

Nick Cutmore (IMPA General Secretary)

Nick detailed the new pilot ladder proposals that were being debated by the IMO Maritime Safety Committee These proposals, largely drafted by IMPA were complete and ready for inclusion in SOLAS regulations. IMPA has built a good working relationship with Intertanko who were supportive of the IMPA proposals and had appreciated IMPA’s input into securing accommodation ladders by means other than welded points.

e-Navigation, The agenda has departed from the original ship / shore concept and was rapidly expanding to include freight logistics and port infrastructure projects. Such expansion of the agenda indicated that this would be a very long term project! With respect to the concerns with IALA, this stemmed from IALA establishing a “Pilotage Advisory Forum” (PAF). IMPA had attended the early meetings but had been dismayed by the ignorance of the members regarding pilotage issues and had therefore withdrawn from the Forum. Recently the IALA PAF had produced a paper for presentation to IMO which contained many elements not endorsed by IMPA. Consequently IMPA had attended the IALA conference in Cape Town and following raising their concerns at a private meeting, IMPA had reinforced their “position” that IALA had no authority to be drafting papers on pilotage issues by issuing a formal letter to IALA. This issue was on-going but Nick hoped to be able to release details to members in the near future.

LEGAL: Paul Kirchner,(Executive Director & General Counsel, American Pilots’ Association (APA))

The UKMPA had been very fortunate in that Paul had agreed to address the conference. Having been intimately involved in the Cosco Busan case he was in a unique position to detail the pilotage aspects of the case. Paul opened by stating that whilst this case had encompassed every aspect of pilotage, he didn’t believe that it had fundamentally changed US pilotage law which is different to that in the UK. What had changed was that this had been the first case involving a criminal prosecution of a pilot for “unintentional conduct”. This wasn’t for drugs or alcohol or a deliberate act but for negligence and strict liability (liability without fault). The prosecution had been brought under the Migratory Birds Act which dated from 1912 and made it a criminal offence to kill certain listed birds. Much of this case had been a result of its location in a very environmentally aware area and much time had been spent dealing with local and national politicians. Fortunately, the APA had been able to quash the draconian proposals that had originally been tabled and only minor local legislative changes had actually occurred as a result of this incident. These had been supported by APA as positive and the main changes had been as a result of “lessons learned” from the incident. Paul explained the unique American system of State & Federal pilot licences and also addressed the issue of a pilot as an “advisor”. APA agreed that the term failed to correctly identify the role of a pilot.

The issue of Portable Pilotage Units (PPU) had been examined and San Francisco was one of a minority ports where their local Association didn’t have a carriage policy on this and at that time only around 40% of pilots used them. John Cota was one who didn’t. The US Coast Guard considered that non carriage of a PPU by John Cota might be considered negligent and, in contrast to previous liability concerns, all Bay pilots now carry PPU’s. Although APA support PPU’s they are against establishing a national policy and left it up to the individual ports & pilots to decide their PPU type and carriage policy.

The pilots’ use of the ships’ navigational equipment had also been examined by the court and it had been unfortunate that it had been reported that pilots needn’t know how to use on board navigational equipment because that was the watchkeeper’s role. US pilots has for many years been arguing the contrary. Other areas examined included fog procedures, the pilot’s medical history and drug and alcohol policies. The National Transport Safety Bureau’s (NTSB) investigation into the case concluded that the cause was a loss of situational awareness coupled with BRM failure from the bridge team and the recommendations made regarding the APA had all been complied with and the main one of these was ensuring a comprehensive Pilot / Master exchange. It is standard practice for APA to be involved in any investigation involving pilots but their role is as an expert witness rather than as defence council and so this is usually undertaken by a recently retired pilot. The pilot representative is not allowed to be an attorney and proceedings are strictly confidential until the NTSB release their report. Due to a general lack of experience and knowledge of pilotage issues, such participation was always beneficial to pilotage in general and the Cosco investigation findings would have been totally inaccurate had pilots not been involved. The case was now used as a training example on MRM courses with the emphasis on presenting the facts as a discussion topic without the conclusions and recommendations. With respect to the criminal charges there were two charges of “unintentional conduct”. One was breaching the US Clean Waters Act resulting from negligently discharging a pollutant into the waterway and the other was the aforementioned Migratory Birds Act. The prosecutors were aware that they were setting a precedent by criminalising the civil law case of “unintentional conduct” so two further charges relating to making false statements on his health form were introduced to justify the criminal charge. A plea bargain resulting from pleading guilty to the Clean Water and Birds Acts resulted in a recommendation of 2 – 10 months imprisonment. Although the judge gave the maximum jail sentence, in recognition of the civil unintentional aspects, she removed the fine and reduced the community service recommendations.

So why the criminalisation in this case? It would appear that John Cota was unlucky in that this spill happened in a very environmentally aware area with a very active and aggressive media which provided the prosecutors with an incentive to set a legal precedent and find an individual criminally liable for pollution. However, since the 1990’s legislation had existed in the US for such incidents to be criminalised but although the Cosco Busan incident did meet the criteria for a criminal prosecution to be brought, subsequent legal opinion was that prosecutors were generally unlikely to bring criminal charges against pilots for unintentional conduct Regarding general issues of concern to pilots, Paul offered advice that legally, the most important part was the Master/pilot exchange and that pilots should conclude every exchange by asking the Master if he had any questions and supplementing this by reminding him to ask if he had any questions during the passage. With respect to proceeding in fog, pilots should err on the side of caution and the decision should be jointly made with the Master and if either was uncertain then the ship shouldn’t move.

Voyage Data Recorders (VDR): are increasingly being installed on vessels and in the USA the NTSB take the position that if a conversation isn’t on the VDR then it never took place!

AIS is another technology that prosecutors believe provides precise information. APA had advised both the USCG and the NTSB that AIS information was too unreliable to be used as admissible evidence in any investigation. Despite this there were an increasing number of private companies providing AIS information to attorneys but there were also companies providing expert witnesses to refute AIS evidence. With respect to action to be taken by a pilot after an accident the advice is get a lawyer! In the US a pilot has the right to have an attorney and the attorney must establish whether a criminal prosecution may result. This is probable in cases of pollution or where there has been loss of life.

Insurance: US pilots don’t generally need liability insurance but have insurance to cover defence to protect their licence and some districts self insure by holding a fund to cover this. However US pilots are looking at taking out cover for legal defence costs and fines resulting from a pollution incident. Another important part of any response in the US is to hire a PR firm. A good PR company can ask appropriate questions to divert the press and also handle the press with respect to providing statements and organising interviews etc. Most pilot groups also have one or more pilots specially trained to draft statements and give interviews.

CRIMINALISATION Francois Laffoucriere (Le Havre)

In addition to Paul Kirchner the UKMPA were also fortunate that Le Havre pilot and lawyer Francois Laffoucriere had agreed to address the conference on criminalisation of seafarers in general and pilots in particular. Francois stated that the criminalisation of seafarers was causing great concern in legal centres as well as the IMO and he believed that the trend would stifle seafaring as a career and do nothing to enhance maritime safety. Why was this happening? It was basically the interpretation of “negligence” and increasingly around the world, even in accidents resulting from “force majeure”, prosecutors were pressing for criminal charges to be brought. Francois quoted the case of the acific Adventure which had been caught in a typhoon off the Australian coast which had resulted in 31 containers being lost overboard where they struck the hull and punctured the fuel oil tanks causing pollution. The Captain had been arrested and charged with causing pollution and was facing a fine of $350,000 if found guilty. It was considered likely that this charge would be successful. The difference between civil liability and criminal liability was that civil was to repair damage and criminal was to punish and deter.

Criminal liability: There are two elements required to prove criminal liability: A breach of the law (actus Rea) and the will to break the law (mens rea). Mens rea exists if there is Intent, negligence or recklessness. Recklessness exists if foresight of the consequence is evident but with negligence there cannot be foresight so prosecuting won’t act as a deterrent. Pollution is a breach of the law under MARPOL but only two criteria for mens rea are stated: Intent & recklessness. Intent is straightforward since a deliberate act of pollution is a criminal offence but recklessness is difficult to prove so prosecutors were using negligence to prove recklessness. Despite this legal necessity of proof of criminality, Francois gave examples where Masters & pilots had been found guilty even though such proof had been absent. Popular & media pressure, resulting from intolerance of pollution, has led to a blame culture which requires a scapegoat in the hope that it would act as a deterrent and eliminate rogue operators! However in no cases of pollution involving seafarers had there ever been any “intent” so such prosecutions were meaningless. The IMO & International Labour Organisation had introduced resolutions on the fair treatment of seafarers and other legislation covered human rights and fair trials but in many cases these were being overturned by prosecutors. In Europe the situation was even more serious in that an EU Directive, which was ratified in 2009, overturns MARPOL legislation and gives the EU Commissioners powers to overrule States for any breaches of environmental law and impose criminal sanctions. Such criminalisation will never be a deterrent for accidental pollution and the maritime industry is concerned that this legislation will be a serious deterrent to anyone taking up a seagoing career. However insurance can be obtained for legal defence and this is now especially essential for all pilots. With respect to action to be taken by pilots following any incident, the officers’ union Nautilus had produced guidelines for officers and these were also useful for pilots: The most important of these is that you have the right to remain silent and should do so until legal representation is present. In conclusion Francois believed that no pilot could afford to be without legal defence insurance. Stating that “YOUR LEGAL DEFENCE INSURANCE IS YOUR LIFEBOAT!”

In the subsequent discussions the concepts of “negligence” and “recklessness” were explored which confirmed that prosecutors were analysing these words to justify criminal charges. All present fully agreed that no pilot could afford to be without personal legal cover regardless of employment status.

Technical &Training Committee (T&TC) Brian Wilson (Belfast)

Personnel changes: Roger Francis has retired and has been replaced by Kevin Vallance as Deep Sea representative.

Jonathan Mills has replaced Paul Wibberley as Deputy Chairman.

Brian thanked both Roger and Paul for their dedication to the committee.

During the last year the T&TC had met once with the second meeting being set to coincide with the 2010 SeaWorks Exhibition. Brian had attended the IMO Nav 55 as part of the UK government team to oversee the UK’s interests in pilot transfer arrangements and the overhauling of SOLAS V/23 with the drafting of a new resolution to replace A889. The steering group comprised of 22 countries and within that and coordinated by IMPA, were some 12 pilots. Brian paid credit to Nick Cutmore and Mike Watson whose expertise had ensured the successful adoption of the proposed pilot ladder regulations. Pilots should report any substandard ladders and refuse to board if in any doubt and if possible take photos and forward them to Brian. The success of the pilot ladder proposals had confirmed the value of UK pilots being part of IMPA and working together as an international body.

Foundation degrees: Hopefully this proposal had died a death but the T&TC, will continue to strive to ensure that any pilotage qualification will reflect the value of our work.

The pilot boat survey update had been completed by Dave Roberts and given to EMPA for their data base.

Kevin Vallance has worked extremely hard during his first year within the committees of the UKSON, Dover Straights Working Sroup, Sunk / Bristol Channel Working Group. In addition, Kevin had taken on the E-navigation brief and is working with EMPA to support an IMPA paper on E-Nav at IMO Nav 56 this summer.

Revalidation of Masters and other STCW qualifications: After 2012, pilots will have to have attended a generic ECDIS course and the committee are working on resolving the type specific requirement issue for pilots.

Azipilot – Gareth Rees and Nigel Allen have been busy all year on the project.

Personal Locator beacons (PLB’s): Prices of these are now under £250 and having undertaken a detailed survey, Brian personally approved the Sea Marshall 121.5 MHz devices which are salt water activated, intrinsically safe, have a homing rage of about 30 miles and all aircraft and rescue organizations can receive the signals. Despite the apparent lack of progress on some issues, behind the scenes the T&TC was proving effective and IMPA General Secretary Nick Cutmore confirmed that the UKMPA T&TC had gained recognition throughout the pilotage world as a highly professional and respected body.

The Pilot Qualification! Brian expressed his frustration at the fact that despite over 10 years of hard work, pilots still had no qualification because a pilot’s authorisation is not a qualification but something totally in the control of a CHA which can be removed at any time by them as had happened on the Humber and the Clyde. Generally, the IMO required pilots to have a qualification and it was in the whole Industry’s interests to have well qualified pilots. Despite this, the UK ports had stalled any attempts to implement a qualification, the DfT and MCA seemed powerless and so the status quo was unlikely to change.

The solution? Brian proposed that Continual Professional Development (CPD) could provide pilots with valuable protection by setting standards for re-validation and the same criteria could also be used for PEC holders. CPD was a recognised concept and the elements for pilots were already in place and widely used throughout the world. Brian then detailed how the UKMPA could establish a grading criteria endorsed by the Nautical Institute and / or the nautical colleges whereby such a system could be incorporated into the dormant National Occupational Standards (NOS) thus making it easy for the procedures to be adopted by the MCA / DfT. Since such procedures were fully recognised as a requirement it would be difficult for the ports’ lobbyists to resist them! Having created the framework to introduce such a system, Brian concluded by explaining to the delegates that it was now up to the membership as to how this proposal was progressed.

During the subsequent discussion it was questioned as to how CPD could provide the protection stated? It was explained that the major objection of the ports over the years had been the costs of a formal pilot qualification but CPD built on a candidate’s existing STCW qualification rather than requiring a new qualification so would be at no cost to the port. What CPD would achieve was that at the end of a pilot’s training period he would be examined / authorised as per the NOS criteria for his particular port and thus be issued with a formal qualification as a pilot. On-going training to progress through the grades would add endorsements to the original qualification as per the proposed CPD procedures tailored to individual ports. A pilot’s qualification is an IMO requirement under A960 and also a requirement of the PMSC so the UK had to adopt it and once implemented it could provide the security for pilots currently missing under the 1987 Pilotage Act.

In reply to the question as to how this could be progressed, Brian explained that the Nautical Institute were establishing a formal CPD programme and that the UKMPA T&T Committee had been in contact with the NI and they were happy for the UKMPA to participate in the programme. The T&TC would have to manage the pilotage aspect but in return would have the benefit of endorsement from a respected independent professional organisation.

What happens next? Under the remit from the 2009 conference the Section Committee would progress this matter.

In conclusion Brian thanked Liverpool pilots Jonathan Mills and Dave Roberts who had done most of the work on this project.

P&I CLUBS & PILOTS: Andy Kirkham North of England P&I Club (North) Loss prevention Department.

Andy provided an overview of North which covered 3800 vessels employing 100 claims handlers, all of whom were ex mariners. Like all P&I clubs North was a non profit Mutual organisation and was part of the International Group of P&I clubs (IG). Consisting of 13 P&I Clubs the IG held a central cash reserve and members contributed varying amounts dependent upon risk analysis. The structure was complex but basically each individual club covered claims up to £8M with anything over that being handled by the IG. The total maximum cover offered by the IG was £5.25 billion. Explaining his role as a loss prevention officer, this involved working with the ship owners to reduce the possibility of a claim arising and he was pleased to announce to delegates that following last year’s presentation, North had dropped the term “pilot error” from their statistics and now had pilot incident records. The object of these pilotage incident reports was to raise awareness and to encourage debate and most importantly the P&I Clubs were not there to allocate any blame. The pilotage incident reports no longer include cases resulting from engine or systems failures or even helmsman errors and so the only cases now considered as pilotage incidents were where it was considered that an act or omission of the pilot had been a contributory factor to an incident leading to a claim. The claims were now simplified into three groups:

-Damage to property

-Collisions

-Groundings.

The number of claims was falling but the costs of each claim were rising rapidly with the average cost of each claim now around £1.5m. Of the three groups, groundings were resulting in the highest claims and this was very much a result of the pollution element. With ten years of data now analysed, a major report had been produced which broke down the data into countries and ports. IMPA had provided much useful data on pilot numbers etc which had enhanced the accuracy of this major report. Although this report was still in draft form there was evidence that it was already being studied and its content noted by a wide variety of organisations. One outcome of the report was that as a result of the vast increase in costs of claims it was possible that the P&I Clubs might become involved in training and standards of both officers and pilots. Andy then detailed three recent cases which highlighted how an inadequate Master / pilot exchange coupled with inadequacies of the bridge team had resulted in claims.

During the subsequent debate a question was asked regarding the case where a port was accepting larger vessels but the available tugs were of insufficient power. Could a pilot be liable for damage even if the problem had been raised with the CHA? The consensus was yes, because the pilot was effectively knowingly undertaking an unsafe act.

MAIB: Admiral Stephen Mayer

Stephen announced that he was retiring as head of the MAIB after 8 years but planned to remain active in maritime affairs and hoped that in some way he might help to reverse the worrying trend of the criminalisation of seafarers. Stephen then detailed the role of the MAIB and expressed his concern that there was still widespread ignorance over the status and modus operandi of the organisation.

The MAIB was not part of the MCA it wasn’t interested in enforcement of legislation, never carried out prosecutions and it was fundamental to the organisation that no information obtained during investigations could be used in a court of law. Stephen stated that he had never investigated any case involving a deliberate act. Errors were obviously made but he had never come across criminal intent behind those errors and no accident is ever the result of a single factor by a single person. Accidents always result from a combination of factors and one reason why the MAIB always tried to release their report as soon as possible following an incident was to try to avoid the finger of blame being pointed at a single individual. Stephen stressed the importance that the MAIB attached to their investigations being totally independent and this frequently meant resisting considerable pressure from other interested parties. Confidentiality was of paramount importance and the sole purpose of the reports was to establish:

-What happened?

-How did it happen?

-Why did it happen?

-What can be done to prevent a recurrence?

This ethos of the MAIB had slowly gained recognition and Stephen was pleased that an increasing number of countries were establishing similar investigatory bodies and in particular there was an EU Directive being introduced that would require all EU countries to have an investigatory body modelled on the MAIB’s “no blame” investigation procedures. It was essential that it was the MAIB rather than other bodies undertaking this form of investigation because the Police were solely interested in criminal investigations that would lead to prosecution and regrettably, all other bodies who may be involved in maritime investigations had a vested interest, either to exonerate themselves or their clients. The MAIB was unique in that by seeking to identify causes, their investigations looked beyond the immediate accident to on board practices and cultures that may be relevant in preventing a recurrence in the future.

With respect to the major area of concern, this continued to be the fishing industry where the death rate was 200 times the average. Short sea traders also frequently operated in an unsafe manner resulting from complacency but with the added risks of fatigue. The leisure industry resisted all attempts to introduce any formal competency which resulted in a culture where safety practices were considered a voluntary, optional extra.

To conclude his presentation Stephen referred to pilotage, which was unique in that pilots operated in areas where vessels were at their highest risk of an accident. Pilotage should therefore be considered as a high level risk mitigation service but it was essential that pilots were supported and should never work in a vacuum. Having undertaken the same passage, possibly hundreds of times it was easy for a pilot to drop his guard and traditionally, when under pilotage, the bridge team also relaxed their guard thus increasing the risk of an incident. Although everybody disliked the term, it was a fact that every single pilotage incident that the MAIB investigated had involved an element of complacency. During the subsequent discussion the following questions were raised.

With respect to defect reporting, should UK pilots’ status be amended to be a representative of the State rather than the ship owner as is the case in many countries? Stephen agreed that the current system contained confusing anomalies that served neither the pilot or the port.

With respect to the legal presentations, following an incident, should a pilot have legal representation when being interviewed by the MAIB? No! The whole ethos of the MAIB is that any information received during interviews is totally confidential.

Why is it that some in-port incidents are only investigated by the port authority? THE MAIB receive over 1500 incident reports per year. It is only possible to fully investigate 40 – 50 of these so unless it is considered that an incident is a result of a failure by a port or that there are important aspects of wider relevance then it is necessary to leave the port to undertake its own investigation. However, although a full investigation may not be made, the MAIB may recommend that the CHA examine / address specific elements of an incident and will subsequently check that this has been done.

Can individuals object to the content of a report rior to publication? Part of the process is full consultation and all parties are given the opportunity to respond prior to publication. The MAIB have to carefully analyse all the responses because again it is fundamental to the existence of the MAIB that the final report is accurate.

Does the MAIB use outside consultants? Yes, but only to ensure accuracy of detail outside the sphere of expertise of the MAIB investigators For example external experts were used regarding the behaviour of Becker rudders in the Vallermosa report.

At the end of the discussions, UKMPA chairman, Joe Wilson, presented Stephen with a UKMPA plaque as a gesture of thanks for the interest that he had shown in the Association and pilotage issues by his attendance at many conferences during his time as Chief Investigator. This recognition was supported by the delegates offering warm applause.

DfT: Ian Timpson (Ports division – Navigation Safety)

Following an introduction by Chairman Joe Wilson, Ian detailed his role which includes responsibility for the PMSC. Explaining the history behind the Code he explained that although it was a voluntary document, it did link in with legislation and CHA’s were required to comply with its provisions. Having been designed as a “living” document an updating “refresh” process had recently been undertaken in order to ensure that it reflected current best practice and correctly integrated with existing and new legislation along with MAIB recommendations. Ian detailed the various sections and indicated where and why revisions had taken place and explained the difference between the “duty holder” and “designated person”. With respect to what happens next with the Code, the important issues were the monitoring of the effectiveness of the Code, the enforcement of its provisions and the relationship between what he referred to as the “wet & dry” aspects of port operations. With the PMSC covering the “wet” aspects and the H&SE dealing with the “dry” there is a debate over whether the two bodies should be merged. Ian summed up the ethos of port safety as being that everyone was responsible and the duty holder was accountable

Q&A

What was the current position of the DfT regarding the situation on the Clyde where it was reported that there were currently no Class 1 pilots? There were acknowledged problems on the Clyde and the MCA had undertaken a verification visit in 2009. There had also been an incident investigation by the MAIB which had identified areas of concern. The outcome of the visit and MAIB’s report had been that there was now a “dedicated person” in place and assurance had been received that the identified areas of concern were being addressed.

What can the DfT do if it became evident that a port was not compliant with the Code? This would be up to the relevant government Minister but one course of action could be making the Code mandatory but that in itself created problems in that it would set minimum standards whereas the aim of the Code was to establish best practice.

Whilst acknowledging that the majority of ports might be doing their best to comply with the Code there was a general impression that it seemed to lack “teeth” ? Some aspects of the Code were supported by legislation and the accountability of the duty holder should be sufficient to ensure all CHA’s were compliant. Also, the fact that the code was voluntary wouldn’t prevent a judge examining compliance issues should they become relevant to any court proceedings. There were also provisions for the Secretary of State to intervene in a non compliant CHA contained within the draft Marine Bill.

JCB

The full conference minutes are available for members on request or from the UKMPA website:

ECDIS Part 2: Navigating Using ECDIS

JCB — Tue, 29 Jun 2010 14:24:10 +0000

He had bought a large map representing the sea

Without the least vestige of land

And the crew were much pleased when they found it to be

A map they could all understand.

Lewis Carroll

Farewell! Photo: JCB

TRAINING:

In part 1, I expressed concerns over the training and in particular the need for any ECDIS user to be fully competent in the particular type of ECDIS placed on board his ship. Whilst such type specific expertise through training is being achieved the top end of the shipping industry, such as cruise liners and large tankers, the evidence is emerging of an alarming lack of comprehension by many officers of, not just their own system but of ECDIS and its functions in general. These are not just personal concerns but reflect those of many Industry observers.

Why is training such an issue?

Currently if you place any navigating officer on a bridge with a set of paper charts, even if they have been supplied by a country whose charting he has never seen before, he will recognise the key features and be able to plan a safe passage for any vessel to which he has been allocated.

This hasn’t happened by accident but is a direct result of the evolution of the paper chart over centuries which has been accompanied by similarly evolving chartwork skills passed on to successive generations of navigators. In contrast to such evolution, within the next eight years, the safety of the worlds’ shipping and coastlines will be dependent upon navigators fully comprehending not just the principles behind vector charting but the particular ECDIS operating system on their ship. As mentioned in part 1, despite an IMO model course being approved by the STCW committee in 1999, this course is not yet mandatory but ship owners / operators are required to train their officers to use ECDIS under their ISM policies. The top ship owners are sending their officers on training courses, based on the IMO model, run by their ECDIS suppliers and since these normally run for five days these officers will have a comprehensive understanding, not just of the principles of ECDIS, but also of their specific equipment. This is the ideal but only covers a minority group and because so many ship owners / operators now use crewing agencies the vast majority aren’t receiving such comprehensive training. The result is that, in order to tick the appropriate ISM box,these officers are being sent on very basic three day courses which can only ever be generic and with, no exam to pass, make no assessment as to an officer’s comprehension of the ECDIS concept or competence in its use.

Detail from a paper chart

An ECDIS “standard” display of the same area. Note the missing anchorage and restricted zone text & detail! The safety contour here has been set at 10m.

Poor training is a fundamental problem because navigating by use of ECDIS requires a completely new approach to chartwork and the adoption of totally new skills. When navigation by use of electronic charts was first muted there was considerable discussion as to how such a system should operate and although mariners preferred the familiarity of a scan of a paper chart into an electronic version of the same it was considered that, if accompanied by a comprehensive re-training programme, a three dimensional “intelligent” charting system could not just enhance safety but also provide a platform for integrating other information technologies into one central navigational console for the navigator. Thus the vector chart was born. So, here we are in 2010 with the technology in place but without the requisite training. The widespread concerns over this situation are valid because in order to navigate effectively using ECDIS a navigator must forget the two dimensional paper chart and navigate using the three dimensions in which the ship actually operates. Unfortunately, in order to avoid overloading the tiny screen, the vector chart hides much essential navigational information away on different “layers” and the navigator is therefore faced with three major problems. Firstly, he needs to know how to tailor his ECDIS to his ship and the intended passage. Secondly he needs to know what information is available within the ECDIS relevant to the intended passage and thirdly, where to find that information, recognise its relevance and effectively apply it. Quite a tall order for an officer who has joined a ship with an ECDIS that he’s never seen before after a 30 hour trip in a mini bus from Poland who’s only had a 45 minute hand over because the officer he’s relieving is going home in the same minibus. Yes, it has happened!!

Setting up the ECDIS

During the installation of an ECDIS, the supplier should have entered fixed vessel data such as the length and beam and also aligned the ship’s position on the ECDIS with the aerial position on the ship. The manoeuvring characteristics of the ship should also have been entered during installation and once set, this information cannot normally be altered by the operator. As the range is zoomed in, the ship position identifier on the chart will change from a spot surrounded by two concentric rings to a scale plan of the vessel so it is essential that this vessel data is correctly entered.

Generally, unless a vessel is spending a long period in port, it is recommended that the EDCIS is left switched on whilst in port because, like any computer a start up from cold can take a considerable time.

Preliminary set up:

Before commencing a passage the navigator must check the ECDIS for the proposed passage, firstly to ensure that the vessel has licenses for all the ENC charts ( called cells) and secondly to ensure that these are up to date with the latest corrections that are supplied, either by CD ROM or via an Internet connection. So, assuming that all the passage licenses are in order and up to date, the first thing that the navigator needs to do is to enter the ship’s draft and air draft and establish the safety contour based on draft and the required Under keel Clearance (UKC). For example, with a vessel of 6m draft the depth contour could be chosen as 8m. However, since most ENC data is supplied with preset contours, typically at 5m intervals the display will default to the next deepest contour which in this case would be 10m. All areas of less than 10m will show as blue and areas deeper than 10 will be displayed as white (see above picture). So as long as the ship remains in the white area, she is, in theory, safe! There are more complex facilities that can be set up if required but that is outside the scope of this article. In addition to the safety contour, this same depth of 8m can be set as the safety depth. In this case, if the navigator sets the ECDIS to display depths then all depths of less than 8m will show in bold type and those deeper than 8 will be a pale grey. This means that a depth of 9m, although within the 10m blue safety contour it will displayed in pale grey text whereas a depth of 7m will be displayed in bold black. The whole safety of the passage is dependent on this information being correct so, if a navigator fails to set this correctly, the scene is set for a disaster! It could be all to easy for a new watchkeeper joining a vessel that arrived in a loading port with a draft of 4m with the safety contour and depth set at 5m to forget to change the draft and depths to the loaded draft, especially if he was unfamiliar with the ECDIS type in use. Such a failure was responsible for the grounding of the CFL Performer in 2008 where the MAIB report states the following: ECDIS was the primary means of navigation, but none of the vessel’s bridge watchkeeping officers had been trained in its use. Consequently, many of the system’s features which could have prevented this accident were not utilised. However, assuming that our officer has fully trained on his ECDIS the next task is to set up a safety domain. IMO specifications require ECDIS to trigger alarms in the following circumstances:

If, within a specified time set by the mariner. the ship will cross the safety contour

If, within a specified time set by the mariner, the ship will cross the boundary of a prohibited area or of a geographical area for which special conditions exist

When the specified cross track limit for deviation from the planned route is exceeded

If continuing on its present course and over a specified time or distance set by the mariner, the ship will pass closer than a user-specified distance from a danger (eg obstruction wreck or rock) that is shallower than the mariner’s contour or an aid-to navigation.

In order for these requirements to be met the navigator has to input the parameters for both depth and beam clearances and once set, upon checking any passage, ifany hazards are present along the proposed route then alarms will be generated from the relevant chart at the largest available scale whatever scale is being displayed on the screen.

ECDIS manufacturers often meet the requirements by allowing users to specify a safety domain for the vessel, effectively contained by the following parameters:

In depth, by the safety contour and safety depth
In forward extent, by the look-ahead time or look-ahead range
In lateral closeness by a specified distance.

The following diagram which is reproduced courtesy of Dr. Andy Norris clarifies the concept.

Note that the safety domain requires the navigator to input the vessel / voyage specific parameters and so this must be done at this stage. Best practice would seem to dictate that these parameters should be established by the Master.

Setting all of these voyage safety features will require type specific knowledge of the ECDIS, underlining again the importance of specialist training!

The Passage Plan

Once the vessel’s dynamic parameters have been set the passage plan can be created and it is here that the difference between traditional chartwork and ECDIS working become apparent. Used correctly ECDIS planning provides for a safer passage but if a navigator is lazy, pressed for time or fatigued etc, then some important information may be overlooked.

Passage planning on an ECDIS requires exactly the same procedures as for a paper chart and the navigator must follow the same “best practice” guidelines as per the Bridge Procedures Guide but with ECDIS, the process is complicated by the fact that the navigator needs to know what information is already incorporated into the ECDIS and what isn’t and this is where a weakness of ECDIS is exposed. For example if some changes to buoyage have taken place on the intended passage, a navigator using a paper chart will be aware of this because the amended buoyage will be pasted on the chart over the old system and is therefore immediately visible. With ECDIS, as reported in part 1, problems have arisen with synchronising electronic Notices to Mariners (NtM) updates for ECDIS with the paper equivalent. So on an ECDIS it may not immediately be apparent as to whether or not the changes been included. Because of this anomaly between the printed and electronic versions of NtM’s, mariners are currently being advised to check all routes with the paper NtM’s. Not a good start for ECDIS!!

In addition to checking the NtM’s the navigator still needs to refer to the traditional printed passage planning documents such as tide & current tables, Lists of Lights, sailing directions, NAVTEXT etc. relevant to the proposed passage. To make life easier there are an increasing number of companies offering electronic versions of these references and the UKHO have recently launched an “e-Navigator” service which provides all the necessary berth to berth ENC chart cells and other services and documentation relevant to the intended passage in a single download. As ECDIS take-up rates accelerate it is certain that all the major suppliers will offer full data packages which will remove the current tedious and error prone task of cross referencing electronic and printed information. However, this additional data can only be provided as an overlay onto the ENC and must be capable of being removed from the screen by means of a single operator action.

Once the navigator has all the relevant documentation to hand, the plan can commence and the first thing to check (that familiarisation again!) is whether waypoints for that passage already exist in the ECDIS database. If so it can be uploaded for re-use and by running an initial check the ECDIS will verify if the plan is safe for the dynamic parameters previously set. As well as alerting the navigator to any parts of the plan that are outside the safety domain parameters, the ECDIS will also alert the navigator to charted features of relevance on the passage such as traffic separation zones, restricted areas, anchorages etc. How alerts are presented to the navigator are dependent on the manufacturer with the best automatically jumping to the problem area and others providing a simple drop down list.

If there is no existing passage in the ECDIS database then the navigator will have to create one. Waypoint databases are commercially available and some ECDIS manufacturers supply them with the ECDIS but whilst these are useful, it must be remembered that other vessels are likely to be using the same waypoints so a prudent navigator may wish to amend them, especially in areas of high traffic volumes such as the Dover Strait. CNIS at Dover have been frequently amazed to witness many vessels converging onto the same waypoint when plenty of sea room exists in the sea lane and this was identified as a factor by the MAIB investigation into the collision between the Dutch Aquamarine and the Ash, which tragically resulted in one fatality, in 2001.

If no pre-loaded waypoint list exists for the passage then the navigator will have to start from scratch, which isn’t the easiest procedure on an ECDIS. The main problem that traditional mariners find with this is the small screen size which makes it difficult to obtain the outline overview obtained from a small scale paper chart. However, in practice the advantage of the ECDIS is that by putting in the departure and arrival points any obstructions will be identified and the navigator can then move waypoints and re-check the outline route. For longer ocean passages the ECDIS really shines since it can instantaneously offer a great circle or Rhumb line route or a combination of both thus saving much tedious plotting.

Once a viable outline passage has been established it is then essential to check the whole route in detail using the zooming and scrolling facilities. Although this sounds tedious, it is actually easier and less error prone than drawing course lines on a series of passage charts of differing scales. However, it is essential that this process is done with extreme care because, as previously mentioned, many chart features such as submarine cables are hidden on the different layers of the ENC and essential detailed information such as notes pertaining to precautionary areas needs to be accessed and analysed for relevance by means of clicking on the ! symbol to obtain the “pick report” relating to the feature. Yet again, the effectiveness of this plan analysis is dependent upon the navigator being fully familiar with the particular ECDIS manufacturer’s operating system!

This pick report is one of the most essential tasks during planning because there are some confusing new symbols and display anomalies when compared to the paper chart as shown on the following pictures.

What’s this? A hazard of some sort! Dangerous wreck, Rock, underwater rock awash? It could just be depth unknown but the meaning will only de revealed by interrogating it and checking the object information file. Traditional symbols have been replaced by a new symbology by default but if the navigator prefers the familiar object display it can be set via the menus. The following pictures show the difference.

Simplified symbols.

Traditional symbology.

These are just two examples of many ECDIS features that need to be fully understood to ensure a safe passage. Whilst all the planning is going on the navigator must never forget that he is working on a computer and he should save the plan at regular intervals to avoid totally losing all the detail in the case of a “crash”. Yes, that happens!

Best practice guidelines recommend that planning is undertaken ion the back up ECDIS unit so once the plan has been completed and fully verified it needs to be exported to the primary unit. This is increasingly done via a data link cable between the two systems. Some commentators have expressed concern that the main and back up units are linked together by such a cable maintaining that the two units should be totally independent to avoid any possibility of a virus or Trojan infecting both systems. However, such an arrangement would require the navigator to create two exactly identical plans for each unit which isn’t practically feasible. and transferring data by means of a memory stick or CD ROM would pose the same potential risk of viral infection but I am unaware of any ECDIS units having suffered from such computer viruses. However, many ECDIS run using the Windows platform and can be connected to the Internet, so that factor, coupled with the presence of unsecured CD, DVD and USB drives leads some to valid concerns that it may only be a matter of time before a virus attack happens. One essential factor that mustn’t be overlooked when transferring the voyage plan is that as a result of the primary and back up ECDIS being independent, the vessel specific safety depth and domain parameters must be set on each set independently and a prudent navigator will undertake the final route verification checks on both systems prior to the passage commencing.

Getting Underway

Once the plan has been saved and exported to the main ECDIS unit at the conning position the passage can commence and it is here that the advantages for a well trained bridge team are evident but for less well trained officers, unfamiliar with their ECDIS system, the differences between ECDIS and the traditional paper chart can result in some important features being overlooked. The performance standards require ECDIS units to have three display modes: Base, Standard and full

Base Display: This displays the absolute minimum information considered necessary for navigation such as the coastline, fixed structures and the safety contour. It is not recommended for navigation but some find it useful for de-cluttering the screen when checking ahead on a small scale.

Standard Display: This is the display for normal navigation and it is a requirement that it can be presented at any time by a single operator action. In addition to the information of the base display this mode contains the drying lines, buoys and other navigation marks, prohibited and restricted areas, separation and traffic routing and precautionary area ( but not the notes!) Despite being the recommended display, this display doesn’t provide the same information as a paper chart with information such as buoy names and characteristics, anchorages, submarine cables etc

Full Display: This contains all the information contained within the ENC but due to the amount of data this mode tends to overload the typical small screens with text overwriting and concealing other objects except on the largest scales and so again isn’t recommended for navigation. Note that even on this full display mode much of the paper chart detail such as precautionary notes can only be accessed by interrogating objects on the chart to display a pick report of the required information.

In practice additional information is added onto the standard display via the ECDIS menu system to the preference of the watchkeeper but how this additional information is accessed and displayed is not standard and is left to the whim of the manufacturers. However, once set, many systems now permit different users to save their preferred display layout.

The fact that important detail isn’t instantly visible represents the key difference between paper charts and ECDIS. Even with comprehensive type specific training this factor represents the most dangerous aspect of navigating by means of ECDIS because whereas historically the navigator has become used to all the necessary information being visible on the paper chart, the vector chart requires the navigator to be inquisitive and interrogate objects and hunt for additional display features in menus and sub menus.

A full display. Note the depths less than 7m highlighted but also note that this display doesn’t show the text detail so information that is readily available can only be accessed by interrogating an object! with such a cluttered display on a small screen it is easy to overlook important navigational information.

On passage

Assuming the standard display is chosen the ECDIS will automatically choose the largest scale chart available and the default display mode is North Up with own ship in the centre and true motion so the ship moves to near the edge of the screen after which it will automatically reset as with true motion radar. Most navigators find this pretty useless so the menu system offers the same variety of tracking options as the radar. Most users prefer the centre offset relative motion display but some advanced users on the cruise liners are increasingly using offset Head Up displays on both radar and ECDIS meaning that the displays correspond to the visual picture. The heading marker is a fixed line extending to the edge of the screen and again, in the same way as radar, the vector can be set to either GPS tracking or water tracking. GPS tracking is indicated by a double arrow head on the vector and water tracking by a single arrowhead. The route is usually displayed as a solid orange line. The brightness of the screen is adjustable and there are generally three screen display options of day, dusk and night. Additional care must be taken when in the night mode because some features, such as precautionary zones can be very indistinct.

If the ECDIS is part of an integrated system then information from other systems such as radar and AIS can be overlaid on the ECDIS display and this facility can be very useful. In particular the radar image can provide a valuable verification of the accuracy of the GPS input in coastal water in that the radar land image should align with the chart display. However it is recommended that such radar overlay isn’t left on permanently because not only could it mask important data but it also uses additional computing power which may overload the processors.

On normal passages the ECDIS provides an instant visual position check and alarms sound when a waypoint approaches or if the vessel wanders off track outside the pre-set safety domain or approaches a shoal or other charted hazard. One function that an ECDIS cannot currently perform is to integrate live tide data to produce real time depths so whilst the safety contour and depth settings are fine for normal deep water navigation, when the vessel needs to transit a tidal dependent area, such as arises in my own port, then the auto checking of the passage will flag up as being outside the parameters. Third party software can provide tidal data as an overlay and may also include a passage planning tool to calculate tidal windows etc but such programs cannot interact with the ENC to produce live depth data. Consequently in tidal restricted areas the safety domain alarms will need to be disabled.

It is very easy for a watchkeeper to have unreasonable trust in the ECDIS position, reassuringly displayed on the chart but the verification of position by other means is as essential with ECDIS as with traditional paper chart navigation because if the GPS is in error then the whole ECDIS is rendered inaccurate and for this reason traditional navigation verification techniques must be used and tools to facilitate this are required to be readily available on the primary screen. If the aforementioned radar overlay isn’t available then VRM & EBL functions enable radar ranges and bearings to be transferred and electronic bearing markers permit traditional chartwork to be undertaken using visual bearings.

If a GPS error is identified then the input must be disabled and the ECDIS used as a traditional chart using traditional position fixing techniques but I understand that this is not a user friendly process on many ECDIS units!

Conclusion

ECDIS is a highly complex electronic tool and still in its infancy so it is inevitable that anomalies in the charting will be identified and the training of navigators will lag behind the implementation dates. In part 3 I will be examining some of the problems and accidents that have arisen already along with the vulnerabilities.

The need for ECDIS to be used with extreme caution was highlighted in February when an ENC error was identified resulting in the following emergency NAVTEX alert to be issued

Mariners are advised that ECDIS may not display some isolated shoal depths when operating in “base or standard display” mode. Route planning and monitoring alarms for these shoal depths may not always be activated. To ensure safe navigation and to confirm that a planned route is clear of such dangers, mariners should visually inspect the planned route and any deviations from it using ECDIS configured to display “all data”. The automated voyage planning check function should not be solely relied upon. The International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) is leading technical action to resolve this matter. Further information will be made available through Notices to Mariners.

Such notices are alarming but in a few years time, as new navigators come through colleges having done all their chartwork exams on ECDIS, the teething problems should have been ironed out and this next generation of officers will be fully familiar with the operational aspects of ECDIS and navigational safety should be enhanced. Already, on cruise liners and other well managed ships ECDIS is being used as intended and the benefits are evident because in addition to the three dimensional safety domain features, when zoomed right in, a good quality ECDIS can be used as a berthing aid.

Visual assessment for swinging in a restricted area is difficult

The ECDIS provides valuable instant and predictive information. Photos: Nigel Allen

READ PART 3 “ECDIS PROBLEMS” HERE

ECDIS (Electronic Chart Display and Information System): Part1: How ECDIS works.

JCB — Tue, 09 Mar 2010 12:39:29 +0000

When I decided to produce an article on ECDIS I thought that it would simply involve reading a few articles, condensing the content and adding a few photographs. How wrong I was! Having started to delve into the mysteries of ECDIS I realised that this charting system, the carriage of which shortly will become mandatory, is a highly complex tool which, if it is to fully deliver the enhanced safety advertised, will require watchkeepers to forget many of the traditional chartwork skills and learn to use the electronic chart from scratch. Despite having waded through many papers and articles, even now I am not too sure that I fully understand all the elements that are combined to produce an authorised ECDIS.

A typical ECDIS console

At the end of 2008, the IMO Maritime Safety Committee approved the mandatory carriage of ECDIS for SOLAS vessels. The requirements are for ECDIS to be phased in for different classes of vessels between 2012 and 2018. One year on from the decision we are already seeing many vessels being fitted with electronic charts so pilots need to be aware of what is now becoming the primary on board navigation system. At first glance the electronic chart seems wonderful, your own ship is displayed on a computer screen sitting nicely in its exact position on the chart. But, is it real or is it an illusion?

Navigation by means of a fully approved ECDIS is totally different from traditional navigation using paper charts and requires detailed knowledge of the functions in order to ensure safe navigation yet, whereas traditional chartwork formed a major element of a deck officer’s navigation exams, electronic charts are being placed on board ships and officers are frequently expected to teach themselves how to use them in their own time by use of a thick and confusing manual. The situation is further complicated by the fact that different manufacturers provide different operating systems and features and so a watchkeeper could be fully competent in using one system but may then be transferred to another vessel with a totally different charting system. Currently, there appears to be considerable confusion over whether or not the electronic chart being displayed is an “official” ECDIS running an approved ENC ( Electronic Navigational Chart), an unapproved ECS (Electronic Charting System) or a RCDS (Raster Chart Display System). Unapproved systems must not be used for navigation but since they are usually located on the bridge front and even fitted into integrated bridge consoles they are commonly used as the primary navigation resource! I have frequently seen unauthorised electronic charts with a warning notice “Not to be used for navigation” fitted into the bridge console with the passage route displayed. There will be a set of paper charts on the chart table fully corrected up to date so the ship isn’t breaking any rules but it is obvious that many watchkeepers will just cast a glance at the electronic chart and be reassured that the ship is on-track. Even worse, some incidents have revealed that watchkeepers have trusted the position provided by such unauthorised systems despite conflicting visual and radar information. Such misguided trust is a human failing not limited to ship’s watchkeepers since vehicle drivers using electronic navigation systems will happily take articulated lorries down farm tracks or the wrong way down one-way streets!

Unfortunately, without comprehensive training in the ECDIS concept, such misguided trust on board ship is usually disastrous and tragically will almost inevitably result in fatalities.

Raster and Vector Electronic Charts

As the official ECDIS is phased in, one of the major problems is that for the last 15 years manufacturers have been producing electronic chart systems to a variety of differing standards and there are currently two totally different formats: Raster & Vector.

A raster chart is basically a scan of a paper chart

A Raster Navigation Chart (RNC) is basically a digitally scanned paper chart and the electronic chart database will be identical to a paper chart folio and the user license provides the relevant folios and corrections for a particular area with new editions being issued in an identical manner to those for paper charts. Raster charts are never approved for navigation. However, just to add a bit more confusion into the issue, the IMO permits raster charts to be used on an official ECDIS which can operate an approved Raster Chart Display System (RCDS). The ECDIS can therefore be used to display a raster chart in areas where ENC data is not available or the full ENC license hasn’t been purchased. However, when in RCDS mode a warning should appear on the ECDIS screen and paper charts for the area must be carried and corrected up to date. This potentially dangerous “dual fuel” (as it is known) option will probably rapidly disappear rapidly as hydrographic offices complete the world database of approved ENC data since if a ship gets orders to proceed to an area not covered by its existing ENC license then, rather than keep paper chart folios and also pay for raster chart folios for the ECDIS, the ship will just have to email the chart supplier for the key to the additional areas and the access codes will be sent and the owners charged accordingly. Last year an interesting spat arose between the UKHO and an innovative chart supplier over the issue of access codes that I will cover later.

There are two main advantages with the raster chart. Firstly, they are cheap and so they have been a popular choice with ship owners. Indeed some Masters, whose owners are reluctant to invest in anything unnecessary, carry their own raster charts on a laptop with a cheap, low grade, GPS aerial plugged in. Such charts are usually from a somewhat dubious source. I have seen such laptops running charts that are at least ten years out of date. The Captain of course always states, “No no Mr. Pilot, not used for navigation. Paper charts all correct in chart room”!

The other advantage of a raster charts is that since it is a scanned version of a traditional paper chart the chart display is totally familiar to the navigator. However, this scanned format also represents the greatest drawback of the raster chart in that by being displayed on a small screen data which may be clear on a large paper chart may be lost and whilst switching to the larger scale chart for the area may clarify detail, the important overview of the passage ahead is lost whilst the alternative of “zooming in” on the smaller scale chart generally produces distortion. Another problem frequently arises in areas where two charts overlap where the software may become confused and the navigator then has to locate and manually input the correct chart from the database.

A typical small vessel bridge showing an unapproved ECS at the conning position

Vector charts are far more complex being totally seamless and built from several different “layers” which cause additional features such as depth data to appear as the operator zooms in and therefore provides a less congested display on the smaller scales. However, in their wisdom the authorities have set the minimum screen display size at a tiny 27cm x 27cm which is about 1/4 the size of a paper chart so zooming in considerably reduces the view ahead for the passage and there is therefore a recommended optimum layer range set for navigation. The main danger of this layering function is that chart corrections and notices to mariners information is only required to be displayed on this optimum layer for navigation as decided by the ECDIS specifications. This results in another major disadvantage in that passage planning becomes more complex since a navigator will use a small scale display to plan a port to port passage but must then check the whole route at the largest scale in order to ensure that no hazards or obstructions are overlooked. I have now piloted many ships operating without paper charts and this factor is a common complaint amongst the watchkeepers using them. Indeed many of these vessels still use paper planning charts for this reason, which reveals another problem in that some of the newly constructed vessels designed to operate without paper charts aren’t fitted with a chart table!!

However, once a safe passage route has been identified the advantages of the vector chart become evident because the chart display can then be configured specifically to the vessel’s parameters. Depth contours and “no-go” areas can be tailored to the ship’s particulars and hazards highlighted with alarms that can be activated if the vessel strays from the intended track or when approaching a hazard. The provision of AIS overlay permits anti collision parameters to be set and radar and other data can be input and overlaid on the screen. Such features represent the great advantage of the vector chart and offer considerable potential to enhance safety but, in untrained hands, is can also be its greatest weakness. Because of its three dimensional functionality using layers of “objects” the techniques for navigating on a vector chart are totally different to the traditional paper chart methodology and so the comprehensive training in their use is paramount for the transition from a two dimensional paper chart.

This vector chart is an “AECDIS 2000″ but it isn’t an “approved” ECDIS and therefore must not be used for navigation so why is there a passage track on it?

Are all vector charts ENC’s?

Simple answer: NO! Whilst official ENC data is only supplied in vector format the vast majority of existing vector charts have been created by manufacturers using their own methodology for transferring data from existing paper charts into vector format. If this data hasn’t been provided by an approved hydrographic office using the authorised S-57 format then such vector charts are only classified as ECS and therefore cannot be used in place of paper charts.

Is an ECDIS an ENC?

A common misconception is that an ECDIS is an actual chart. In fact it is basically a display system meeting the strict specifications required to display the ENC data supplied by the approved HO’s. The following is the official definition for ECDIS:

IMO Resolution MSC 232 (82) defines an Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) as: “a navigation information system which with adequate back-up arrangements can be accepted as complying with the up-to-date chart required by regulations V/19 and V/27 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention, as amended, by displaying selected information from a System Electronic Navigational Chart (SENC) with positional information from navigation sensors to assist the mariner in route planning and route monitoring, and if required display additional navigation-related information”.

An ECDIS also has to meet specific performance standards which are laid down in IMO Resolution A/817. This resolution describes the minimum performance standards for ECDIS, with reference to hardware, software, ENC and updates, user interface, integration with positioning sensors such as radar and other devices, etc.

The technical standards are set by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and it is the responsibility of the Classification Societies to assess whether a particular ECDIS installation is compliant. Systems that comply with all requirements get a “Type Approval” certificate from the Classification Society and only such Type Approved installations can legitimately be called ECDIS.

An important point to note here is that an ECDIS can only be used in place of paper charts if the information being displayed is sourced from an ENC converted by a SENC. Confusing? Yes, because although manufacturers may fit type approved ECDIS, the ship owner, having fitted an ECDIS unit in anticipation of future carriage requirements, may not purchase licenses for ENC’s until legally required to do so and the chart may therefore only be a basic Electronic Chart System (ECS). So, until all vessels are finally fitted with “approved” systems over the next 8 years mariners in general and pilots in particular will be faced with a mix of approved and non approved electronic charts.

There is also a requirement for a back up system in case of ECDIS failure. The specifictions state

The purpose of an ECDIS back-up system is to ensure that safe navigation is not compromised in the event of ECDIS failure. This should include a timely transfer to the back-up system during critical navigation situations. The back- up system shall allow the vessel to be navigated safely until the termination of the voyage.

What’s the difference between ENC & SENC?

MSC 232 provides the following definitions:

ENC: means the database, standardised as to content, structure and format, for charting and updates issued for use with ECDIS by or on the authority of a Government, authorised Hydrographic Office or other relevant government institution, and which conforms to an IHO standard known as S-57/3. The ENC contains all the chart information necessary for safe navigation. On the ship, S-57/3 data is loaded into the ECDIS in a dedicated storage area, called the ENC database.

SENC:

Since the S-57/3 format is not suitable for data processing, the ECDIS has to

convert the ENC into a different format referred to as SENC. The resulting data is then loaded into a separate SENC database from where it is accessed by the chart display and navigational

functions of ECDIS and this database may also contain information added by the mariner or from other sources.

The ECDIS manufacturer may choose whatever format and database structure for the SENC, provided that the ENC data is not downgraded in accuracy and/or contents during the conversion process.

The ECDIS structure is best explained in the following diagram which I obtained from an excellent website on ECDIS at the following link:

www.fuerstenberg-dhg.de/index.php?&L=1

There are some concerns that the SENC is a potential weak link in the integrity of the ECDIS installation since the final chart display presented to the watchkeeper is in the hands of the ECDIS manufacturers rather than the Hydrographic Offices. There is also the fact that when corrections or new charting editions are sent to the ship the conversion process can take a long time during which time the ECDIS cannot be used. To overcome this the manufacturers are increasingly offering a service to convert the ENC data to SENC ashore. In a recent paper, Dr. Fosco Bianchetti (President & CEO of C-Map) detailed the problems associated with the ENC’s and the conversion process within and ECDIS and why he believes that the conversion to SENC should be undertaken ashore rather than on board the ship. The following is an edited extract from his paper which can be found at the following link: www.thsoa.org/hy99/A_5.pdf

“The problem is that the SENC is generated by the ECDIS, and never tested before being used by the ECDIS itself. It may be argued that the SENC Compiler, as part of a type-approved ECDIS, has undergone a severe testing procedure and is therefore assumed to be robust, reliable and exact. Nevertheless there is always a certain degree of uncertainty in format conversion, that could result in partial data loading, unexpected behaviour of the ECDIS, or a system crash. Also, the conversion of a large amount of data may be a lengthy affair, and could absorb a large part of the ECDIS resources, maybe right in the moment in which the system is performing a critical computation or analysis. The lack of official ENC’s makes things worse. Even if a number of Hydrographic Offices have started ambitious programs of ENC production, very few official electronic charts in S-57/3 format currently available. The result is that ECDIS users have to supplement ENC data with non-ENC electronic charts. This is the concept of the so-called “dual-fuel ECDIS. Since the ECDIS operates in non-equivalent mode when using non-ENC charts, S-52 and the IMO Performance Standards require that these are not mixed with the ENC and therefore, they must be loaded in the ECDIS into a separate storage area (‘Non-ENC information’ in the diagram) and must remain clearly distinguishable from official charts even after compilation in the SENC. It must be stressed that quality of non-ENC charts may vary to a large extent, and their format may be very different from S-57/3 and this adds further complications (and potential problems) to the task of the SENC Compiler that has to blend various electronic charts with different features into a single database”.

In order to address these issues, not surprisingly, C-MAP have come up with a solution in the latest version of their product known as CM 93/3 which produces the SENC format ashore in a format which I understand has type approval from DNV. Dr Bianchetti explains.

The advantages of this approach are obvious. All format conversions, as well as the difficult task of harmonising and merging data from different sources, are performed at C-MAP facilities, under strictly controlled conditions, and not by the ECDIS installed on board. All data delivered to ships is double checked in advance, in the format in which it will be actually used by the ECDIS, to ensure that it is fully functional and does not contain ‘unwanted surprises’. Any error affecting the source electronic charts is detected (and, if possible, corrected) by C-MAP, instead of being just passed off to the user. As regards the theoretical issue of whether the original ENC in S-57/3 format should be physically present in the ECDIS or not, there are a number of considerations that could mitigate such requirement, or lead to a different interpretation of it:

The only purpose for the ENC to exist on board is generating the SENC. In fact, whatever operation performed by the ECDIS on electronic chart data pertains to the SENC, not the ENC. Therefore, existence of the ENC in the ECDIS is purposeless, if the conversion to SENC has been already performed under controlled conditions, by a SENC compiler that is part of a type-approved ECDIS.
S-52 and the IMO PS require that data is not downgraded in accuracy and/or contents during the conversion from ENC to SENC, meaning that ENC and SENC are logically equivalent to each other. At this point, any ENC stored in the ECDIS would represent a mere duplication of the corresponding SENC.
Based on the above consideration, the theoretical requirement of having the ENC physically present in the ECDIS could be fulfilled by the capability of the SENC compiler to perform a back conversion (i.e. from SENC to ENC).

An approved ECDIS chart. Note the crowded screen!

Operation

When an ECDIS is switched on the watchkeeper is presented with a “standard display” which will consist of the largest scale available in the SENC for the displayed area. The navigator can then build on that display and taylor it to his own watch keeping needs. The specifications require that the ECDIS can be returned to the standard display by means of a “single operator action”.

However, this standard display will not show all the features that you would expect to see on the paper chart. For example features such as submarine cables and spot depths aren’t there and although navigation marks are shown their characteristics aren’t so the navigator needs to know how to access and display this important additional data from the menu system.

For passage planning the navigator first needs to ensure that the ECDIS contains all the necessary charts for the passage and it is here that an interesting argument has developed between a chart supplier and the UKHO. In 2009 an authorised Dutch ENC supply company introduced a sort of “pay as you go” charging plan called ENCTrack that basically permitted free access to all ENC’s but only required the ship owner to pay licence fee for those he actually used on passage.

The UKHO, along with some other approved HO’s halted the launch of this service on the basis that the licensing of any chart should start on the commencement of the planning process; that is, “when it is ‘first used’ in the vital and mandated process of assessing the data available to enable a voyage plan to be prepared”.

In contrast, ‘ENCTrack’ considers the chart’s ‘first use’ to be when the vessel is passing through the chart region, not when the mariner starts his planning process with those same charts. The UKHO argument is that when preparing a passage plan a navigating officer is making informed decisions affecting ship safety from consulting all the charts and the embedded additional information relevant to his plan so licences should be purchased for all the charts not just for a narrow track over which the vessel actually passes. However, not all HO’s agree with the UKHO position on this and consequently at the time of writing Datema have launched a limited ENCTrack service with those HO’s. Interestingly, despite the objections, Datema have recently won an award as a “Value Added” reseller of ENC’s. This case highlights just one of the many issues that need to be resolved within the next two years.

Once the navigator has the relevant charts he can now set his waypoints and save the passage in the database and should back this up in case of failure of the primary system. He can then set the safe depth parameters and the ECDIS can then be set to highlight the appropriate contours for the passage. Undertaking the passage and the quirks of ECDIS for navigation will be covered in part 2 in the April issue.

Don’t forget to pay! photo: N Allen

Of course, having the shiny new ECDIS with the relevant chart folios is only the initial element of chart work since the ENCs stored in a SENC require regularly updating. and it is here that some further unresolved complications arise. Updating data can either be made by sending a CD ROM by post, or by data transfer using satellite or mobile phone. Because of the large size of files associated with the updates the latter mode, although preferable is currently expensive, also upon receipt, data transferred by satellite or mobile phone must be burnt on to a CD ROM before the ENC can be updated. The CD ROM is necessary for keeping a hard copy of the update available. The cheaper option of updating by post, apart from the obvious problem of time delays, also could result in some updates being missed. This is serious because updates are sequential and if one is missing the update procedure can not be completed until the missing previous updates have been applied.

Even when the CD is received on board there is evidence that the updating process is not always simple and can take considerable time. It also appears that on many systems there is no confirmation that the update has been successful without the navigator having to subsequently check in the folio database for each chart affected which represents a total waste of a busy watchkeeper’s time and totally annuls one of the fundamental advantages claimed for ECDIS.

For urgent navigation warnings ECDIS specifications require that they can be manually updated but again I understand that on many systems this can be a time consuming and fiddly process with no standard input procedure. These problems are well known and the following somewhat alarming information is taken from the latest (January 2010) ECDIS guidance CD issued by the UKHO:

Updates for UKHO ENCs are issued weekly in line with UKHO policy for all its navigational charts, paper and electronic. Due to unforeseen technical difficulties, ENC updates may occasionally be issued late and consequently may not be synchronised with the corresponding Notices to Mariners and updates for paper and ARCS charts. Updates are issued for all Permanent Chart-Correcting and Preliminary Notices to Mariners. However, it may not always be possible to issue updates for Temporary Notices to Mariners, especially those that cover large geographical areas and are not chart specific. Mariners should consult the paper weekly Notices to Mariners booklet or the UKHO website, http://www.nms.ukho.gov.uk/, for details of these Notices to Mariners.

So it appears we have a situation where the ECDIS updates may not contain the latest warnings and may even be missing some altogether! I wonder just how many officers have either the time or inclination to check the printed weekly NtM’s to check that their ECDIS information is complete? My estimation would be zero!

Another worrying aspect of the updating process is that once applied these are not shown in the traditional manner associated with paper charts but with a new symbology of a polygon with an exclamation mark in it placed in the general area of the notice. The notice will only appear on the “recommended” range scale for a particular ENC so won’t appear if the display is zoomed in or out! The following is again from the UKHO:

The display shows red polygons around the locations of NMs, along with the NM number. T&P NMs are shown with the NM number used in the Admiralty NM Bulletin, including the (T) or (P) designator. EP NMs are shown with (EP) in the number and using numbers that do not conflict with existing paper NMs. All NMs are linked to specific ENCs and will only display when the linked ENC is displayed. This means that as the user zooms in or out to scales at which the NM is no longer relevant, it will be removed from the screen.

Attached to each polygon is the full text of the NM, which can be viewed using the ECDIS pick report. In addition, complex NMs have an attached diagram or picture that helps explain the situation and is available directly from the ECDIS.

So we currently have a situation where the ECDIS NtM’s aren’t synchronised with the printed NtM’s and the information is displayed in an unfamiliar format that has to be interrogated to reveal its content. Feedback from users also reveals concerns that these polygons add further clutter to an already crowded display especially if they contain information not relevant to their particular vessel.

System Stability

An ECDIS is a computer and as such its stability is dependent upon the processing power available. Like all computers, over a period of time the ECDIS memory will fill up and require clearing out. As the memory fill then processing of information will slow and sometimes freeze and the ECDIS will require a re-boot. Obviously this is far from ideal if the vessel is in a busy shipping lane when such computer “issues” occur.

Additional Navigational Information

As part of an integrated system an ECDIS can be interfaced to overlay Radar and AIS data on the charted. Other items such as passage planning tools can be added to the ECDIS database and accessed as required. However, information software is not automatically supplied with the ENC so has to be purchased separately at additional cost. Examples of planning overlays are tide and weather information, sailing directions, port arrival information etc. The disadvantage of such services is that they are often produced by different software providers so the incompatibility problems associated with any computer software on different platforms can arise and of course additional software uses up memory and processing power. To combat this the ECDIS suppliers are increasingly offering such additional software packages specifically tailored to their equipment.

The striped lines on this ECDIS diplay alert the user that he is not using the “recommended” scale!

Training

As can be gleaned from all the aforementioned factors, the safe and efficient operation of ECDIS requires officers to not only be aware of the basic principles of ECDIS operation but they must also be fully conversant with their particular installation.

So, with an estimated 500,000 officers requiring such training before 2018, how is the Industry addressing this training issue? Well as is traditional for the Maritime world the situation is confusing because there is currently no mandatory IMO requirement for watchkeepers to attend ECDIS courses. However, under STCW95 a navigation officer must possess “a thorough knowledge of and ability to use navigational charts and publications…” He must show “..evidence of skills and ability to prepare for and conduct a passage, including interpretation and applying information from charts”.

In an annexe to the STCW95 requirements ECDIS is classified as a “chart” so under the ISM code ship owners have an obligation to ensure that their officers are trained to use ECDIS. Consequently, there is a requirement that all the watchkeepers serving on board any ship which has replaced its paper charts with an approved ECDIS system must have been formally trained in its use. Despite not formally requiring training, the IMO have proposed a syllabus for ECDIS courses and the major navigational institutions are now offering generic ECDIS courses but which currently vary in length between two and five days. Considering how traditional chartwork formed such a major element of a navigator’s training there is increasing concern that the existing courses are woefully inadequate for a watchkeeper to practically comply with the STCW95 requirements. These concerns are enhanced by the generic nature of these courses which cover the basic principles ECDIS but cannot possibly provide an officer with the necessary competencies required to operate a particular manufacturer’s ECDIS. Since the regulations leave the manufacturers free to decide how the SENC information is displayed and the multitude of functions accessed, we are entering the age of ECDIS with a similar incompatible and confusing variety of ECDIS operating systems as currently exists with the myriad of radar operating systems on today’s bridges!

The IMO are currently proposing that ECDIS training will be a specific requirement in the revised STCW code, scheduled for adoption this year but again this will be generic rather than type specific and so will probably just serve to formalise the existing ad-hoc training courses.

The best ship owners are addressing these issues by sending their officers on type specific courses under their ISM compliance requirements but even such well trained officers may not be fully competent to use another manufacturer’s equipment if he transfers to another ship or company.

Other ship owners are sending officers for the basic training but passing the buck back to the ship by issuing ISM instructions that watchkeepers must familiarise themselves with the ECDIS using the manufacturers handbook. Since some of these can be over 500 pages in length and not easily understood, even by officers who have the advantage of English as a first language such training methodology is unlikely to provide the requisite competency. At the bottom end of the scale the vast majority of ship owners are awaiting the mandatory carriage dates for their fleets and somewhat unsurprisingly there is a growing concern that the authorised training establishments will not be able to cope with the last minute rush! I am already aware of one company which having purchased a coastal tanker from an owner who had fitted an ECDIS system had placed paper charts on board rather than incur the cost of sending the new officers on a training course. Another reason might have been that his crew agency were unable to supply ECDIS trained officers who, if available at all, are no doubt currently at a premium!

Given the track record of some crew supply agencies I think that we can expect to see a lot of forged ECDIS certificates appearing in the near future.

What about pilots?

Given all the complexities of ECDIS and the myriad of different operating systems the advice to pilots is that an ECDIS should never be used as the primary navigation tool for pilotage.

Finally my thanks go to Harry Gale of the Nautical Institute for permission to freely use information from the NI publication “From paper charts to ECDIS” which is the best publication on ECDIS available at this time. See my review in the April 2009 issue.

JCB

PS This article has been compiled from a wide variety of different sources and so my interpretation may not be totally correct. Please let me know if you find any errors in order that I can correct them accordingly.

READ PART 2 (NAVIGATING USING ECDIS)HERE

The Bristol Channel Sailing Pilot “Skiffs”

JCB — Wed, 23 Dec 2009 12:06:46 +0000

In the October 2007 issue I ran a feature on the pilot gigs of Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly. That feature was based on information contained within a, long since out of print, book called “Azook” by Keith Harris who kindly permitted me to freely use his research for my article. In addition to the gigs, the waters of South West England were also frequented by another famous pilot craft, the Bristol Channel sailing skiff, or cutter as it now more commonly known as. Despite the ongoing massive popularity of this sailing design, the only authoritative book on the craft was written in the 1970’s by Peter Stuckey. The book was updated and re-published in 1999 but again has long since been out of print and used copies rarely appear and attract very high prices. At the time of writing there is one copy on the internet in the USA with an asking price of $216! In what was probably my best investment in recent years, I purchased a copy in 1999 when it was republished and Peter Stuckey has kindly granted me permission to use extracts from the book for this article. As an introduction, I cannot better Peter’s own which dedicates the book to: those brave men of the Bristol Channel who, with their stout boats, went seeking “downalong”

The Pilotage History

In order to better understand the role of the Bristol Channel skiff it is useful to understand the pilotage area that they covered since the pilots also served vessels trading to ports in S Wales as well as Bristol. The picture however is not as clear cut as the name suggests because due to the competition between pilots in those days there are records in the Welsh ports of their own pilots and in a further complication, the Bristol Channel pilots were not based in Bristol at all but at the small village of Pill at the mouth of the river Avon.

The records of pilotage out of Pill go back to 1497 when barge master James Ray was appointed by the Mayor and Corporation of Bristol to pilot John Cabot’s Mathew on its historic voyage to the New World. Pill subsequently became the centre for Bristol Channel pilots but the relationship between Pill and Bristol was not a happy one and this strained relationship could probably fill a book of its own so suffice to note for period covered by this article that the pilots operated under the Bristol Channel Pilotage Act of 1807 from which the following extract defines the pilotage area as;

from a certain Place about Four Miles Eastward of King Road and so down the River Severn and Bristol Channel to the two small islands called the Stipe Holmes and the Flat Holmes … (and their authority shall) be extended to the Appointment of Pilots for the conducting of Ships and Vessels into and out of and upon the whole of the Bristol Channel, and the several Ports, Harbours and Creeks belonging to and issuing from the same … (that is) all Vessels passing up and down and upon the Bristol Channel to and from the Eastward of Lundy Island, and in or upon the several creeks of the said Channels.

The fact that theirs was a tough life can appreciated by the photo of Pill pilots and “Westernmen” taken around 1880!

Pill Pilots & “Westernmen c 1880

The Sailing Skiffs

There are no historical records of skiffs and their construction prior to the early 19th century but like many craft the evolution would have been gradual over the centuries to met the three main requirements of speed, seaworthiness and ease of handling. The very nature of pilotage in those days where pilots were in direct competition with each other would have meant that any design element which gave a new boat the edge over existing boats would have been incorporated by others and there is no doubt that this constant drive to gain advantage over others is what caused these remarkable vessels to not only become the best sailing craft of their day but also for the design to be still one that is world renowned as one of the best blue water sailing craft in the 21st Century.

The earliest reliable record is from the 1795 Register of Ships which was instigated by the Corporation of Bristol that year and lists 12 Skiffs and provides their tonnage which ranged between 14 and 24 tons but no other details. Other records from the early 19th Century provide more details of some skiffs still surviving from the 1780’s & 90’s and the lengths of the craft ranged between 33 ft (10m) and 40 ft (12.2m). The sail plans weren’t recorded but the skiff James and Samuel which is listed in the 1795 register was sold in 1812 and the equipment included 1 mainsail, 2 foresails, 4 jibs, 1 squaresail, 1 gaff topsail and 1 topmast steering sail.

The earliest photograph of a skiff is that of the Trial which belonged to pilot T Vowles (1847 -78). and shows the squaresail yard which was seemingly a common feature on the early skiffs..

The Trial : An early skiff

It may be thought that detailed plans would exist for the cutters, especially those built in the late 19th and early 20th century, but such plans are virtually non existent because the construction lines were either taken from existing hulls or from half hull models. Also there was no “standard” model with lengths generally varying between 40ft ( 2.2m) and 50 ft (15.2m). Despite the variation in length the method of construction and timber used was fairly standard and the construction was usually of English oak, English elm and pitch pine with interior fittings of teak. Despite the lack of detailed drawings there is the following specification for the Kindly Light, a cutter built for Barry pilot Lewis Alexander dated1911:

General Dimensions: 52ft overall, 141/2 ft. beam, about 81/2 ft. draught. Length of keel, 38ft. Vessel to be built with round forefoot and elliptic stem. Cabin to be fitted with 2 berths and usual lockers. Forecastle fitted with 2 berths, lockers and racks for sails. Materials to be the best of their respective description and to be fitted in a workmanlike manner.

Keel: To be of English elm. (Generally the elm keels were in one length and about 18 inches deep and 6 inches wide)

Stem & Stem Posts: Of English oak.

Floors, frames, stanchions and beams: Of oak.

Keelson: Of pitch pine.

Planking: 1 oak plank round top, pitch pine to bilge, stout elm bilge 21/2 inch, remainder of plank of elm or pitch pine l1/2inch.

Rails: To be of elm or oak with greenheart capping.

Decks: Best yellow pine.

Fastenings: To be galvanized iron.

Masts: To be cutter-rigged with pole size as required.

Bowsprit, boom, gaff, topsail yard, two oars, boat hook. Booming out spar. Ironwork on Keel: Ballast iron.

Rigging: Three shrouds each side of 2in wire, forestay 31/2 inch wire running tackle.

Sails: One mainsail, one foresail, two topsails, three jibs, one balloon foresail, one spinnaker.

Painting: Vessel to be scraped, cemented and concreted up to bilge, to have two coats oil paint, two coats paint on bottom and top sides. Cabin to be varnished, forecastle to be grained.

Brasses for rudder head and collar for trunk and head of stem post.

Sundries and Utensils: Four plates, four mugs, cooking stove, knives, forks and spoons, saucepans etc. Foghorn, bulb flashlight, Morse lamp, combination lamp, water tank 60 gallons, table in forecastle. A

As an interesting note, I understand that Kindly Light still exists and is currently being fully restored in time for her centenary.

The performance of any sailing vessel is as dependent upon the cut and set of her sails but especially for pilots since their livelihood depended upon getting out to the boarding ground ahead of the competition.

The mainsail was of cotton in summer and flax in winter and they were fitted with four sets of reef points and were loose footed. An indication of the extreme conditions that these craft had to work in, when set to the fourth set, the gaff jaws were almost down to the boom gooseneck. Later, some cutters were fitted with roller-reefing and so were laced to a wooden jackstay or ‘combe’ along the boom. The disadvantage of this reefing was that as the sail was rolled the leech exerted a load on the boom between the gooseneck and mainsheet and the stronger the wind the greater the stress. However, the risk of a broken boom was more than offset by the ease of handling.

The number of headsails carried depended largely on the affluence of the owner, but in all boats it was usual to have a working foresail, which had two sets of reef-points, a balloon foresail and three jibs, namely the large jib or ‘spinnaker’, working or ‘slave’ jib and storm or ‘spitfire’ jib. One or more topsails were also carried

Pilots didn’t normally tan or ‘cutch’ their sails as it was essential that their number or port initial should stand out clearly, but one Welsh pilot apparently carried a tanned jackyard topsail for reasons of strategy. When cruising amongst the numerous tan-sailed fishing craft, he would set this tanned topsail to disguise himself as one of them, and work out to the westward of a rival cutter, resetting his normal sail when the advantage had been gained. Some pilots made their own sails using skills gained on deep-water sailing ships during their required ‘sea-time’ .

When steamships made their appearance the pilots rapidly exploited the possibility of using the ship to tow the skiff back to port in order for it to be available immediately for the next job! This resulted in the unique structural fitting of heavy towing bits being added to the foredeck of the craft. Somewhat understandably, the crews apparently hated being towed because with the ship steaming at full speed it was exhausting to keep the skiff under control with the foredeck awash!! Pilot Frank Trott actually fitted a proper tug’s towing hook to the fore side of his cutter Marguerite. Marguerite is also still sailing today.

The cutter Cymro under tow! photo N Alexander

The Skiffs at Work

The other important aspect of the skiffs was that handling should be manageable by a cox’n and deck hand so the deck fittings, rigging and layout were designed with the same eye for efficiency as the hull and sail plan.

The mainmast was a stout spar wire shrouds but no backstays, and was usually surmounted by a short fidded topmast which was supported by a topmast forestay and a pair of wire shrouds, but often no spreaders and, again, no topmast backstays. The spars were of pine and very heavy in order to eliminate as much supporting rigging as possible, as in the case of the bowsprit which, although sometimes fitted with an adjustable bobstay wasn’t fitted with shrouds in order to facilitate the frequent adjustments necessary to change jibs or reef jib. The bowsprit was normally shipped through a hole in the bulwark to starboard of the stem post.

Just abaft of the aforementioned bitts was the fore-hatch which gave access to the foc’s'le and forepeak and aft of that a little forward of amidships was the mast. Spare spars and sweeps were stowed fore-and-aft in two vertically mounted iron hoops. Aft of the mast a companion hatch was situated at the fore end of the self draining cockpit. There was usually just one seat athwart-ships at the after end of the cockpit and as additional useful feature, the cutter Pet had a lavatory pan built into one comer of the cockpit seat!

Behind the cockpit coaming was the mainsheet horse and rudder post. The lower mainsheet block was not on a running traveller but was located at the centre of the horse by two very heavy flanking coil springs, or buffers. These buffers were highly necessary as the cutters were frequently gybed all standing as a standard manoeuvre when working and there was seldom time -or hands -to spare for the refinement of overhauling the sheet to ease the load. Generally speaking, the horse was about 2ft to 2ft 6in in length and was mounted between two very strong iron uprights, just high enough to allow clearance for the tiller arm.

The pilot’s boarding punt was kept on the port side, abaft the main rigging, stowed in chocks right way up. This was usually a clinker-built boat about 13ft length often painted white so as to be easily identified at night.

Skiffs generally had fairly high bulwarks, of about 1ft 6in to 2ft, with a removable section through which the punt was launched to be rowed to and from the ship, Many punts had a standing wire strop fastened between the inside of the stem and transom at the point of balance, and to get the punt back on board the cutter a burton from the masthead was made fast to the eye in the strop, thus making it comparatively easy to hoist it inboard.

There were a few deadlights flush mounted into the deck to provide daylight below and there were rarely any ventilators ( they got enough fresh air!) fitted so the decks were clear of obstructions for working.

On station the cutters were required to display a pilot flag which in 1849 became the white over red flag still in use today. At night an all round white light was displayed supplemented by a kerosene flare every 15 minutes with each port having a sequence code for displaying the flare. For example the flare code for Bristol was two shorts and a long. After 1858 the cutters were required to display sidelights at night when underway but contemporary accounts indicate that this was frequently ignored, especially in calms when it was not unusual for cutters to extinguish all their lights and get the sweeps out and row the cutter to gain a Westerly advantage over other cutters. Once a ship was encountered that required the services of the pilot, the ship would heave to while the cutter would work into the lee of the ship and “out punt” to transfer the pilot across for boarding. One man and the pilot would do the rowing whilst the man remaining on board would sail clear single handed and once the pilot had shipped return close under the lee of the ship to recover the punt and other man. The cutter would then either sail or be towed back to the home port ready for the next run out. Occasionally more than one pilot would be on board so the cutter would remain out on station looking for other work. I refer to both the cutter hands as “men” but it was normally the case that these cutter hands were related to the pilots and were pilot apprentices themselves so there was no on board distinction of cox’n and deck hand

“Out Punt” Painting by Peter Stuckey

There are some today who question whether the skiffs were actually sailed by two men but this was definitely the case. Peter Stuckey wrote the book when some of the old sailing pilots were still alive and he undertook interviews which has left us a valuable records of those days. These first hand accounts reveal not just a life of hardship and danger but almost unbelievable accounts of seamanship skills.

The following are extracts from the story of Captain George Buck who served his apprenticeship skiffs in the early 1900’s.

Once we were hove to about 5 miles SW of the Wolf Rock, the wind had died away to a flat calm, the sea like a mirror, very dark without a cloud in the sky and the stars shining in the water the same as in the sky, all the lighthouses showing their lights all around the horizon and the Lizard light flashing in the sky. I was on 12 to 4 watch when a ship’s masthead light came in sight. I took a bearing and saw she would pass a long way to the north of us and, having no wind, the only thing I could do was show the Bristol signal on the flashlight, though as the flashlight was usually used by fishing boats in this area ships generally gave it a wide berth. We were expecting one of Pyman’s ships along, called the Cober, she being five days out from Gibraltar. I decided to call one of the pilots (we had two on board) and when he came on deck I suggested calling the other pilot, launching the punt and pulling as far as possible to get as close as we could, then to show the flashlight and hail her with the megaphone. We pulled until she was abreast of us, still more than a mile away, showed the flashlight and started to hail her, but eventually had to give up and had started to pull back to the skiff when we saw her port light come in sight and she came towards us, and sure enough it was the Cober bound for Bristol. I put the pilot on board and he towed me back to the skiff. The next night we still a flat calm. In the 12 to 4 watch I heard my mate come below and tell the other pilot a ship was in sight a long way to the north. I turned out and suggested another pull, the pilot agreed and this time he took an oar and we made the punt fly through the water, stopping now and again to show the flashlight. We were just deciding to give up when she went hard-a-starboard and steamed towards us. She was bound for Bristol and of course I expected to be towed back to the skiff, but when the pilot suggested this to the captain he told him had lost a blade and a half of his propeller and wanted to make sure of his tide. The pilot looked over the bridge and told me but I did not care, being happy to think we had another ship, and started to row back. After pulling for some time I stopped to see if I could pick up the skiff’s light but with so many stars reflected in the water I could not find it but I could see the Wolf light and knew if I pulled in that direction I was bound to find her. It seemed I had been rowing for hours alone in the world and I started singing to keep myself company. Then I stopped rowing, looked around and saw a light and was close to the skiff. My mate was pleased to see me back and I often wonder how many miles I rowed that night.

….It was very dark as we were approaching Barry entrance when suddenly a blue light (a signal for a pilot), was shown from a large ship at anchor in the roads. We sailed off to her and she was the Everton Grange (twin-screw) bound for Avonmouth. We hailed her, told them to put a ladder over and we would put a pilot on board.

The weather had by now got worse with a strong west wind and confused sea, with the tide ebbing west. The ship was lying across the tide, with the tide running on her lee side at about three knots. This meant we had to keep well to leeward, drop the punt with the pilot and myself, and the man in the skiff would have to get back into the wind, then come back and pick me up. If he lost the wind under her lee the tide would set the skiff down on the ship and do some damage. Everything went along fine. I put the pilot on the ladder and the skiff was coming back to pick me up with sufficient way to take her in to the wind again. I was about to jump aboard with the painter when the pilot hailed us to come back and take the Liverpool pilot in as he wished to catch the first train back to Liverpool in the morning. I rowed back to the ladder and then saw that the skiff had lost the wind and was setting down on the ship and we could do nothing to stop her going alongside. We managed to get a couple of fenders over and she brought up on the ship’s starboard quarter close to the propeller, the tide pinning her there. I made the punt fast to the skiff and asked them to pass us down a rope to heave us clear of the ship’s quarter as every time she rolled she smashed our bulwarks and the propeller was very close. But before we got the rope the propeller started to revolve and we yelled for them to stop it. The engines were stopped right away, they passed us down a rope and as they hove us amidships the pilot looked over the ship’s side and asked what all the shouting was about. I told him we had been close to the propeller and felt sure it had touched our bottom. The pilot, using the ship’s engines, then brought her head to tide and we were able to sail away from her.

I pulled up the floorboards in the steerage to make sure we were not making water as the blades of the propeller had been whizzing round abreast our cockpit. When we found everything was all right we asked if the Liverpool pilot still wanted us to land him. The reply being ‘Yes’, I rowed back to the ladder and took him off. We got alongside the skiff and having hauled the punt on board, set more sail and as we shaped course for Avonmouth I made a pot of tea.The next day the pilot came on board to survey the damage. It was not serious, about six feet of bulwark damaged. We pulled up the floorboards over the pump-well and found she had not made any water. The pilot then asked me why I had been shouting and I told him if he had been on board the skiff with that propeller churning round alongside he also would have done some shouting and I was still of the opinion that the propeller had touched our bottom. About three weeks later we put her on Ilfracombe Strand to scrub and tar her bottom and we found the bottom scored to to a depth of about 1/2 inch over a 3 foot length! It was the only time I was really frightened.

Pilot skiffs at Pill circa 1910

..We were cruising about 30 miles west of Lundy Island in a strong westerly wind and rough sea, expecting the Dominion liner, Manxman. We knew there were no skiffs to the westward of us and if she came along she would be ours. We had three rolls in the mainsail, reefed foresail and storm jib. About midday the pilot decided to run towards the island as the wind was increasing, as sometimes, when blowing hard, the wind would decrease to leeward, but when we got abreast the north end of Lundy the wind increased, so, putting another roll in the mainsail, we decided to run farther up Channel. About 8 pm we rolled the mainsail down with the jaws of the gaff on the mainboom, double reefed the foresail and hove-to, being now between the Nash and Foreland Point.

We never cared to give up the chance of a ship and we were certain if the Manxman came along she would be ours and, being a large ship and loaded, we should manage to board her. At 10 pm the pilot came on deck and the wind seemed to be increasing, with heavy squalls and confused sea, so he told me to put the helm up and run for Barry Roads. This skiff was the old Glance and she would run in any sea and never take any water over the stern. Just before midnight the pilot came on deck again and told me to make a pot of tea and call my mate. This I did and was on my way to the cockpit with a cup for the pilot when I heard a crash and when I got to the cockpit I found that the mainboom had snapped like a carrot. The mainsheet and the end of the boom were towing in the water and the mainsail was in ribbons. We had a difficult job getting the broken piece of boom on board and were afraid it might hit the side and break a plank} but we finally got everything secured and again running before the wind. I thought we should go to Barry but the pilot said we would go to Pill as we would require a new mainsail and mainboom.

Lowering the foresail and jib, we put a spare foresail fore side of the mast, hoisted it up and were away like a scalded cat. When we reached the river we hoisted the reaching foresail aft side of the mast for a mainsail, set the foresail and arrived at Pill just before high water. While we were mooring, the havenmaster’s office hailed the boatman’s shelter to say that the Manxman was in King Road and had asked for a pilot. We had not only lost a mainsail and mainboom but also a good paying ship. That was just the luck of the draw in the days of competitive piloting

This is just a small selection of accounts from George Buck and others in the book but provides a valuable insight into the life of pilots who earned their livelihood from the skiffs. Although several pilots and boatmen lost their lives in this service their losses were remarkably low considering the conditions they suffered and were probably no more than those of other occupations in those times. The testimony as to the seaworthiness of of the skiffs and the relationship between the men and their craft is summed up by George Buck as follows:

….when boarding ships at night during dirty weather, we were always glad when we had the punt back on board. In the daytime we took little notice of the weather and it had to be very bad when we could not board and it was not very often we had to run for shelter. The skiffs were fine craft and in bad weather would heave-to with the fore sheet to windward and the helm lashed a little down and they would work to windward off a lee shore.

Off Duty

The pilots relationship with their skiffs contnued even when they were off duty and racing “Reviews” were held at each port and were enthusiastically supported by the local community. Occasionally the skiffs raced against professional sailing yachts and frequently beat them especially in windy conditions. When on service, speeds of 10 knots were frequently achieved and this speed was often exceeded during racing when the additional sails were set.

Off duty racing.

Ilfracombe was the popular holiday resort for the Bristol Channel and the flat firm sands provided a good place for repairs and sprucing up of the skiffs. The pilots andf crew’s families would be lodged ashore in boarding houses and carnivals and other entertainments were enjoyed by all.

The 21st Century

The remarkable sea keeping qualities of the Bristol Channel skiffs and cutters has ensured their survival, with many original craft having been fully restored and maintained. Although during the latter half of the 20th Century the advent of fibre glass cruising and racing yachts somewhat eclipsed these wonderful craft, in recent years there has been a revival of interest and as well as restorations, lines are being taken from original hulls for new builds. In particular they are increasingly popular for the charter market. In ocean races they continue to win trophies when competing against modern yachts and since 2006 an annual pilot cutter “Review” has been held at St Mawes in Cornwall which is seeing an increase in turnout, despite the economic downturn. Meanwhile the reputation of the design for serious “blue water” cruising remains unsurpassed. Such a legacy is a fitting tribute to those hard working pilots and men who earned their living from these legendary craft.

JCB. With thanks to Peter Stuckey for permission to use extracts from his book.

Read the story of Alfred William Venn, one of the last sailing pilots here (page 8 )

COSCO BUSAN: CRIMINALISATION OF PILOTS IS CONFIRMED!

JCB — Thu, 10 Sep 2009 20:33:38 +0000

In the April issue’s editorial I expressed concern over the fact that the pilot of the Cosco Busan, John cota, had been charged with and had pleaded guilty to causing pollution. In pleading guilty to the pollution charge, John Cota’s case was used as a test case for the Oil Spill Act passed following the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster and the prosecutors were therefore determined to ensure that John cota received the maximum penalty of 10 month’s in prison.

In contrast, The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report, which has now been published, provides a very detailed account (161 pages!) of the events leading up to the incident and reveals that John Cota’s error was compounded by failures of the bridge team and the failure of the VTS to provide support at a critical time. Although the report catalogues “Human element” failures, in my opinion it doesn’t identify any actions which could be identified as criminally negligent. It is therefore all the more worrying that in sentencing John Cota to prison, the prosecutors have set a precedent that will encourage other legal teams around the world to criminalise the pilot.

The following analysis is extracted from the NTSB report and press reports from the trial but the opinions expressed in it are my personal views.

The Cosco Busan after the allision with the Bay Bridge. Photo: NTSB

SUMMARY

On Wednesday, November 7, 2007, about 0830 Pacific standard time, the Hong Kong registered, 901-foot-long containership M/V Cosco Busan allided with the fendering system at the base of the Delta tower of the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge. The ship was outbound from berth 56 in the Port of Oakland, California, and was destined for Busan, South Korea. Contact with the bridge tower created a 212-foot-long by 10-foot-high by 8-foot-deep gash in the forward port side of the ship and breached the Nos. 3 and 4 port fuel tanks and the No. 2 port ballast tank. As a result of the breached fuel tanks, about 53,500 gallons of fuel oil were released into San Francisco Bay. No injuries or fatalities resulted from the accident, but the fuel spill contaminated about 26 miles of shoreline, killed more than 2,500 birds of about 50 species, temporarily closed a fishery on the bay, and delayed the start of the crab-fishing season. Total monetary damages were estimated to be $2.1 million for the ship, $1.5 million for the bridge, and more than $70 million for environmental cleanup. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the allision of the Cosco Busan with the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge was the failure to safely navigate the vessel in restricted visibility as a result of (1) the pilot’s degraded cognitive performance from his use of impairing prescription medications, (2) the absence of a comprehensive pre-departure master/pilot exchange and a lack of effective communication between the pilot and the master during the accident voyage, and (3) the master’s ineffective oversight of the pilot’s performance and the vessel’s progress. Contributing to the accident was the failure of Fleet Management Ltd. to adequately train the Cosco Busan crewmembers before their initial voyage on the vessel, which included a failure to ensure that the crew understood and complied with the company’s safety management system. Also contributing to the accident was the U.S. Coast Guard’s failure to provide adequate medical oversight of the pilot in view of the medical and medication information that the pilot had reported to the Coast Guard.

NTSB CONCLUSIONS

1. The following were neither causal nor contributory to the accident: wind and current; the vessel propulsion and steering systems; the bridge navigation systems; bridge team response to orders; vessel harbor traffic; navigation aids, including the RACON at the center of the Delta–Echo span; maintenance of a proper lookout; pilot training and experience; and vessel traffic service equipment and operational capability.

2. The California Department of Transportation’s assessment of damage to the San Francisco– Oakland Bay Bridge following the allision was timely and appropriate.

3. The California Department of Transportation’s decision to allow the bridge to remain open to traffic after the allision was appropriate.

4. In this accident, the bridge tower fendering system worked as intended to protect the pier structure and to limit damage to the striking vessel to the area above the waterline.

5. The pilot’s order for hard port rudder at the time of the allision was appropriate and possibly limited the damage to the vessel and the bridge fendering system.

6. Although the pilot had been diagnosed with sleep apnea, he was being treated for the condition, and there was no evidence that he was sleep-deprived at the time of the accident.

7. As evidenced by his prescription history and duty schedule, the pilot was most likely taking a number of medications, the types and dosages of which would be expected to degrade cognitive performance, and these effects were present while the pilot was performing piloting duties, including on the day of the accident.

8. The Cosco Busan pilot, at the time of the allision, experienced reduced cognitive function that affected his ability to interpret data and that degraded his ability to safely pilot the ship under the prevailing conditions, as evidenced by a number of navigational errors that he committed.

9. The pilot and the master of the Cosco Busan failed to engage in a comprehensive master/pilot information exchange before the ship departed the dock and failed to establish and maintain effective communication during the accident voyage, with the result that they were unable to effectively carry out their respective navigation and command responsibilities.

10. The master of the Cosco Busan did not implement several procedures found in the company safety management system related to safe vessel operations, which placed the vessel, the crew, and the environment at risk.

11. The interactions between the pilot and the master on the day of the allision were likely influenced by a disparity in experience between the pilot and the master in navigating the San Francisco Bay and by cultural differences that made the master reluctant to assert authority over the pilot.

12. Because the Cosco Busan master was the only crewmember to have been drug tested in a timely manner, no conclusive evidence exists as to whether the use of illegal drugs by the other crewmembers played a role in the accident.

13. Vessel Traffic Service San Francisco personnel, in the minutes before the allision, provided the pilot with incorrect navigational information that may have confused him about the vessel’s heading.

14. Vessel traffic service communications that identify the vessel, not only the pilot, would enhance the ability of vessel masters and crew to monitor and comprehend vessel traffic service communications.

15. Although Vessel Traffic Service San Francisco personnel should have provided the pilot and the master with unambiguous information about the vessel’s proximity to the Delta tower, the Safety Board could not determine whether such information, had it been provided, would have prevented the allision.

16. The lack of U.S. Coast Guard guidance on the use of vessel traffic service authority limited the ability of Vessel Traffic Service San Francisco personnel to exercise their authority to control or direct vessel movement to minimize risk.

17. Even though the pilot’s personal physician, who prescribed the majority of medications to the pilot, was aware of the pilot’s occupation and his medical history, including his documented history of alcohol dependence, he continued to inappropriately prescribe medications that, either individually or in concert, had a high likelihood of adversely affecting the pilot’s job performance.

18. Although the pilot did not disclose to the physician who conducted his January 2007 medical evaluation all of his medical conditions or medication use, as he was required to do, the physician exercised poor medical oversight on behalf of the California Board of Pilot Commissioners by finding the pilot fit for duty despite having collected sufficient information regarding his multiple medical conditions and medications to call into question his ability to perform his piloting duties safely.

19. Although the pilot did not disclose to the U.S. Coast Guard and the California Board of Pilot Commissioners all of his medical conditions or medication use, as he was required to do, the information he did provide should have been sufficient to prompt the Coast Guard, at a minimum, to conduct additional review of the pilot’s fitness for duty.

20. The U.S. Coast Guard, which had the ultimate responsibility for determining the pilot’s medical qualification for retaining his merchant mariner’s license, should not have allowed the pilot to continue his duties because the pilot was not medically fit.

21. The U.S. Coast Guard’s system of medical oversight of mariners continues to be deficient in that it lacks a requirement for mariners to report changes in their medical status between medical evaluations.

22. Fleet Management Ltd. had failed to adequately train the Cosco Busan crewmembers, who were new to the vessel, who had not worked together previously, and who for the most part were new to the company, and this failure contributed to deficient bridge team performance on the day of the accident.

23. Providing a safety management system manual to the Cosco Busan crew only in English and not also in the vessel’s working language limited the crewmembers’ ability to review and follow the SMS.

24. Fleet Management had not successfully instilled in the Cosco Busan master and crew the importance of following all company safety management system procedures.

25. The failure of the U.S. Coast Guard and the California Department of Fish and Game’s Office of Spill Prevention and Response to quickly quantify and relay an accurate estimate of the quantity of oil spilled to the Unified Command did not affect the overall on-water recovery effort in this accident.

26. The Federal on-scene coordinator failed to aggressively use the resources available to him to obtain timely and accurate information about the extent of the spill in order to fulfill his responsibilities.

27. Effective communication regarding response activities was established and maintained between the oil spill response organizations, the qualified individual, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Unified Command on the day of the accident.

28. The designated oil spill response organizations’ level of response to the Cosco Busan fuel oil spill was timely and effective.

29. A mechanism for the collection and regular communication among pilot oversight organizations of pilot-related performance data and information regarding pilot oversight and best practices would enhance the ability of those organizations to effectively oversee pilots.

30. Recently implemented international regulations with regard to the protection of fuel oil tanks on nontank vessels will, over time, reduce the likelihood of oil spills in mishaps such as occurred with the Cosco Busan.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the allision of the Cosco Busan with the San Francisco–Oakland Bay Bridge was the failure to safely navigate the vessel in restricted visibility as a result of (1) the pilot’s degraded cognitive performance from his use of impairing prescription medications, (2) the absence of a comprehensive pre-departure master/pilot exchange and a lack of effective communication between the pilot and the master during the accident voyage, and (3) the master’s ineffective oversight of the pilot’s performance and the vessel’s progress. Contributing to the accident was the failure of Fleet Management Ltd. to adequately train the Cosco Busan crewmembers before the accident voyage, which included a failure to ensure that the crew understood and complied with the company’s safety management system. Also contributing to the accident was the U.S. Coast Guard’s failure to provide adequate medical oversight of the pilot in view of the medical and medication information that the pilot had reported to the Coast Guard.

NTSB Recommendations

To the U.S. Coast Guard:
Propose to the International Maritime Organization that it include a segment on cultural and language differences and their possible influence on mariner performance in its bridge resource management curricula.
Revise your vessel traffic service policies to ensure that vessel traffic service communications identify the vessel, not only the pilot, when vessels operate in pilotage waters.
Provide Coast Guard-wide guidance to vessel traffic service personnel that clearly defines expectations for the use of existing authority to direct or control vessel movement when such action is justified in the interest of safety.
Require mariners to report to the Coast Guard, in a timely manner, any substantive changes in their medical status or medication use that occur between required medical evaluations.
Establish a mechanism through which representatives of pilot oversight organisations collect and regularly communicate pilot performance data and information regarding pilot oversight and best practices.

To Fleet Management Ltd.:

When assigning a new crew to a vessel, ensure that all crewmembers are thoroughly familiar with vessel operations and company safety procedures before the vessel departs the port.
Provide safety management system manuals that are in the working language of a vessel’s crew.

To the American Pilots’ Association:

Inform your members of the circumstances of this accident, remind them that a pilot card is only a supplement to a verbal master/pilot exchange, and encourage your pilots to include vessel masters and/or the officer in charge of the navigational watch in all discussions and decisions regarding vessel navigation in pilotage waters.

In view of all the factors analysed in the report it is a seriously alarming development that the pilot has been held solely responsible and condemned as a criminal. As a pilot with 27 years experience some factor evidently caused him to lose situational awareness at a critical point. The medication that he was taking seems to have been a factor in the loss of situational awareness but did this represent a criminal act? I am no legal expert but I don’t believe that this case should ever have come anywhere near a criminal court. Compare John Cota’s actions with that of a driver of an HGV in Alaska in 2002 whose vehicle collided with a car and killed the two occupants because the driver was watching a film on a DVD player mounted in his cab. That driver faced manslaughter charges but he was acquitted because no law existed prohibiting a driver from operating a DVD in the view of a driver and there are many other cases of road drivers causing death and destruction and walking away unpunished.

In frightening contrast (and I mean to be alarmist here!), the prosecutors in John Cota’s trial were determined to condemn the pilot and this now has set a precedent for any pilot who may be unfortunate enough to have the conduct of a vessel which is involved in an incident that results in pollution or death. An exaggeration? Take careful note of these accounts from the trial:

In papers filed in court, prosecutors told the judge that Captain Cota should receive a sentence of incarceration because he was “guilty of far more than a mere slip-up or an otherwise innocuous mistake that yielded unforeseeably grave damage. Rather, he made a series of intentional and negligent acts and omissions, both before and leading up to the incident that produced a disaster that, as widespread as it was, could have had even worse consequences.”

“Captain Cota abandoned ship by not following required safety procedures which then resulted in an environmental disaster”

“The court’s sentence of John Cota should serve as a deterrent to shipping companies and mariners who think violating the environmental laws that protect our nation’s waterways will go undetected or unpunished,” said Joseph P. Russoniello, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California. “They will be vigorously prosecuted.”

Imposing a prison sentence rather than a fine, U.S. District Judge Susan Illston said, “I know there is a lot of blame to go around and there were a lot of authors in this tragedy, but I think Captain Cota was right in the middle of that.”

She stated that Congress had made it a crime to engage in negligence resulting in an oil spill “in order to protect the environment against the very kinds of things that have happened here.”

John Cota’s legal team are of the opinion that, by criminalising the pilot, the lessons of the Cosco Busan accident will not be learnt and have identified the following failures that contributed to the disaster:

The Cosco Busan’s master, Captain Sun, failed to adequately supervise his crew and exercise any responsibility for ensuring the safe navigation of the vessel even though under well-established international law, the master is always in charge of his ship and the pilot acts only as his advisor;

The Cosco Busan’s master ultimately gave the final approval to sail;
The crew failed to take fixes at frequent intervals as required by international law, and at least every 5 minutes as required by Fleet Management’s policies, to ensure the safe navigation of the vessel in a congested area such as the San Francisco Bay;
No one told Captain Cota that the electronic chart on the Cosco Busan was not IMO certified, and therefore should not be used in place of the paper chart;
The fog signals on the Delta and Echo Towers were not working and cannot be heard at any time on the ship’s bridge recorder;
The master did not know how to operate his ship’s electronic chart system and failed to either admit his ignorance or ask for help. As a result, when Captain Cota twice asked him for assistance, the master “guessed” at the meaning of the red symbols, first telling Captain Cota they were “lights on . . . bridge” and later, after VTS called, confirmed they marked the “center of the bridge”;
The crew falsified various checklists and work logs (i.e., the work logs reflected that the crew was getting more rest than was actually the case);
At the master’s direction, the crew collaborated on their “story,” and continued to be less than forthcoming even though the government gave them immunity from prosecution. The master in particular made statements under oath at various times that he later repudiated during his Rule 15 deposition.
The master never told Captain Cota that he did not know or understand the symbols on his electronic chart or that he could have “queried” the symbols and learned that they were the red/green/red buoys in front of the Delta Tower;
At the direction of Fleet Management’s Superintendents, the crew falsified documents after the accident to make it appear that the ship’s records were “complete” for the upcoming audit and/or government investigation;
The Chief Officer abandoned his post at the bow of the ship and went to the mess hall to have a “meal and a smoke” shortly before the accident and later lied about this fact to the Coast Guard;
The crew aboard the vessel, including the master, failed to adequately perform its duties in violation of international law—in particular, there was no pre-departure passage planning and none of the mandatory bridge team management procedures were followed
The master failed to direct his crew to prepare a berth-to-berth passage plan prior to departing the Port of Oakland even though Fleet Management’s own policies required such a plan;
The master failed to place a dedicated lookout on the bridge on the morning of November 7, 2007;
The radars aboard the Cosco Busan were not properly tuned: the gain had been turned up considerably to compensate for the anti-clutter device that was mistakenly left in auto-mode by the master while his ship was in the Bay;
The master also violated international law when he claimed not to know that the Cosco Busan’s intended route to sea was through the Delta-Echo span of the Bay Bridge or that the course drawn by his crew on his ship’s paper chart was not through the center of the span but was much closer to the Delta bridge tower
Fleet Management’s Superintendents, who were on board the ship on November 7, 2007 before the ship sailed, and the ship’s master, failed to recognize the need to take any extra precautions or even consider delaying the ship’s departure given the foggy conditions that morning
The master claimed not to know that his ship was headed in the direction of the Delta Tower because he allegedly did not know how the pilot intended to direct the ship through the Bay Bridge as it departed its berth in Oakland
VTS failed to give a warning that the Cosco Busan was heading toward the Delta Tower of the Bay Bridge. Had a warning been given even within the last minute or so, the ship could have safely traveled through the Charlie-Delta span;
VTS failed to follow its standing orders and mission statement to “coordinate the safe and efficient transit of vessels in San Francisco Bay in an effort to prevent accidents” by either making recommendations or issuing directions “to control the movement of vessels in order to [protect] . . . the environment

A STATEMENT FROM JOHN COTA

Following sentencing, John Cota issued the following statement through his legal team:

Today marks the first time in over 200 years of maritime history of the United States that the government has sent a Bar Pilot to prison for an accident.

Captain John Cota, a man who literally grew up on the San Francisco Bay, is devastated by the events of November 7, 2007. Having spent over 27 years as a Bar Pilot, and having worked on the waterfront since he was 12, Captain Cota is deeply tied to the Bay. For the rest of his life, Captain Cota will bear the stigma of his role in the November 7, 2007 oil spill.

Captain Cota apologizes for his actions.

Sending a hardworking man to prison, who was just trying to do his job, for errors in judgment, is a very tough life lesson that Captain Cota wishes on no one.

Captain Cota hopes people understand that many factors – not just his actions – contributed to the cause of this tragic event. Yet, he alone has been singled out for prosecution, and he alone will be going to prison.

Captain Cota accepts his share of responsibility. But for lessons to be learned and carried forward to prevent this type of incident from ever occurring again – the multiple errors of all involved must be recognized. To date, this has not been done. Even the NTSB investigation was woefully inadequate and missed key evidence and critical facts.

The ship’s managers share in the responsibility for this accident by having:

Allowed an unseaworthy ship to sail, with a vessel manned by a poorly-trained crew, supervised by an incompetent master; and
Generated false documents after the accident to cover up its misdeeds.

The United States Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service (“VTS”) also shares in the responsibility for this accident. VTS made the conscious decision not to warn the Cosco Busan that it was heading straight for the Bay Bridge Tower in the fog.

It is baffling why these vessel traffic professionals sat silent in their control tower and did nothing to try to keep this tragic accident from happening. There is persuasive expert opinion that there was ample time for VTS to warn, and had it done so, even within the last minute or so, there was still time for the ship to avoid hitting the bridge. The government must review its own procedures, in addition to prosecuting others, to make sure we never have a similar incident in the future.

In the end, Captain Cota hopes that this process is not just about blaming and punishing one man, but about finding solutions to making the Bay a safer place. Captain Cota appreciates the support he has received from family and friends.

DOES ALL THIS AFFECT UK PILOTS?

What happens in the USA inevitably sets a precedent for court cases here in the UK so the answer is yes and the only way that any pilot can defend himself is to ensure that procedures, especially the Master / pilot exchange are as comprehensive as possible. Can’t be bothered? Take careful note of the following court statement:

Where it is possible to guard against a foreseeable risk, which, though perhaps not great, nevertheless cannot be called remote or fanciful, by adopting a means, which involves little difficulty or expense, the failure to adopt such means will in general be negligent.

As Australian pilot and senior IMPA Vice president observes:

The primary defence against negligence claims is “due diligence.” This really means that a reasonable person (in the eyes of a court) in the same position would have undertaken certain procedures and processes to ensure whatever it is that did happen, on the balance of probabilities, shouldn’t have happened.

This means that the courts could ask, “what could have guarded against the risk of the accident occurring?“. The answer is, “A proper Master / Pilot exchange including a passage plan with contingencies that would enable a shared mental model by the bridge team (what we all know as BRM).” To which the courts could then ask the following question, “how much does it cost to have a proper MPX and produce a passage plan?”…..to which the answer is, “two minutes of time and about 20 cents for a sheet of paper”

AND FINALLY….

Just in case you still doubt that criminalization of pilots is just something that happens in the USA, the following has been received from EMPA:

On 1st August 2004 Capt Calvi boarded the Cruise Ferry ‘Danielle Casanova’

to help the Captain berthing in Marseilles harbour. Due to sudden weather

changes and the constriction of the area the ship hit a pontoon with a

residual speed (less than ½ knot), after avoiding a collision with another

ferry and dropping an emergency anchor. Unfortunately there were passengers

boarding another ferry moored on the opposite side of the pontoon. During

the collision, the pontoon chains were broken and a car fell into the water

resulting in one fatality. After many years of investigation Captain Calvi

is facing charges for his conduct and he is now involved in a criminal

prosecution, together with the Ferry’s Captain, Gérard Bouvier.

JCB

The full NTSB report can be downloaded from:

www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2009/MAR0901.pdf

FOG & PILOTAGE

JCB — Thu, 25 Jun 2009 20:00:04 +0000

In fog. proceed with caution and obey the COLREGS! Photo: MAIB

Fog has always been one of the elements to cause most concern to the mariner, especially in coastal waters, and in the days before radar the prudent navigator would frequently stop or anchor and wait until the fog cleared before continuing on passage. Similarly, once in pilotage waters, pilots would also anchor and await clearer visibility rather than risk a collision or grounding by continuing on passage. The advent of radar enabled vessels to proceed in fog and, as watchkeepers became familiar with using it, vessels were able to maintain schedules and then commercial pressures to proceed at full speed regardless of the visibility inevitably impinged upon safety. A series of fog related disasters led to new Collision Regulations (COLREGS) which dramatically reduced collisions and groundings in fog and these fog rules are also applicable in pilotage waters. As radar and GPS technology improved and with VTS able to provide traffic overviews, the primary limiting factor became the ability of tugs to manoeuvre vessels but although vessels requiring tug assistance were unable to proceed, other vessels continued to navigate normally in order to maintain schedules. The very nature of pilotage waters results in reduced safety parameters and these are obviously further eroded in fog. Four MAIB investigations have taken place during the last three years into fog related incidents, one of which resulted in a tragic loss of three lives and so all pilots would be well advised to read the full reports and take careful note of the findings.

The following are the “synopsis” and “conclusions” from the MAIB reports. The relevant sections within the full text are shown in brackets.

SKAGEN & SAMSKIP COURIER

Read the full MAIB report HERE

In June 2006, the general cargo ship Skagern and the container ship Samskip Courier collided in the Humber estuary in dense fog. Samskip Courier sustained minor damage to her bow but Skagern was extensively damaged forward and required major repairs.

Skagern had embarked her pilot Spurn light float and following the master/pilot exchange the vessel proceeded inbound towards King George Dock, Hull at a speed of 11.5 kts.

Samskip Courier had embarked a pilot at King George Dock, and after leaving the dock proceeded seaward at speeds of up to 12.5kts, in thick fog.

Both pilots were experienced and aware that the vessels would meet each other at some point; they had talked to each other on mobile telephones, and VTS also informed them of each other’s location. The vessels acquired each other on radar when some 2 miles apart but neither vessel plotted the other on radar as they converged.

VHF radio communications between the two pilots, together with the radar images, revealed that the vessels were on a collision course. The subsequent attempts at emergency avoidance were unsuccessful, and the ships collided head-on.

The ensuing MAIB investigation identified contributing factors to the accident which included:

• Failure to apply long established collision avoidance methods by the masters and pilots of both vessels.

• Pilot /master relationships: the masters’ over reliance on the pilots.

• Poor interaction and communications among the bridge teams.

• Loss of situational awareness by Samskip Courier’s pilot.

• The positioning of Sand End light float.

• Use of mobile telephones on the bridge.

Tracks of Samskip Courier & Skagen prior to the collision MAIB

CONCLUSIONS

3.1 SAFETY ISSUES

1. Humber Estuary Services’(HES) Port and Vessel Information System (PAVIS) recorded erroneous information about the master of Samskip Courier’s PEC status. [2.6]

2. Neither master exercised his right to take the con of their ships when it became apparent that a serious situation was developing. This was due to a misplaced trust in the pilots’ experience and ability. [2.8]

3. The bridge manning levels on both vessels were inadequate for the prevailing circumstances and conditions. There was little guidance given on watch manning levels in Samskip Courier’s BPM. [2.9]

4. Neither pilot queried the bridge manning levels on their respective vessels.[2.9]

5. Masters frequently take the opportunity to relax their vigilance when they have a pilot on board. [2.9]

6. Bridge team management was weak on both ships. No briefing or discussion of individual’s roles took place after the pilots boarded. [2.10]

7. Both pilots took over the con of their respective vessels without any formal andover taking place. [2.10]

8. The pilot master exchange on Samskip Courier was inadequate with neither the pilot or master giving each other enough information. [2.10] [2.11]

9. There was poor bridge teamwork and interaction, more so on Samskip Courier, culminating in a failure of the groups to operate as a team and in particular, monitor and question the actions of the pilots. [2.10]

10. There were repeated failures of key personnel to communicate with each other throughout. This impinged upon bridge team interaction. [2.11]

11. VHF radio familiarisation did not take place on Samskip Courier despite there being adequate time to do so whilst the ship was in the lock. This ultimately led to the pilot losing situational awareness at a crucial time. [2.12]

12. Pilots’ mobile telephones were used as the means of communication between the two vessels before and after the accident, resulting in the masters being excluded from the information exchange regarding their own ships. [2.13]

13. There was a failure to apply established collision avoidance measures by the pilots and masters of both vessels, namely:

• The vessels were travelling at an unsafe speed for the prevailing circumstances and conditions.

• There was a failure to determine early risk of collision by using systematic radar plotting or long range scanning techniques.

• Evasive actions to avoid collision were inadequate.

• Samskip Courier strayed from her side of the channel

• Accepted radar navigation principles for the prevailing circumstances were not applied.

• Restricted visibility sound signals were not used despite the prevailing conditions. [2.14]

14. The excessive speeds were possibly indicative of complacency through habitual risk-taking and a failure to perceive approaching danger. [2.15]

15. The vessels were steered from buoy to buoy using radar as the primary means of navigation without applying parallel indexing, long range scanning or clearing bearings. [2.17]

16. Positional information was not queried or relayed by the master of Samskip Courier to the pilot. [2.17]

17. Samskip Courier’s radar had a mapping facility which, if used appropriately, would have helped maintain situational awareness and possibly prevent the accident. [2.17]

18. Sand End light float was not best placed to indicate the proximities of the navigational channel. [2.18]

19. Both masters and pilots failed to take positive decisive action when it became apparent a serious situation had developed. [2.19]

20. The ship masters did not verbally query the actions of their pilots thus interfering with the process of them taking the con away from the pilots. [2.19]

21. The pilot of Samskip Courier misjudged the effect the tide and consequentially kept too far to Skagern’s side of the channel. [2.20]

22. Samskip Courier did not standby the stricken vessel, Skagern, until other assistance arrived. [2.21]57

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Port Marine Safety Code Steering Group is recommended to:

2007/121 Promulgate to pilots, by way of Port Authorities, a reminder on the importance of abiding by the International Collision Regulations at all times, and in particular Rule 6, Safe Speed, when navigating in confined waters in restricted visibility.

2007/122 Promulgate to Port Authorities the need for pilots to maintain dialogue with the bridge team regarding the conduct and execution of the passage plan, thus ensuring the team is kept fully involved, and informed, at all times.

2007/123 Highlight to Port Authorities the risks in using mobile telephones for passing operational information. They should emphasise the need for pilots to use mobile telephones only under controlled situations, and avoid the exchange of operational information which should more appropriately be transmitted by radio.

ABP Humber Estuary Services is recommended to:

2007/124 Discourage its pilots from using mobile telephones for discussing operational matters pertinent to the safe navigation of vessels when VHF radio is available.

The International Chamber of Shipping is recommended to:

2007/125 Through its member organisations, emphasise the need for shipowners to ensure masters are given clear guidelines which detail the importance of effective dialogue with pilots, and identifies the need for masters to challenge or question decisions or actions taken by pilots at an early stage so that, when required, effective corrective action can be taken to prevent accidents.

SEA EXPRESS & ALASKA RAINBOW

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources/Sea%20Express%201_Alaska%20Rainbow.pdf

SYNOPSIS

At 1138 (UTC) on 3 February 2007, the high speed ferry Sea Express 1 and the general cargo vessel Alaska Rainbow collided on the River Mersey in thick fog. The collision holed the starboard hull of the ferry, causing her to list and trim significantly within seconds. Alaska Rainbow was bound for Birkenhead Docks. Two tugs were attached before the vessel arrived off the lock. Here, the pilot turned the vessel to stem the tide and await the scheduled docking time, and for the visibility to clear enough for a safe approach to be made.

Sea Express 1 was bound for Liverpool Landing Stage. At 1033, as Sea Express 1 approached the Bar Light Buoy, the trainee captain made contact with Mersey Radio (VTS), who passed the positions of other traffic and advice that visibility in the river was poor. No mention was made of Alaska Rainbow.

Sea Express 1 proceeded inwards, reducing her speed over the ground to about 7 knots. At 1138, in the vicinity of Alfred Lock, Sea Express 1 took action to avoid Alaska Rainbow’s forward tug, which had suddenly appeared out of the fog directly ahead. Seconds later Alaska Rainbow appeared, and Sea Express 1 took further avoiding action. However, this was too late, and Sea Express 1’s starboard quarter and Alaska Rainbow’s bow collided. The collision tore a large hole in the starboard hull of Sea Express 1, immediately flooding the engine room and jet pump room effectively disabling the vessel. Sea Express 1 was towed to the Liverpool Landing Stage, where the passengers were disembarked.

Mersey Docks and Harbour Company (MDHC) and Isle of Man Steam Packet Company Limited (IMSPCL) have taken a number of actions following the accident, particularly with respect to VTS operations, pilotage training and the allocation of bridge team duties in preparation for type rating examinations.

Sea Express 1 being towed to the Liverpool Landing Stage Photo: MAIB

Conclusions

Factors related to Sea Express 1:

-A ground stabilised radar display was not used in the confined waters of a river transit, thereby making it difficult for the operator to distinguish moving targets from land radar returns. [2.2.1]

-The initial communication made by Sea Express 1’s captain to VTS lacked urgency and detail as to the seriousness of the situation, thereby delaying an appropriate external emergency response. [2.5.5]

-The allocation of bridge team duties in preparation for the type rating examination was unclear, resulting in the presence of other vessels in the vicinity to be missed during the period immediately leading up to the collision. [2.2.1] [2.2.2] [2.2.3]

Factors related to Alaska Rainbow:

-The pilot did not proactively communicate with Sea Express 1 and VTS at an early stage to ensure that all parties were aware of the hazard that Alaska Rainbow presented to other traffic, resulting unnecessarily in the development of a close quarters situation. [2.3.1]

-The pilot was not proactive in requiring support, and neither the master nor the OOW was proactive in providing support to the pilot, thereby unnecessarily increasing the pilot’s workload. [2.3.3]

-Neither the pilot nor the master ordered fog signals to be sounded, thereby omitting a means by which Sea Express 1 might have been alerted to the presence of Alaska Rainbow. [2.2.2]

-The pilot was insufficiently practiced in maintaining Alaska Rainbow’s position in the prevailing circumstances, resulting in the vessel moving significantly between the west bank and mid-river. [2.3.2]

Factors related to the VTS station:

-No fog routine was in place, thereby preventing a closer watch on vessel movements being maintained to ensure safe traffic flow at times of restricted visibility. [2.4.3] [2.4.4]

-The VTS duty staff were expected to absorb the additional workload that operation in restricted visibility demands; an independent audit of the Port of Liverpool’s safety management system might have identified this shortfall. [2.4.5]

-A review of the Mersey Channel Collision Rules on the sound signals required of vessels manoeuvring in close proximity during periods of restricted visibility would appear to be appropriate. [2.2.2]

-The VTSOs were not proactive in ascertaining further information following the initial report of the collision and in notifying Liverpool Coastguard, thereby delaying an appropriate emergency response. [2.5.4] [2.5.5]

-Additional workload created by the VTSOs having to take pilotage bookings at a time when performance of their normal duties was at a peak, had the potential to result in the VTSO responsible for the Information Service becoming distracted. [2.4.2]

-Specific risks associated with the carriage of passengers had not been separately assessed, particularly with regard to emergency response. [2.5.4]

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Isle of Man Steam Packet Company Limited is recommended to:

2007/185 Review its Safety Management System with particular respect to:

• using ground stabilised radar display in the confined waters of a river transit;

• improving external communications in the event of an emergency in terms of urgency and detail.

2007/186 Ensure that the passenger safety instruction card illustrates the lifejacket to be found under the seat for which the card is provided.

J.G.Goumas (Shipping) Co. S.A. is recommended to:

2007/187 Ensure its masters are given clear guidelines which detail the importance of effective dialogue with pilots and identify the need for the ship’s bridge team to:

• be proactive in providing support to pilots;

• challenge decisions or actions taken by pilots at an early stage so that, when required, effective corrective action can be taken to prevent accidents.

Mersey Docks and Harbour Company is recommended to:

2007/188 Complete its review of compliance with the requirements of the PMSC with particular reference to:

• VTS operations, ensuring that an effective fog routine is established and that the VTS station is sufficiently manned to absorb the additional workload that operation in restricted visibility demands, and that VTSOs are proactive in ascertaining further information in the event of incident;

• Pilotage best practice, highlighting the need for pilots to proactively communicate with approaching vessels and VTS at an early stage to avoid unnecessary development of a close quarters situation; to be proactive in requiring support from the ship’s bridge team; and to sound appropriate fog signals in restricted visibility.

2007/189 Following satisfactory completion of its review into PMSC compliance, invite the MCA to conduct a PMSC verification visit to the Port of Liverpool.

2007/190 Review the Mersey Channel Collision Rules with respect to sound signals required by vessels manoeuvring in close proximity during periods of restricted visibility.

AUDACITY & LEONIS

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources/Audacity_Leonis.pdf

SYNOPSIS

At 1351 on 14 April 2007, the UK registered product tanker Audacity was involved in a collision with the Panama registered general cargo ship Leonis, in very poor visibility, in the precautionary area at the entrance to the River Humber. Both vessels sustained damage to their bows. Fortunately there were no injuries and no pollution was caused. Audacity had been outward bound from Immingham Oil Terminal and was approaching the precautionary area in order to disembark her pilot. Leonis had entered the precautionary area from seaward and had just completed embarking her pilot. The MAIB investigation found that the operation of the bridge team on Audacity was inadequate, and the extent of the VTS area and VTS powers was not clearly understood by the VTS operators. The investigation identified contributing factors to the accident; these included:

• The pilots and bridge teams, on both vessels, did not make a full assessment of the

risk of collision.

• VTS procedures for managing traffic in the precautionary area were insufficient.

• VTS operators were unaware of the poor visibility in parts of the VTS area.

• Humber VTS did not have a formal operating procedure for periods of reduced visibility.

• Communications were poor.

• The Port Authority misunderstood how risk assessment could be used to improve the effectiveness of the VTS operations. As a result of this accident, Associated British Ports Humber Estuary Services (ABP HES) has taken several actions to improve the performance of the VTS, pilots and pilot boarding operations.

The VTS view showing a dangerous situation developing Photo: MAIB

Safety issues directly contributing to the accident which have resulted in recommendations

1. The procedure for a pilot/coxswain briefing prior to embarking the vessel was

not conducted efficiently. The radar equipment available in the launch was liable

to severe shadow effect while close to vessels, making the identification of navigational markers unreliable. [2.11]

Other safety issues identified during the investigation also leading to recommendations

1. From historical data, incidents in the Humber Estuary are occurring more frequently than weighted in their current risk matrix. This indicates the risk is greater than initially allowed for or that the safety barriers are insufficient or ineffective. [2.3 / 2.5.2]

2. There were no detailed marine policies applied throughout the group, which made the auditing of ports within the ABP group for compliance with the PMSC more difficult. [2.5.1]

3. Risk analysis should be reviewed as a matter of routine after any serious incident to ensure the effectiveness of the safety barriers or to evaluate the need for additional barriers. [2.5.1]

Safety issues identified during the investigation which have

not resulted in recommendations but have been addressed

1. Due to a combination of circumstances the VTS operator allowed Leonis to drift into a dangerous position close to the exit from the outbound TSS. This action was compounded by the lack of traffic information to either Leonis or Audacity about the position of the other. [2.10.1 / 2.10.4]

2. Main Highway’s transit of the precautionary area, at speed, and with substantial alterations of course during the pilot boarding operation, was not good seamanship, nor was it commented on by VTS. [2.8.1]

3. The powers of the AHM to give advice and guidance to vessels operating inside the VTS area, but outside the port limits, were not fully understood, and there was reluctance for operators to issue proactive information to vessels within the precautionary area. [2.6.1 / 2.10.1]

4. It was incumbent on VTS to ensure that its plan for boarding of pilots recognized the need for vessels arriving at the boarding area to be properly separated both geographically and in time. [2.6.2]

5. The VDR recording from Leonis was incomplete, and information regarding helm and engine status was not recorded. There were no procedures in the SMS for the use and maintenance of VDR equipment. [2.4]

6. Routine information broadcasts, including visibility reports, were made every 2

hours. Although several reports of reduced visibility were received, no formal re-assessment was made of the visibility in the estuary and no additional broadcasts were made. There were no formal reduced visibility procedures and no requirements for reduced visibility to be reported. [2.6.2]

7. Humber VTS had no formal procedures for the preservation of records in the event of an incident. [2.6.3]

8. Leonis altered course towards the northwest because both master and pilot were unaware of the presence of Audacity. As a result, no assessment of the risk of collision was made before manoeuvring. [2.7.1 / 2.7.4]

9. ARPA was not used effectively on either vessel to assess risk of collision. By the time the ARPA was used on Leonis, it was too late for it to provide reliable information. [2.7.4 / 2.9.5]

10. Effectively, no-one held the con on the bridge of Audacity because both the master and pilot had deferred to the other, there was no discussion or questioning of the intentions of Leonis, and at a critical time they involved themselves with tasks that were inappropriate given the impending close quarters situation.

[2.9.1 / 2.9.2]

11. The bridge on Audacity was insufficiently manned in the circumstances and conditions. It did not comply with company requirements or HES instructions to pilots, however no additional resources were requested by the pilot. [2.9.2]

12. Despite advising the pilot of Leonis that he would take action and come to the south, the pilot of Audacity did not alter course. This lack of action was not questioned by the master or the VTS operator, and the pilot of Audacity did not advise Leonis’s pilot that he no longer intended to act as agreed. [2.9.2 / 2.10.3]

13. The communication between all parties involved was unclear and prone to misunderstanding, and use of standard marine phrases was not practised. [2.10]

14. VTS operators did not consider they were able to give advice and guidance to vessels with pilots on board. It was considered that the pilot would know what he was doing and that the operator did not need to be further involved once a pilot was on board. [2.10.2]

15. Communications from the VTS operator and P/L Venus were ambiguous and confusing. They were not result orientated and did not use identifier markers. Requests for specific information were inappropriately answered. [2.10.5 / 2.11]

Recommendations

UK Major Ports Group and British Ports Association are recommended to:

2008/103 Inform their members of the MAIB’s advice that they should consider how best to review how pilots can be helped to gain proper orientation of the traffic and navigational situation prior to boarding vessels to conduct acts of pilotage.

Associated British Ports Group is recommended to:

2008/104 Develop Group Marine Policies covering headline issues which can be implemented throughout the ports within the Group. Such policies should encompass, but not be limited to, training, risk assessment, and development and promulgation of best practice.

2008/105 Develop an auditing process to verify compliance with the group marine policies, including procedures which track the status of audit findings until agreed

corrective actions have been implemented.

LOSS OF TUG FLYING PHANTOM WHILST TOWING THE RED JASMINE IN FOG.

www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources/Flying%20Phantom.pdf

SYNOPSIS

On 19 December 2007, the tug Flying Phantom was girted and sank while acting as a bow tug. She was assisting the bulk carrier Red Jasmine during a transit of the River Clyde in thick fog. Three of the tug’s four crew were lost; only the mate managed to escape from the tug’s wheelhouse and was subsequently rescued.

After Flying Phantom’s tow line had parted during the capsize, the pilot on board Red Jasmine completed the transit to the berth safely, in the thick fog, with only a stern tug to assist him.

The investigation has identified a number of factors which contributed to the accident,

including:

• The emergency release system for the towing winch on board Flying Phantom had operated, but not quickly enough to prevent the tug from capsizing.

• There were no defined operational limits or procedures for the tug operators when assisting/towing in restricted visibility.

• The routine observed by the tug’s crew prior to towing or entering fog was ineffective, resulting in the watertight engine room door being left open and the crew not being used in the most effective manner once the fog was encountered.

• The port risk assessment was poor, and the few control measures that had been put in place after a previous similar serious accident in thick fog proved ineffective.

• The port’s reliance on their ISO9001 quality management system audits to highlight safety concerns was fatally flawed.

• The lack of an individual to fulfil the role of “designated person” had resulted in major shortcomings in the port’s safety management system being overlooked.

• UK ports appear to have been failing to learn lessons from accidents at other ports.

• The lack of an accepted international industry standard for tug tow line emergency release systems.

CONCLUSIONS

Safety issues directly contributing to the accident which

have resulted in recommendations

1. Although the tow line emergency release mechanism operated after the mate activated the system, it did not act quickly enough to prevent the girting of Flying

Phantom. [2.4.1].

2. Towing winches are not generally regarded as equipment that should be the subject of class surveys. Additionally, there is no clear standard defining the time or loading within which the towing winch brake should release. [2.4.3]

3. There were no defined limits for tug towing operations in restricted visibility. If fog was encountered, there was no appropriate procedure or training provided to ensure tug crews could continue to operate safely. [2.5]

4. In the event of encountering fog, the bridge ergonomics of Flying Phantom were not suited to conducting blind pilotage operations. [2.5]

5. There were no formal pre-towing checks to ensure the necessary preparations had been completed prior to towing. This resulted in the engine room watertight door being open, which reduced the tug’s residual stability and, therefore, her ability to right herself when experiencing a heeling load. [2.6.1]

6. Once Flying Phantom had entered the fog bank, her personnel were not used to best advantage to ensure the vessel navigated safely in the narrow confines of the

River Clyde. [2.6.2]

7. Clydeport had no effective system for assessing the risk of fog. Although the area in which the accident occurred was known to be susceptible to fog, there was no reliable means of detecting the arrival of fog on the River Clyde, or warning river users of its presence. [2.7.3]

8. While a procedure for operating in restricted visibility was provided in the port’s safety management system, it was ineffective. Specifically, although a lay-by berth was detailed for consideration, it was not appropriate for a vessel of Red Jasmine’s size, and the pilot had little choice other than to continue to the ship’s intended destination, at Shieldhall Riverside Quay [2.7.4]

9. Clydeport’s risk assessment was immature, and many of the control and counter measures put in place were ineffective. It is vital that a comprehensive review of the port’s risk assessment is conducted urgently by an independent marine expert to rectify this position. [2.8.1]

10. Many of the recommendations from the Abu Agila accident, which occurred in thick fog, were not followed up, and the subsequent control measures were not implemented or were ineffective. [2.8.2]

11. There were a number of inconsistencies and conflicts within Clydeport’s SMS documentation. These had the potential to cause confusion and permitted too much flexibility in interpretation. [2.8.3]

12. Clydeport’s ISO9001 audits were not effective at highlighting any gaps in safety procedures or the adequacy of the safety procedures in place. Furthermore, the audit approach did not provide a means of checking that the underpinning risk assessments were adequate. [2.8.4]

13. Clydeport’s board was receiving a false impression of the safety performance of the port by relying on the ISO9001 system acting as the designated person. Given the safety management system shortcomings identified in this investigation, it is considered essential that Clydeport needs to appoint an appropriately qualified individual to the post of designated person under the Port Marine Safety Code. [2.8.5]

Safety issues identified during the investigation which have

not resulted in recommendations but have been addressed

1. The liferaft painter was attached to the tug directly without a weak link. Although having no bearing on this accident, if Flying Phantom had been lost in deeper water, the liferaft, even if it had inflated, would have been lost with the tug. [1.7.7]

2. Lessons from an accident at one port are not always being learnt by other. [2.9]

Recommendations

Clydeport Ltd is recommended to:

2008/161 Appoint an appropriately qualified individual to the post of designated person under the Port Marine Safety Code.

2008/162 Conduct an urgent review of its port risk assessment and safety management system to ensure:

• Requirements, conditions, controls and operational limitations for the safe transit of large vessels on the Clyde are clearly defined.

• Ambiguities or conflicts within its SMS documentation are removed.

• The company’s SMS is subject to routine audits by an independent and appropriately qualified marine professional.

• Limitations and/or working procedures relating to the operation of tugs in restricted visibility are agreed with the port tug operators and incorporated into standard operating procedures.

Lloyd’s Register is recommended to:

2008/163 Take forward a proposal to IACS to develop a standard for tug tow line winch emergency release systems, to ensure tow lines can be released effectively when under significant loads in an emergency.

Svitzer Marine Ltd. in association with the BTA is recommended to:

2008/164 Derive limitations and associated necessary guidelines and training for the operation of tugs in restricted visibility. Ensure that ports and pilots are aware of such limitations and guidelines.

The British Tugowners Association is recommended to:

2008/165 Highlight to its members the importance of tug crews’ emergency preparedness, including:

• maintaining watertight integrity

• functionality of tow line emergency release systems

• limitations and procedures for operating in restricted visibility

MARNIS & POADSS

JCB — Sun, 15 Mar 2009 22:03:02 +0000

As you will be aware, the UKMPA have been involved in the European Maritime Navigation Information Services (MarNIS) project for four years and EMPA have been the project leaders for the development of the Portable Operational Approach and Decision Support System (POADSS) which developed from the Innovative Portable Pilot Assistant (IPPA) project which ran from 2000 – 2003.

Our “front man” on the POADSS project has been Southampton pilot, Nigel Allen who, along with other pilots from within EMPA, has achieved the rare distinction of producing a fully working unit on time and on budget. The project culminated in a successful live demonstration in Lisbon last October and the future now rests with how the manufacturers wish to develop the concept to the requirements of individual pilots and ports. POADSS is a highly sophisticated aid which incorporates the latest technology and although we all know it will never happen it actually has the potential to transfer the whole VTS to the pilot on the bridge. At its current state of development it is somewhat hampered by the necessity to have much of the hardware in a separate Interface Unit (IU) but since this unit has already been downsized within 12 months from a tea trolley (see issue 291 October 2007) it is probably only a matter of time before all the necessary components can be included in a single display unit. Nigel must be congratulated for his unflagging enthusiasm and dedication and Maarten Betlem and the Lisbon pilots also deserve a special mention for successfully concluding a complex project which has been a credit to the professionalism of pilots.

The following article details the key elements of POADSS and has been edited from the detailed final report produced by Dutch pilot, Maarten Betlem.

POADSS within the MarNIS Project

The work on POADSS was undertaken as part of the MarNIS project under Work Package 4.2 (Port’s safety and infrastructural info on board vessels)

The other Work Package 4.1 in this Cluster was “Modern Vessel Traffic Management” and during the project intensive consultation took place between the two Work Packages to achieve the most beneficial results for both parties.

The MarNIS project is also linked to other European maritime research projects such as WATERMAN and EMBARC.

Initially the acronym POADSS stood for Portable Operational Approach and Docking Support System but Docking was subsequently changed to Decision, to better reflect the project’s aims.

The POADSS unit consists of three main elements, two onboard units and the ashore unit. One onboard unit is an Instrument Unit (IU) and the other is a laptop for displaying the available information and for receiving and transmitting data to and from the shore based unit by means of mobile broadband. Ashore this information exchange is organized by the POADSS Ground Server Station which sources data from VTS, tide / swell gauges etc. Thus, together with its own stored data, an independent comprehensive overview of ship’s static and dynamic information data, as well the surrounding traffic image and environmental conditions results in a comprehensive overview of all relevant parameters of the particular ship on her passage.

What will it do?

Most pilotage units monitor the vessels horizontal position (2D), whilst the POADSS also monitors the vertical position (3D) and all dynamic motions.

In summary, there are 4 main new applications:

• Integration of an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) with Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) to accurately determine all dynamic movements of the vessel
• Wireless broadband to exchange information in real time (Web Map Services)
• Dynamic high density bathymetric data displayed on an electronic chart (enables a true dynamic safety contour)
• Dynamic Under Keel Clearance (DUKC) software

The POADSS is intended to improve navigational safety and efficiency, reduce voice radio communications, access relevant information to maximise the usability of fairways and thus enhance the efficiency of the overall traffic flow.

POADSS has incorporated as much available ‘off the shelf’ hardware and software as possible in order to facilitate data exchange with the shore server.

The Shore Server Station provides the following support:

• VTM Stakeholders;
• Dynamic Passage Planning and resource management
• Information inputs to support Dynamic Passage planning
• Data logging.

Interoperability with the VTMS centre is a key element and by using Web Map Services (WMS) the overall VTS traffic image can be overlaid on the POADSS Electronic Navigation Chart (ENC).

WMS can also provide real time meteorological and hydrographical conditions along with temporary navigation notices

If the broadband connection is lost AIS information remains available via the vessel’s Pilot Plug Connection.

The Dynamic Under Keel Clearance (DUKC©) module is divided into two elements: predicted and actual. The predicted DUKC, is computed for each ship and passage prior to the passage and stored on the shore server and can be accessed at any time during the passage. The actual DUKC is established with cm accuracy by the POADSS Instrument Unit (IU)using the latest position, heading, speed, heave, roll (heel) and pitch (trim) and displayed on the laptop. Crucial for an accurate DUKC is the exact determination of the onboard position of the POADSS IU in relation to the ship’s dimensions, as well as, the ships stability data and the centre of gravity.

The predicted DUKC and the actual UKC are presented in graphical diagrams

and comparison of both values will confirm that the actual UKC is within an acceptable safety limit to the predicted DUKC. In practice the real time UKC is always greater than the predicted UKC because the latter is based on increased parameters to ensure safety.

Functional requirements

The ENC is the most important part of the display since the information must be accurate and not mask other essential information. However operating the POADSS mustn’t distract attention away from the essential task of overall safe navigation and therefore training is of fundamental importance. The POADSS software has therefore been developed to be ‘Port specific’ which results in it being much easier to use whilst piloting.

Special consideration must also be given to integrating POADSS into the Bridge Resource Management structure in order to reduce the chance of single person error.

System components

The existing two POADSS units contain the following modules:

The Instrument Unit (IU).

o Integrated Global Navigational Satellite Systems (GNSS) / Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) component;
o Satellite Antenna;
o RTK Antenna;
o AIS Unit;
o Electronic Motherboard;
o Internal Communication to the User Interface Unit;
o Battery Pack.

User Interface Unit (Laptop)

- o Windows XP;
- o Dedicated Electronic Navigation Chart System/ ECDIS kernel;
- o External Communication by means of Mobile Broadband to the POADSS Shore Server;
- o Internal Communication to Instrument Unit by means of a Local Area Network. (WiFi);
- o Dedicated POADSS software application, divided in:
  - ♣ Information Mode;
  - ♣ Planning Mode;
  - ♣ Navigation Mode;
  - ♣ Docking Mode.

The POADSS Shore Server (PSS) contains

- o Server
- o Network Switch;
- o Tide data Server;
- o DUKC Server;
- o VTS – WMS Server;

The increasing use of Portable Pilotage Units (PPU’s) worldwide has resulted in a growing need for such units to be operated within a legislative framework. Achieving this will require close co-operation with international organisations such as the IMO and IEEC and this will be an important aspect of the implementation of the POADSS. Likewise, the POADSS Server station will need to conform to agreed standards in order to ensure the provision of quality assured information.

Since this project began, there have been rapid advances in the technology available for stand alone PPU’s carried by pilots and many systems are already capable of accessing much VTS and hydrographic information without the separate IU box.

However, although the matter of PPUs has been raised in IMO NAV and STCW meetings, the IMO has not issued any definitive guidelines or regulations on what constitutes a PPU or how they should be used by Pilots. Currently the only formal requirement is that there must be an AIS “Pilot Plug” installed on the bridge of a ship that can be used by a Pilot with a PPU.

State of the Art

Consultation with pilots

The POADSS project involved consulting with pilots currently using PPU’s which produced the following findings:

- • Most pilots prefer screen displays that are very simple and pragmatic. In general, little extraneous information is shown other than what is needed for the current situation or task-at-hand. For this reason the interest in having radar imagery or VTS information superimposed on the chart display is very port specific. However, some pilots (particularly river pilots) wanted to predict points for meeting or overtaking other ships. The AIS is crucial for this predictor facility.The display chosen by the pilot may be basic but the software allows the pilot to choose what to show and what to hide.

HIGHLY DETAILED INFORMATION CAN BE DISPLAYED IF REQUIRED

- • Transit times varied within the survey group from 45 minutes to 13 hours. From arrival on the bridge the PPU is usually up and running within 2 – 3 minutes but if a pilot has to set up his own DGPS this might add another 2-3 minutes. The GPS antenna is normally clamped onto the railing on the bridge wing and if there are two antennae they are usually placed in a fore and aft fashion, and spaced one to four meters apart. This arrangement and distance are set into the software. If a specialized docking system is deployed, this might take up to 15 minutes to set up but in such cases two pilots are usually employed and one sets the equipment up while the other goes to the bridge.

- • Few pilots currently use radar integration but in Rotterdam VTS radar information is integrated in the PPU due to the large number of barges not fitted with AIS transponders.

- • Currently, relatively little VTS-related information is displayed on PPU’s. and digital VTS services are not widely available. This may change with the wider introduction of long range mobile broadband services such as Hyperlan or Wimax in the future..

- • Precise docking systems are widely used in Europe and Australia but far less so in North America. These systems are relatively expensive (about €50,000) and require that the chart data be large scale and highly accurate (+/- 1 meter or better).

- • Some pilots specifically mentioned that an important advantage of using PPUs was video playback. Specifically, video playback of a pilot’s recorded voyage data can be useful for reviewing a passage, analysing an incident to establish “lessons learned” and for training.

- • Some pilotage organizations take training very seriously while others less so. All believe that a minimum level of hands-on training should be a prerequisite for carrying a PPU but there are differing opinions on how much and who should conduct it (e.g., a manufacturer or experienced pilots).
- • Some pilots expressed their opinion that if mandatory PPU use is implemented there needs to be an agreed system of assessment and that there should be an approved standard operating procedure.
- • The master must give permission to use the POADSS, in particular if it is using any ships systems such as AIS.
- • Civil liability is mostly excluded for the maritime pilot, with the exemption of negligence or flagrant fault. With a normal proper functioning POADSS, the legal position of the pilot isn’t changed with respect to his position without the use of the POADSS.
- • The responsibility of the pilot is to use all sources of information available to safely conduct the vessel.
- • VTS and other organisations are in principle responsible for the content of the data and liable if the content proves to be incorrect. It doesn’t make any difference whether this information comes via the ships sensors (ie VHF) or via the POADSS.

Survey Conclusion

Each pilotage organization had significantly different requirements for a PPU and consequently there is no single “fits all” solution. However, each pilot group had a good understanding of what are their specific requirements were and the overall requirements for PODSS were considered to be that it should:

- • Be developed for vessels whose dimensions reach the limits of a fairway;
- • Supply three dimensional position information of the vessel.
- • Should be capable of undertaking Dynamic Passage Planning (DPP) including prediction of Dynamic Under Keel Clearance and display of the actual UKC.
- • Monitor and assess the available position accuracy
- • By using the POADSS in conjunction with Dynamic Passage Plan the maximum draft could be considerably increased and tidal windows widened without compromising the safety of the vessel or the safety and efficiency of other traffic.

POADSS can provide all of the aforementioned requirements and therefore the commercial benefits of POADSS to the shipping industry are potentially considerable.

POADSS Conclusions

1. 1. The development and demonstration of the POADSS have been successful and the majority of the determined objectives have been met.
2. 2. The assembly of the POADSS Instrument Unit requires more research to come to an optimum. Off the shelf units are currently not designed for a portable unit which makes them cumbersome as well to expensive.
3. 3. The development of Fibre Optic Gyro’s and Micro Electronic Motion Sensors (MEMS) is advanced and it is expected that within the next five years MEMS will be available with the required accuracy, reliability, dimensions, weight and cost for use in the POADSS.
4. 4. Currently positioning and calibrating the POADSS correctly onboard is complicated.
5. 5. The development of the POASDSS has resulted in the maximum of applications, which can be included within a PPU.
6. 6. Resulting from the above the installation of a permanent 3D GNSS/IMU on board should be considered. However the cost/benefit of the installation needs to be clarified to the ship owner/operator.
7. 7. The use of Web Map Services in Lisbon was very successful. The presentation of additional data in the form of graphical layers on top of the ENC is considered as the most efficient way of presenting this kind of information.
8. 8. The application of Dynamic Under Keel Clearance was also very positively received during the demonstration in Lisbon. The presentation of the computed DUKC ashore with the actual UKC simultaneously on the POADSS laptop is seen as a major step forward for navigating in shallow waters.
9. 9. All the information/data exchange depends on a reliable wireless broadband link. In Lisbon a commercial broadband link was used which proved to be very good but not perfect. The coverage depends on the number of users and the capacity of the accessible relay stations. It is anticipated that Wimax (see page …)will be implemented in the next few years, but Harbour Authorities and pilots may need to come to special arrangements with the providers or a dedicated Wimax network can be installed. A satellite connection is considered as being too expensive for POADSS applications.
10. 10. With the development of E-Navigation there is a good opportunity to integrate the POADSS into Integrated Bridge Systems and to install some components of the POADSS onboard. This could possibly result in a dedicated pilotage console within the integrated bridge layout.

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