Pilotage History Part 2

August 20th, 2004 by JCB
Posted in Features, History | No Comments »

PILOTAGE HISTORY ~ Part 2

Harry Hignett

View the original pdf illustrated magazine article:

pilotmag.co.uk/userfiles/Pilotmag%20279%20(Oct%2004).pdf

The Francis Henderson, built by Murdock and Murray in 1896, the first steam pilot

vessel for the Liverpool Pilot Service. From an original painting by J Witham.

In part 1 we learned how the situation for pilots over the centuries had resulted in

legislation covering compulsory pilotage being introduced but as a result of poor

drafting much of this legislation was open to abuse and offered poor protection for

pilots. By the end of the 19th Century, pilots were subjected to competition from

exemptions to pilotage being offered to vessels and sadly in some cases from other

pilots! The founding of the UKPA in 1884 had focused unity of purpose and achieved

a significant result by stimulating the 1889 Merchant shipping Act (Pilotage). Whilst

many of the pilots’ requirements had been incorporated into the is Act it was still full

of loopholes and this was compounded by apathy by Trinity House in tackling pilotage

exemption abuses. The 1889 pilotage Act was incorporated into the 1894 Merchant

Shipping Act but having achieved few further gains pilots became despondent.

1901 – 1941

1900 was a time of falling membership and low attendances at conferences. The UKPA membership fell to around 700 in contrast to a decade earlier when the numbers were about 1,200. Although the total number of pilots entered in the annual returns of the BoT was about 2,300, many were part-time pilots at very small ports.

The complaints against “aliens” obtaining pilotage exemption certificates were a very strong card in the hands of the Association. The Foreign Office insisted that there were treaty arrangements between countries that made such arrangements inevitable, however there was a serious flaw in this argument in that foreign masters could pilot their vessels at each end of the voyage but British masters could not. In 1902 B J Foster (Hull) rose at the Plymouth Conference to announce that the holder of a pilotage certificate for the Humber was a commissioned officer in the German Navy and claimed he would get promotion because of that qualification. It was stated that alien pilotage had increased 200% under the 1889 Pilotage Act and that all members of the 1888 Select Committee on Pilotage who had not been against alien pilotage, “were now aware of the damage done and entirely against the principle”.

Legal matters concerning pilots were handled by the Association’s barrister and the cases were becoming ever more complex, as the quirks of legal decisions arose. In 1902 a Clyde pilot had to pay £1,071 damages even though he had not been found in any way negligent or to blame for an accident. The ship-owners had gone bankrupt and the costs had been set against the pilots! For many decades the pilots had assumed that the signing of the bond for £100 gave them protection from liability for damages but it was then found that for an unknown reason, this condition applied only to Trinity House pilots. In 1902 at Barrow, a local official suspended a pilot for a very dubious infringement of the rules. The pilots took the matter to the County Court and proved that the official had no powers to suspend anyone. The official turned to Trinity House Pilotage authority, which, without further inquiry, agreed to suspend the pilot. The case was taken to the High Court and the Trinity House’s action declared illegal. However the pilot was required to pay part of the court costs and his own expenses amounting to some £100.

In 1908 Clyde pilot, J McKinley, was accused of navigating a vessel in a dangerous manner when pilot of ss Maracas inward-bound He met HMS Harrier outward-bound in visibility of about 11/2 miles; there was no collision, but the commander of the naval vessel made a complaint about the navigation of Maracas. The Sheriff, trying the case without assessors, said that it was a very clear case and stated, “I should say that the risk having been placed there by the Maracas, it was only averted by the prompt action of those in charge of the Harrier who succeeded in preventing what might have been a very serious disaster”. He found the case proved and fined McKinley £25 with £10 costs.

The incensed delegates to the 1908 Conference six months later were

unanimous in a demand for an appeal to a higher court at the expense of the Association. The appeal was dismissed, so the Association petitioned the King who passed it to his Scottish Secretary who merely passed it to the same High Court, not surprisingly with the same result. Commander Cawley, at the 1909 Conference said that he would try to appeal to His Majesty in person. However he drew attention to the depletion of the Management Fund in providing legal advice in the many and wide-spread court proceedings against pilots and in obtaining assistance in Parliamentary matters.

Following representations from Commander Cawley, all the members of the 1889 Select Committee agreed to assist the Association and Sir John Puleston arranged for a deputation from the UKPA to meet the president of the Board of Trade (Winston Churchill). Led by Commander Cawley and Michael Joyce MP (Limerick pilot), the Association Officers were introduced to Churchill and members of his staff. Churchill listened carefully to all the arguments placed before him. Given his ideas at the time (he was campaigning for the formation of MI5 to act against enemy agents), alien pilotage was a strong point in the Association’s favour, as was also the court proceedings against McKinley. Churchill promptly signed the order for a Departmental Committee on Pilotage to begin work in 1909.

In 1908, the Counsel to the Association had died, and he was succeeded by a Bristol solicitor, Sandford D Cole. Cole was a very competent person, who became a member of the Departmental Committee. From this Committee arose the Pilotage act 1913, encompassing much of what the pilots required:- freedom from illegal pilotage, a restriction on the issue of pilotage certificates, better rules generally and mandatory representation on pilotage committees.

The Pilotage Act 1913 and After

The implementation of the 1913 Pilotage Act was interrupted in many ports by the outbreak of war and there is no record of the activities of the Association for a couple of years. Many pilots entered the armed forces and several lost their lives on land and sea. Those who remained in the pilotage services braved torpedoes and mines: most received Mercantile Marine and War Medals. Some were decorated for specific acts of bravery.

After the end of the War the Association’s Solicitor, John Inskip, in conjunction with Michael Joyce, suggested that a Committee of Members of Parliament sympathetic to the pilots’ cause should be formed with a view to having assistance whenever legislation or matters affecting pilots was passing through Parliament. Inskip introduced the Officers of the UKPA to his brother, Thomas Inskip, KCMP, who agreed to assist. Thomas Inskip was to become Attorney General in several later governments and eventually a Cabinet Minister. A ten-member Committee was formed to continue discussions but the introduction of new pilotage orders did not go smoothly. Inskip, in one of his reports as Secretary in the early twenties, said he had attended ten inquiries in one year. And in six years there were more than twenty inquiries, not all brought about by the same type of objection. For example, in the Forth, the ship owners objected to the new ‘pooling’ arrangements, claiming that the pilots would become lazy, inefficient and incompetent.

During the War the subscriptions had been raised from 1/- per month to 1/6d and again in 1919 to 2/-. However the cost of correspondence, telephone calls, printing of agendas, minutes and expenses of travel were all putting the finances under pressure. A total of 24/- annually would not cover the amount required for long.

“THE PILOT”, appeared for the first time in 1920 through which membership increased from about 1,000 to almost 1,300 in 1921. The magazine proved to be the most efficient way of increasing the pilots’ awareness of problems, and indicating how difficulties could be avoided or averted by adopting better procedures. In 1923 the MP for Hull, Lt Cmdr Peter Kenworthy (Independent), who had been helpful in supporting the Humber pilots as a member of the House of Commons Pilotage Committee, agreed to become President when Michael Joyce retired but in 1924 he was forced to resign due to illhealth. Like Joyce he had seldom missed an Executive Committee meeting, once slipping away from a crucial debate in the House, to attend a conference. Peter Kenworthy was succeeded by Lord Apsley, MP for Southampton, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minster of Transport and a person known for his sympathies with seafarers in general. Refusing all fees, he was of invaluable assistance in the years to come.

Around this time there was unrest at Bristol, stemming from the introduction of steam pilot cutters which although having been in use at other ports since the turn of the century, were not popular with pilots from Pill. New bye-laws did not meet the pilots’ demands and they objected to the Board of Trade who ordered a local inquiry. The Bristol pilots told the Executive Committee of their intention to join a dockworkers’ union and that they could not remain members of the UKPA on the grounds that the Association represented licensed pilots who were unable to strike.

During the immediate post-war years, many cases of maladministration of pilotage affairs appeared with Dundee the best example. The pilots there were paid a weekly salary of £4 by the Authority, together with such further amounts as the Authority cared to distribute from the surplus earnings after they had met their own requirements. But there was a legal dispute between the Anchor Line and Dundee Harbour Board where the pilotage funds had been used to defray costs that had little or nothing to do with pilotage. In 1925 there were eight inquiries and the local branches were subsidised by £21 for each inquiry. Over a decade the Association’s finances were in a deficit of £212 which was eating into the accumulated funds and the larger ports were subsidising the smaller. At the 1925 Conference, John Inskip impressed upon members that there were always to be two funds established in each district: a Pilot Fund for administration and a Pilot Benefit Fund for disablement and retirement pensions. He took pains to explain and distinguish between the two types of funds that made it imperative and legally necessary to maintain them separate and distinct.

During the late 1920s, the cost of living was falling, the shipowners pressed for reductions in pilots’ earnings and in 1929 attacked the Liverpool pilots directly. Until then the local inquiries had been ‘round the table’ affairs with no formal structure. At Liverpool the authority agreed with the pilots that a reduction of 10% was warranted. The Chamber of Shipping, however, brought in their own counsel who used formal procedures, leaving the UKPA somewhat short in its planning. The pilots lost the case in that the previously agreed reduction was increased to 15%. During the same Inquiry the shipowners managed to include another principle into the reckoning, namely that of having pilots’ earnings set between the pay of the master and mate of the average vessel using the pilot.

There was a deputation to the Board of Trade making a point on the use of formal procedures at inquiries. The pilots, with members of the Parliamentary Committee, made known their strong case of injustice. Whenever there had been an objection to a by-law or dispute between the authorities, pilots or shipowners, the BoT found it easy to institute an inquiry. These were formal affairs and thereby expensive for pilots. Between 1925 and 1930, following the Liverpool example there was a series of applications for reductions in pilotage rates or incomes, mostly demanding cuts of 15-20 per cent but the Association managed to hold most of the cuts to 10%. There were other problems, not least in the matter of membership. Inskip, agreed with the Thames River Pilots’ Association to pay two guineas to one of their members who unsuccessfully took a case to court. He later learned that the man concerned was not a member: In fact only 73 of the 125 pilots of that district were members. There were other membership abuses such as, in a couple of inquiries, the local pilots suddenly had 100% membership several months before the inquiries took place so in 1935 a rule was introduced and passed that before the Association assisted a local branch, there had to be a substantial membership at least three years before any assistance was granted.

In 1935 the shipowners began attacking pilot cutters and methods of boarding to reduce costs. They demanded that the Liverpool pilot station at Point Lynas be closed and the cutter withdrawn. The Inquiry lasted seven days, four in Liverpool and three in London. Six counsel were engaged, of which two were briefed by the Association. There was a principle involved and Sir John thought it worth the fight. The Liverpool pilots won the case. But the expenses paid by the Association were over £1,300; the Liverpool Pilots’ Association returned £100 of this to the UKPA in appreciation of the support.

History does repeat itself especially at Barrow-in-Furness. A pilot there was docking ss Orion in 1935, when, without warning, a dockmaster ordered the headrope to be moved. The vessel sheered away from the lock wall and was damaged, for which the pilot was brought before the local Trinity House Commissioners and suspended. The evidence had been given in his absence and was later read over to him.

When Sir John looked into the matter he found that one of the Trinity House Sub-

Commissioners was a servant of the owners of the vessel. He wrote immediately to

Trinity House, who restored the licence and re-opened the proceedings.

In 1934 the Executive Committee, following consultation with branches, produced a seven-point policy for discussion in the branches related to the financial regulation of the pilot funds and associated costs such as cutters etc.

During the 1938 Conference on the Mersey, Liverpool pilots announced that they had 435 exemption certificates in force in their district, with a high average number of vessels on each certificate. One certificate had 114 vessels entered and although many of the vessels no longer existed over 29 vessels on one certificate was considered ridiculous.

WW2

War was impending and many members of the UKPA were commissioned officers in the Royal Naval Reserve. For the first two years of the War, Inskip carried on almost single-handed and there were no meetings. Many senior members of the districts were called into administrative matters to become involved in the re-organisation of war-time pilot services. The UKPA still continued to function but they had consult by letter or phone. Matters dealt with included the insurance of cutters during hostilities, employment of pilots during lack of shipping, registering apprentices to preclude conscription, the new compulsory pilotage order for war purposes, food rationing, clothing, liability for fire-watch duties or Home Guard stand-by.

Membership in 1938/9 was nearly 1,200 but there was to be a change. In 1942 the Secretary told the Executive Committee that 25 members of the Manchester Pilots’ Association had not renewed their subscriptions and had apparently joined the Transport & General Workers Union due to closer contact between the pilots, tug crews, canal operating staffs and dockworkers. Certainly the latter had received increases of more than 40% and some pilots were now receiving less than a dockworker.

A couple of months later, 112 Liverpool pilots, led by Lewis Jones, a former member of the Executive Committee also resigned Association membership to join the TGWU. The withdrawal of the Liverpool pilots was particularly galling for the Association members, in view of the costly support given in defending the retention of the Point Lynas Pilot Station a few years earlier.

From 1942 the Executive Committee met regularly every quarter, and in making plans for the future, the seven-point programme was resurrected, re-drawn and discussed at an informal conference in the summer of 1944. Shortly after the conference it was learned the Lord Apsley had been killed in action. The post-War political changes led to difficulties in finding a new president or indeed any parliamentary representation.

The General Election of 1945 was called at the same time and the Conservatives were in disarray. The senior Labour Members of Parliament had insufficient time to represent the Association and newer members were unwilling to take up the reins. In the UKPA debates it was found that the subscriptions would have to be increased from £2 16s per annum to £3. In 1949 at Hull the local authority decided to appoint pilots as choice pilots whether or not the particular pilot was willing to take the work. The Association decided to take interest in the choice pilotage situation and circulated 48 of the 60 ports: only 12 replied.

Discussions towards a standard for pilots’ earnings began to bear fruit in the early 1950s. In 1956 there was a Ministry of Transport Inquiry chaired by Sir Robert Letch. The “Letch Report” resulted in a structure for pilots’ earnings which lasted to the end of the century. Although not without criticism, as a basis for discussion, it simplified negotiations for half a century.

Modern Times

From 1960 onwards the UKPA turned its attention to pensions and gathered details of the many and varied schemes around the UKPA ports. Several ports had no official pension scheme: the smaller ports were particularly badly off. Charges were another area of variance and the mid-1960s were a time of impending change with a new method of tonnage measurement affecting pilotage charges. Every vessel had two sets of tonnages and only when a certain “delta” mark on the vessel (similar to the Plimsoll mark) was immersed would the higher tonnage charges apply. Pilots were very concerned over changes that were being used to curb incomes and many felt that it was time for direct action. In 1968 a new General Secretary and Legal Advisor, Edgar Eden, a barrister warned against any precipitate action on the part of the pilots fearing that if they disturbed the balance of the Letch Report, there could be action from the ship owners who would love to overthrow Letch and make pilots salaried employees.

Industrial Action

On 26^th January 1971, after due notice being given to all sectors of the shipping industry, more than 1,400 pilots met in Birmingham Town Hall effectively bringing UK’s ports to a standstill for 24 hours. For the next couple of months the pilots’ representatives pursued a target of 20% increase in pilotage incomes and the final result was an increase of 16%.

The Pilots’ National Pension Fund came into being in 1971 and within a decade 99% of pilots were members and contributors. During the 1970s other issues were addressed including London pilots who became concerned about health issues, and in 1978 brought certain facts to the notice of the UKPA. As always finance was an issue and it became increasingly difficult for the UKPA to operate as a stand-alone group and it was therefore decided to seek affiliation with a larger union. In 1979 the UKPA and TGWU began steps to merge. Following the successful merger the membership increased and by the 1984 centenary of the UKPA it exceeded 99% of the total number of pilots in the UK.

1984 – The Present (by JCB)

All good things must come to an end and in 1984, in what represented a U-turn in the Thatcherite policies of encouraging free enterprise the Government decided to revolutionise pilotage and transfer responsibility for pilotage from Trinity House and other local pilotage commissioners to the ports by means of a new Pilotage Act. The UKPA found itself fighting for survival and much time and effort was expended in trying to ensure that the proposed legislation preserved the essential rights for pilots. Unfortunately, once the Bill was in the hands of the politicians, the UKPA lost control of the content and the resulting 1987 Pilotage Act effectively granted ports total power over pilots without any accountability. The Act also resulted in a division of UKPA membership between employed and self employed districts.

Whereas in some instances the pilots

(usually self employed) enjoyed a good

working relationship with their port (now

known as the Competent Harbour

Authority CHA) in many ports the

relationship was poor. In Liverpool the majority of pilots were bitterly opposed to being employees of the port and after much difficult negotiation were able to reverse their employment status to become self employed. The other major conflict was on the Humber where the CHA, Associated British Ports, sought to force employment onto the self employed pilots. That dispute, along with its tragic outcome has been well documented within these pages.

The most dramatic development post 1987 was the Sea Empress disaster which starkly revealed the lack of accountability of a CHA for the powers over pilotage that had been transferred to them. In 1997 the new Labour Government was sufficiently concerned by this lack of accountability to launch an enquiry which in turn led to the Department for Transport drawing up a Port Marine Safety Code. The UKPA were deeply involved in drafting this code and established a good working relationship with the DfT. Once published, pilots were concerned that whilst the PMSC provided a good framework for port safety, without legislation to underpin it, the document lacked teeth. Meetings commenced with the Government with a view to drafting legislation but these came to an abrupt halt as the situation on the Humber deteriorated into a serious dispute. At the same time the British Ports Industries Training (BPIT) forum, which had been working closely with the UKMPA in producing a set of standards and qualification requirements for UK pilots was also disbanded to be replaced by a body operated by the UK ports industry called Port Skills and Safety (PSS). PSS promptly excluded the T&G and hence the UKMPA from representation and subsequently became a dormant organisation. In 2003, the President of the UKMPA Lord Tony Berkeley made approaches to the shipping minister which resulted in meetings being resumed, both sides being fully in agreement that the safety of shipping and the environment is a priority. Regular meetings are now being held and the following report detailing the work of the Chairman and section Committee indicates that constructive progress is once again being made.

Pilotage History Part 1

August 15th, 2004 by JCB
Posted in Features, History | 1 Comment »

PILOTAGE HISTORY Harry Hignett

View the original pdf illustrated article from the magazine:

pilotmag.co.uk/userfiles/Pilotmag%20278%20(Jul%2004).pdf

The majority of serving UK pilots have joined the service since the implementation of the 1987 Pilotage Act and many are probably largely unaware of the origins of the UKMPA. June marked the 120^th anniversary of the UKMPA (originally the UKPA) and for the 1984 centenary Manchester pilot Harry Hignett (now retired) wrote a book detailing the history of the UKPA. Long since out of print this book is now unknown to the majority of pilots but it contains much interesting research. Harry has recently updated this original work but having failed to .nd a publisher for the book he has permitted me to place it on my website for all to access. As an introduction Harry has kindly agreed to provide an edited version for inclusion in the magazine which I will be running over two issues.

PART 1: ANTIQUITY TO 1900

Although pilotage will have been undertaken since vessels first started trading and

ancient texts such as Homer’s Iliad from the 7^th century BC make vague references

to pilots one of the most precise early written descriptions of a pilot’s work was

around 64 AD.

“The passage is difficult because of the shoals at the mouth of the river. Because of

this, the native .shermen in the King’s service go up the coast to Syrastrene (Surat) to meet the ships. And they steer them straight and true from the mouth of the bay between the shoals with their crews and they tow them to fixed stations going up with the flood and lying through the ebb at anchorages and in basins. These

basins are deeper places in the river as far as the port, which lies about 10 stadia up

from the mouth.”

In this extract we can recognise the work of an estuary or river pilot from the earliest times until the steamship arrived onto the maritime scene.

In the UK one of the earliest records is from the 12^th Century. Godric was born in Norfolk in 1069 and became a Chapman (travelling salesman carrying his own wares). He turned to carrying them not only using the inland waterways but also on coasting vessels along the coast and across the North Sea to Denmark. He made the trip so often that he eventually became a ship owner at one time owning four ships. A “colourful” character he was actually referred to by some as a pirate before he turned his energies to religious fervour and sub-sequently gave all his considerable wealth to charity! Such was his skill of navigation that he was asked to pilot vessels and he became famous not only for his pilotage skills but also for his ability to forecast the weather. Giving up his pilotage career around 1110 he became a hermit and was later canonised becoming St. Godric of Finchale (near Durham). He died in 1170 at the amazing age of 101, and his hermitage became Finchale Priory where his tomb (despite being pillaged many centuries ago) can still be visited. Later references to pilots are for London and include a 1387 reference to a “Pilot of the Black Deeps” (Thames Estuary). Other London records from a log-book reveal that pilotage charges on the Thames in the 1400’s were as follows:

to the losmanne who sailed me into the Temse . . . 10s 6d

to the man who led the shippe through the bridge . . . . . 8d

to the man who led the shippe into the dock . . . . . . . . . . 6d

The first organisation of UK pilotage was established by Trinity House and in 1457 the Trinity House of Hull was an exclusive maritime organization which in 1512 passed an ordinance restricting pilotage between Hull and the mouth of the Humber to members of Hull Trinity House. The founding of the Corporation of Trinity House on the Thames was in 1514. There were initially, 40 members (mostly pilots), 8 assistants, four wardens and the master. For the first fifty years the Corporation was, to all intents and purposes, exclusively concerned with pilotage, and most of the senior members were important naval officials, shipmasters or both.

The Cinque Ports pilotage was formally inaugurated in 1527 in Dover and before the end of the sixteenth century there was strife between the Dover pilots and their Trinity House counterparts because, when they disembarked off the Cinque Ports, the Corporation pilots attempted to pilot inward bound ships. However, the boating services were provided by relatives and friends of the Dover pilots and they were naturally reluctant to offend the Cinque Ports pilots. The Corporation pilots therefore had to travel home by land, a journey of at least two days via Canterbury to Gravesend and thence by boat to Deptford. Naturally the Cinque Ports pilots found similar difficulty in obtaining vessels to pilot from the Thames outwards. One may criticise one-way pilotage as being wasteful and inefficient, but ships in the days of sail arrived in great numbers according to the winds and travelling in company against pirates and enemy ships. Pilots near a pilot station remained at home on stand-by. So began the Thames pilotage system; Trinity House outwards, Cinque Ports inwards.

The Cinque Ports Pilotage Act of 1717 was the first parliamentary legislation covering pilotage. The Dover pilots now had something that Trinity House had not and the Elder Brethren applied for their own legislation. The next Pilotage Act, passed in 1732, confirmed the provisions of the 1717 Act and, gave exemption to the Trinity Houses of Hull, and Newcastle wherever their respective jurisdictions overlapped.

In the mid 1700’s establishing longitude at sea was difficult and many shipmasters feared to approach the Isles of Scilly, with rocks that made the area a noted graveyard for ships. The fishermen of the Scillies began to take up pilotage, meeting the vessels well out of sight of land and guiding them past the Isles up the channel and by 1800 they conducted ships to all parts of the British Isles and the coasts of France and Belgium. The successful application of parliamentary legislation led to several local Pilotage Acts, including those for Boston, Lincs, in 1774 and Hull in 1800 which were older established ports. In the late 18^th century new industrial ports such as Swansea appeared receiving its first pilotage regulations in 1791.

The first comprehensive Pilotage Act was placed on the stature book in 1808, “An

Act for the better regulation of Pilots and of the Pilotage of Ships and vessels

navigating the British seas”. Its most important provisions were the establishment

of compulsory pilotage in all districts where licensed pilots were

available and the authority was given to the Deptford Trinity House to form

pilotage districts where it was deemed necessary to control pilots and regulate

pilotage. Almost immediately 35 Trinity House “outports” appeared around the

coast of Britain. The 1808 Act was replaced in 1812 but re-enacted most of

the provisions of its predecessor and gave the Trinity Houses of Hull and Newcastle

the powers they had exercised previously and also in “any ports or harbours or

places within the limits of their respective jurisdictions”. All licensed pilots were required, in an entirely new section, to execute a bond for their good behaviour in the sum of £100. This requirement has been carried through to the present day with the amount unchanged.

An important section of the Act attempted to define the responsibility and

rights of the ship owner, master, and owner or consignee of the cargo, with regard to

any damage to ship, goods or persons occurring through “neglect, default, incompetency or incapacity of any pilot taken under the provisions of the Act.”

Another Pilotage Act was passed in 1825 and prolonged the existing situation, without easing the litigation then giving the industry extra worries.

In 1835 a Royal Commission was instituted to look into the “existing laws,

regulations, and practises under which pilots are appointed, governed and paid in

the British Channel and the several approaches to the Port of London, and

also in the navigation connected with the other principal ports in the United

Kingdom.” It was the first major inquiry into pilotage and one of the main items in the findings and report of the Commission was the recommendation that there should be a central body to control all pilotage affairs. Alas the ensuing Pilotage Act of 1836 did not include this far-reaching proposal. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 included and consolidated most of the existing legislation on pilotage, as did the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894. Further inquiries arose in 1860, 1870 and 1880: that of 1870 being particularly significant being specifically instituted to study compulsory pilotage since it developed into a major study of all aspects of pilotage lasting three months. However, its findings were ignored by Parliament. At the end of the 19^th century it was again obvious that the existing legislation was outdated and inadequate and, after a searching inquiry in 1910/11, the Pilotage Act of 1913 came into being.

The Nineteenth Century: The Coming of Steam

The years from 1800 to 1914 were the most difficult any pilots have had to face.

Iron ships and screw propulsion appeared mid-century, improving standards and

speeds but pilots had to handle ships up to eight times larger, with single screw

propulsion. When shipowners realised that ships were no longer dependent on wind

and tides they suggested that pilots were no longer as important and proposed

reductions in pilotage tariffs. The 19^th Century opened peacefully but by 1803

Britain and France were once again at war which continued until the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. There followed a period of peace in Britain for nearly the next 100 years but it was anything but peace and contentment for pilots. The Pilotage Act of 1808 promoted a wider regulation of pilotage than previously, but the 1812 Act included an extra paragraph:

“No owner or master of any ship shall be answerable for any loss or damage for, or by reason of, any neglect, default or incompetence of any pilot taken on board of any such ship under or in pursuance of the provisions of this Act.”

A somewhat simple idea, but the interpretation of this clause by the courts brought chaos for shipowners and pilots alike and fortunes for the lawyers in the Admiralty Courts. The clause granted absolute freedom from claims for any damage done to other vessels or property to ships under compulsory pilotage. i.e. if ship ‘A’ under compulsory pilotage collided with ship ‘B’, a barge or any other vessel not subject to compulsory pilotage, ship ‘A’ was free from liability even when, under normal circumstances she would be at fault. Under this clause ship ‘A’ was also free from liability for damages after striking a shore installation. In 1824 another Pilotage Act replaced the 1812 Act, a section of which made it possible for a non-British vessel to enter or leave British ports without pilots.

Modern administration

During the early part of the 19^th century British vessel entering and leaving the Tyne enjoyed preferential rates of pilotage. The advantage over foreign vessels was ended by the 1824 Act that gave equal treatment to foreign vessel wherever their governments gave similar treatment to British vessels. To compensate the Tyne pilots for the loss they would have sustained they were to be paid, by the Treasury, “Reciprocity Money”, viz. the difference between the old and the new tariffs for foreign vessels. Newcastle Trinity House claimed the full difference for all vessels entering the Tyne although many never went above the entrance, but the pilots were paid only on the ships they piloted. The unclaimed pilotage was then allocated to the Superannuation Fund, although the pilots disputed the right of Newcastle Trinity House to retain the money and demanded a full distribution of the amounts involved. The Newcastle authority refused and was unwilling or unable to account for the money.

In 1861 the Treasury discontinued Reciprocity Money, but as compensation the pilots were to receive, for a ten-year period, a sum equal to the Reciprocity Money paid in 1861 of which only 50% was handed to the pilots. The pilots commenced legal proceedings against the Elder Brethren who in turn sent for the pilots’ leaders, senior pilots, John Hutchinson and Robert Blair. The two pilots refused to attend and were threatened with dismissal. Newcastle Trinity House then began to examine and license local fishermen. The two pilots then went to London, to the Board of trade and Parliament. In 1863 an order by Parliament forced Trinity House to publish the accounts that showed a balance of more than £20,000 although further unclaimed pilotage of over £3,207 was not shown in the accounts. A long legal battle with Trinity House at Newcastle ensued from which the pilots emerged successful and a new body, the Tyne Pilotage Commissioners, was formed in 1865. It was proved that Trinity House had withheld over £24,000 from the pilots whose average wage at that time was about £180 per annum; the Elder Brethren claimed £3,500 for expenses incurred in opposing the Parliamentary Bills and other legal proceedings. Of the pilots, Hutchinson and Blair, they were to become founder members of the UKPA almost twenty years later.

An inquiry into pilotage in 1835, was the first to open up the subject in depth,

covering all major British ports and found that to make pilotage entirely optional

would “hold out a boon to the foolhardy” recommending that certain exceptions to compulsory pilotage be made for vessel in the short sea trades. The Commissioners suggestion that there was a need for a central body to control local authorities was ignored. About this time the pilots of the east coast ports were badly hit by Parliamentary legislation giving preferential taxes to the Canadian trades. Timber from the Baltic abruptly dropped to a minimum. Pilots of the west coasts such as Liverpool and Bristol found their incomes rising, just another example of the wild swings and variations of incomes due to political decisions.

A further Act in 1840 covered many aspects of pilotage and continued exemptions from compulsory pilotage to non-British vessels flying the flags of countries having so-called reciprocal treaties with Britain. Several decades later the Board of Trade was to use this provision against British pilots even to the extent of allowing complete falsehoods to be used about exemptions for British-flag vessels in continental ports.

In 1853 an Act of Parliament dissolved the Court of Loadmanage of the Cinque Ports and it effectively became a Trinity House Outport. One of the conditions was that the pilots could retain their licenses which were issued for the district from Dungeness to London Bridge and vice-versa. It was this condition that was to prove so disastrous for the Cinque Port pilots some thirty years later.

At the 1888 Inquiry into Pilotage, it was stated that on the Thames there was

bribery and corruption and that a few pilots had obtained more “choice” work

than they could handle and farmed it out making considerable income in additions

to their ordinary fees. Trinity House seemed to meet the situation with complete inaction.

The Parliamentary Select Committee of 1870

The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 collected all the pilotage laws then in force and re-enacted them into part V. In 1860 ship owners, still affected by the freedom from liability of compulsory piloted vessels, again attacked the principle of compulsory pilotage at the meeting of the Parliamentary Select Committee into Shipping. The Committee recommended its abolition but Parliament took no action. In 1870 the Parliamentary Select Committee again examined pilotage with terms of reference that were much the same as the previous committees. But this was the most comprehensive Inquiry ever with witnesses from all sections of the shipping industry, port authorities and Government Departments. The Deputy Master of Trinity House and the Principal of the Marine Department of the BoT, each spent days explaining the vagaries of the several pilotage systems.

In the decade1871-81 there was great unrest among pilots especially in the Bristol Channel since towards the end of the 1850’s the ports of Cardiff, Newport and Gloucester had begun a campaign to remove the superiority claimed by Bristol Corporation in the matter of pilotage since the 16^th century. Their efforts were rewarded in 1861 by the passing of an Act that gave them independence in their own pilotage affairs. This had the effect of disturbing the pilotage income of the Bristol pilots and caused a number of them to move across the Channel to take licenses at Cardiff.

In the last half of the 19^th century the UK shipping industry was subject to severe cycles of economic booms and depressions of the British overseas trades. The improvement in steam propulsion bringing larger vessels tended to reduce incomes and bring disorder to working routines and rotas of pilots. But the underlying cause of the pilots’ apprehension was still the clause in the 1812 Pilotage Act relating to the freedom of liability for vessels subject to compulsory pilotage and it was also the cause of about seven major Governmental inquiries into pilotage. This clause can be said to have led indirectly to the formation of the United Kingdom Pilots’ Association.

The Origins of the United

Kingdom Pilots’ Association

It was the situation in the Bristol Channel, particularly at Bristol that brought together all the parties most likely to form a core of a national body since a series of events there as a result of the change in the nature of maritime traffic and trade, in particular a growth of the new South Wales industrial ports. In the 1870’s Samuel Plimsoll, campaigning for increased safety for British ships and seamen, called together a number of interested parties: MPs, shipowners and mariners. Known as the Plimsoll Committee, the secretary was Plimsoll’s brother-in-law Roger Moore, a Bristol toilet-soap manufacturer. One of those consulted by Plimsoll’s Committee was Captain George Cawley, an experienced shipmaster, and part owner of a steamship, who later left the sea to take a post ashore. A few months after being appointed pilot master at Cardiff he had been drawn into a serious dispute between the 84 pilots there and the port management. A channel dredged through notorious banks, the Cefyn-y-wrack shoal, in the approaches to Cardiff docks, silted up. In March 1878 pilot John Howe, refused to take the Royal Minstrel to sea with a draft of 24 ft 8 inches. The dockmaster said that there was 25 ft of water over the shoal at the time. A month later, David Samuel also refused to pilot a ship to sea in similar circumstances. The charterer of both vessels complained that his ships had been neaped and thereby delayed three days. Both pilots were suspended. The Cardiff pilots wanted a strike. But Cawley resigning in disgust, advised the pilots to lobby for support from Plimsoll’s Committee.

Within a month Plimsoll had visited Cardiff, and verified the pilots’ complaints. A few weeks later, he raised the matter in Parliament causing the Board of Trade to ask the Cardiff authorities to explain their actions. There was enough of an outcry for a local inquiry to be set up in 1879 and two seats were subsequently allocated for the pilots on the new Pilotage Board. Across the water the 37 pilots at Bristol were also unhappy about the actions or inactions of their pilotage authority. With 37 apprentices and 74 Westernmen (time-served apprentices), any fall in traffic affected the whole village of Pill – a village of watermen and pilots on the River Avon about a mile from its confluence with the Severn. The traditional working routine could mean a loss of income of disastrous proportions if “choice” (appropriate) pilotage appeared. The pilots did not work a “turn” or “rota” system, but sailed in competition the first pilot to board an incoming vessel normally given the work and he would also claim the outward pilotage. In November 1880, however, a firm of Bristol shipowners, the Great Western Shipping Company, with a very successful line across the North Atlantic, built several larger steam vessels to cope with the trade and resolved to have their own “choice” Bristol pilots. The masters were instructed to take only the pilots displaying the prearranged signal. Three pilots were covertly selected and informed of the date and time of arrival of the ships.

In December the same year one of these “choice” pilots, on the way to sail his cutter from Pill Creek, encountered some 50 women and boys and was tarred and feathered. A week later the Westernmen went on strike – licensed pilots could not. The “choice” pilots tried in vain to get boat- men at Ilfracombe, (some 30 miles down the coast) to take them to a couple of inward-bound ships. Returning to Pill they were blocked from taking their cutter to sea by a chain made fast to a bollard which had been organised by the owner of the local inn, Captain Henry Langdon (then current secretary of the Bristol Pilots’ Association).

At the suggestion of Roger Moore, Tamlin, with Edward Edwards of Cardiff, met representatives of the Bristol Pilots’ Association, Craddy (chairman), Langdon and Joseph Browne at the Waterloo Hotel, Pill. Initially a Bristol Channel Pilots’ Association was envisaged, but those present encompassed pilots from other districts, and they suggested forming a British Association There were favourable responses from all the major pilot districts around the British Coasts. In October 1883 a meeting at Bristol, of representatives from the largest ports decided to form a national body using the services of the Bristol Pilots’ Association. Plimsoll was approached to be chairman, but being heavily involved in Parliament refused and suggested Captain George Cawley.

The Early Years

The Inaugural Conference opened on 11^th June 1884 in the Athenæum Hall, Bristol. Supported by a few remarks from Bedford Pim, the 30 delegates from a total of 18 UK ports approved the selection of Captain George Cawley, Lt RNR, as president. Observers from Spain and Denmark also attended. Roger Moore represented the American Pilots’ Association.

Henry Langdon, as Secretary, stated there were 3,168 pilots in the British Isles and in 1883 they piloted 168,418 vessels for an income of £427,532; the association hoped to redress wrongs, repeal bad laws and obtain proper representation.

The subscriptions were agreed at 12 shillings per year. Towards the end of the

Conference, which lasted two days, Cawley reminded the delegates, to be

careful to maintain a watch that no further attack on compulsory pilotage should be made.

The Second Conference was held in London in 1885 with 50 delegates – 20 more than attended the previous year –and representing 28 ports. The Secretary’s report gave the membership as being between 1,200 and 1,300 out of a possible 2,955 licensed pilots many of whom were earning less than £30 per annum.

Liverpool, the venue for the third Conference was in the throes of a severe depression, but its maritime system and connections were unsurpassed in efficiency but not economy. Cawley informed members that just before the Conference, he learned that two Poole pilots had been suspended for six months for attending the previous year’s conference without permission even though their colleagues had carried out the work in their absence. In the following year, 1887, at South Shields the Committee introduced two new officers, JT Board, solicitor and A Northmore Jones, barrister. In future the legal work would be separate from the day-to-day work of the Association. In a debate, Bristol pilots explained that as the average age of their pilots was 54 their pension funds needed supplementing, they were promoting a Parliamentary Bill to amend the local Act. Robert Blair (Tyne) said that the main problem in the Tyne was that 30 of the 161 pilots took two thirds of the gross pilotage income. Again this was due to the effects of “choice” pilotage. At the sixth Conference, in London the members looked back with satisfaction at the development of the UKPA which had been formed to protect the principle of compulsory pilotage, to ensure that pilots had proper representation on pilotage bodies and to maintain a watch on the funds which pilots were expected to contribute to.

The 1889 Pilotage Bill was about to pass through Parliament and each clause was debated with great thoroughness and enthusiasm. Alien pilotage and pilotage exemption certificates were again points of irritation. In another direction many pilots tried to have a clause inserted to make the towage of vessels without pilots illegal. Thus the pattern of the work of the UKPA was set in the first six years. When the Merchant Shipping Act (Pilotage) 1889 came into force the members found that more then half of their wishes had been incorporated in its provisions. The moderate success provided a guide to their future actions. The new Act, however, was not without loopholes.

In the early 1890’s Trinity House came in for strong criticism for its apathy in many respects of pilotage administration.

It was said that their pilots were required to produce certificates from magistrates or

clergymen that they were “well affected to the Sovereign and her Government”, but

a foreign subject could be handed a pilotage certificate at his will.

1895 – 1900

In South Wales, Llanelli pilots were threatened with abolition of compulsory pilotage. Initially they had approached the Association for advice, but an offer of legal aid had not been taken up and, at the Cardiff Conference in 1895, there was a note of discord. Three times the Llanelli representatives were asked in open session to comment. They felt that Mr Northmore Jones could be placed under “social influence” and therefore they felt his services should not be used. Apparently Northmore Jones’ services were taken up a couple of years later, for the Association had fought the challenge to compulsory pilotage at Llanelli and were preparing to ward off yet another attack. In the years immediately before the end of the 19^th century incomes were an ever present topic and the Executive Committee were at pains to search every corner to find arguments for the negotiations. In 1898 they suggested that as pilots were also quarantine officers, they should receive an allowance from the State. This idea was to be taken up by their MPs. The passing of the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act, which incorporated the pilotage provisions of the 1889 Act, unfortunately did little for pilots and this was reflected in attendances at conferences which began to decrease even though incomes were declining.

Pilots’ incomes at the turn of the Century pilotage incomes averaged about £300 per annum.

LOSS OF LIVERPOOL PILOT CUTTER CHARLES LIVINGSTONE

April 1st, 2004 by JCB
Posted in History | 2 Comments »

Many pilots will be unaware of the greatest tragedy to befall UK pilotage when the Liverpool pilot cutter Charles Livingstone was lost in 1939. Retired Liverpool pilot David Hodgson has sent in the following report to the enquiry submitted by his great uncle, Senior Class 1 pilot, Tom Webster.

In November 1939, No 1. Pilot Boat the SS Charles Livingstone stranded on Ainsdale Beach in a west- north- west gale and twenty three lost their lives, including eight Pilots and eight Apprentices. Six of her personnel who took refuge in the rigging were rescued by the Blackpool Lifeboat and four made it to the beach. The Apprentices who manned the pulling and motor boats all lost their lives. Their valour was recognised by the Trustees of the Carnegie Hero Fund, and certificates were presented to the parents of the four young men. In fact my father used to recount the story that Tom did in fact remember being dragged up the beach by two rescuers, the last words he remembers being “Christ this one’s a big bugger!”.

At 7 p.m. on Saturday, the 27th November, I went on board No 2 Pilot Boat at Princes Stage and proceeded in her to the Bar where I transferred to No 1 Pilot Boat at about 10.30 p.m. to wait to be boarded on an inward bound vessel. I slept until shortly after 3 a.m. and went on deck. The weather then was wind, force 7 with heavy rain squalls. No lights were visible. I spoke to one of the firemen and feeling the engines going astern I noticed that there was sand churned up in the backwash from the propeller. I said to him “We’re either ashore or very near it”, and went below to dress. I then went up on the bridge and asked Captain McLeod where he thought we were and his reply was somewhere on Rhyl Flats. I returned to the lower deck and advised various people to get their life-jackets. By this time the Pilot Boat was bumping, lurching and rolling and continually driving to leeward. The three boats were lowered into the water and brought round the stern on to the lee (starboard) side Several distress signals had been detonated and these were continued at intervals. I assisted in getting lifelines ready and ropes out to the boats so that they would be ready for emergency. There was a quiet acceptance by everyone on board of the situation and help was willingly rendered by everyone. Four apprentices were in the boats but then the Pilot boat slewed round which caused the starboard side to become the weather side, causing the pulling boat to break adrift. One of the motor boats went after her and disappeared in the darkness and after what seemed a longish interval I saw her return to about 50 feet almost ahead with the pulling boat in tow. They stayed in view for a short period and I heard a hail from the motor boat that the engine was conking out. They then disappeared from view in a heavy sea and I did not see them again. Very shortly after, Apprentice Lancaster came on to the fore deck and asked if he should go in the remaining boat to the rescue. I replied that he should not go without permission. He returned to the bridge and I presume received permission because he went over the starboard bow down a life line and cast off. The boat disappeared into the darkness to leeward and after a considerable interval we observed her returning apparently alone. She turned to run before the sea, and in turning disappeared from view. During this time the Pilot Boat was still driving to leeward, bumping over the ground and shipping heavy water over the port side and I returned to the bridge. Everyone was very wet with the rain and spray and the wireless was transmitting and receiving messages. From what I could hear of the Wireless Operator’s voice I gathered one ship was in communication and also that three lifeboats were out looking for the Pilot Boat. I took on the duty of detonating the maroons. At about this time we observed a dark object on the starboard side which was identified as Ainsdale Lido and we knew we were on the Lancashire Coast. Up to this time it had been the general idea on board that we were to the Southward of the Bar Ship We estimated that the Pilot Boat was not less than a quarter of a mile from the shore but discounted the possibility of swimming ashore because of the distance and the heavy breakers. At about this time, the vessel’s drive to leeward had ceased and she was fast aground with a very dangerous list to port; the port side of the boat deck under water with seas breaking over her whole length. Up to this time no one had gone overboard and the two life rafts were lowered. There were a number of pilots, the engineers, firemen and maybe others under the lee of the chartroom and various people on the bridge.. The seas were enormous and lifted us to the underside of the bridge deck and dropped us in the water again. At this time the top structure began to carry away. A sea which seemed larger than the others lifted her bodily driving her to an even keel and apparently into deeper water, so that what before had been the high (starboard) side now became totally submerged. With the rising tide and consequently rising sea l saw the ability of those with me to hold on was getting less and a subsequent sea carried Bibby and Teire overboard. This same wave washed me over the rail to which I hung on outboard and from there I made my way to the forward rigging, into which I climbed below Steward Roberts. Above him were those saved by the Blackpool Lifeboat. I could see the bridge and wheelhouse. There were Mcleod, Trott, J.Currie and Hoppins and maybe Lawler on top of the wheelhouse with Cockram holding on to the starboard bridge stanchions. My colleagues on the lee side of the chartroom had disappeared. During this time I saw Cockram washed over from the bridge and climb back again but later, after a sea had swept over, I did not see him. I entwined by right leg in the ratlines to keep me from being washed away when the lamp standard on the bridge washed across my left hand causing me to lose hold and I fell backwards with my feet still entangled. A subsequent sea tore the ratlines away and when I came to the surface I was about 20 yards from the vessel and realising that I could not get back I turned and swam for the shore. Owing to my injured right leg and the character of the shore I was unable to get up. I don’t know how long I laid there but was eventually picked up in an unconscious condition. I came to in Southport Infirmary.

 LETTER
Liverpool pilot cutter Charles Livingston erratum:There are several mistakes in the article “loss of the Liverpool Pilot Cutter Charles Livingstone” (Pilot 277). Firstly the name should be Livingston. Sadly this was not “the greatest tragedy”. In 1917 the previous No.1, the Alfred H Reid was sunk by a mine near the Bar light vessel with a loss of 39 lives. It was the 25th (not 27th) that the No.2 pilot boat the Walter J Chambers took Mr Webster and colleagues out to the Bar where the Charles Livingston was on boarding station and the stranding occurred on Sunday 26th November. (Several pilots who were further down the “boarding list” remained aboard the No.2). Unfortunately the article could give the impression that Captain MacLeod (not McLeod) the “Senior Master” was on the bridge during the stranding and that he might be responsible for the pilot boat’s position. However, nothing could be further from the truth and the “Second Master” subsequently resigned from the service. As reported, the first losses were five apprentices in the boats – one was in the pulling boat when it broke adrift, two manned a motor “boarding punt” and went after the pulling boat when it broke adrift and then two more manned the remaining motor “boarding punt” to go to the aid of their shipmates. (These were my shipmates as well because I had been on No.1 for 20 months and was due to rejoin that very morning after two days leave.) The excellent picture of No.1 accompanying the article shows her as new. She was built in 1921 and was 434 tons, loa 144.9 feet, 27.7 feet beam and 12.7 feet draft. Although battered and sand filled she was salvaged and rebuilt looking quite different. She served then as an examination vessel before returning to service as a Liverpool pilot boat until 1951. I look forward to each edition of The Pilot. Many thanks to yourself and other contributors.
J. Delacour Keir Liverpool pilot (retired)

Thank you, to all the others who wrote in identifying the errors in the article. ed

WW2 Picture Identified

March 17th, 2004 by JCB
Posted in History | 1 Comment »

 

INFORMATION REQUIRED… AND SUPPLIED

 In the July issue I ran an article on Pilotage in Liverpool during WW2. I illustrated the article with the above photograph taken from a WW2 book about the British Merchant Navy. Harwich pilot Andy Adams has provided the following interesting information about the photograph:

… the illustration comes not from the Liverpool District but from London. The photograph was taken from the head of Southend Pier which at the time was known as HMS LEIGH, the convoy and Naval Control of Shipping base at Southend.

The photograph shows the convoy anchorage inside the boom, which stretched from the Essex to Kent shore, remnants of which are still visible. The vessel on the extreme left with TH on the bows is the Trinity House pilot cutter LIONHEART. Two cutters were always stationed with the convoys and went out to the Sunk LV, landed pilots and then shipped them in the arriving convoys before returning to Southend. LIONHEART was a former Grimsby trawler (GY222) which was converted for pilot service in 1941 after three pilot cutters were requisitioned for service with the RN. She remained with Trinity House until 1948 when she was sold to a Dutch company for further service as a fishing vessel, she was finally broken up in April 1963. One of the London District vessels THPV VIGIA was requisitioned for the examination service at Liverpool and commissioned as HMS ARIEL. After service as an examination vessel she became the nominal base ship for the radar training school until this was transferred ashore to Burtonwood in 1943. After this she was transferred to the War Department  under her civilian name, VIGIA, it is believed that she was used to service the anti-aircraft forts in Liverpool Bay before being returned to Trinity House in

September 1945.

LIVERPOOL PILOTAGE DURING WW2

March 16th, 2004 by JCB
Posted in History | No Comments »

A summary by R.F. Youde Licensed Liverpool pilot 1936 -1975
On the outbreak of war it was ordered that all leave for pilots was cancelled and no pilot would be granted leave of absence to join the fighting services. Pilotage in Liverpool was declared a reserved occupation by order of the War Cabinet, however, there was an instance of an apprentice-pilot who joined the Royal Air Force, was commissioned with “wings” and served as an instructor in flight navigation. The Pilot-boat on the Western Station at Point Lynas was ordered to proceed to a position near the North West Light-Float and to keep her station there, about seven miles to the west of the Bar Lightship. In that position she continued to serve ships approaching Liverpool from the south and around the Welsh coast, while the Bar Pilot boat maintained her usual station near to the entrance to Queens Channel, the main channel which leads into the Mersey. Navigation in the Mersey was suspended during the hours of darkness due to the restrictions which were placed on lighting until well after the severe blitz of May 1940. An Examination Service was set-up on the Bar pilot-boat, comprising Royal Naval commissioned ranks, NCOs and other ranks. Accommodation was cramped and there were instances of Royal Naval officers taking exception to being obliged to live and eat with other ranks. After the fall of France, the Royal Navy managed to produce a pilot-boat from Holland for the Examination Service. This made life much easier for the pilots and crew of the Bar pilot-boat. At the outbreak of war there were 145 licensed pilots. This number was considered to be insufficient to meet the unforeseeable problems which were known would lie ahead. Twenty men were recruited from outside the Liverpool Pilot Service. They had either served as pilots in other ports, including London, Southampton, and Preston, or else were Masters or Mates who had held Pilotage Exemption Certificates for the Mersey. The Pilotage Authority also invited Second Class Liverpool Pilots (then limited to 2,000 tons net) to apply to be examined for a 4,000 ton-limit licence, to be held until completion of the normal qualifying period for a First-Class licence, which was then an unrestricted licence. It was ordered by the Marine Surveyor and Water Bailiff for the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board that the Mersey should be partitioned into anchorages which were effectively designated as specific parking lots. Circles were printed in red ink on the chart from the Rock Lighthouse as far south as water would permit any anchorage at low water. Each parking lot was numbered and was useful for tugs and river-launches in ascertaining where particular ships were anchored. A principle difficulty was in the matter of communication. In most circumstances the only possible means was by Morse lamp or by hailing through a megaphone. In many cases, ships were routed to Liverpool for orders but had not been given specific docking instructions. Very often this would lead to a ship missing the tide which she could otherwise have made if only the necessary arrangements had been known and, in consequence, space would be taken up in the anchorages. When a convoy was preparing to sail it was usual for some of the ships to undock and anchor in the river and then wait for the rest of the fleet to join them by undocking on the following tide, as there might well have been too many ships to undock all at once on the same tide. This would add to the congestion in the anchorages and, if a convoy was due in on the next day and perhaps did not catch the tide, there would be further addition to the congestion. When the air-raids became heavier and more frequent after the fall of France, the enemy began to drop magnetic mines which lay on the sea-bed and could not be seen from the surface by ships navigating the river and channels. To combat this, a fleet of HM minesweepers were detailed to be first to sail from the Mersey to sweep the Main Channels and Western Approaches. On one occasion the Pilot-boat was ordered to proceed to sea before the minesweepers, which gave rise to much concern aboard the cutter. The order was questioned and rectified. As far as I can recall, three ships were mined and sunk in the river, with one in the Main Channel and one just outside it. The property on both sides of the river took a very heavy pounding, but the Port itself was never closed due to enemy action. The Princes Landing Stage and the Ferry Stages remained usable. The lock gates and river entrances were never put out of action, with the exception of Hornby-lock, the use of which could be avoided by alternative routes within the dock system. As to the Royal Navy, there was no change in the law which provides that HM ships are exempt from compulsory pilotage; and no change in the custom and practice of the Royal Navy to engage the service of Liverpool pilots in most circumstances. Relations between the Royal Navy and the Pilot Service were conducted properly and professionally by all concerned and it is probably fair to say that mutual respect and regard between the two organisations was probably never higher than at that time. Duty was the watchword: and every man knew that England expected nothing less. R. F. Youde

Ronald Fergus Youde sadly passed away in December 2005. The following obituary was written by his son, ex Liverpool pilot Barrie Youde. JCB
Ronald Fergus Youde (1910 – 2005)
Pilot Ronald Fergus Youde died peacefully on 14th December 2005, aged 95. The son of a leading Chester lawyer, he was born in 1910 and educated at Chester Cathedral Choir School, followed by the King’s School and HMS Conway. In 1927 as a Senior Cadet Captain (HMS Conway) he began what was to prove to be a nineyear apprenticeship in the Liverpool Pilot Service. During 1932-34 he was released to serve as Fourth Officer in the Far-East trade of the Blue Funnel Line. He was Licensed in Liverpool as a Third Class Pilot in 1936. The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 saw him fast-tracked to First Class rank. For his services during the War he was ultimately granted, as were all serving pilots of the time, the honorary Freedom of the City of Liverpool – an honour which he greatly appreciated. In 1945 he was elected to the Liverpool Pilotage Committee and also to the Chair of the Liverpool Pilots’ Association, holding both offices for twenty-five years until relinquishing each one in 1970. In 1948 he was appointed Appropriated Pilot to Anchor Line Ltd. The vessel in the photograph is Anchor Line’s Circassia which had two sister ships, Cilicia and Caledonia, all operating a monthly liner service from Liverpool – with much coastal work to the Clyde and the Bristol Channel when in home waters. Together with Anchor Line’s cargo service to USA, he was kept very busy. RF Youde served Anchor Line from 1948 until the withdrawal of its passenger-service to Bombay in 1964 after which he was appropriated to Shaw Savill & Albion, from which he retired in 1975. Following this he served as a Trustee of the Pilots’ National Pension Fund, eventually relinquishing that post in 1993, aged eighty-three. If the holding of professional office is to be seen as a prize, it may safely be said that RF Youde swept the board of all the prizes available to any pilot of his generation. His leadership was by example and he was a man of few words. It was sometimes said that he could say more with his mouth shut than with his mouth open – and he frequently did so with devastating effect. He could not suffer any fool. He inherited his father’s incisive legal mind and had no difficulty in recognising any aspect of pilotage law. On behalf of pilots in the 1950s he was one of the leading figures in securing the Agreement of Sir Robert Letch (the “Letch Agreement”) in relation to conditions of service. By the authority of the Secretary of State. This Agreement stands to the present day as a precedent benchmark for the benefit of pilots and all others concerned with the organisation of shipping at national level. More locally, as a member of the Liverpool Pilotage Committee, he was the pilot most closely associated with the generally unpopular task of de-commissioning the traditional sea-keeping pilot-cutters, on the grounds of expense, and replacing them with a shorebased launch-service. He never courted popularity in any way and the fact that he achieved any of his aims at all was attributable solely to his unfailing (if sometimes blunt) civility. Beyond his rather lonely professional exterior, family farming connections as a child had instilled in him a love of the countryside and a respect for any good sporting horseman. He had been a keen sporting oarsman when at the King’s School in the early 1920s, in stark contrast of style to the working-boat oarsman which he was soon obliged to become as a pilotage apprentice. Any further interest in sport, however, remained general rather than specific and he was never known to take mere physical exercise of any kind at all. Even golf was anathema to him. All his life, on the other hand, he was an enthusiastic and hard-working gardener, a sharp humorist, a good bridge-player and a ladies’ man. He married Mary Lloyd Evans in 1936 and they became the loving parents of two sons. He was a loving and muchloved husband, father, grandfather and great-grandfather. He remained physically active and mentally razor-sharp to the end, having made many friends in later life and earning the accolade “Everybody’s Grandfather” in doing so. After being widowed in 1980 he lived with Connie Miller, sister of Pilot Cyril James Miller, his former “Conway Chum”. His entire life was devoted to pilotage and his family. Pilotage has lost a good friend. The loss to his family is much the greater.
Barrie Youde

Piloting During WW2

January 20th, 2004 by JCB
Posted in History | No Comments »

Pilotage in Liverpool during the Second World War

A summary by R.F. Youde Licensed Liverpool pilot 1936 -1975

On the outbreak of war it was ordered that all leave for pilots was cancelled and no pilot would be granted leave of absence to join the fighting services. Pilotage in Liverpool was declared a reserved occupation by order of the War Cabinet, however, there was an instance of an apprentice-pilot who joined the Royal Air Force, was commissioned with “wings” and served as an instructor in flight navigation.  The Pilot-boat on the Western Station at Point Lynas was ordered to proceed to a position near the North West Light-Float and to keep her station there, about seven miles to the west of the Bar Lightship. In that position she continued to serve ships approaching Liverpool from the south and around the Welsh coast, while the Bar Pilot boat maintained her usual station near to the entrance to Queens Channel, the main channel which leads into the Mersey.  Navigation in the Mersey was suspended during the hours of darkness due to the restrictions which were placed on lighting until well after the severe blitz of May 1940.

An Examination Service was set-up on the Bar pilot-boat, comprising Royal Naval commissioned ranks, NCOs and other ranks. Accommodation was cramped and there were instances of Royal Naval officers taking exception to being obliged to live and eat with other ranks. After the fall of France, the Royal Navy managed to produce a pilot-boat from Holland for the Examination Service. This made life much easier for the pilots and crew of the Bar pilot-boat.

At the outbreak of war there were 145 licensed pilots. This number was considered to be insufficient to meet the unforeseeable problems which were known would lie ahead. Twenty men were recruited from outside the Liverpool Pilot Service. They had either served as pilots in other ports, including London, Southampton, and Preston, or else were Masters or Mates who had held Pilotage Exemption Certificates for the Mersey. The Pilotage Authority also invited Second Class Liverpool Pilots (then limited to 2,000 tons net) to apply to be examined for a 4,000 ton-limit licence, to be held until completion of the normal qualifying period for a First-Class licence, which was then an unrestricted licence.

It was ordered by the Marine Surveyor and Water Bailiff for the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board that the Mersey should be partitioned into anchorages which were effectively designated as specific parking lots. Circles were printed in red ink on the chart from the Rock Lighthouse as far south as water would permit any anchorage at low water. Each parking lot was numbered and was useful for tugs and river-launches in ascertaining where particular ships were anchored.

A principle difficulty was in the matter of communication. In most circumstances the only possible means was by Morse lamp or by hailing through a megaphone. In many cases, ships were routed to Liverpool for orders but had not been given specific docking instructions. Very often this would lead to a ship missing the tide which she could otherwise have made if only the necessary arrangements had been known and, in consequence, space would be taken up in the anchorages.

When a convoy was preparing to sail it was usual for some of the ships to undock and anchor in the river and then wait for the rest of the fleet to join them by undocking on the following tide, as there might well have been too many ships to undock all at once on the same tide. This would add to the congestion in the anchorages and, if a convoy was due in on the next day and perhaps did not catch the tide, there would be further addition to the congestion.

When the air-raids became heavier and more frequent after the fall of France, the enemy began to drop magnetic mines which lay on the sea-bed and could not be seen from the surface by ships navigating the river and channels. To combat this, a fleet of HM minesweepers were detailed to be first to sail from the Mersey to sweep the Main Channels and Western Approaches.  On one occasion the Pilot-boat was ordered to proceed to sea before the minesweepers, which gave rise to much concern aboard the cutter. The order was questioned and rectified.

As far as I can recall, three ships were mined and sunk in the river, with one in the Main Channel and one just outside it.  The property on both sides of the river took a very heavy pounding, but the Port itself was never closed due to enemy action. The Princes Landing Stage and the Ferry Stages remained usable. The lock gates and river entrances were never put out of action, with the exception of Hornby-lock, the use of which could be avoided by alternative routes within the dock system.

As to the Royal Navy, there was no change in the law which provides that HM ships are exempt from compulsory pilotage; and no change in the custom and practice of the Royal Navy to engage the service of Liverpool pilots in most circumstances. Relations between the Royal Navy and the Pilot Service were conducted properly and professionally by all concerned and it is probably fair to say that mutual respect and regard between the two organisations was probably never higher than at that time. Duty was the watchword: and every man knew that England expected nothing less.

R. F. Youde

 

Pilot Veterans Honoured

January 15th, 2004 by JCB
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VETERANS HONOURED

 

At a ceremony hosted by the Lord Mayor of Liverpool in Liverpool Town Hall on 8^th December 2003, Merchant Navy veterans and Liverpool pilots, who had served in the battle of the Atlantic were granted the Freedom of the City of Liverpool along with a framed Freedom Scroll. The honour was granted posthumously for those veterans now sadly deceased. The veterans included almost thirty surviving Liverpool Pilot and amongst those honoured was RF Youde who at 93 was the oldest recipient and the only surviving pilot who had served throughout the duration of the war. The Lord Mayor, Councillor Ronald Gould, made the presentation wearing a Liverpool Pilot’s Tie which had been presented to him at the Lord Mayor’s Reception prior to the UKMPA Conference.

Many have unsuccessfully tried to ascertain what it actually means to be a Freeman of a City, other than the invitation to the Mayoral Reception and the possibility of a medieval tradition of being able to have the right to drive a flock of sheep down Dale Street in the City Centre! The present serving pilots, who amongst their number are several with access to flocks of sheep, are investigating this possibility, believing that our retired colleagues shall have everything possible to honour their contribution to keeping open the lifeline afforded by the Western Approaches, be it as either serving pilots of the period or as ship-born cadets serving in the Merchant Navy prior to entering the Liverpool Pilot Service as Boathands.

For myself, as the then Chairman of the serving Liverpool Pilots, it was a privilege to be present as witness to my colleagues well deserved honour

John Curry

Liverpool

HMS Whimbrel

January 10th, 2004 by JCB
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RESEARCH AND

Battle of Atlantic

Liverpool’s decision to grant the Freedom of the City to Battle of Atlantic seafarers has been reinforced by a preservation group which is hoping to acquire HMS Whimbrel, one of the last surviving Black Swan class sloops, to be berthed at Liverpool as a memorial of that legendary struggle which kept Britain’s vital sea lanes open. The preservation group, led by retired Vice-Admiral Michael Gretton RN, has signed a memorandum of agreement to buy the ship after she was deemed surplus by the Egyptian Navy where she has served as ENS Tariq since being sold by the Admiralty in 1949.

Armed with 4in guns and a formidable array of anti-submarine weapons, HMS Whimbrel served with Escort Group 2, the flotilla of the legendary U-boat hunter Captain Johnny Walker and her war-time record makes her an ideal vessel for a memorial. Her service took her from the ice floes of northern Russia to the heat of the East Indies.

She was also present at the surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945 that marked the end of the Second World War.

www.hmswhimbrel.org/

To support the HMS Whimbrel preservation project, contact:

conrad.waters @btopenworld.com