

# THE PILOT



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## Editorial

Reading press releases and browsing through maritime journals it is easy to gain the impression that every new vessel is fitted out with the latest in hi-tech systems and equipment but as any pilot knows this image is totally false and thus dangerously deceptive. Regrettably, these images are those that are seen by the armchair "experts" who question why a pilot is needed in addition to this apparent seamless interface between the crew and their ship. The reality of this false image was brought home to me the other day whilst piloting a new 40,000 dwt tanker. Built in Korea the bridge layout was indistinguishable from a wheelhouse from the 1970s with the row of pale green instrument over the top of the central bridge windows and the helm indicator directly over the top of the pilot conning position between the "standard" console and the central gyro repeater on the bridge front. We are all familiar with the contortions required by this layout to verify that engine and helm orders are being correctly executed and of course the wheelhouse contained none of the exciting integrated products and even the daylight (green on black invisible in sunlight) radars were housed in the traditional green casings!

This traditional design had also encompassed the deck machinery where half the required moorings had to be secured by turning up on the bits. The mooring was handled by one officer and two crewmen (apparently legal manning) each end resulting in the operation taking 1½ hours! Thirty years ago there would have been an officer plus 6-8 men and the same operation would have taken one third of the time. This is a major problem for pilots since during mooring and unmooring we have to hold the vessel in position on the berth, often in strong winds and tide. Such a situation is always inherently dangerous since even a minor error can result in damage, injury or death and this minimum manning vastly enhances the risks. We all know that such vessels have filing cabinets full of compliance documentation to reassure all the inspectors and armchair wallahs but in the event of an accident the Master and pilot will be subjected to an intense interrogation and

## PILOTAGE HISTORY ~ Part 2

Harry Hignett

*In part 1 we learned how the situation for pilots over the centuries had resulted in legislation covering compulsory pilotage being introduced but as a result of poor drafting much of this legislation was open to abuse and offered poor protection for pilots. By the end of the 19th Century, pilots were subjected to competition from exemptions to pilotage being offered to vessels and sadly in some cases from other pilots! The founding of the UKPA in 1884 had focused unity of purpose and achieved a significant result by stimulating the 1889 Merchant shipping Act (Pilotage). Whilst many of the pilots' requirements had been incorporated into the is Act it was still full of loopholes and this was compounded by apathy by Trinity House in tackling pilotage exemption abuses. The 1889 pilotage Act was incorporated into the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act but having achieved few further gains pilots became despondent.*



*The Francis Henderson, built by Murdock and Murray in 1896, the first steam pilot vessel for the Liverpool Pilot Service. From an original painting by J Witham.*

will inevitably found to have done something wrong and most alarming is the increasing tendency to bring criminal charges against seafarers. The impact of minimum manning on pilots will not be addressed and their value will continue to be undervalued unless we continue to raise issues such as this at the highest levels. Despite progress being slow there is evidence that the campaigning by the UKMPA, EMPA and IMPA is now changing opinions. Membership of the UKMPA ensures that your concerns are not only heard but also effectively raised at national and international fora and its insurances also ensure that pilots are fully supported should the unthinkable happen.

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## 1901 - 1941

1900 was a time of falling membership and low attendances at conferences. The UKPA membership fell to around 700 in contrast to a decade earlier when the numbers were about 1,200. Although the total number of pilots entered in the annual returns of the BoT was about 2,300, many were part-time pilots at very small ports.

The complaints against "aliens" obtaining pilotage exemption certificates were a very strong card in the hands of the Association. The Foreign Office insisted that there were treaty arrangements between countries that made such arrangements inevitable, however there was a serious flaw in this argument in that foreign masters could pilot their vessels at each end of the voyage but British masters could not. In 1902 B J Foster (Hull) rose at the Plymouth Conference to announce that the holder of a pilotage certificate for the Humber was a commissioned officer in the German Navy and claimed he would get promotion because of that qualification. It was stated that alien pilotage had increased 200% under the 1889 Pilotage Act and that all members of the 1888 Select Committee on Pilotage who had not been against alien pilotage, "were now aware of the damage done and entirely against the principle".

Legal matters concerning pilots were handled by the Association's barrister and the cases were becoming ever more complex, as the quirks of legal decisions arose. In 1902 a Clyde pilot had to pay £1,071 damages even though he had not been found in any way negligent or to blame for an accident. The ship-owners had gone bankrupt and the costs had been set against the pilots! For many decades the pilots had assumed that the signing of the bond for £100 gave them protection from liability for damages but it was then found that for an unknown reason, this condition applied only to Trinity House pilots.

In 1902 at Barrow, a local official suspended a pilot for a very dubious infringement of the rules. The pilots took the matter to the County Court and proved that the official had no powers to suspend anyone. The official turned to Trinity House Pilotage authority, which, without further inquiry, agreed to suspend the pilot. The case was taken to the High Court and the Trinity House's action declared illegal. However the pilot was required to pay part of the court costs and his own expenses amounting to some £100.

In 1908 Clyde pilot, J McKinley, was accused of navigating a vessel in a dangerous manner when pilot of ss *Maracas* inward-bound. He met HMS *Harrier* outward-bound in visibility of about 1½ miles; there was no collision, but the commander of the naval vessel made a complaint about the navigation of *Maracas*.

The Sheriff, trying the case without assessors, said that it was a very clear case and stated, "I should say that the risk having been placed there by the *Maracas*, it was only averted by the prompt action of those in charge of the *Harrier* who succeeded in preventing what might have been a very serious disaster". He found the case proved and fined McKinley £25 with £10 costs.

The incensed delegates to the 1908 Conference six months later were unanimous in a demand for an appeal to a higher court at the expense of the Association. The appeal was dismissed, so the Association petitioned the King who passed it to his Scottish Secretary who merely passed it to the same High Court, not surprisingly with the same result. Commander Cawley, at the 1909 Conference said that he would try to appeal to His Majesty in person. However he drew attention to the depletion of the Management Fund in providing legal advice in the many and wide-spread court proceedings against pilots and in obtaining assistance in Parliamentary matters.

Following representations from Commander Cawley, all the members of the 1889 Select Committee agreed to assist the Association and Sir John Puleston arranged for a deputation from the UKPA to meet the president of the Board of Trade (Winston Churchill). Led by Commander Cawley and Michael Joyce MP (Limerick pilot), the Association Officers were introduced to Churchill and members of his staff. Churchill listened carefully to all the arguments placed before him. Given his ideas at the time (he was campaigning for the formation of MI5 to act against enemy agents), alien pilotage was a strong point in the Association's favour, as was also the court proceedings against McKinley. Churchill promptly signed the order for a Departmental Committee on Pilotage to begin work in 1909.

In 1908, the Counsel to the Association had died, and he was succeeded by a Bristol solicitor, Sandford D Cole. Cole was a very competent person, who became a member of the Departmental Committee. From this Committee arose the Pilotage Act 1913, encompassing much of what the pilots required:- freedom from illegal pilotage, a restriction on the issue of pilotage certificates, better rules generally and mandatory representation on pilotage committees.

## The Pilotage Act 1913 and After

The implementation of the 1913 Pilotage Act was interrupted in many ports by the outbreak of war and there is no record of the activities of the Association for a couple of years. Many pilots entered the armed forces and several lost their lives on land

and sea. Those who remained in the pilotage services braved torpedoes and mines: most received Mercantile Marine and War Medals. Some were decorated for specific acts of bravery.

After the end of the War the Association's Solicitor, John Inskip, in conjunction with Michael Joyce, suggested that a Committee of Members of Parliament sympathetic to the pilots' cause should be formed with a view to having assistance whenever legislation or matters affecting pilots was passing through Parliament. Inskip introduced the Officers of the UKPA to his brother, Thomas Inskip, KCMP, who agreed to assist. Thomas Inskip was to become Attorney General in several later governments and eventually a Cabinet Minister. A ten-member Committee was formed to continue discussions but the introduction of new pilotage orders did not go smoothly. Inskip, in one of his reports as Secretary in the early twenties, said he had attended ten inquiries in one year. And in six years there were more than twenty inquiries, not all brought about by the same type of objection. For example, in the Forth, the ship owners objected to the new 'pooling' arrangements, claiming that the pilots would become lazy, inefficient and incompetent.

During the War the subscriptions had been raised from 1/- per month to 1/6d and again in 1919 to 2/-. However the cost of correspondence, telephone calls, printing of agendas, minutes and expenses of travel were all putting the finances under pressure. A total of 24/- annually would not cover the amount required for long.

"THE PILOT", appeared for the first time in 1920 through which membership increased from about 1,000 to almost 1,300 in 1921. The magazine proved to be the most efficient way of increasing the pilots' awareness of problems, and indicating how difficulties could be avoided or averted by adopting better procedures.

In 1923 the MP for Hull, Lt Cmdr Peter Kenworthy (Independent), who had been helpful in supporting the Humber pilots as a member of the House of Commons Pilotage Committee, agreed to become President when Michael Joyce retired but in 1924 he was forced to resign due to ill-health. Like Joyce he had seldom missed an Executive Committee meeting, once slipping away from a crucial debate in the House, to attend a conference. Peter Kenworthy was succeeded by Lord Apsley, MP for Southampton, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport and a person known for his sympathies with seafarers in general. Refusing all fees, he was of invaluable assistance in the years to come.

Around this time there was unrest at Bristol, stemming from the introduction of steam pilot cutters which although having

been in use at other ports since the turn of the century, were not popular with pilots from Pill. New bye-laws did not meet the pilots' demands and they objected to the Board of Trade who ordered a local inquiry. The Bristol pilots told the Executive Committee of their intention to join a dockworkers' union and that they could not remain members of the UKPA on the grounds that the Association represented licensed pilots who were unable to strike.

During the immediate post-war years, many cases of maladministration of pilotage affairs appeared with Dundee the best example. The pilots there were paid a weekly salary of £4 by the Authority, together with such further amounts as the Authority cared to distribute from the

surplus earnings after they had met their own requirements. But there was a legal dispute between the Anchor Line and Dundee Harbour Board where the pilotage funds had been used to defray costs that had little or nothing to do with pilotage.

In 1925 there were eight inquiries and the local branches were subsidised by £21 for each inquiry. Over a decade the Association's finances were in a deficit of £212 which was eating into the accumulated funds and the larger ports were subsidising the smaller. At the 1925 Conference, John Inskip impressed upon members that there were always to be two funds established in each district: a Pilot Fund for administration and a Pilot Benefit Fund for disablement and retirement pensions. He took pains to explain and

distinguish between the two types of funds that made it imperative and legally necessary to maintain them separate and distinct.

During the late 1920s, the cost of living was falling, the shipowners pressed for reductions in pilots' earnings and in 1929 attacked the Liverpool pilots directly. Until then the local inquiries had been 'round the table' affairs with no formal structure. At Liverpool the authority agreed with the pilots that a reduction of 10% was warranted. The Chamber of Shipping, however, brought in their own counsel who used formal procedures, leaving the UKPA somewhat short in its planning. The pilots lost the case in that the previously agreed reduction was increased to 15%. During the same Inquiry the shipowners managed to include another principle into the reckoning, namely that of having pilots' earnings set between the pay of the master and mate of the average vessel using the pilot.

There was a deputation to the Board of Trade making a point on the use of formal procedures at inquiries. The pilots, with members of the Parliamentary Committee, made known their strong case of injustice. Whenever there had been an objection to a by-law or dispute between the authorities, pilots or shipowners, the BoT found it easy to institute an inquiry. These were formal affairs and thereby expensive for pilots.

Between 1925 and 1930, following the Liverpool example there was a series of applications for reductions in pilotage rates or incomes, mostly demanding cuts of 15-20 per cent but the Association managed to hold most of the cuts to 10%.

There were other problems, not least in the matter of membership. Inskip, agreed with the Thames River Pilots' Association to pay two guineas to one of their members who unsuccessfully took a case to court. He later learned that the man concerned was not a member: In fact only 73 of the 125 pilots of that district were members. There were other membership abuses such as, in a couple of inquiries, the local pilots suddenly had 100% membership several months before the inquiries took place so in 1935 a rule was introduced and passed that before the Association assisted a local branch, there had to be a substantial membership at least three years before any assistance was granted.

In 1935 the shipowners began attacking pilot cutters and methods of boarding to reduce costs. They demanded that the Liverpool pilot station at Point Lynas be closed and the cutter withdrawn. The Inquiry lasted seven days, four in Liverpool and three in London. Six counsel were engaged, of which two were briefed by the Association. There was a principle involved and Sir John thought it worth the fight. The Liverpool pilots won the case. But the



# The Pilot

(OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE UNITED KINGDOM PILOTS' ASSOCIATION.)

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OCTOBER, 1920.

**F**OR some time it has been recognised by members of the Executive that the work of the Association has not been sufficiently well known among the members. The need of more propaganda has been strongly urged at many Conferences, an obvious weakness of the organisation being that its membership embraces little more than 50 per cent. of the pilots round the coast. "The Pilot" will endeavour to remedy that state of affairs.

We start in an unpretentious way, the first issue being devoted largely to a record of a meeting of the Executive. From that, members will see the various matters which are engaging the attention of the officers and the steps which are being taken to deal with the points which have arisen. It is hoped that in subsequent issues it will be possible to devote some space to local events and to the ventilation of the opinions of pilots who are unable to attend, or are too retiring to address the Conference.

At the outset, it is proposed to make "The Pilot" a quarterly publication, and it will be in the hands of members as soon as possible after each quarterly meeting of the Executive. In this experimental stage no charge is being made for it. It has been felt that the reporting in full of the lengthy debates at the Conferences has made those books unwieldy, and that has discouraged reading. By presenting those reports in more concise form considerable economies in printing will be effected, rendering it possible to issue this new magazine quarterly without increasing the expenses of the Association under the heading of "printing."

We sincerely hope that "The Pilot" will succeed in establishing that link between the ports which has hitherto been lacking, and its measure of success will be in proportion to the co-operation of branch secretaries and individual pilots.

expenses paid by the Association were over £1,300; the Liverpool Pilots' Association returned £100 of this to the UKPA in appreciation of the support.

History does repeat itself especially at Barrow-in-Furness. A pilot there was docking ss *Orion* in 1935, when, without warning, a dockmaster ordered the head-rope to be moved. The vessel sheered away from the lock wall and was damaged, for which the pilot was brought before the local Trinity House Commissioners and suspended. The evidence had been given in his absence and was later read over to him. When Sir John looked into the matter he found that one of the Trinity House Sub-Commissioners was a servant of the owners of the vessel. He wrote immediately to Trinity House, who restored the licence and re-opened the proceedings.

In 1934 the Executive Committee, following consultation with branches, produced a seven-point policy for discussion in the branches related to the financial regulation of the pilot funds and associated costs such as cutters etc.

During the 1938 Conference on the Mersey, Liverpool pilots announced that they had 435 exemption certificates in force in their district, with a high average number of vessels on each certificate. One certificate had 114 vessels entered and although many of the vessels no longer existed over 29 vessels on one certificate was considered ridiculous.

## WW2

War was impending and many members of the UKPA were commissioned officers in the Royal Naval Reserve. For the first two

years of the War, Inskip carried on almost single-handed and there were no meetings. Many senior members of the districts were called into administrative matters to become involved in the re-organisation of war-time pilot services. The UKPA still continued to function but they had consult by letter or phone. Matters dealt with included the insurance of cutters during hostilities, employment of pilots during lack of shipping, registering apprentices to preclude conscription, the new compulsory pilotage order for war purposes, food rationing, clothing, liability for fire-watch duties or Home Guard stand-by.

Membership in 1938/9 was nearly 1,200 but there was to be a change. In 1942 the Secretary told the Executive Committee that 25 members of the Manchester Pilots' Association had not renewed their subscriptions and had apparently joined the Transport & General Workers Union due to closer contact between the pilots, tug crews, canal operating staffs and dockworkers. Certainly the latter had received increases of more than 40% and some pilots were now receiving less than a dockworker.

A couple of months later, 112 Liverpool pilots, led by Lewis Jones, a former member of the Executive Committee also resigned Association membership to join the TGWU. The withdrawal of the Liverpool pilots was particularly galling for the Association members, in view of the costly support given in defending the retention of the Point Lynas Pilot Station a few years earlier.

From 1942 the Executive Committee met regularly every quarter, and in making plans for the future, the seven-point

programme was resurrected, re-drawn and discussed at an informal conference in the summer of 1944. Shortly after the conference it was learned the Lord Apsley had been killed in action. The post-War political changes led to difficulties in finding a new president or indeed any parliamentary representation.

The General Election of 1945 was called at the same time and the Conservatives were in disarray. The senior Labour Members of Parliament had insufficient time to represent the Association and newer members were unwilling to take up the reins. In the UKPA debates it was found that the subscriptions would have to be increased from £2 16s per annum to £3.

In 1949 at Hull the local authority decided to appoint pilots as choice pilots whether or not the particular pilot was willing to take the work. The Association decided to take interest in the choice pilotage situation and circulated 48 of the 60 ports: only 12 replied.

Discussions towards a standard for pilots' earnings began to bear fruit in the early 1950s. In 1956 there was a Ministry of Transport Inquiry chaired by Sir Robert Letch. The "Letch Report" resulted in a structure for pilots' earnings which lasted to the end of the century. Although not without criticism, as a basis for discussion, it simplified negotiations for half a century.

## Modern Times

From 1960 onwards the UKPA turned its attention to pensions and gathered details of the many and varied schemes around the UKPA ports. Several ports had no official pension scheme: the smaller ports were particularly badly off. Charges were another area of variance and the mid-1960s were a time of impending change with a new method of tonnage measurement affecting pilotage charges. Every vessel had two sets of tonnages and only when a certain "delta" mark on the vessel (similar to the Plimsoll mark) was immersed would the higher tonnage charges apply. Pilots were very concerned over changes that were being used to curb incomes and many felt that it was time for direct action.

In 1968 a new General Secretary and Legal Advisor, Edgar Eden, a barrister warned against any precipitate action on the part of the pilots fearing that if they disturbed the balance of the Letch Report, there could be action from the ship owners who would love to overthrow Letch and make pilots salaried employees.

## Industrial Action

On 26th January 1971, after due notice being given to all sectors of the shipping industry, more than 1,400 pilots met in Birmingham Town Hall effectively bringing UK's ports to a standstill for 24 hours. For

## Will Thatcher trim the Pilots' sails?

The Times - Friday 7th December 1984



**DROPPING THE PILOT.**

*Peter Brooks  
(aka Pennel)*

the next couple of months the pilots' representatives pursued a target of 20% increase in pilotage incomes and the final result was an increase of 16%.

The Pilots' National Pension Fund came into being in 1971 and within a decade 99% of pilots were members and contributors.

During the 1970s other issues were addressed including London pilots who became concerned about health issues, and in 1978 brought certain facts to the notice of the UKPA. As always finance was an issue and it became increasingly difficult for the UKPA to operate as a stand-alone group and it was therefore decided to seek affiliation with a larger union. In 1979 the UKPA and TGWU began steps to merge.

Following the successful merger the membership increased and by the 1984 centenary of the UKPA it exceeded 99% of the total number of pilots in the UK.

## 1984 - The Present (by JCB)

All good things must come to an end and in 1984, in what represented a U-turn in the Thatcherite policies of encouraging free enterprise the Government decided to revolutionise pilotage and transfer responsibility for pilotage from Trinity House and other local pilotage commissioners to the ports by means of a new Pilotage Act. The UKPA found itself fighting for survival and much time and effort was expended in

trying to ensure that the proposed legislation preserved the essential rights for pilots. Unfortunately, once the Bill was in the hands of the politicians, the UKPA lost control of the content and the resulting 1987 Pilotage Act effectively granted ports total power over pilots without any accountability. The Act also resulted in a division of UKPA membership between employed and self employed districts. Whereas in some instances the pilots (usually self employed) enjoyed a good working relationship with their port (now known as the Competent Harbour Authority CHA) in many ports the relationship was poor. In Liverpool the majority of pilots were bitterly opposed to being employees of the port and after much difficult negotiation were able to reverse their employment status to become self employed. The other major conflict was on the Humber where the CHA, Associated British Ports, sought to force employment onto the self employed pilots. That dispute, along with its tragic outcome has been well documented within these pages.

The most dramatic development post 1987 was the *Sea Empress* disaster which starkly revealed the lack of accountability of a CHA for the powers over pilotage that had been transferred to them. In 1997 the new Labour Government was sufficiently concerned by this lack of accountability to launch an enquiry which in turn led to the

Department for Transport drawing up a Port Marine Safety Code. The UKPA were deeply involved in drafting this code and established a good working relationship with the DfT. Once published, pilots were concerned that whilst the PMSC provided a good framework for port safety, without legislation to underpin it, the document lacked teeth. Meetings commenced with the Government with a view to drafting legislation but these came to an abrupt halt as the situation on the Humber deteriorated into a serious dispute. At the same time the British Ports Industries Training (BPIT) forum, which had been working closely with the UKMPA in producing a set of standards and qualification requirements for UK pilots was also disbanded to be replaced by a body operated by the UK ports industry called Port Skills and Safety (PSS). PSS promptly excluded the T&G and hence the UKMPA from representation and subsequently became a dormant organisation. In 2003, the President of the UKMPA Lord Tony Berkeley made approaches to the shipping minister which resulted in meetings being resumed, both sides being fully in agreement that the safety of shipping and the environment is a priority. Regular meetings are now being held and the following report detailing the work of the Chairman and section Committee indicates that constructive progress is once again being made.

# THE UKMPA AT WORK: CHAIRMAN'S REPORT

## DfT

The DfT has handed the responsibility for monitoring, compliance and review of the PMSC to the MCA. This new responsibility will cover the Pilots National Qualification, HM Standards and PEC Standards. Interestingly, the Working Time regulations and how they impact on Pilotage is on the agenda. Mr Joe Collins will head the department that will be renamed the Navigation and Safety Branch and both he and his new assistant a Mr Simon Gooder have been invited to the Eastbourne Conference. Two working groups will be established; one covering the PMSC and the other the qualifications and standards. The DfT, Ports Division, still retain overall control and responsibility. The Transport Select Committee, chaired by Mrs Gwenyth Dunwoody, has demanded action from the MCA on these issues. Don Cockrill (London) will head the UKMPA team assisted by Brian Wilson (Belfast) and they will attend both working groups. I have invited Mr Phil Hart (pilotage) Ports Division, and his research assistant Mr James Weedon to the conference.

A question has been raised regarding body searches required by the ISPS code. I have contacted TRANSEC (transport security) at the DfT for their interpretation of the code. There exists a document on the Standards to be applied to the code. TRANSEC is discussing with the DfT whether or not they can issue this confidential document to the UKMPA. However, amendments that have been issued to this document state that if an individual has been issued with a pass to gain entry into an area at Security State 1, would not normally be expected to be bodily searched. If you refuse to be searched by the individual acting as a security officer you will be held until a member of Her Majesty's constabulary arrives and carries out the search.

## Legal

Blake Laphorn Linnell has dealt with contracts for Inverness and Peterhead and are monitoring the contractual discussions in Belfast and Wisbech. An opinion was sought and given regarding the interpretation of the Railways and Transport

Act where, following an incident, a pilot was tested for alcohol content. Circular no 36/04 refers to the opinion given. Following more enquiries into our liability issues further opinion was given and circular no 29/04 refers.

## Europe

The EU Commission, on the 13th October 2004, has adopted the new Port Access Directive without further consultation. Rest assured that the UKMPA will be lobbying hard against this directive on its various stages in the EP, Council and Commission. I will be attending a meeting at Transport House to prepare a strategy of opposition to this directive on 3rd November. Immediately following this meeting we will be meeting with Mike Davies, the Ports Division civil servant responsible for the Port Access Directive.

## EMPA

The Board of Directors of EMPA met in Antwerp on 1st and 2nd September. The three main topics were the new Port Access

Directive, the finalisation of the Internal Rules and the MarNIS project. The Port Access Directive will be opposed by EMPA and lobbying will be carried out in each member country and in Brussels. Only one significant change has been made to the Internal EMPA Rules and that is the possibility of the Secretary/General being a non-active pilot with a maximum period of office of 2 years. This does not preclude an active pilot being nominated for the post at the General meeting that next year will be held in Poland.

The MarNIS project officially started on 15th September although the working groups do not begin until November. **EMPA are looking for two pilot volunteers from each member country who are technically qualified, document competent, possibly with a knowledge of French and able to be released to cover the meetings. Joe Wilson has volunteered for one of the positions. If you are interested please contact the Chairman.**

The Council of Presidents (COP) met on 8th and 9th September and an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) of EMPA was held on 10th September in Paris. The COP discussed the Internal Rules and the impending start of the MarNIS project. The EGM ratified the new Internal Rules of EMPA.

## Review of the 1987 Pilotage Act

I have appointed our Vice Chairman Joe Wilson to the task of preparing amendments to the Act after which we will submit them to our legal team to scrutinise and then to the DfT for their perusal and translation into civil service jargon.

## CHIRP

The AGM and quarterly Marine Advisory Board, of which I am a member, met at Quiniteq in Farnborough both Maritime and Aviation board members were present at the AGM. Another abuse of PEC's was on the agenda and this was discussed but because I informed the board the matter is being investigated, CHIRP is putting the matter on hold. I have informed both the DfT and the MCA of the incident and they are investigating on our (UKMPA) behalf. I hope to have more information in the near future.

## Association of Maritime Pilots of Ireland.

In September I met with the Irish pilots in Cork and experienced their renowned hospitality. I was able to give them an insight into the structure and way of operating of the UKMPA. We discussed all the relevant issues facing pilots in the UK and Europe; in particular the Working Time Regulations, the ETCS and MarNIS

projects and the new Port Access Directive. Their President Bob Kieran has accepted an invitation to attend the UKMPA Conference in Eastbourne and give a presentation about his association

## Conference

Conference is in Eastbourne on 17th and 18th November. A day delegate rate of only £25 is offered and I very much hope that pilots in the near locality will take advantage of this and attend.

## The Section Committee

### Vice Chairman: Joe Wilson: (Tees)

In addition to the responsibilities detailed in the Chairman's Report, Joe attended the 17th IMPA conference in Istanbul and his detailed report was included in the October issue of *Seaways* magazine.

### John Pretswell: Treasurer (Forth)

- UKMPA accounts on a weekly, monthly and quarterly basis
- Reconciling quarterly membership figures for T&G subscriptions
- Preparation for treasurer's report and budget preparation for the Annual Conference in November
- Secretary's work in advising District Secretaries of Section Committee Regional elections and nominations
- Notification to District Secretaries on Proxy voting at conference, also hotel and delegate booking forms
- Scottish Pilot's representative.

### Geoff Taylor: (Tees)

- Senior Vice-Chairman IMPA. Attended 17th Conference in Istanbul
- Attended the GLA's 2020 vision for navais
- Unfortunately the news on the IMPA front is not good insofar as Hein has had a recurrence of cancer and is currently undergoing chemo and radiotherapy
- Issues we shall be covering in the future

- include the use of ECDIS charts
- Deep Sea pilotage issue
- Attended the American Pilots congress in San Francisco representing IMPA
- Presented a paper in Newcastle on the Pilot Master relationship to a P&I club technical seminar
- Had an initial meeting with the chair of their International Pilotage Committee
- IMO MEPC meeting where our single interest will be developments of PSSAs.

### Don Cockrill: (London)

- Attends IMO Nav sessions
- Attends MCA meetings
- VTS steering group
- EMPA
- Attended GLA 2020 vision
- Member of PMSC / Pilotage Act working group and attends DfT/MCA meetings.

### Kristian Pederson: (Swansea)

- Represents the interests of South West members
- Involved in the legal aspects of pilotage.
- Recruitment of new members
- Technical and training matters.

### Paul Haysom: (Great Yarmouth)

- Representing the small ports and has written to pilots in these ports detailing the benefits of UKMPA membership.
- Attends miscellaneous meetings on behalf of the UKMPA
- Meeting with Navigators and General to discuss rates, implications of the FSA (Financial Services Act) and Insurance for Pilots operating in the VTS.

### David Devey: (Liverpool)

- Represents NW UK and self employed pilots
- Attends miscellaneous meetings on behalf of the UKMPA
- Review of the Pilotage Act and PMSC
- EMPA EGM (Emergency General Meeting) to ratify the new Internal Rules of EMPA (Non-profit Association under Belgian Law).

## BLAKE LAPHORN LINNELL TO ACT FOR UKMPA

Leading regional law firm, Blake Laphorn Linnell, has been appointed to act on behalf of the UK Maritime Pilots Association for employment and commercial law matters.

Nigel Craig, a commercial partner at Blake Laphorn Linnell and the client partner for the UK Maritime Pilots Association, says: "We are delighted to represent members in such a specialised profession."

There are approximately 500 members of the UK Maritime Pilots Association across the country, all of whom may require specialist legal representation.

Michael Nott, a solicitor with Blake Laphorn Linnell, has acted on behalf of the Association for a number of years. As a result he has developed expertise in this specialised area of law and he has extensive knowledge of the Pilotage Act 1987.

The extended team at Blake Laphorn Linnell will provide comprehensive legal advice on the more specialist legal issues for the pilots' profession, and utilise its more generic expertise in employment law and a host of commercial law areas to act on behalf of this client.

Nigel's team will comprise Philip Broom, partner in the employment team, Michael Nott and Mark Foden, a solicitor in company commercial team.

# PENSION NEWS

## PNPF AND THE SECRETARIAT

From November 2004 it will be a busy 18 months or so for all of us in the Secretariat and the Trustees as well. In addition to the normal day to day running of the Fund the triennial valuation is due as from 31 December 2004 and we will be working hard at providing the actuary with all the information and data he will need to calculate and finalise this valuation.

Prior to this the Trustees have decided to carry out a review of the Fund's actuary and investment consultant to ensure that the service is conducted in a manner which will provide the highest quality of advice and service for a reasonable cost. The Trustees are looking for cost effectiveness. If the review results in a change of advisor(s) then it is anticipated that they will be in place prior to the 2004 valuation.

We will have just sorted all this and the Finance and Pension Bills heave into view with some changes needing to be implemented by April 2005 and others by April 2006. Once these legislations have been well and truly signed, sealed and delivered then the Trustees will have to decide what amendments will need to be made to the PNPf Rules and these will subsequently be communicated to all members.

We have begun the process of identifying members that may be adversely affected by the new legislation and I am pleased to say it is very few.

I am sure that by the time summer 2006 comes around we will all heave a collective sigh of relief.

## RUMOURS

### PNPF Benefit Changes

This brings me neatly to some rumours that have reached our ears regarding changes in the PNPf benefits. Some members appear to be under the misapprehension that changes are going to be made in anticipation of the results of the 2004 valuation. The only pre-emptive strike the Trustees are looking at making prior to the valuation results being finalised is to look at alternative investment classes and how they might add value and reduce risk for the Fund. The Trustees have not taken any decision to change benefits.

## Retirements

May 2004 - July 2004

|              |        |       |
|--------------|--------|-------|
| IM Grant     | Forth  | June  |
| IT Henderson | Dundee | April |
| R Risi       | Dundee | April |
| GC Winter    | Tyne   | July  |

## Pension Bill

Instead of being the panacea to complicated and inflexible pension legislation this Bill appears to be increasing in size and complexity. There is likely to be a further 100 sets of statutory instruments added to it, and it already includes 300 clauses, before it receives Royal Assent.

In a recent article, Alan Pickering, the author of the Simplification Report urged ministers to scrap the Pensions Bill as it was a 'dreadful' piece of legislation. Pickering further commented that all the amendments have made it too long and too complicated and will fail to encourage pension saving in its current form. In addition to this criticism of the Bill, industry leaders are calling for the newly-appointed work and pensions secretary to "overhaul" the Bill.

So perhaps the rumour that the Pensions Bill will be scrapped to make way for new laws to ban fox hunting are true. Although most commentators say it would be political suicide for the Government to drop the Bill now.

## PENSION PROVISION

During a recent television interview, Alan Johnson, the new work and pensions secretary, dismissed the calls to increase the age of retirement and described compulsory membership of schemes as a "very complex and difficult issue". Mr. Johnson said that the government wanted to encourage people to retire later by offering greater flexibility rather than increasing the pension age to 70 as called for by the Confederation of British Industry. What makes you think a general election is due soon?

## NEWS IN BRIEF

### First PPF Chair Appointed

Lawrence Churchill, currently Chief Executive of Life business at Zurich Financial Services has been appointed to chair the board of the Pension Protection Fund (PPF).

### Financial Assistance Scheme

The Department of Work and Pensions has announced the provision of a Financial Assistance Scheme worth £400 million to provide compensation for workers who have lost their pension benefits when their employers wound up their pension schemes.

### Final Salary Schemes Closure Slowing

According to recent research the rate of final salary schemes closure is slowing as more employers take actions to retain plans on a more cost-effective basis.

### TUC Threaten Further Strikes

The trade unions are threatening more strikes to defend pension benefits unless

radical steps are taken by the government to halt the growing pension crises.

## Early Retirement

Despite the current pension crises and increasing restrictions placed by employers on early retirement, members of final salary pension schemes continue to retire early. A recent study revealed that the average age for leaving work early fell from 61 in 1985 to 59 in 2003. Among defined benefit scheme members in 2003 59% of men retired under the age of 60 compared to 45% in 1985, whilst among women 60% of those who retired in 2003 were under age 60 as compared to 45% in 1985.

## JAN LEMON - EX PNPf SECRETARY

Knowing how well liked and respected Jan was as Secretary to the Trustees, I thought you might like an update on what she is doing. Following her retirement in August 2002 Jan and her husband, John decided to up sticks and move away from the crowded Southeast to Dorset. They bought a converted pub with a few acres of land and have spent the last couple of years renovating it. During this time they also added to their family by acquiring a bearded collie called Jay. We went down to see them in early May and I am pleased to say that all are doing well, do not know when they found time to go to work and are enjoying their bucolic existence.

Debbie Marten  
debbie@pnpf.co.uk

## THISTLE HOTELS



The UKMPA has negotiated a "Thistle Advantage" package for UKMPA members. Full details are with your local Secretary but the basic package for members includes:

- \* Free Room upgrades
- \* 40% off Thistle Leisure breaks
- \* Air Miles

Bookings will require the UKMPA Advantage membership code which is available from the members section of the UKMPA website.

# MV ROCKNES: A DISASTER STILL SHROUDED IN MYSTERY?

All pilots will remember the horrific capsizing of the stone carrier *Rocknes* on the 19th January this year, especially those of us who have piloted the vessel and other vessels from the same company. Our impressions are of well run ships with competent crews. At the time of the disaster there was the usual media circus involving a succession of "experts" facing up the cameras and offering on the spot theories for the loss. Naturally much of this theorizing was focused on the role of the pilot who was very fortunate to have been one of the survivors. After so many months, this maritime disaster has now joined the masses of other forgotten maritime casualties and ceased to be newsworthy any more.

The physical cause of the disaster was a grounding which ripped open the hull. But how is it that in 2004 a modern, well founded vessel capsizes when two compartments are opened up by grounding damage?



## The Vessel and brief details:

*Rocknes*, is a self-discharging bulk carrier of 17,357grt. The ship was built in 2000 as a self-discharging bulk carrier and was originally called *Kvitnes*. From November 2002 to March 2003 it was converted in the Netherlands to a gravel dumper for dumping stone onto pipelines to secure them, among other purposes, and its name was changed to *Rocknes*. The conversion took place in collaboration with the Dutch company Van Oord ACZ.

On 19 January 2004 at 08.55 hrs *Rocknes* left Eikefet outside of Bergen, Norway, loaded with 23,243 tonnes of gravel and stone. The ship bunkered near Skålevik and then headed for Emden, Germany. The ship had a crew of twenty-nine, of whom one was the Norwegian Captain, one was a German trainee master, and the rest of the officers and crew consisted of three Dutch and twenty-four Filipino; in addition, there was a Norwegian pilot on board.

*Rocknes* capsized in Vattlestraumen within a few minutes of grounding on rocks. Apart from the pilot and eleven Philippine crew members all the other 18 officers and crew were killed in the tragedy. The ship was subsequently towed to Hanøytangen outside Bergen and righted there.

## The passage

### The pilot & Master:

The Norwegian pilot already had experience of the waters before becoming a licensed pilot in 1998. Both he and the master were familiar with the passage to be undertaken so a detailed passage plan was not prepared nor considered necessary. The account of the passage up to the grounding reveals a typical pilotage act but an early incident provided evidence that all may not be well with the stability of the vessel. At the first turn to port after leaving the berth the ship adopted a slight starboard list. The master was unconcerned since this was apparently fairly normal after loading stone at that particular berth since the loading arm from the jetty couldn't reach right to

the starboard side of the ship resulting in an uneven pile to port. As the vessel listed into a turn the cargo shifted to find a level of equilibrium. The list on this occasion was corrected by use of ballast. The pilot mentioned that the two masters had discussed the stability of the vessel but he had not paid attention to the detail although he noted that the German master appeared concerned and went to check the details on the computer and the Norwegian master mentioned to the pilot that the vessel had little initial stability. Following a bunker stop the vessel proceeded on its voyage. The pilot did not check the new draft because a few additional centimeters would not affect the passage. It was later on when passing between two small islands that both the master and pilot felt a judder and suspected that the vessel had grounded. Very soon after that the vessel started to list to starboard and kept going. The master sent a MayDay and sounded the alarm to abandon ship. At that point a crew member opened the port bridge wing door and feeling the ship continuing to capsize the pilot managed to get out onto the port bridge wing and climb over the side. Fortunately the accommodation was continuous below the wheelhouse to the hull and he was therefore able to walk long the port side of the accommodation onto the hull as the capsize continued. Rescue boats were already on the scene searching for survivors in the water and being relatively safe he was rescued by the air ambulance some twenty minutes later.

The questions asked of the pilot by the Maritime investigator underline the importance for pilots always to follow basic procedures and take nothing for granted. These included the following:

- Passage plan
- Turning characteristics
- Stopping distances for the vessel
- Why no check lists or pilot card were completed
- Use of the Electronic chart
- Use of the radars
- Charts and corrections.
- Echo sounder

The pilot explained that his navigation was based on a constant reference to the radars coupled with visual observations of the turns with respect to land and sea marks which on the *Rocknes* necessitated walking from one side of the wheelhouse to the other in order to site round the centrally stowed cargo handling arm which obstructed the view forward.

### The charts and the Hydrographic department

Following the disaster there was much press speculation about whether or not the rocks upon which the vessel grounded were charted. It would appear that a new shoal depth of 9.2m had been found during a recent survey but had not been specifically marked on a new edition of the Norwegian chart covering the area because it was found on a rock shelf that fell within the 10m sounding outside the channel off the Revskolten and was in the red sector of the Hilleren light marking the channel. The *Rocknes* did not have this latest edition of the chart on board and the ship's electronic chart was a raster chart which, not forming part of the official navigation chart folios was not required to be kept up to date. The Norwegian pilots also had an electronic chart system for their home computers but the correction contract had expired so these were also not corrected to include the latest data.

Whatever the exact situation over the charting of this passage (which is only 297m wide) following the disaster the red sector of the Hilleren light has been enlarged to cover the shelf and a buoy now marks the extremity of the shelf. The pilot confirms in his statement that had the buoy been in place at the time of the *Rocknes*' transit the grounding would not have occurred.

## Why did the vessel capsize?

The Norwegian Maritime Directorate has produced a technical report into the capsizing which confirms that following its conversion the vessel complied with construction

and stability criteria although she did not comply with some recommendations not yet incorporated into the rules. The report concluded that:

- a) *Rocknes* was not loaded in accordance with the ship's approved stability calculations in respect of the quantity of cargo and ballast, which gave the ship too high a centre of gravity.
- b) The cargo was not trimmed as described in Chapter VI, Part B, Regulation 7 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).
- c) If *Rocknes* had been loaded in accordance with approved stability calculations and the cargo had been trimmed, it would probably have capsized from the damage the ship suffered from running aground, but not as quickly.
- d) The elapsed time under c) would have given the crew more time to undertake an evacuation, and lives might have been saved.

The basic interpretation is that the Master was to blame for incorrectly loading the ship. Tragically both the Norwegian master

and the trainee German Master are unable to defend themselves against the charges of incorrectly loading the vessel but reading the witness statements (*99 pages which I will place on my website*) reveals that despite being fully within classification society, IMO, SOLAS criteria the vessel had a stability deficiency in the loaded condition.

- At the loading berth the loading arm couldn't reach to the outside of the hold so the cargo was loaded offset from the centre line requiring further ballast to remove the list
- The loading gauge on the conveyor was prone to intermittent jamming in freezing weather and so vessels had to load by checking the draft. In this case the agreed Bill of Lading
- The loading arm could not travel up and down the quay so the vessel had to be moved to position the holds under the loading arm
- In loaded condition the vessel required up to 1461 tonnes of ballast to retain adequate stability

At the time of writing the enquiry is ongoing with the investigators trying to recover data from the loading computer and electronic chart and further details may yet emerge as to the cause. However, in my opinion the most disturbing factor of this casualty is that a minor grounding incident has once again resulted in tragic loss of life on a modern, well equipped and well run merchant ship. Even more disturbing is that had the vessel not been a bulk carrier it is unlikely to have capsized. Since the loss of the *Derbyshire* over twenty years ago there have been more than 300 bulk carriers lost and over 1000 seafarers killed. The investigations and reports into these losses have achieved absolutely no improvements in design.

JCB

*This report from the "working group charged with considering the ship-technical aspects of the capsizing" can be downloaded from:*

[http://www.sjofartsdir.no/upload\\_attachment/Rocknes\\_report\\_NMD\\_working\\_group.doc](http://www.sjofartsdir.no/upload_attachment/Rocknes_report_NMD_working_group.doc)

## IMO RESOLUTION A960 (Replaces A485 XII)

Following the pre-emptive strike by a section of the shipping industry, who last year released a controversial document entitled **International Best Practice for Maritime Pilots**, the IMO have now released Resolution A960 which represents the "official" document for this topic. IMPA were fully consulted during its drafting but had a long and difficult battle taking it through the IMO procedures. However their hard work has been rewarded by being credited as co-authors on the cover. Having been drafted by pilots, at eleven pages short this resolution is brief and to the point.

### **ANNEX 1: Recommendation on training and certification for maritime pilots other than deep sea pilots.**

This annex recommends that Governments establish "Competent Pilotage Authorities" to administer or provide a pilotage service. It details proposals to ensure that every pilot is licensed and that entry qualifications and training are appropriate for the applicant's pilotage district. It also recommends that these criteria are established in co-operation with the national and local pilots' associations. Basic guidelines for training are set out which emphasise the practical experience gained by accompanying experienced pilots and it identifies 28 topics that should form part of a

syllabus for certification.

### **ANNEX 2: Recommendation on operational procedures for maritime pilots other than deep sea pilots.**

The annex covers the following topics:

- Duties of master, bridge officers and pilot
- Pilot boarding point
- Procedures for requesting a pilot
- Master Pilot information exchange
- Communications language
- Reporting of incidents and accidents
- Refusal of pilotage services
- Fitness for duty

One welcome point made in the Master pilot exchange section qualifies the recommendation of IMO resolution A893 which states that "... a detailed voyage or passage plan should be prepared which should cover the entire voyage or passage from berth to berth, including those areas where the services of a pilot will be used".

Pilots' Associations have always disagreed with this viewpoint because it is impossible for the Master to be in possession of all the information necessary to prepare such a detailed plan. Such plans must assume that the vessel will arrive off the port at a fixed time, will undertake the passage at a set speed and arrive of the berth at a precise time! We all know that this is unrealistic and Resolution A960

acknowledges the impracticalities of the vessel preparing a detailed plan by stating that "... This (master/pilot) information exchange should be a continuous process that generally continues for the duration of the pilotage." This concept of a flexible and dynamic plan is further emphasised by the clause stating "It should be clearly understood that any passage plan is a basic indication of preferred intention and both the pilot and master should be prepared to depart from it when circumstances so dictate".

Any pilots left who are reluctant to adopt a formal passage plan exchange with the master (my passage plan is in my head syndrome!!) should read a few recent pilotage incident reports and all pilots should be aware that an increasing number of vessels are being fitted with voyage data recorders and some wheelhouses are also covered by video cameras!

Resolution A960 provides simple and common sense guidelines and all pilots should make themselves familiar with its contents and in particular the page covering the master pilot information exchange.

The full Resolution can be downloaded from the (new and improved) IMPA website: [www.impahq.org/haberdetay.asp?kategori\\_no=35&id=40](http://www.impahq.org/haberdetay.asp?kategori_no=35&id=40)

JCB

# MASTER/PILOT RELATIONSHIP: MV ASTOR

In the July issue I referred to a Master Pilot relationship seminar hosted by the Nautical Institute's SW branch in Bristol. The outcome of that seminar was that legally there was still a lack of clarification on the roles and responsibilities of the master and pilot when a vessel is subjected to compulsory pilotage. The following account of an enquiry into a minor grounding incident by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) provides interesting reading and the detail within the report reveals an opinion that if a pilot is engaged then he should have "conduct" of the vessel. In this case the pilot had discussed the passage with the staff captain but when the master arrived on the bridge he ignored the pilot, was not interested in a departure plan and undertook the unberthing and departure himself.

The following is an extract from the ATSB release:



At 1900 on 26 February 2004, the Bahamas registered passenger ship *Astor* let go its mooring lines and departed the Queensland port of Townsville.

The ship, equipped with twin rudders, controllable pitch main propellers and a single bow thruster, did not require a tug for the departure. The master, as is common practice on passenger ships, manoeuvred the ship clear of the berth and then, even though this was his first visit to Townsville, kept the conduct of the ship without consulting the harbour pilot. The pilot adopted an advisory role.

As the ship was turning from the harbour into Platypus Channel (part of the approach channel to the port) it grounded on its port side. The ship heeled three degrees to starboard and, after about three minutes, slid clear of the bank without assistance and continued out of the channel.

Based on the available evidence the report concludes that:

- \* The investigation has been unable to determine the degree, if any, to which a reported steering malfunction (by the master after the grounding) contributed to the grounding.

The following factors, however, are considered to have contributed to the incident on 26 February 2004, independently from any steering malfunction:

- \* The master did not accept the pilot's advice after the ship left the berth.
- \* Communications on the bridge were in a language the pilot was not able to understand.
- \* The ship's master and bridge team members did not employ good Bridge Resource Management practices at any time leading up to the grounding.
- \* The master had not positioned the ship correctly for a turn to starboard into Platypus Channel.
- \* The master did not present an outward passage plan to any of those present on the bridge at the time of departure.

Of additional concern to the safety of navigation and the prevention of pollution on the Australian coast is that the master did not declare any steering defect to the Cairns pilot or port authority and *Astor* entered the Cairns Channel using only one steering motor on the port rudder without the pilot's knowledge.

This reports recommends that:

- \* Masters of vessels should not actively con the ship directly during pilotage unless they are familiar with the port and they do so in full agreement with any pilot.
- \* Ships' masters should ensure that all bridge orders in pilotage waters are in a language understood by pilots and ships' staff.
- \* Ship owners, managers and operators should instruct masters and ships' crews to use all elements of effective Bridge Resource Management at all times.

*The following is the relevant extract from the report which details the above interpretation:*

It is understandable that a master, particularly where a master manoeuvres a particular ship on a regular basis, would want to manoeuvre the ship alongside or off the berth. But a pilot is employed to con the ship in waters where he/she has detailed knowledge. The master of *Astor* maintained the conduct of the ship after the ship was clear of the berth. Under such circumstances it would be reasonable, at the very least, to expect the master and pilot to agree on such an arrangement and for the master to follow the pilot's advice. This is particularly important in a port in which the master has no prior experience.

The pilot had not committed any error that would have required the master to intervene and over-rule the pilot or take over the conduct of the vessel. The pilot was effectively excluded from the information flow between the master, helmsman and engine control as all orders were given in Ukrainian. When he advised the master to alter course, it was his

opinion that his advice was ignored.

The discussion of the pilot's outward passage plan with the staff captain hardly qualifies as 'using the services' of a pilot. Such discussion alone does not support the practice of good bridge resource management, particularly when the staff captain's role was to set the pitch of the propellers as instructed by the master and to monitor the helmsman. It is therefore a matter of semantics whether the master was using the services of the pilot or not. Effective communication between the master and pilot, in the period of time leading up to the grounding, was virtually nonexistent.

A master's normal role during port pilotage is to have an overview of the overall passage of his ship and to be in a position to intervene early if things do not go to plan. This is a good use of his/her experience and is in accordance with bridge resource management principles. By maintaining the actual conduct of the vessel during all phases of the pilotage, *Astor's* master was unable to perform this role effectively.

An important aspect of good shipboard operations is the interpersonal relationships between the crew, including the pilot when one is embarked. All *Astor's* bridge staff were either Ukrainian or Russian nationals, and the pilot, Australian. Prior to boarding *Astor*, the pilot was aware that he may experience some difficulty with the master. Statements by other pilots who had worked with this master referred to the fact that, while the master appeared aloof and standoffish, they did not experience the difficulties that the Townsville pilot did on departure.

It is therefore not unreasonable to say that this incident was caused, in some part, by the poor interpersonal relationship that developed between the pilot and the master, which was aggravated by the lack of communications between the two.

The press release and link to the full report can be found at: [www.atsb.gov.au/marine/incident/incident\\_detail.cfm?ID=200](http://www.atsb.gov.au/marine/incident/incident_detail.cfm?ID=200)

# PRODUCT REVIEW: NEPTUNE TIDES

Having reviewed the UKHO TotalTide program in the July issue I decided to find out whether there were any alternative tidal programs on the market and Neptune Navigation kindly sent me a full program in order that I may review their tidal prediction software.

## The Product

As with the TotalTide this product is designed to run on a PC using the MS Windows operating system but Neptune have customers operating the software on MACs fitted with Windows compatibility. A separate version is also available designed to run on Pocket PC or PALM handheld computers.

Separate programs are available for UK only, UK and Europe and USA.

Having purchased the disc it will only activate after registration which provides the user with an activation code. As with TotalTide, Neptune also allows additional unlocks for the users laptop and home PC the proviso being that the program is only for the purchasers use.

## Running the program

This is simplicity itself and upon opening the program the tidal curve for the user selected "home" port is displayed for the date and time of the user. As with TotalTide this uses date and time of the computer in use and obviously if this is not set correctly the information displayed will be nonsense.

Setting the home port is very simple since the UK database is divided up into 27 sea areas which are in turn subdivided into a list of the main and secondary ports contained within each area. This makes selecting information for a specific area far simpler than the convoluted process within TotalTide. The information window contains all the required data in a clear and concise format.

- Tidal curve for the day
- Current time, tide height and tendency (rise or fall)
- Alongside the graph the times and heights of HW and LW are displayed
- The user can select either local time or GMT

Placing the cursor over the graph produces an index line which can be moved over the graph and the resulting time/height is displayed in the area next to the graph. Clicking either mouse button locks / unlocks the index line in any chosen time/height location.

Changing the date is simple and quick process

Comparing the data displayed with my UKHO based tide tables I noticed a discrepancy between the times/heights and upon contacting Neptune they provided the following explanation:

*All popular tidal height prediction software with the exception of Total Tide and the Proudman Institute's Poltips appear to use the same restricted harmonic data from the UKHO and typical accuracy that might be expected is +/- 20 minutes and +/- 0.4metre with greater variations for certain south coast ports particularly in the Solent.*

Whilst my own observed discrepancies were much less than those declared parameters this does reveal a drawback for use of this program where the depth / time element is critical and thus may render it of limited use to pilots in some districts.

This is a pity because the additional features of the program include the facility to set up a user depth for a location and use draft and UKC parameters to display times available and lost over a bank etc. The simplicity of entering this data compares favourably with the TotalTide process and the resultant tidal window is displayed as a separate curve on the main display graph. Several options are available for data to be collated / printed out or copied into other programs such as Word or Excel.

Other additional information is easily accessed and includes

times of sunrise / sunset, moon phases, nautical and civil twilight. The harmonic constants and astronomical data used to produce the data is also available for specialists. Again all of this can be collated / printed if required. The program can also be linked to a GPS receiver and will automatically select and display data from the closest reference port.

An optional add-on to this program is a tidal atlas which consists of a basic (but accurate) outline raster chart with direction /rate arrows, based on the Admiralty chart tidal diamond data, displaying real time flow data. Again this facility is clear and simple to use and if the GPS receiver is connected the GPS position will be displayed on the chart. The facility also exists to integrate a Yeoman plotter into the program and waypoints can also be entered and tracks displayed. Since I do not have a GPS or Yeoman plotter I have been unable to assess the effectiveness of these functions.


All these features create the potential for the program to be used for passage planning and indeed the additional tools to effectively use the program for passage planning are available on the disc and can be unlocked for a further charge. I have not trialled this facility but Neptune advise me that they are currently updating the whole software and an enhanced program is due to be released at the London Boat Show in January.

## Conclusions:

This is a delightfully simple yet efficient program sold at a reasonable price. There are no additional annual update costs and predictions are available up to 2050! Unfortunately the inaccuracies of predictions resulting from the use of the UKHO limited data release do restrict its effectiveness as a pilotage tool but it is still useful for rough planning purposes and Neptune are currently undertaking market research which may result in a version using the fully accurate UKHO data.

**Costs:** Tidal Program UK £29.95. Pocket PC tide £39.95 . PALM tides £29.95. Tidal Stream add-on £15 per area. Route Passage Planner £65 + £25 per chart folio (UK is divided into 15 folios and each folio contains approx 10 charts). Route Passage Planner for use with C-MAP charts £99.95 (Release expected January 2005)

**Contact:** Neptune Navigation, PO Box 5106 , Riseley, Reading RG7 1FD UK. Tel: +44 (0)118 988 5309. Fax: 087 0056 7329  
Email: sales@neptune-navigation.com  
Website: www.neptune-navigation.com



# INFORMATION REQUIRED

# ... AND SUPPLIED



A colleague has loaned me this picture and would appreciate any information about it such as name, dates in service etc.



... and Geoff Topp seeks any information this one from the Clyde







On page 11 of the July issue I ran an article on Pilotage in Liverpool during WW2. I illustrated the article with a photograph taken from a WW2 book about the British Merchant Navy. Harwich pilot Andy Adams has provided the following interesting information about the photograph:

... the illustration comes not from the Liverpool District but from London. The photograph was taken from the head of Southend Pier which at the time was known as HMS LEIGH, the convoy and Naval Control of Shipping base at Southend.

The photograph shows the convoy anchorage inside the boom, which stretched from the Essex to Kent shore, remnants of which are still visible. The vessel on the extreme left with TH on the bows is the Trinity House pilot cutter LIONHEART. Two cutters were always stationed with the convoys and went out to the Sunk LV, landed pilots and then shipped them in the arriving convoys before returning to Southend.

LIONHEART was a former Grimsby trawler (GY222) which was converted for pilot service in 1941 after three pilot cutters were requisitioned for service with the RN. She remained with Trinity House until 1948 when she was sold to a Dutch company for further service as a fishing vessel, she was finally broken up in April 1963.

One of the London District vessels THPV VIGIA was requisitioned for the examination service at Liverpool and commissioned as HMS ARIEL. After service as an examination vessel she became the nominal base ship for the radar training school until this was transferred ashore to Burtonwood in 1943. After this she was transferred to the War Department under her civilian name, VIGIA, it is believed that she was used to service the anti-aircraft forts in Liverpool Bay before being returned to Trinity House in September 1945.

|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| <p><b>WARSASH MARITIME CENTRE</b><br/>over 50 years serving the maritime industry</p> <h2>Professional Development for Pilots</h2>   |  |  <p>WARSASH MARITIME CENTRE</p>   |
| <p><b>SHIP HANDLING COURSES</b></p> <p>Utilising the 7 scaled manned models, we offer specialised courses designed to develop the skills and understanding of ship handling techniques.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Scaled models of up to 300,000 Dwt</li> <li>• Radio controlled model tug</li> <li>• 10 acre lake with many miles of channels and 30 berths</li> </ul> | <p><b>COMBINED COURSES</b></p> <p>Using a distinctive combination of the manned models and bridge simulator.</p> <p><b>ADVANCED SHIPHANDLING</b></p> <p>A customised course utilising the manned models to further enhance existing knowledge and skills.</p> <p><b>Warsash Maritime Centre also offers further courses including ARPA updating and VTS training. Please visit our website for more details.</b></p> |  <p>SOUTHAMPTON INSTITUTE</p>  <p>FOR VOCATIONAL TRAINING RESEARCH AND CONSULTANCY<br/>REG. NO. 926387</p> |
| <p><b>SIMULATOR COURSES</b></p> <p>Extensive use is made of the bridge simulator by pilots both for area knowledge and Professional Development Courses. The wind, current and visibility conditions are set to operational requirements.</p>   | <p><b>Warsash Maritime Centre</b><br/>Newtown Road, Warsash,<br/>Southampton, SO31 9ZL<br/>Tel: +44 (0)1489 556215<br/>Fax: +44 (0)1489 573988</p>   |  |

## REMEMBER

It is in your interest if involved in any accident or injury, however trivial it may seem at the time, to inform Navigators and General **within 30 days.**

# OBITUARIES

## Donald F. Twells 1934 - 2004

Died 15th June 2004



Don was born on 21st March, 1934. He was educated at Prescott Grammar School and joined HMS *Conway* in September 1949 at the age of 15, where he was an excellent student and cross country runner. On leaving the 'The Conway' he sailed with Clan Line before joining the Liverpool Pilot Service in 1952 and served as an apprentice on the pilot vessels for 7 years. In 1959 Donald gained his 3rd Class Licence and became 1st Class in 1963. He worked as pilot until 1988, when the Government made changes to pilotage and he started a new job with the Mersey Docks & Harbour Co. in the VTS. During his time as a pilot he worked as a representative and as one of the small team organising social events.

Outside of pilotage, Donald will be particularly remembered for the 28 years work he did setting up and running the local Sea Scouts, where he passed on his knowledge of boat management and comradeship with enthusiasm and good humour. He became Assistant District Commissioner; was awarded a medal of merit for outstanding service and a silver acorn for especially distinguished service.

Through his interest in first aid he became an expert on exposure recovery and hypothermia. Somehow, he also found time for his garden of which he was very proud, and which he opened to the public on occasions, and became the President of the local Horticultural Society.

Donald was a devoted family man and leaves behind his wife Norma and three sons. Donald will be truly missed and fondly remembered for the way in which he embraced life to the full.

*Andy Malcolm,  
Retired Liverpool Pilot*

## John Edward David Halton

1940 - 2004

It is not every pilot who is blessed with the qualities of excitability, forgiveness and kindness. Pilot JED Halton ("John" to his family and many friends ashore, "Ted" or "Ted Bear" to his fellow pilots at Liverpool) had all of those qualities in abundance. It was a great sadness to hear of his recent and far too early death.

Ted was a product of his time, which is to say that he grew up in the apprenticeship system which formerly operated at Liverpool. Four station-keeping pilot-cutters, each one manned on deck by a crew of ten apprentices, served in the Irish Sea three-at-a-time for three weeks each, followed by one week in dock. The apprenticeship system was described more than once as an extension of the public-boarding-school system. Ted Halton, having been educated at Oswestry, fitted smoothly and naturally into the system in the late 1950s. Following initial deep-sea service as a Blue Funnel Midshipman, Ted's apprenticeship will be remembered fondly by all who shared it with him. A frustrated engineer and shipwright, his favoured cure for any defect in deck-machinery was invariably effected by means of a lump-hammer. His handwriting

was legible to all who knew what he meant; and the effort which he put into passing his annual examinations was equalled by few others. For a prolonged period in the early 1960s, life aboard *No. 1 Pilot Cutter* was dominated by two senior apprentices, each of whom was named "Ted". Out of earshot, their separate identities were determined as "Ted Scream" and "Ted Sweat". Although it would be unkind to identify which name applied to Ted Halton, nobody would disagree with the reference provided by Captain Leighton Spencer Edelsten which described him as "a most likeable young man." Ted's courtesy to all was unflinching.

Ted qualified as a pilot in 1965 at what now seems the astonishingly young age of twenty-four. Modest, self-effacing and the butt of much good-humour, it was a subject of frequent comment that Ted, for all his eccentricities, was rarely if ever obliged to submit a damage-report. He saved my bacon on one occasion when I suffered the indignity of being swept aground, inward-bound, outside Eastham Locks. To my great good fortune, Ted happened to be standing on the lockside, waiting for his own ship, outward-bound. Ted attested to the fact that the lock-paddles had been raised at the wrong moment by a lockmaster who had failed to appreciate the hazardous consequence. I was duly exonerated, thanks only to Ted.

A model of good-nature, Ted will be sadly missed by all who knew him. All pilots will wish to offer their best wishes to his devoted wife Linda and their son and daughter.

*Barrie Youde 29/08/04*

## Pensioners Deceased

May 2004 - July 2004

|                       |                      |
|-----------------------|----------------------|
| <b>PA Barraclough</b> | <b>Manchester</b>    |
| <b>TV Booker</b>      | <b>SE Wales</b>      |
| <b>G Latham</b>       | <b>Liverpool</b>     |
| <b>J Miller</b>       | <b>Harwich</b>       |
| <b>ML Nevens</b>      | <b>Peterhead</b>     |
| <b>EWA Paterson</b>   | <b>Humber</b>        |
| <b>JM Paterson</b>    | <b>Inverness</b>     |
| <b>TEJ Rogers</b>     | <b>Bristol</b>       |
| <b>WJ Russell</b>     | <b>Bristol</b>       |
| <b>ER Ryan</b>        | <b>London-Cinque</b> |
| <b>DR Twells</b>      | <b>Liverpool</b>     |
| <b>DAG Wright</b>     | <b>Harwich</b>       |

## Legal Defence Insurance

(Navigators & General Insurance Co Ltd Policy No 20004375 UKPMA Indemnity)

### Notification of Incident

Pilots involved in incidents should notify the company as soon as is practical to register the case, either by telephone or in writing to:

Navigators & General Insurance Co Ltd, PO Box No 848, Brighton, BN1 4PR.

**In office hours:** Mr L Powell Daytime tel: 01273-863453

**Outside office hours:** Mr L Powell Home tel: 01323-729393

or Mr S S McCarthy: Home tel: 01444-248520

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