THE PILOT

April 2004 No.277

The official organ of the United Kingdom Maritime Pilots' Association

Editorial

The last few years has seen an increasing tendency to criminalise the mariner and pilots should be aware of the latest piece of legislation to be slipped quietly in by the Government which makes "professional mariners" subject to the same alcohol limits as drivers. As of 30th March 2004 "professional mariners" will be declared over the limit if they have more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood. The testing regime is also the same as on the road which means that the police will be able to use the same equipment and follow the same procedures as they do with motorists.

The announcement means that the Government is fulfilling its pledge to implement Lord Justice Clarke's recommendation in his report into the *Marchioness* disaster to introduce alcohol limits and tests for mariners. Marine officials have been given powers to detain vessels pending the arrival of the police if they have reason to suspect that an offence is being committed. In order that all may be clear as to whom the regulations apply the official DfT press release states: *"The law will apply to professional mariners on UK registered vessels around the globe and to those serving on foreign vessels while in UK waters and on un-registered vessels in UK waters"*. An early indicator that police and Magistrates will impose maximum penalties on mariners was revealed prior to the legislation being introduced when the Master of the dredger Donald Redford, which collided with Hythe pier in Southampton Water, was charged under the Merchant Shipping Act for the offence of conduct endangering ships, structures and individuals. In that case the Master was found to be 2.5 times over the road drivers' limit and was sentenced to two eight month custodial terms to run concurrently which is a very severe penalty rarely, if ever, imposed on similarly "over the limit" road drivers involved in non fatal accidents. All pilots should therefore be fully aware of the implications of the new legislation and this court case which means that if a pilot is involved in any notifiable incident he will be arrested by the police, breathalysed and judged in court rather than the matter being dealt with internally by their CHA. You have been warned!

PS The legislation currently only applies to professional mariners. However there are plans to extend the legislation to leisure users as well but in this case the DfT are undertaking a consultation process and details are available on the DfT website (consultation) at:

www.dft.gov.uk

John Clandillon-Baker
Canterbury Gate House, Ash Road
Sandwich, Kent CT13 9HZ
Tel: 01304 613020
Email: john@pilotmag.co.uk

Integrated Bridge Systems

A modern integrated ferry bridge *Photo: Seafrance*

With the development of increasingly sophisticated electronic bridge equipment the general trend has been for the various elements to be located around the available space on the bridge rather than in any logical layout. This has usually resulted in good quality equipment being rendered inefficient and impractical to use. It is a sad reflection on the maritime industry that very little notice has ever been taken of the requirements of the end user and new ships continue to be accepted by owners with expensive equipment located in inefficient and inappropriate locations. In response to feedback on this subject, the Nautical Institute hosted a major seminar at the SeaTrade exhibition at the Excel Centre in London's Docklands in September 2003. Entitled "Integrated Bridge Systems and the Human Element" the seminar sought to

In This Issue

bring together the manufacturers, shipping companies and end users with the hope that co-operation between the three could result in the maritime industry finally accepting that rather than being randomly placed on board because it was mandatory to carry it, modern bridge equipment should be an effective enhancement to the safety of a vessel especially if well designed and located! Naturally, pilots are at the front end of the user group and IMPA was an official partner to the seminar. One of the challenges facing Integrated Bridge Systems (IBS) is to accommodate user requirements in different situations. For example the requirements of a pilot are different to those of a watchkeeper away from land and a good system should be effective for all user requirements.

The aims of the seminar were:

- Identify best practices for the use and implementation of existing and new technology.
- Identify the training needs associated with the implementation of new equipment for future watchkeeping.
- Document the basic principles of operation and the key issues of concern, for use in industry-wide technical and regulatory committees.
- Explore options for developing a system of user feedback for future design and implementation.

A BRIEF HISTORY

The modern wheelhouse basically originated with the advent of the steamship where for the first time the helmsman and deck officer were brought together into an enclosed space integrating the functions of navigation, steering, engine control and communications in the early years of the twentieth century. The equipment was basic, consisting of a wheel, engine telegraph, communication voice pipes and signal flags and lamps. The navigation area was a separate "chartroom" off the wheelhouse with no forward view.

This basic layout survived virtually unchanged until the 1970's when some radical companies adopted the idea of integrating the chartroom into an enlarged wheelhouse usually behind the helmsman. Some tradition was maintained in that this chartroom space was curtained off from the main wheelhouse at night and was thus still a separate area. I was recently amazed to pilot a six month old 100, 000 tonne tanker which had been built with this traditional layout in a miniscule wheelhouse. It was mainly on the continent that around this time the Germans, Scandinavians and Dutch introduced an open bridge with a logical layout of navigation equipment mainly being driven by the requirements of a sole watchkeeping officer and (officially) a lookout! The French went one stage further and also integrated the engine console into the bridge space. In the 1980's these same continental operators undertook the most revolutionary step since the installation of bridge window and installed a radical element called a chair for the watchkeeper. Not only that but they also designed a console layout that enabled the watchkeeper to actually sit on the chair and reach essential equipment without getting up. The radar had a motorised foot operated control that enabled it to be lowered out of the line of sight through the bridge window. Concerns that a usually overworked and thus exhausted watchkeeper would fall asleep if he sat down in a comfortable chair were soon realised so a watch alarm arrangement was introduced to keep him awake. On-going groundings have revealed not just the practice of switching these alarms off but also the common practice (quietly endorsed by the shipowner to save overtime costs) of no lookout being posted on the bridge at night as per requirements. Because of this phenomena of an exhausted watchkeeper falling asleep in a chair many companies have refused to fit such a luxury item in their wheelhouse, preferring to rely on the tried and trusted fact that without a chair the watchkeeper will lean on the bridge front and when he falls asleep his head will hit the bridge window and he will wake up!! So, as we progress into the 21st century we find that during the last century there has been very little change in the mindset of the ship owner with respect to the human element looking after his investment. The majority of companies still believe that ships should be manned by the cheapest possible officers using the cheapest and minimum requirement of equipment. The same watchkeeper is expected to operate, and interpret the information from, this equipment with a minimum (or non existent) training in a state of fatigue induced by long and irregular shift patterns



THE EQUIPMENT

When I was an apprentice back in the 1960s radar was still not compulsory on board ships but much discussion was taking place over how it could enhance a vessel's passage times in reduced visibility and the economic benefits resulted in most companies purchasing them. One factor that was emphasised by the ship board users was that all radars should have standard controls in order that an officer could transfer from any ship to another and immediately be familiar with the controls and functions. Well, as we all know although some key symbols were standardised the layout of the various controls was left to the whim of the manufacturers and as additional functions were introduced the result was a vast array of different control panels many of which defied all logic and lost sight of the requirements of the end user. The ideals of the 1960's were finally lost altogether when the simple VRM & EBL control knobs were replaced by a rollerball frustratingly inefficient to use. Feedback from irate users has now seen this basic function restored but only as a more expensive "optional extra" which is rarely fitted by the ever cost conscious owner! Anyway, having decided to fit a radar, the usual location for this equipment was on the port side of the bridge to balance the location of the engine room telegraph on the starboard side. The other piece of equipment gaining prominence at that time was the VHF set which in the 1970's rapidly became the preferred mode of intership and port communications finally replacing the Aldis lamp and signal flags. These sets were usually located as far as possible from the radar and telegraph. It is to the shame of our industry that non standard, user unfriendly equipment is now being incorporated into non standard and user unfriendly "integrated" bridge systems!

INTEGRATION

As previously mentioned the reduction in officer manning and an increase in equipment led to a requirement for a certain element of integration and in the 1970's and 1980's companies and manufacturers came up with the bridge console. Hence we witnessed the introduction of a long console

A modern bridge console. A good example of poor layout

plonked in the middle of the wheelhouse with engine controls on the right, the autopilot and helm controls in the middle and the radar on the left. The VHF was rarely integrated into this unit being usually placed on the sides of the chartroom enclosure, still located to the rear of the bridge. This layout is still to be found on newbuilds especially on vessels constructed in the far east which despite being at the forefront of microtechnology for domestic equipment rigidly sticks to 1970's style equipment and layouts even to the extent of encasing modern daylight radars (with a preference for traditional green on black displays which cannot be seen in sunlight) in traditionally styled pale green housings. Yet another of the world's great unsolved mysteries!

Still, from a pilots' point of view such ships tend to be entirely reliable and predictable and we don't have to stay on board for long. A variation on the same theme was to place this console right to the front of the bridge under the windows. Again this is still a popular layout with all its associated problems of cleaning the inside of the windows and condensation running down off the windows onto the console equipment. A unique risk associated with this layout was brought home to me when I was second mate. One quiet afternoon in the Mediterranean the engine suddenly coughed and died. Alarms duly rang and engineers were unable to restart it. A process of elimination brought an irate chief engineer to the bridge to confront the concerned Captain as to why the emergency engine stop had been pressed. The Captain turned his ire on me as the watchkeeper who had been innocently keeping a look out and enjoying the sun on the bridge wing. I in turn looked at my dutiful lookout who was still kneeling on top of the console calmly cleaning the inside of the bridge windows. He had accidentally knelt on the main engine emergency stop button!! Fortunately we were well away from land and there was no other shipping around. The console was rapidly modified with a Perspex cover for the emergency stop button!!

Despite far too many examples of poor layout, full integration is being realised and the best examples are to be found on ferries and modern N. European and Scandinavian vessels. On these the watchkeeper has all the information and equipment he requires in view or to hand from the armchair which can be slid out of the way when not required. Radar, ECDIS, engine monitoring, autopilot, VHF with a duplicate manning position are all incorporated and the seat is normally set high so that the direct line of sight is over the top of the console with almost an all round view from the conning position. The visual information can therefore be rapidly compared to the "virtual" information from the ECDIS and radar. Brilliant, or is it? Whilst it is a delight to pilot such vessels it is necessary to bend down to adjust controls and there is a danger at night of light pollution from all the screens reducing night vision. The wheelhouse, rather than being in total darkness is often illuminated by soft red lighting. It is all too easy to be lulled into a false sense of security and miss a small light from a badly lit yacht or small vessel not detected by the digitised radar display which is increasingly set to provide a "clean" image with the auto function eliminating all "clutter" which of course in choppy or rainy conditions can also eliminate small targets.

The most serious case of integration lulling watchkeepers into a false sense of security was the grounding of the passenger ship *Royal Majesty* where a failure of the aerial connection to the GPS set resulted in the GPS calculating the position by means of dead reckoning. For a period of 34 hours successive watchkeepers diligently plotted the GPS DR position cosseted in their splendid modern integrated bridge until reality arrived with dramatic but fortunately non fatal disaster. The officers were criticised for over reliance on the automated features of their integrated bridge but the company in turn was criticised for not giving the officers training in integrated bridge operations. Integration was mentioned as a factor in the enquiry but the question needs to be asked would the grounding have occurred with the same officers had a traditional bridge been fitted to the vessel? It is not certain but in my opinion it is probable that without integration the discrepancy between the radar image and GPS positions being obtained would have resulted in concern leading to double checking of the position by separate means.

It can be seen from the aforementioned that in reality integration is frequently far removed from the images presented in glossy manufacturers brochures. However, what is of equal concern is that some of those brochures are still unashamedly advertising poor design layouts and I have downloaded an example from the Internet.

THE NI SEMINAR

I was very disappointed that I was unable to be released from my piloting roster to attend this seminar but I have copies of most of the papers presented and the Institute's own official report issued following the event. The presentations were

A typical 1990s "modern" layout, still popular!

Typical cluttered bridge

made by a wide variety of representatives from the maritime sector including those concerned with the technical aspects of integrating and licensing of new equipment. Running to a vast number of pages the papers paint a very revealing image of the current state of the process along with many personal opinions and recommendations but the basic message is that since the technology exists it should be placed on board ships and integrated into a format that provides the primary information required in a manner that is easily assimilated by the watchkeeper. All the contributors were unanimous in the opinion that any data produced by equipment was useless unless the recipient had received comprehensive training in its interpretation and application. So, we are not talking about rocket science here! What we are dealing with is forcing often reluctant ship owners to invest not just in the equipment but also in the "human element" and that is proving to be a major stumbling block. IMO have made great progress in gaining basic agreement on the principles of integration and the new SOLAS Chapter V provides best practice guidelines for wheelhouse layout and equipment specifications. The problem with the IMO is that progress is painfully slow since it relies on full agreement of all members with all the varied interests that this entails. However, the process does work but a prime example of the problems is provided by the introduction of AIS and its installation and use on board ships. Wisdom originally perceived that the installation of a new and relatively untested technology should be gradually introduced over a period of several years. The USA, having decided that AIS would be a valuable tool in the "war against terror" managed to accelerate the implementation time and it will be now compulsory for all vessels over 300 grt to be fitted with AIS by the end of this year. AIS is now appearing on an increasing number of vessels but how is it being integrated? The answer is not at all. Although there are many companies offering full integration of AIS into ECDIS and radar displays over 80% of owners are opting to fit the minimum requirement of an alpha numeric unit similar in size and design to a GPS unit and these have been condemned as useless for any purpose for which AIS is designed. I have dealt with these AIS problems in detail in previous issues and they are available on my website at www. pilotmag.co.uk. As for the ships' watchkeepers the overwhelming majority have not received any information or training in their use. The primary use of AIS by watchkeepers in my experience is to identify other vessels and contacting them by VHF either to confirm or contravene the COLREGS! The other main usage is to send text messages to other ships. Both of these uses contravene good bridge practice and the general consensus is that there will be a major AIS assisted collision being investigated in the near future! There is however one valuable aspect of shipboard AIS and that is the provision of a standard pilot plug demanded by IMPA which enables a pilot to plug into the unit and use the data on his portable pilot unit if his port uses it. This facility is a great step forward and it is a credit to IMPA that they have managed to make the provision of this plug a compulsory part of the specification. The down side of this feature is that the information is dependent upon the ship's AIS being correctly installed and calibrated since any defects on the vessel's AIS will also be suffered by the pilot user.

THE SEMINAR REPORT

The Nautical Institute's report following the seminar contains submissions from those who presented papers and the conclusion drawn from these are that there is some very high quality equipment available but that its integration into the bridge is frequently haphazard and with a vast difference between the methods of extracting the required information much of the required information is not always presented to the end user in a clear format. This of course confirms what users would have reported had they been fully consulted by owners and their requirements passed on to the manufacturers as happens in the rest of the transport industry!

These shortfalls are being gradually addressed. The IMO working group 13 is tasked with examining the presentation of navigation related information with a view to removing current inconsistencies and with developing a new generation of composite navigation display that integrates information derived from two or more systems. There is also a requirement to clarify the difference between an Integrated Navigation System (INS) and an Integrated Bridge System (IBS) since both terms are currently loosely applied. The suggested clarification by a manufacturer was:

- INS is a system that integrates information from several navigational aids
- IBS integrates information from a variety if different shipboard data sources. This may include passage execution but only if combined with an INS.

The integration of information should:

- Use all available sources
- Automatically verify the validity and integrity of data
- Ensure fail-safe redundancy
- Support unambiguous situation awareness
- Automatically provide (and prioritise) alarms for arising hazards
- Be user friendly.

The users' requirements were detailed by a ship owner representative who identified a need for intelligent systems that would be pro-active in alerting a watchkeeper that the vessel was running into danger. In recognition that a watchkeeper is unable to perform multiple tasks when under pressure the alarms should be prioritised to a "need to know" sequence. I suppose an example of this would be that if an anti collision warning was sounding then other distractions such as engine alarms or the telephone ring would be suppressed until the watchkeeper had acknowledged this alarm.

In general the opinions of those attending the seminar can be summarised by concerns being expressed that too much information can be counter productive and a vast array of screens will detract from the ideal of looking out of the window and thus obtaining an overall situational awareness. The standardisation of control systems was considered to be a necessity with users being faced with, keyboards, joysticks, trackballs, menus etc. but history suggests that this is probably a utopian dream! The functions essential for navigation are not always logically available and equipment is often embellished by the manufacturer to present the minimum requirement in the best commercial light. Equipment should be simple to use and understand with essential basic safety information readily available.

A modern fully integrated bridge, still far from ideal!

There was unanimous agreement that training in the use of complex systems was essential but sadly lacking. A few top companies did ensure that all their officers were sent on training courses and given familiarisation time on "hand-over" but these were the exception.

CONCLUSIONS

This seminar served to highlight the fact that information is currently provided to a watchkeeper in a generally inefficient, non prioritised manner from an array of badly laid out equipment. The most serious consequence of this is that there is evidence that such equipment is reducing safety on navigation. A recent press report on accident trends by a leading P&I Club stated "*...recent reports on several collisions and casualties suggest that computerisation of bridges (integrated bridges, GPS, ECDIS etc) may have been one of the contributing underlying causes.*" The P&I club points to numerous recent examples whereby mariners have made expensive and even tragic mistakes despite having been provided with all this technology. Investigations indicated that the "human-technology" interface revealed many shortcomings. The report concluded that *"evidence suggests that despite improvements in technology and of training through various STCW conventions, the majority of collisions continue to occur due to a failure of the bridge team to follow simple principles of bridge watchkeeping and violations of the collision regulations."* This leads neatly to the common sense viewpoint made by our own Geoff Taylor to the seminar in the following (slightly edited) presentation which all pilots will fully endorse.

"In a previous paper to the first of these seminars, I made reference to the Transitorless Flat Panel Display Screen or Bridge Window! In all that we have spoken of let us not throw away the natural tools we have at hand. On the ship's bridge there remains the basic IBS/INS consisting of the mark one eyeball and the afore-mentioned bridge window and integrating their transmitted images uses the most sophisticated and versatile computer known to man, the human brain. These though simple and long available tools must not be discarded or even put to one side for all of the perceived benefits of technology. The harnessing through proper training and hard earned experience of hi-tech equipment to generate clearly defined and easily used decision support information will give us all a safer and better future.

It is essential in our profession to bear in mind at all times that the tools we use to perform our tasks are decision support systems and NOT decision makers in themselves We should all welcome IBS/INS for the joined up process of support it can offer but it should never be forgotten that the decisions arrived at can and must continue to be accessed through the time honoured practice of good seamanship supported by the exercise of sound judgment".

Sums it all up really!

JCB

The IMO have produced a full set of guidelines for bridge layout in MSC circular 982. Running to 33 pages it is available for download in pdf format from the IMO website page 106 -112 on the MSC section or the direct link (if you are an accurate copier!!) is:
www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D1878/982.pdf

PENSION NEWS

ANNUAL BENEFIT STATEMENTS

You will have received your PNPF annual benefit statement for 2003 within the last couple of months and we have had a few telephone calls on various items of information so I thought it might be helpful to clarify a couple of points.

Inland Revenue maximum benefits

At present your overall pension at normal retirement cannot exceed 2/3rds of Final Remuneration. Final Remuneration can be calculated in several ways and, in a majority of cases will be higher than your Final Pensionable Earnings. It is possible, therefore, in a few cases where your total pensionable service exceeds 2/3rds, that your pension at normal retirement age will have been "restricted" and will be less than the sum you were expecting. Do not let it worry you. The new "simplified" tax regime that is due to be implemented in April 2006 will probably override this restriction.

Earnings used in the calculation of pension benefits and death in service lump sum.

Very occasionally we find that pensionable earnings show a gradual decline over several years and so Final Pensionable Earnings remain constant for some time. As you know your pension is based on the average of the best three consecutive years out of the last ten.

The lump sum payable in the event of death in service, however, is based upon the best single year's pensionable earnings figure out of the last three, or if higher, your current Final Pensionable Earnings. Therefore, if your pensionable earnings have fallen for more than three years you might notice a reduction in the death in service lump sum. Either that or that it remains constant if the previous year's earnings are higher.

REVIEW OF FACTORS

The Trustees, in conjunction with the Actuary, have recently completed a review of the factors used by the PNPF and from 10 February 2004 agreed to adopt the Actuary's recommendations in respect of the factors used for early retirement pensions and the conversion of AVC capital to pension.

The factors for existing and new members will remain unchanged down to and including early retirement at age 54, thereafter a 4% p.a. reduction would apply.

A distinction will now be made between active and deferred members taking early retirement whereby existing members will have their pension reduced by 6% down to and including age 55, thereafter by 4% p.a. to age 50. New members (pilots who joined after 08.08.02) will have their pensions reduced by 4% p.a. down to age 60, by 6% p.a. down to age 55, by 4% p.a. to age 52 and thereafter a 5% p.a. reduction would apply.

The AVC conversion factors have been amended in accordance with the Actuary's proposals to bring them back to a cost neutral basis.

Retirements

November 2003 - January 2004

NCE McKinney	**Belfast** *November*
JPW Ryder	**Milford Haven** *December*

BUDGET MARCH 2004

On 17th March 2004 the Chancellor delivered his Spring Budget Report. The Chancellor described his budget report as "Prudence with a purpose", but most commentators considered it a political budget with the clear aim of getting the government re-elected. Nonetheless there is something for all of us in the budget report, but of particular significance are the final proposals by the Government in respect of tax simplification for occupational pension schemes.

Simplification of the tax rules on pensions

The simplified (there is a misnomer if ever there was one!) regime will come into force on 6 April 2006. At this date all existing pension tax regimes will be replaced by a single universal regime. The implementation date is a year later than originally intended, but will, at least, give all concerned a bit more time to plan for the proposed changes.

The Lifetime Allowance (LTA) under the new regime has been confirmed as £1.5m and not the £1.4m originally proposed. The LTA will apply to an individual's pension savings from all sources. This limit will be increased by steps to £1.8m by 2010. The LTA will be reviewed every five years thereafter.

Similarly the annual contribution allowance has been confirmed at £215,000 rising by steps to £255,000 by 2010. This is the annual amount of contributions payable by the employee and employer to all defined contribution arrangements.

PENSIONS EARNING CAP

Until the new regime is implemented we are still stuck with the pensions earning cap which has increased to £102,000 from April.

TAX ALLOWANCES

Personal allowances for those aged under 65 for the new tax year will increase in line with price inflation.

Single Person

Aged under 65	£4745
Aged 65-74	£66830
Aged 75+	£6950

Married Couple's Allowance

Aged under 65*	£5725
Aged 75 and over*	£5795

**The married couple's allowance is only available to couples where one spouse was born before 6 April 1935 and reduces the tax bill by 10% of the amount of the allowance, but not below £2210 if the husband has income above the age income limit.*

The income limit for age-related allowances was raised to £18,900. The threshold for inheritance tax has been raised to £263,000.

Basic State Pension

The basic State pension has increased in line with price inflation, by 2.8%, with a minimum annual increase of £100.

Single Pensioner	£79.60 p.w.
Married Couple	£127.25 p.w.

Deferring State Pension

To encourage people to retire later the Chancellor has confirmed that from April 2005 individuals who defer taking their state pension will receive increments of 1/5th of one per cent for each week of deferral (10.4% p.a.)

As a further incentive, individuals who defer their state pension for at least one year will be able to take the deferred instalments as a taxable lump sum. The payment will be taxed on the member's marginal rate and not move the member into a higher tax rate bracket as a consequence of receiving the lump sum.

Council Tax Payments

Households where at least one person is over the age of 70 will receive a £100 payment to help with council tax. This benefit appears to be available from 2004/05.

***

My beautiful Bumbles' antics are no more, she could not wait 'til Spring and slipped away from me on March the 1st.

Debbie Marten
Debbie@pnpf.co.uk

AIS and VTS - *Is the pilots' message finally getting through?*

As you are aware I have been following the developments of AIS closely in our magazine, not least because there are many promoters of AIS who have made no secret of the "ideal" that it will eventually become the platform for so called "Remote Pilotage" from VTS centres. This is despite increasing evidence that AIS is not the perfect tracking system originally anticipated. Our hard working Section Committee, in co-operation with EMPA and IMPA have possibly managed to kill off the contradictive term "remote pilotage" but other interests have sought to revive the concept under such headings as "Sea Traffic Controller" or "Enhanced Navigational Assistance"! Again, pilots attending the various seminars and conferences have generally managed to convince Brussels that VTS is incapable of being used to take over the "conduct" of vessels in port approaches and pilotage is being seen as an enhancement to safety in sensitive coastal waters. In particular EU officials are increasingly tending to support the concept of compulsory pilotage in waterways adjacent to Sights of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI). Such moves are obviously generating fierce opposition lobbying from ship owners, especially on the short sea trade sector. At this point it is relevant to mention that some pilots, who do not bother too much about what goes on outside their own district, question the cost of UKMPA membership (less than one tankfull of petrol per month!) and the answer is that much of it goes into representations to counter this anti pilot lobbying, which is often made by those in ignorance of what a pilot actually does. Such representations are not futile as some defeatists feel and it is frequently the case that when a pilot stands up and spells out how things actually are in the real world of commercial shipping they gradually win converts. Any committee member will tell you that when they get up in a room full of "suits" and state that yesterday they were actually on board a ship it will usually grab the attention of the attendees since pilots are often the only serving mariners present. Bearing in mind that these members are usually attending in their spare time the results in relation to expenditure are remarkable value! One highly influential person who has become a firm supporter of pilots and their skills is Michael Grey from Lloyds List who has written several articles supporting pilots and explaining their value. This brings me neatly back to the topic of VTS and AIS since this was recently the subject of an excellent article by Michael Grey in his Viewpoint column. Referring to the proponents of AIS he questions their enthusiasm in no uncertain terms. The following is an edited extract from his article which puts forward the common sense view.

"Put in simple terms, it is the advent of AIS which has caused such a focus on getting the pilot off the bridge of a ship and into the air-conditioned ambience of the Vessel Traffic System tower. "Shore-based pilotage" it is termed, although (in that the process is divided between ship and VTS) it is, strictly speaking, neither shore based, nor pilotage. But if every ship on the VTS screen is going to be pleasingly identifiable to the "controller" watching it, that is a major breakthrough.

That, at least in theory, would enable the person in the tower to rap out "Ship A - hard a starboard and slow ahead", with a confidence that has been hitherto impossible.

In the old days, our controller might have been speaking with such authority to a lump of floating debris bobbing in the tide, or to the fairway buoy.

Thus, so this argument develops, pilotage can be centralised into the VTS tower and a lot of bolshie pilots and expensive pilot boats, not to mention a helicopter or two, can be paid off. Do these enthusiasts really understand what a pilot actually does, both in terms of the local knowledge that he brings with him, and the ship handling expertise which is only really vouchsafed to people who drive ferries and regular traders?

How is marine safety being enhanced, when an exhausted shipmaster, who has spent the previous umpteen hours glued to a radar, when he was not thinking about all the paperwork he has neglected, finds he is required to undertake his own pilotage, helped by a remote (if friendly) voice over the VHF, who has prefaced any remarks with a clause politely declining any liability for advice given?

How can anyone, other than a pilot on the spot, realise that the man at the wheel barely knows the difference between port and starboard, and the third mate, speaking no language known to mankind, nods vigorously when he means "no"?

In an era of massive liabilities and total intolerance of any form of error, are we really ready for an "advance" which is so far a step backwards that it represents a major threat to marine safety?

Forget about pilots' jobs, or a new career of "sea traffic controller". Professional mariners should unite and reject something which is fundamentally so potentially dangerous".

Reinforcing those arguments, a recent article in the BIMCO magazine also questioned the rush to embrace the utopian dream of VTS control of shipping via the platform of AIS. The following extract again serves to support the pilots' arguments:

"It might be a good idea in theory, but to both pilots and to hard pressed shipmasters who are not as over the moon at undertaking their own pilotage and ship handling as some might suggest, there remain plenty of unanswered questions. Once again it is a case of equipment manufacturers running the agenda, persuading owners that they have the answers to questions that are actually beyond technical problems.

In the case of a fine day, in a simple pilotage with a small amount of traffic and a Master very confident in his own ship handling abilities and a competent bridge team, shore-based pilotage might possibly work. But with the same ship, on a filthy night with poor visibility and a man short on the bridge, the Master might greatly welcome the proximity of a competent pilot on the bridge. The pilot, after all, is an expert in this particular port and unlike a shipmaster of a deep sea ship, who rarely manoeuvres his ship, ship handling is the pilot's speciality.

Pilots cost money, and owners wish it was rather less, but shipmasters are exceedingly put upon, with practically every week bringing some new extension to their manifold duties. The use of a competent pilot does not mean that the Master can forget his own role, rather that he is enabled to operate with a slightly reduced burden. The absence of a pilot, with a large ship swinging off a quay, with tugs in attendance and unpredictable tidal effects, can be the preliminary to an expensive mistake, with plates damaged and quay squashed. Sure, pilots make mistakes, too, but they will usually make them less frequently.

There is a certain air of the "One Man Bridge Operation" syndrome about the concept of shore-based pilotage. The equipment manufacturers say it is OK, so it must be. It is worth remembering that equipment manufacturers speak with forked tongues, driven by the need to sell their equipment. It is also well worth asking the port management proposing this interesting new facility of shore based pilotage, whether the port will be carrying the entire liability for any accident that may occur in pilotage waters."

These excellent articles are both based on professional awareness and sound common sense. Your elected representatives at the UKMPA are making such arguments on our behalf at every opportunity, so next time you wonder where your subscription goes you should remember these articles.

JCB

IMMERSION AND HYPOTHERMIA

Although this is a very grim topic to feature in the magazine the reality is that as pilots we daily face the risk of immersion frequently in conditions of extreme cold. The following article has been written by retired Liverpool Pilot Don Twells who has been a senior instructor with the British Red Cross specialising in Immersion and Hypothermia. Don has sent this for publication because he feels that pilots and pilot boat crews should be aware of the latest information on the subject. As one who hasn't attended a First Aid course for many years my own recollection of dealing with immersion and hypothermia is not only very hazy but also well out of date. The explanations and techniques, especially those learned following the Fastnet disaster, could well save a life should the "unthinkable" happen.

DROWNING

Some 500 deaths per year occur from drowning in England and Wales alone. Approximately 19% occur in the sea, 71% in inland waters and swimming pools and a further 10% drown in their own baths. Many of the victims are competent swimmers and die within 1 metre of safety. Among adults, alcohol is a contributory factor.

PHYSIOLOGY OF DROWNING

Sudden immersion in cold water causes a sharp intake of breath resulting in panic breathing and frequent submersion. This compounds the respiratory distress and the victim, having compromised their buoyancy, may begin to sink, at the same time swallowing (not inhaling) large volumes of water.

Water does not enter the lungs, it is prevented from so doing by a combination of repeat swallowing and laryngeal spasm eventually resulting in hypoxia, loss of consciousness and ultimately death. Water usually only enters the lungs at the point of death when the larynx becomes relaxed.

TYPES OF DROWNING

Near Drowning - The casualty is rescued just before the point of death.

Dry Drowning - As the drowning person sinks and unconsciousness deepens they continue to try and breathe thus water flows through the pharynx stimulating the reflex which triggers the larynx and epiglottis to close off and protect the trachea, diverting water into the stomach. Due to acute hypoxia the casualty will have died before water enters the lungs.

Fresh Water Drowning - If a sufficient volume of water enters the lungs it will cause an interference with the process of external respiration by preventing the passage of gases between the alveoli and the pulmonary capillaries. Haemodilution is created by the rapid absorption of the water into the blood which in turn grossly distorts the pH value of the blood. This may result in cardiac arrest some 2-4 minutes after rescue.

Salt Water Drowning - In these circumstances the opposite occurs. Salt water entering the lungs is more solute than blood; therefore water is drawn into the alveoli from the blood stream increasing the volume of fluid in the lungs. This increases the viscosity of the blood and more sluggish circulation eventually slows the heart rate to the point where cardiac arrest occurs. This can occur 8-10 minutes after rescue. Types of protective clothing should include a face piece to prevent salt water splashing on the lips.

Secondary drowning - Should a drowning victim be successfully rescued and resuscitated they may appear to have fully recovered. However, if water has entered the body, this can cause irritation to the pulmonary lining of the lungs which in turn leads to a clear secretion filling the lungs. death can occur up to 72 hours later.

MAMMALIAN DIVING REFLEX

Another feature of some drowning mainly in the young is the mammalian diving reflex. This primitive and little understood reflex is activated in circumstances where the victim is suddenly plunged into very cold water face first. The most immediate effect is the almost total shutdown of the respiratory, circulatory and nervous systems to the point of suspended animation and apparent death. Victims have been known to make a complete recovery after 38 minutes submerged and 16 hours resuscitation. It must be understood that a casualty when first immersed in cold water will behave very oddly. They may refuse rescue and indicate that they are swimming to the USA etc. They often will swim away from a boat or other means of rescue.

FIRST AID TREATMENT FOR DROWNING

- Establish Airway.
- If required commence resuscitation.
- Never perform abdominal thrust. *(This will transfer water from stomach to lungs)*
- Check pulse twice in different places. *(Particularly if hypothermia is present)*.
- Never apply direct heat to a hypothermic victim.
- If a thermal blanket or exposure bag is available, remove wet clothing and place casualty inside.

NEVER GIVE UP ON A DROWNING PERSON – resuscitation should be continued until hospitalisation.

IMMERSION AND DROWNING

Immersion injuries and drowning are medical conditions which can affect a person who, deliberately or accidentally, goes into the water. They account for most deaths in water and for many of those occurring after rescue.

Immersion injuries are due to the physical characteristics of water and its effects on the human body. The important characteristics of water are density, thermal capacity and thermal conductivity. These three together govern how immersion affects our heart, circulation and metabolism. If we remove heat loss from the equation and put a man into a swimming pool containing water at body temperature 37.C he will neither gain nor lose heat. Before entering the water much of his 5 litres of blood volume will have collected in the veins in his legs due to gravity. The water's density is approximately the same as that of the swimmer's body. In water he is weightless and the hydrostatic effect of water around the legs pushes the blood pooled in his veins back into the trunk, especially, the heart. The more blood the heart contains, the greater the cardiac output. The relationship between heart volume and cardiac output provides the reason for laying people down who have fainted or are in shock. This drains the blood from the veins in the legs and back to the heart thus increasing cardiac output. The increase in the return of venous blood from the legs to the heart during immersion also causes the hydrostatic pressure in the heart chambers and major blood vessels to increase. Effectively there is now too much blood in the heart. On land about 1 litre of blood was not being used, it had collected in the legs. When the swimmer is in the water the blood returns to the heart. The heart senses this surplus and gets rid of it by the increase of urine production in the kidneys. This process continues until cardiac output and pressures in the circulation return to normal.

If the swimmer remains in the water long enough to lose a large amount of urine, when removed from the water the total blood volume will be much lower than before immersion.

On standing up blood will again pool in the legs. Suddenly blood volume in the heart will be drastically reduced. Blood pressure and cardiac output will be reduced and blood flow to the vital organs will also decrease. The effects of immersion are increased still more if the water is cold. Water conducts heat 25 times more efficiently than air and can hold 1000 times

more heat. Heat loss during immersion, without proper insulation, is therefore very rapid. The body responds to heat loss by constricting blood vessels, diverting blood away from the limbs and back to the trunk. The constriction of veins in the limbs exaggerates the effect of immersion on limb venous blood return and hence cardiac output, blood pressure and urine production.

Cold also causes restriction of the blood vessels which carry blood away from the heart. When these arteries are constricted the heart has to work harder to overcome the increased resistance to flow. As a result the heart needs a greater oxygen supply because it is doing more work. If the heart does not receive this oxygen it can fail or stop completely. This is why cardiac deaths and other heart problems are much more common in winter than in summer. Both immersion and cold reduce the amount of blood in the limbs particularly the legs and increase the volume in the trunk. When the casualty is rescued, blood pools in the legs and causes blood pressure and cardiac output to fall below normal.

This is the reason why during the Fastnet Race a few years ago so many persons died. Some stayed with their damaged yachts and they survived. Those that went into the water died, in most cases the casualties were alive when the helicopter arrived. They were able to talk and assist the winchman to put the lifting harness on. However as soon as they were lifted clear of the water, blood drained back to their dangling legs. Casualties went into shock, dying before they could be hauled into the helicopter. Rescue Helicopters now use horizontal stretchers and lift all casualties from the water in a horizontal stretcher and keep them horizontal until hospitalisation.

The lesson to be learned from this is that even after swimming for pleasure never come out of the water and start running around or playing games. Instead sit quietly and allow the blood volume to readjust. 30 minutes should be sufficient.

FIRST AID TREATMENT OF IMMERSION

Whether an immersion victim lives or dies more often than not depends upon the first aid given by his rescuers, rather than the intensive care he receives subsequently after hospitalisation. For this reason it is essential that all those who may be engaged in the rescue of such victims should be absolutely clear on the correct first aid treatment to administer.

In recent years medical research has identified several factors which may result in death, either during immersion or just after rescue. An understanding of these may assist the doctor in the medical management of the post immersion patient.

In practice:

1. Is the casualty breathing, and is there a pulse present in a large artery (Carotid)? If not, clear the airway and begin Resuscitation.
2. Having ensured that adequate ventilation and heart action are present, try to prevent further heat loss by the use of windproof garments or blankets wrapped around the casualty.
3. Lift the casualty from the water in a horizontal position and keep the casualty in a horizontal position at all times and transport to the nearest medical care.

***NOTE** In all first aid we do not now check for a pulse at the pressure points. Circulation or not is determined by observing the skin colour of face and lips.*

HYPOTHERMIA

Hypothermia is the condition when heat is lost from the body core.

Normal body temperature is 37ºC. Hypothermia occurs when the body temperature falls to 35ºC.

If the body core temperature falls below 26ºC. then recovery is most unlikely and death is probable.

The ability of the body to resist cold depends on age, health, fitness and psyche.

Alcohol, some drugs and illness will all reduce the resistance to hypothermia.

It is worth remembering that unusual behaviour may be evident i.e. a hypothermic person may complain of being too hot and will begin removing clothing. This must be discouraged.

SYMPTOMS - *MILD HYPOTHERMIA*

37ºC to 36ºC – Normal shivering has begun.

36ºC to 35ºC – Cold sensation, goose pimples, unable to perform complex tasks with hands, shivering can be mild to severe, hands are numb.

MODERATE HYPOTHERMIA

35ºC to 34ºC – Shivering is intense, muscle unco-ordination becomes apparent, movements are slow and laboured, stumbling pace is evident, mild confusion. Test by making the casualty walk for 30ft in a straight line. If unable to do so the casualty is hypothermic.

34ºC to 32ºC – Violent shivering persists, difficulty with speech, sluggish thinking, amnesia appears, gross muscle movements sluggish, unable to use hands, stumbles frequently and signs of depression.

SEVERE HYPOTHERMIA

32ºC to 30ºC – Shivering stops, exposed skin turns blue or puffy, muscle coordination very poor, inability to walk, confusion, incoherent irrational behaviour, but may be able to maintain posture and appearance of awareness.

30ºC to 27ºC – Muscle rigidity, semi-conscious state, stupor, loss of awareness of others, pulse and respiratory rate decreases, possible heart fibrillation.

27ºC to 25ºC – Unconscious, heart and respiration erratic, pulse may not be detected.

25ºC to 24ºC – pulmonary oedema, cardiac and respiratory failure, death.

Death may occur long before this temperature is reached.

FIRST AID TREATMENT:

Hypothermia

The basic principles of re-warming are to conserve heat that they already have and to replace the body fuel they are burning up to generate that heat. If a person is shivering they have the ability to re-warm themselves at a rate of 2ºC per hour.

Mild to moderate Hypothermia

Heat loss must be reduced by additional layers of clothing, increased physical activity and removing the person away from the elements. It is essential to keep a hypothermic person hydrated and fuelled.

Carbohydrates will quickly be released into the blood stream for a sudden heat surge.

These are the best to use for a quick energy intake especially in mild cases.

Food intake should include hot liquids, sugars, proteins and fats but only in mild cases.

Alcohol and tobacco (Nicotine) are to be avoided.

Some external methods of providing heat should be carried out

Body to body warming in a thermal blanket or similar.

Severe Hypothermia

Heat loss must be reduced. Use of thermal blankets, bivvy bags, sleeping bags must be encouraged. In such insulated conditions casualties can re-warm themselves more efficiently than external warming.

Food and fluids should not be given if hospitalisation is close by.

However where the casualty occurs in isolation warm sugar water may be given. Note that the function of the stomach will have shut down and therefore solids should not be administered.

This warm sugar solution may be given every 15 minutes. This will be absorbed directly into the blood stream, thus providing internal heat for the casualty.

- **DO NOT RUB THE EXTREMITIES.** *(This will increase circulation and move the cold blood from the extremities to the vital organs)*
- **DO NOT GIVE ALCOHOL.**
- **DO NOT TRY TO HEAT THE EXTREMITIES ARTIFICIALLY.** *(This will also increase circulation)*
- **DO NOT PLACE THE CASUALTY'S LIMBS IN CONTACT WITH THEIR BODY.**

Don Twells

BOOK REVIEW

MARINE PILOT

by John Foot

This book is an enlarged version of John's previous book: *The Illustrated Diary of a Thames Pilot* but with John's own illustrations or photographs on almost every page of the book, those of you who already own the *Illustrated Diary* will enjoy this new edition as much. For those who havn't got the original book *Marine Pilot* is an essential addition to any book shelf. With half the book dedicated to John's sea-going career the account will stir nostalgia for the heyday of the British Merchant Navy in the 50's and 60's. However, John's account is not all sunny climes and calm seas and the dangers of a seagoing career are vividly brought home with accounts of collisions and groundings which even in these days of GPS navigation and hi-tech bridges are sadly all too common. The second half of the book begins in 1967 when John was "called" to begin training as a Trinity House Cinque Ports pilot serving vessels for London arriving from the English Channel. As well as his own experiences in "tripping" and piloting John provides vivid accounts of the varied vessels, trades and topography of the Thames and also details disasters and incidents from which all pilots can learn valuable lessons. Because of this the book's appeal will extend beyond those in London and John's descriptive writing style and delightful illustrations will appeal not just to pilots but also to all those who are interested in seafaring.

180 pages £12.95 ISBN 0-86025-922-6
Ian Henry Publications Ltd.
20 Park Drive, Romford, Essex RM1 4LH.
Telephone: 01708 749119

JCB



George Woollard

LOSS OF LIVERPOOL PILOT CUTTER CHARLES LIVINGSTONE

Many pilots will be unaware of the greatest tragedy to befall UK pilotage when the Liverpool pilot cutter *Charles Livingstone* was lost in 1939. Retired Liverpool pilot David Hodgson has sent in the following report to the enquiry submitted by his great uncle, Senior Class 1 pilot, Tom Webster. The report has been edited for the magazine but the full text is on the website: www.pilotmag.co.uk.

JCB

In November 1939, No 1. Pilot Boat the SS Charles Livingstone *stranded on Ainsdale Beach in a west- north- west gale and twenty three lost their lives, including eight Pilots and eight Apprentices. Six of her personnel who took refuge in the rigging were rescued by the Blackpool Lifeboat and four made it to the beach. The Apprentices who manned the pulling and motor boats all lost their lives. Their valour was recognised by the Trustees of the Carnegie Hero Fund, and certificates were presented to the parents of the four young men.*

In fact my father used to recount the story that Tom did in fact remember being dragged up the beach by two rescuers, the last words he remembers being "Christ this one's a big bugger!".

David Hodgson

At 7 p.m. on Saturday, the 27th November, I went on board No 2 Pilot Boat at Princes Stage and proceeded in her to the Bar where I transferred to No 1 Pilot Boat at about 10.30 p.m. to wait to be boarded on an inward bound vessel.

I slept until shortly after 3 a.m. and went on deck. The weather then was wind, force 7 with heavy rain squalls. No lights were visible.

I spoke to one of the firemen and feeling the engines going astern I noticed that there was sand churned up in the backwash from the propeller. I said to him "We're either ashore or very near it", and went below to dress. I then went up on the bridge and asked Captain McLeod where he thought we were and his reply was somewhere on Rhyl Flats. I returned to the lower deck and advised various people to get their life-jackets.

By this time the Pilot Boat was bumping, lurching and rolling and continually driving to leeward. The three boats were lowered into the water and brought round the stern on to the lee (starboard) side

Several distress signals had been detonated and these were continued at intervals. I assisted in getting lifelines ready and ropes out to the boats so that they would be ready for emergency. There was a quiet acceptance by everyone on board of the situation and help was willingly rendered by everyone.

Four apprentices were in the boats but then the Pilot boat slewed round which caused the starboard side to become the weather side, causing the pulling boat to break adrift. One of the motor boats went after her and disappeared in the darkness and after what seemed a longish interval I saw her return to about 50 feet almost ahead with the pulling boat in tow. They stayed in view for a short period and I heard a hail from the motor boat that the engine was conking out. They then disappeared from view in a heavy sea and I did not see them again. Very shortly after, Apprentice Lancaster came on to the fore deck and asked if he should go in the remaining boat to the rescue. I replied that he should not go without permission. He returned to the bridge and I presume received permission because he went over the starboard bow down a life line and cast off. The boat disappeared into the darkness to leeward and after a considerable interval we observed her returning apparently alone. She turned to run before the sea, and in turning disappeared from view. During this time the Pilot Boat was still driving to leeward, bumping over the ground and shipping heavy water over the port side and I returned to the bridge. Everyone was very wet with the rain and spray and the wireless was transmitting and receiving messages. From what I could hear of the Wireless Operator's voice I gathered one ship was in communication and also that three lifeboats were out looking for the Pilot Boat. I took on the duty of detonating the maroons.

At about this time we observed a dark object on the starboard side which was identified as Ainsdale Lido and we knew we were on the Lancashire Coast. Up to this time it had been the general idea on board that we were to the Southward of the Bar Ship

We estimated that the Pilot Boat was not less than a quarter of a mile from the shore but discounted the possibility of swimming ashore because of the distance and the heavy breakers.

At about this time, the vessel's drive to leeward had ceased and she was fast aground with a very dangerous list to port; the port side of the boat deck under water with seas breaking over her whole length.

Up to this time no one had gone overboard and the two life rafts were lowered. There were a number of pilots, the engineers, firemen and maybe others under the lee of the chartroom and various people on the bridge.. The seas were enormous and lifted us to the underside of the bridge deck and dropped us in the water again. At this time the top structure began to carry away. A sea which seemed larger than the others lifted her bodily driving her to an even keel and apparently into deeper water, so that what before had been the high (starboard) side now became totally submerged.

With the rising tide and consequently rising sea l saw the ability of those with me to hold on was getting less and a subsequent sea carried Bibby and Teire overboard. This same wave washed me over the rail to which I hung on outboard and from there I made my way to the forward rigging, into which I climbed below Steward Roberts. Above him were those saved by the Blackpool Lifeboat.

I could see the bridge and wheelhouse. There were Mcleod, Trott, J.Currie and Hoppins and maybe Lawler on top of the wheelhouse with Cockram holding on to the starboard bridge stanchions. My colleagues on the lee side of the chartroom had disappeared. During this time I saw Cockram washed over from the bridge and climb back again but later, after a sea had swept over, I did not see him. I entwined by right leg in the ratlines to keep me from being washed away when the lamp standard on the bridge washed across my left hand causing me to lose hold and I fell backwards with my feet still entangled. A subsequent sea tore the ratlines away and when I came to the surface I was about 20 yards from the vessel and realising that I could not get back I turned and swam for the shore. Owing to my injured right leg and the character of the shore I was unable to get up. I don't know how long I laid there but was eventually picked up in an unconscious condition. I came to in Southport Infirmary.

OBITUARIES

It was with dismay that following the delivery of the January issue I realised that a realignment of text in producing the final draft of the magazine had resulted in the photograph of John Burgess becoming separated from the text of his obituary and consequently ending up in the text of the obituary of Eric Jones. I should have detected this mistake when I did the final proof reading of the magazine and thus accept full responsibility for the error. I can fully understand the distress that can be caused to already grieving relatives from such an oversight and thus offer my profound apologies to the families of both John Burgess and Eric Jones. In order to rectify the matter I have decided to reprint the two obituaries correctly assigned.

John Clandillon-Baker

Eric Jones

(February 1925 - December 2003)

Born in 1925, Eric started his sea going career in World War 2, and on completing his time in that hard school, went to sea with the Pacific Steam Navigation Company. Having risen to the rank of 3rd Officer with PSNC he felt the pull of the Orient and joined Jardine Mathesons of Hong Kong. There he served in the capacities of 3rd and 2nd Mate for over three years before deciding to try 'digesting the anchor' and applying for a Helmsman's post on the Manchester Ship Canal. The reason Eric gave for leaving Jardine Mathesons was 'political unrest' in the far east, although I suspect that his wife Irene, and two daughters Leslie and Cathy, helped more than a little to persuade him to seek employment nearer home.

Eric applied to join the Helmsmens' Service in December 1951 and was accepted in March of 1952. Even at the tender age of 26, when he applied, questions were raised about his possibly being 'too old' for acceptance. Happily these doubts were overcome and Eric progressed to become a 2nd Class Pilot in 1956, and a 1st Class Pilot in 1959, in which capacity he served until his early retirement in 1988, partially through ill health and partially to take advantage of the conditions created with the implementation of the 1987 Pilotage Act.

In his early years as a Pilot, Eric served on the Pilots' Committee and always had a clear understanding of the political situation affecting the Pilots. He was also appointed for a short period as an 'Appropriated Pilot' to a car ferry operator in the mid 1970's, and served them with the professionalism he brought to all his piloting work.

In the 'hey days' of the late 1960s and 1970s mention was often made of the possibility of designing a new ship's engine room telegraph for Ship Canal Helmsmen. This telegraph would only require three positions on it, namely, Full Ahead, Stop, and Full Astern; such was the Helmsmens' appetite for speedy transits of the Canal. When directed to work with Eric Jones, every Helmsman was assured of as speedy a passage as circumstances and traffic allowed, which made for a contented relationship. It was most gratifying therefore to learn that Eric appreciated the Helmsmen's skills, when he composed an 'ode' to the difficulties of navigating the Canal, which may well have been published in an issue of the *Pilot* Magazine in the 1980s. Unfortunately I cannot find a copy of the piece, because it is well worth a 'second visit'.

His wife Irene and daughters Leslie and Cathy, to all of whom we send our heartfelt sympathies for their loss, succeed Eric. A man of consummate skill and varied talents, Eric's loss is felt by all who knew him.

DH Jackson.
Manchester District Secretary

John Stuart Burgess MBE

John Stuart Burgess was born on 22nd January 1914. Unfortunately details of John's sea career are very sketchy but it is known that he served throughout the war and was torpedoed whilst serving on the SS *Derry Hoon* on the 22nd April 1941 off Florida following which John spent 14 days in a lifeboat prior to being rescued. After the war John became a licensed pilot for the London district and served as a Gravesend Sea Pilot (West) until his retirement in 1982. During his time as a London pilot he became "Choice" pilot for Blue Star Line.

John died on 7th December 2003 and leaves behind his widow Meryl, two daughters, Elizabeth and Angela along with a son, Christopher

Donald McLean, Chairman,
Trinity House Channel Pilots Society

Peter Barker Johnson

(4th September 1931 - lst January 2004)

Those pilots who regularly attended UKPA conferences in the Seventies and Eighties will be particularly sad to learn of the passing of Peter Johnson or Big Peter as he was affectionately known.

The brief details of Peter's career are that he was Apprenticed as a Tees Pilot on 4th September 1947, serving on cutters and subsequently deep sea and coastal vessels in all ranks to Chief Officer. He was first licensed in April 1957 becoming a first class pilot in April 1963. Elected to the board of the Tees Pilotage Authority in July 1973 he subsequently became the chairman of our Cooperative on 4th September 1989, an apprenticeship of exactly 42 years to that post. Peter retired,still Chairman on April 30th 1994.

Those bare outlines give no picture of a hard working enthusiastic individual who never took shortcuts in any part of his life, was always willing to go the extra mile to help others and the reputation of our work. He inspired respect and affection in all he came into contact with on the river, made many friends and few if any enemies. One of Peter's great loves was figures and he was never so happy as when checking

negotiations or pension calculations and finding invariably, that his results were that bit more correct than the other side. Indeed his first task in retirement was to enrol on a GCE maths course, needless to say, he passed with flying colours.

He was a devoted family man, a hugely proud father and grandfather, following the progress of their careers with great interest, far keener to boast of their achievements than his own. He will be sorely missed by his widow Dorothy, children Karen and Chris and his granddaughter Amy as well as by his many former colleagues on the Tees and elsewhere. RIP

Submitted by G Taylor (Tees)

London pilots were saddened to learn of the death of Mike Belsey after a short illness. Mike had joined the PLA from Trinity House when they took over the pilotage in 1988 and provided a valuable administrative link both during and subsequent to the change over. As Deputy Pilotage Manager he was involved in the day to day logistics of getting pilots to ships and keeping them fully equipped with safety equipment radios, pagers, and all the other sundry items. He also arranged attendance at the various courses and had the somewhat unenviable task of scrutinising pilots' expenses! All this work involving over 100 pilots was always undertaken in with good natured efficiency. I am sure that those who also knew Mike in his Trinity House days will agree that his friendly presence will be sadly missed.

JCB

Michael William Belsey

(6.9.1943 - 9.2.2004)

Michael (Mike) William Belsey died suddenly in hospital on Monday 9th February 2004 following a pulmonary operation. At his passing Mike was 60 years old and had, since 1988, worked as a senior manager in the Pilotage Department of the Port of London Authority until his admission to hospital for the operation.

Mike was brought up in London and attended Allaynes School in Dulwich. Early in his childhood he demonstrated what was to become an abiding interest in the ships that visited the River Thames. He often talked of those visits to the Port as a boy, and of savouring the atmosphere and vitality of the working docks. His experiences at this time would have been pre-containerisation when the docks were quite unlike the port that exists today.

After a short period in the vintners trade after leaving school, Mike took an administrative job in the Dock Labour Board from where he was able to witness the working of the industrial port at first hand. He would later recall the days at the Dock Labour Board with affection remembering, in particular, the close community of the Dockers and their families.

From the Dock Labour Board, Mike took another administrative position this time with The Corporation of Trinity House, which, at that time was responsible for Pilotage Services around the coast of the UK. The years of service with Trinity House formed the major part of Mike's career and formed the fondest memories of his working life. Much of his career at Trinity House was as Liaison Officer responsible for forty Out Port Districts as far apart as the Scillies and Cumbria. In the position of Liaison Officer Mike dealt with the members of the Pilotage Committees and Pilots in the Out Ports, undertaking negotiations on the myriad of issues necessary to the operation of a successful Pilotage Service. Those who knew and worked with Mike at this time recall his patience, wisdom and above all his fairness in all things. It was at Trinity House that Mike met and married Mary, who also worked in the Pilotage Department, and throughout their life together they shared an interest in Pilotage and the life of the River Thames.

Mike's final years as Deputy Principal of Pilotage at Trinity House were over-shadowed by the impending change to pilotage that eventually arrived in 1988.

In 1988 the management of Pilotage became the responsibility of the Port Authorities, and with that change Mike moved to the Port of London Authority as Deputy Pilotage Manager. The successful transfer of responsibility for Pilotage owed much to Mike's knowledge and diligence. His Honorary Membership of the Cinque Ports Pilots Association evidenced his standing amongst the pilots with whom he worked. Mike had many interests outside work, but probably his greatest enthusiasm was a fascination for military vehicles. He owned, restored, and drove a Willis Jeep, which was kept in absolutely pristine condition.

Mike was one of those fortunate people to whom a love of ships and the sea was innate, and who are able to combine the need to make a living with that abiding interest. Those who worked with him, and knew him as a colleague and friend, will sorely miss his wisdom, hard work and balanced view of pilotage and life.

Richard A. Carr
PLA Pilotage Manager

Frederick Albert Tapping

Frederick Tapping died on the 21st January 2004 after a protracted illness. Born on 23rd June 1923 Frederick went to sea in 1939 following an education at Sir Roger Manwood's Grammar School in Sandwich. During the war he served with the RFA in the Ennerdale and Airsprite during which time he was torpedoed twice in the Atlantic. In 1957 he became a Trinity House London (West) pilot where he served until 1985 when he retired after a near drowning whilst trying to board an outward bound vessel at Gravesend. He recounted that whilst being pumped out he experienced the "out of body" phenomena of looking down upon himself on the operating table! A keen sportsman, Frederick played cricket for the pilots' team and was a football season ticket holder with Charlton Athletic Football Club. He was also a member of Gravesend Lions Club for 24 years.

Married for 50 years Frederick leaves behind his widow and three sons.

Submitted by Donald McLean
Secretary, Trinity House,
Channel Pilots' Association