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PILOT TRAINING COURSES
Nautical Colleges offering Pilotage Training
Features
Watchkeeper Fatigue
WATCHKEEPER FATIGUE
Although pilots in the
For many years pilots, whilst acknowledging that modern on-board equipment has made navigation in pilotage waters safer, have argued that compulsory pilotage should not be reduced because as new technology has been introduced the consequent reduction
in manning has more than cancelled out any safety advantages achieved by such technology. This argument has of course been fiercely opposed by the shipping
industry and some ports who always perceive compulsory pilotage as an expensive and outdated anachronism! However, the statistics cannot be disputed and fatigue amongst seafarers is now a major cause of groundings and collisions and at last there is a spotlight being shone upon shipboard practices which is revealing a murky world of
unethical practices which until now have prevented the reality of seafarer fatigue from being exposed to the public gaze. Much of the focusing of this spotlight has been undertaken by the MAIB who are to be congratulated in their persistence over the last few years in placing the issue on the agenda at maritime forums and this perseverance is now at last producing recognition that a serious problem exists.
The results of a specialist survey undertaken by the MAIB, in conjunction with Qinetiq Centre for Human Sciences, into the six on / six-off watch system operated by deck officers on many vessels make for frightening reading.
Such is the concern of the MAIB over this issue, they have taken the unprecedented step of including a special report on their survey in the Safety Digest 1/2005 One aspect of this survey looked in detail at 19 groundings where the on-board watch patterns were identi.ed and the statistics from those 19 groundings revealed two key facts:
· 68% of the vessels were operating a 2 watch system
· 100% of the groundings between 0000 – 0600 were on vessels operating a two watch system.
Using an assessment programme based on one used for aircrews the MAIB survey model analysed the typical working pattern of an officer on a 12-6 watch on a 2,000grt ship. Even when not subjected to extra duties in the off watch period the model indicated that “dangerous” levels of fatigue were reached after as little as two to three weeks.
The MAIB report states that the “…survey serves to reinforce the MAIB’s long-held belief that fatigue, brought on by minimal manning and arduous watchkeeping and operational routines, is endemic at sea, especially in the short sea trade”. The report also states that:
A number of the accidents in the study were caused as a direct result of a lone watchkeeper falling asleep, but fatigue was a factor in many more of them. Long before a watchkeeper has reached the stage where he cannot keep his eyes open, fatigue is affecting his performance. It can cause the following:
· Inability to concentrate, including being less vigilant than usual
· Diminished decision-making ability including:
· Misjudging distance, speed, time etc
· Overlooking information required for complex decisions
· Failing to anticipate danger
· Poor memory, including forgetting to complete a task or part of a task
· Slow response, including responding slowly to normal, abnormal or emergency situations
· Reduced competence in interpersonal dealings
· Attitude change, including:
· Being too willing to take risks
· Displaying a “don’t care” attitude
· Disregarding warning signs
The data used in the safety study, especially that associated with grounding accidents, indicated a strong link between fatigue and watchkeeping arrangements. In its “Lessons” summary the report includes the following two specific recommendations:
· Minimum safe manning levels need to be increased so that each seagoing
vessel of over 500gt has at least a master and two bridge watchkeeping officers.
· Masters and owners should ensure that a vessel does not leave harbour unless all the watchkeepers, including the master where appropriate, are well rested.
NUMAST has taken up the issue and been running a major campaign recently to highlight the problem. Further to data received from the MAIB survey, NUMAST are supporting research by
THE EU WORKING TIME DIRECTIVE?
In order to address the problem of fatigue at sea the EU included seafarers in the WTD in July 2003. Despite much resistance from shipowners the directive rules that seafarers should work no more than 14 hours in any 24 with a maximum of 72 hours in any seven day period. They are entitled to 10 hours rest in any 24 hour period with rest of 77 hours in any seven day period. The rest period may be divided into two periods but must include at least one period of 6 hours and the interval between consecutive rest periods must be no longer than 14 hours.
Having worked the 12 -6 watch myself as Second Mate in the 1970’s for 4 -6 weeks at a stretch my observations are that these WTD working rules, if adhered to, would result in a reasonably safe watchkeeping regime. The problem is that the rules are not being adhered to and up until now no one has really shown any interest in enforcement. Indeed, evidence seems to indicate that whilst all companies now issue instructions to their Masters that working hours must be compliant with the WTD some companies unofficially, actively discourage the Master to actually follow the regulations. The compliance instructions obviously remove the potential for liability from the Owners but leave the Master literally between the rocks and a hard place! The Master is always under pressure to sail and regrettably there is evidence to support the claims that if a master delays his ship for the purposes of resting the crew he will rapidly be replaced by a Master who is prepared to interpret the regulations in a more “flexible” manner! From a practical point of view there are frequently pressures on berth availability which may force a master to sail anyway and anchoring is not really a solution since normally an anchor watch will need to be kept so the vessel might just as well be on passage.
There are of course exceptions and I have piloted many coasters where the owners request the master to ensure that the crew are sufficiently rested in accordance with regulations and will never query his decision to remain alongside a berth for rest. I have also piloted other small vessels where, although the vessel is not subject to compulsory pilotage a master has taken a pilot in order to catch up on rest for
himself. It is of course an appalling situation where such good practices are undermined by a significant number of operators who whilst writing instructions on compliance will penalise or threaten a master who actually seeks to operate within the law. The
situation is also not helped by the practice by some companies of offering the master additional payment for self piloting his vessel thus providing a financial incentive to
stay on the bridge although he may be dangerously fatigued. Most VTS centres will have records of desperate attempts to alert non-piloted vessels that are standing into danger. Although it is obvious that these navigational errors are a result of the master or
watchkeeper falling asleep there is always an excuse other than fatigue provided by the master and some of these can be very imaginative and occasionally amusing. Insects of various varieties and grades of malevolence are a popular reason for causing
distractions to the OOW but in all cases the watchkeeper is always effusive with thanks when alerted to the danger! Unfortunately
outside areas covered by VTS (and occasionally within) the OOW fails to awake and the results are yet another wreck on the coast or a collision. It is the investigations into these incidents that has revealed the problems of fatigue
INSPECTIONS & ISM
The point is often argued that vessels need to show records of compliance with the WTD as part of their ISM procedures and it is true that “official” records of inspections will reveal that vessels are complying with the WTD and that there is no problem. How can this happen? Well, “flogging the log” is still a thriving practice and I have had masters admit to me that they keep one set of records for the inspectors and another for the office for the overtime! I have also heard a story of a company sending a computer program to cover shipboard ISM requirements and in the section for recording working hours, if hours in excess of those permitted by the WTD were entered, the program refused to accept “illegal” data and requested that the operator enter correct data!!
IS THE PROBLEM BEING EXAGGERATED?
The reason that a formal survey is being undertaken is a direct result of the hidden picture revealed by MAIB investigations. A survey by NUMAST amongst its members, who one would expect to be working on fully compliant vessels, revealed the following statistics:
2% of masters and officers were clocking up 16 or more hours per
day
2.4% worked in excess of 100 hrs per week.
29% did not regularly obtain 10hrs rest in 24
12% failed to get at least 6 hrs unbroken rest in 24
27% worked 15 or more hours continuously
20% spent 4 or more hours on additional duties.
50% felt that their working hours presented a potential threat to their personal health and safety 30% felt that working hours presented a danger to safe operations on board.
Obviously, being statistics, these figures need to be put in context since they represent those who responded to the survey. NUMAST does not detail the respondents as a percentage of the membership but it is obvious that those who are working non compliant hours are more likely to respond than those who are on fully compliant vessels. Despite this the survey does reveal a disturbing picture of non compliance with the WTD and another important finding of the survey was that only 7% stated that their hours had reduced in the last 5 – 10 years where a massive 51% reported an increase in working hours over that period.
Could these results be put down to members disgruntled with their lot and therefore be unrepresentative?
The following represents the findings of a researcher who spent fourteen days on board a 3500dwt mini bulker, with only two watchkeepers, during which time the vessel visited ports in
“Both men were working six hours on, six hours off on a four months-on/two months-off work/leave pattern. The standard working arrangement for the deck officers was therefore 12 hours a day, seven days a week for four months without a break. Whilst such a working schedule appears patently excessive by onshore standards, 84 hours a week is actually very much the best case scenario for seafarers working a six-on/six-off two man watch. The captain in particular would frequently work from the start to the finish of a port visit without sleep, a stretch of as long as 24 hours. With only two officers to cover a 24 hour watch there was no ‘slack’ in the system – if one of the officers was unfit to work the other officer was forced to cover, putting an immense burden of duty on both seafarers.’
The researcher said it was clear that excessive job demands had been woven into the culture onboard ship. The deck officers on the vessel were expected to work 12 hours a day – which failed to account for the fact that one or two hours of paperwork would routinely have to be done in supposedly ‘off-duty time.”
The study identified a number of factors which come together to make working on a mini-bulker particularly demanding:
· Short port stays, leaving no time for rest or recovery before heading back out to sea
· Frequent port visits
· Changing cargo types placing extra demand on the crew to prepare the ship accordingly
· Only two officers to cover a 24-hour watch
· Longer pilotage
· Unpredictability of tramping’ from port-to-port, which can be stressful and makes planning sleep and rest periods difficult
“In terms of understanding seafarers fatigue, therefore, where working hours might often appear the obvious culprit a more sophisticated approach is required’ which sees excessive working hours as potentially symptomatic of a poor solution to the port versus-
sea ‘crewing conundrum’,” the report concluded. As the researcher left the ship at the end of the study, the master appealed to him to highlight their conditions. “Something’s going wrong,” were his parting words.
SHOULD PORTS BE INVOLVED IN THE DEBATE?
The ports are obviously reluctant to become involved in this issue. Already, the owners of small vessels feel port charges such as pilotage more than larger vessels and ports have addressed this either by subsidising the charges applicable to small vessels from the revenue obtained from the larger vessels or by excluding small vessels from compulsory pilotage altogether. Regular traders will usually be issued with a pilotage exemption certi.cate. The factor of fatigue is not addressed because if the master declares compliance with international and local regulations then the attitude is that the vessel will be manned in accordance with regulations so fatigue management is a matter for the Master and therefore not relevant to a vessel’s visit to the port. But, is this a neat excuse for avoiding the issue? Under the
WHAT CAN PILOTS DO?
Whilst piloting a vessel, if a pilot becomes aware that fatigue may be a problem the pilot can be placed in an awkward position if the Master tells him in con.dence that he is suffering from fatigue.The Master/Pilot relationship could be weakened if the pilot immediately reports the fatigue to the Harbour Master but there is a duty to report the matter in the interests of safety. The port may .nd it impossible to take any action if the Harbour Master visits the vessel and the Master shows false documents indicating compliance with rest regulations. Likewise if the MCA are called to inspect the vessel, again the Master may be reluctant to reveal a true picture and have the vessel detained. In such a case the best solution would appear to be to obtain as many details as possible from the Master and report the matter to CHIRP. By using the RISAP inter pilot reporting facility other ports can be alerted to the problem and if suf.cient data is obtained then the con.dential and anonymous CHIRP process would probably be able to confront the owners without jeopardising the Master’s position. In the case of exempt vessels the problem is more dif.cult but if a vessel appears to be displaying symptoms of being under the command of a fatigued PEC holder then the HM and the MCA should de.nitely be informed.
CONCLUSION
The fact that this issue is now receiving serious attention is welcome but it is not going to be easy to change the status quo and already pressure is growing to prevent the matter being raised at the IMO. The current situation is summarised in the following edited
extracts from a Lloyds List feature (2nd June) entitled “go on, stop on”
“There is no doubt in the minds of the MAIB inspectors who have ploughed through the causes of some 1,600 accidents over a 10-year period that “poor manning levels and fatigue were major causal factors in collisions and groundings”.
“It is an anachronism in the 21st century”, Admiral Stephen Meyer points out, “that seafarers are falsifying their timesheets to prove that they are working ONLY a 98-hour week. And many of these seafarers work every week, without a break, for between four and nine months before getting leave”.
There is equally no doubt that the operation of ships with a Master and mate alternating 6-hour watches is a recipe for disaster, even though it is a practice that has been widely used in the short sea trades, often, and illegally, without even a lookout during hours of darkness.
There is conclusive research to point to the rapid onset of fatigue aboard ships operated in such a fashion. There is, in fact, no reason for such a way of working to be perpetuated, and the MAIB has made it clear that it considers this way of ship operation is downright dangerous.
It is also interesting to note that the MAIB is regarded with great respect for its independence and could form a “model” for other casualty investigation systems in both European countries and elsewhere.
But issues of fatigue and manning levels cannot be confronted at a national level. The International Maritime Organization needs to take the matter forward as a matter of urgency.
Which makes it quite mysterious that a
JCB
Lee, Martin
MARTIN LEE
Last “Grand Mat’’ of the AICH (UK branch)
View the original illustrated pdf article:
http://www.pilotmag.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/pilotmag-281-final.pdf
It is with sadness that I have to report the passing away of retired Trinity House (latterly Medway) pilot Martin Lee. Many will remember Martin for his enthusiasm for the “wind ships”, one of the last of which was the Passat where Martin served much of his apprenticeship in the late 1940s. As one of a dwindling number of true “Cape Horners” who had sailed around Cape Horn in a commercial sailing ship not fitted with an engine Martin became the last “Grand Mat” of the UK branch of the L’Amicale Internationale des Capitaines au Long-Cours Cap Horniers (AICH) and had the sad task of formally winding up that Association as a result of the dwindling membership in 2003.
The evocative cartoon in the June 2004 edition of The Pilot concerning a sailing ship running at a fair speed into harbour is reminiscent of some of the manoeuvres which sailing ship masters, pilots and crews had to make in the 1930s and 1940s. Their vessels were all in the region of 3,500 to 5,000 tons deadweight, had no motive
power except their sails, no bow thrusts and two large (up to 3 tons) anchors forward. There were one or two exceptions such as the German four-masted barque Magdalene Vinnen / Kommodore Johnson (now the Russian Sedov) which, in those days had a small auxiliary diesel engine for helping in calm conditions but not much use for manoeuvring in any tide or breeze. Some vessels still had their stern anchor hawse-pipes and gear which had been used in Chilean and Peruvian anchorage ports. Erikson (Gustaf Erikson of Mariehamn in the Finnish Aland Islands) masters were
expected, like most Scandinavian masters, to avoid the use of expensive tugs when-ever possible. Incidentally G Erikson have recently sold their last reefer ship and are no longer ship owners in the accepted sense.
Pilots will readily understand the reference to a kick astern when there is no such thing available. Ports such as Port Lincoln, Wallaroo and Bunbury in Australia where ships berthed alongside were places where the master was expected to berth and unberth his ship unaided. I have a copy of the port charges for various Erikson vessels at Port Lincoln in the 1930s The four-masted barque Passat in February 1937 incurred a total of £299 13s 6d harbour dues including £63 pilotage, boatmen and mooring £12.
These charges were for berthing, shifting to and from the ballast grounds and sailing when loaded. There are no tug charges. These vessels had to have a minimum of 300 tons of solid ballast in port and over 1,300 tons for a deep sea voyage this stuff was manhandled by the crew and required shifting the ship with half the cargo loaded out to the ballast ground and dumping the material over the side before returning for cargo
completion. Berthing one of these ships required the right conditions and a great deal of skill and hard work, it could be lengthy business – it took us most of the day and a great deal of sweat and shouting to get the Passat alongside the long, winding jetty in Bunbury with no assistance. We had arrived on 4 September 1947 in ballast from East London. In East London we were head out on the south side of the Buffalo River and when the tug and pilot arrived there was an offshore breeze. Captain Hagerstrand was a man of few words, he never spoke to us in English but conversed well in that language with others; he also rarely swore. The date was 14 April 1947, I was standing by the big double wheels ready for action, the master said “we don’t need the tug, we will sail the ship out to sea.” As he spoke there was a rain squall and the wind shifted to a fresh on the berth breeze. The air then became blue with a mixture of Swedish, Finnish and English oaths – we had to take the tug to get us off the berth. The voyage was 4,331 miles in a time of 20 days 17 hours at an average speed of 8.7 knots, this compares favourably with tramp steamers making passages at 7 knots and consuming large amounts of fuel. On arrival off Bunbury the pilot came on board and said that the tug was away in Fremantle but we could use the local dredger to help us alongside. The master weighed it all up, we dropped the starboard anchor off the end of
the jetty, swung head to wind, the gallant dredger took a line aft and at the first tow pulled her bitts out of the deck. I did not hear any language from amidships but we eventually hove her alongside with hand capstans with no further assistance. We loaded a full cargo (4,700 tons) of jarrah wood railway sleepers for Port Swettenham (now Port Klang) in Malaya, the ship was down to her marks and we sailed on 17 October 1947 with a fair wind off the berth. We had mastheaded the upper tops’ls before sailing so a good spread of canvas was immediately available and sailed quietly away with no tug and no fuss. Mooring at a single buoy in Port Swettenham was a different story, we took two
harbour tugs. We then proceeded, with sand ballast, to Port Victoria in the Spencer Gulf in South Australia to load grain in the traditional manner. Arriving there on 2 March 1948 we found the four-masted barques Lawhill and Viking loading in Hardwicke Bay. Port Victoria is an anchorage port with poor holding ground,
some Erikson masters who had been in the trade for years, detested the place and wrote of the ‘merry-go-round’ of dragging anchors round the bay. We put two anchors down and kept good anchor watches, sometimes a spanker was set and a spring attached to the weather anchor to make a lee for the ketches bringing bagged barley out.
Sailing ships had larger anchors and cables, as required by the classification societies, but, without the benefit of a kick ahead. The shores of Wardang Island in Hardwicke Bay have the remnants of several square-riggers which did not survive the ‘merry-go-round’.
Large square-rigged ships loaded phosphates and guano in remote places such as Astove Island, Nosse Be and other delightful places in the 1920s and 1930s. There were no tugs available there and great skill was required to get these ships into position in a restricted area where there was sufficient depth for anchors to hold. The four-masted barque Olivebank was chartered to load guano for Auckland, at Assumption Island, N of Madagascar, in 1928. She shipped 84 men from Mahe to do the loading and anchored in 80 fathoms, a ship’s length off the island. Two days later her anchors slipped off the ledge into precipitous depths and it took her two weeks to get back and anchor in 12 fathoms forward and 84 fathoms aft with the vessel 80 metres off the land. Captain Troberg had had enough of guano sailing after this! When the Pamir was seized in Wellington in 1941 she had just arrived from Assumption. Two pilots had leapt on board as she approached in a southerly gale and sailed her through the narrow harbour entrance off Pencarrow – she stayed under the NZ flag for a further 8 years sailing across the Pacific to NW America and Canada, with one voyage to London in 1948.
As a River Medway (ex-Thames) pilot I sailed the replica Golden Hind from Upnor to Tower Pier in the 1970s. This was (is) a small ship, she had an underpowered engine set on the starboard side. We sailed up the Thames on a rising tide for an ETA at Tower Bridge and arrived on time with cannon blazing and under full sail. I had already explained to Captain Adrian Small (we had been apprentices together on the Passat) that the next bridge does not open. We still had a following wind and flood tide and there was much shouting as we rounded the Belfast with sails flogging and finally made our way to Tower Pier. As her temporary master and pilot we shifted her a few times in the Upper Pool (always in the middle of the night of course), she had been fitted with under water buoyancy bulges which were invisible from the deck. Making the entrance lock at St Catherine’s could be quite interesting; we actually sailed in stern first on one occasion as the wind was so strong from ahead.
In 1996 and 1997 after a change of direction from piloting to other matters I spent two hurricane seasons in the Caribbean as a master on the four-masted barquentine Star Clipper. This vessel and her sister ship Star Flyer were built in Belgium in the early 1990s, their hull size was similar to that of the German ‘P’ ships –
106m x 14.7m. There the similarity ends, they carry up to 174 passengers in five-star luxury, have two swimming pools a main engine and bow thrust and comply with the very strict USCG requirements for cruise ships as well as the myriad of other needs with strange labels. Their square sails on the fore-mast are controlled by a push-button system, eg ‘lower tops’l out and lower tops’l in’. A magic device that would have amazed any watchkeeper on a proper sailing vessel. Their rigging mistakes are the massive main and mizzen fisherman sails set high up. They have to come in quickly in squalls and often jam in their tracks causing heavy heeling and ominous crashes from the galley and bar.
We sailed whenever possible and carried out manoeuvres such as getting under way from an anchorage under sail alone, tacking, wearing, boxing and other crew heavy (assisted by passengers) work. She was not the easiest ship to handle with her windage
aloft and a not too powerful engine. We did manage a Mediterranean moor in St Georges when both berths were occupied, two anchors down and backed up to the space between the two ships putting crossed stern lines ashore. Approaching Castries (St. Lucia), after sending an ETA for the pilot for 0600, there was no sign of the boat so, of course, we berthed the ship head in quite successfully – he came along later to apologise and get his note signed !
Hurricane Iris was avoided by staying alongside in Barbados until the newly joined passengers sent a delegation to say that they had paid for a sailing cruise and demanded to sail. The weather was moderating with fewer large seas over the breakwater, we had the hurricane movement forecast, ordered the tug and sailed round the breakwater into a heavy swell causing much sea-sickness – still they had paid for it. The difficulty then was to find a sheltered anchorage for a visit ashore but every place was occupied by other ships. Soufrierre Bay was tried but we rolled heavily and motored away. This was not exactly sailing ship stuff but was an experience of a different kind.
In this brave new world of endless lists of acronyms and the minutiae of bureaucracy there seems to be little said about the nuts and bolts of shiphandling etc. When the first generation of car carriers made their appearance at Sheerness’s new car terminal they were a conglomerate of cobbled together ex bulk carriers and passenger ships. On one occasion one of these hybrid monsters had been advised to wait for the strong N’ly wind to moderate. Early in the morning I boarded her in the Little Nore area (this was in the days of Trinity House Pilots). She was a huge slab sided thing and we had three tugs standing by, the wind was moderating as we wandered into the harbour, and then shifted to the ENE, which was fine on our port bow for the berth. It was a tight squeeze (this was the original car berth at the end of No. 3 Sheerness), after mooring up the senior tug master called up and said “you sailed that ship alongside”. This was a compliment which I have always been proud of – in fact those vessels have much the same windage as a four-masted barque under full sail and can, in a way, be treated as such. The links between ship handling and seamanship in the 1930s and 1940s in unpowered ships and the 21st century vessel may be tenuous in terms of motive power but pilots will always have to deal competently with situations demanding a skilful response and perhaps the bean counters are not fully aware of this.
AMICALE INTERNATIONAL CAP HORNIERS
THE BRITISH SECTION
In May 1937 a group of retired French sailing ship masters held a banquet in St Malo to honour Professor George Delarney, chair of the Department of Navigation. They there and then formed the “Association Amicale des Capitaines au Long Cours Cap Horniers”, AICH. Their aims are the same today, “to promote and strengthen the ties of comradeship which bind together a unique body of men and women who embody the distinction of having sailed round Cape Horn in a commercial sailing vessel, and to keep alive in various ways memories of the stout ships that regularly sailed on voyages of exceptional difficulty and peril, and of the endurance, courage and skill of the sailors who manned them”.
There were various classes of membership; Albatross, who had commanded a sailing ship round Cape Horn, Mollyhawk, who had served in a sailing ship round Cape Horn and was subsequently a master mariner, Cape Pigeon, who had rounded Cape Horn in a sailing ship but was not directly involved in the handling of the ship. There were also sympathisers (Friends) who had furthered the interests of the Association. The first Congress was held in St Malo in 1938, this was entirely French and, in 1948, a similar congress was held. It was decided then, by the AICH council that membership should be extended to other countries thus establishing it as an international organisation with affiliated national sections. The first to join were the Belgians in 1949, followed by Sweden in 1953 and Germany in 1955.
Germany has always had a large membership as their four-masted barques Padua/ Kruzenshtern, Priwall, Peking, Passat, Magdalene Vinnen/ Kommodore Johnson/ Sedov and L’Avenir /Admiral Karpfanger in the 1920s and 30s carried at least 40 trainees on every ocean-going voyage as well as having apprentices on board the Erikson square-riggers.
In 1957 the British section of AICH was formed by Cdr CLA Woollard, the inaugural AGM was held on the HQS Wellington in London. Captain H Treaby Heale was elected as Chairman and the committee included M Lee. Finland and the Aland Islands formed two separate sections in 1961, they had the greatest number of Albatrosses, thirty in all, their square-riggers were still sailing round Cape Horn in 1949 when the Pamir and Passat made the last commercial unpowered voyages. Other countries such as Holland, America, Australia, New Zealand and Chile also became members.
Alan Villiers, the author of many books on sailing ships and our last Albatross, wrote of visiting the Bournemouth branch of the British section in 1971: “eight wonderful old boys, most of them octogenarians, except one aged 92, all with the stamp of the sea
still on their open faces, the snap of command in their speech. The talk was of great ships long gone, the hardness of the life and the astonishing way it worked out. All had been apprentices, most had been second mates in sail, all had their masters certificates before
they went into steam. They’d been senior masters in Royal Mail, Cunard and Union Castle, Trinity House Pilots, marine superintendents or surveyors, London dock masters, insurance appraisers – the cream of the profession”. The British section, at its
peak, had surviving Cape Horners from the clipper ships Thermopylae, Blackadder and Cymba. Most of them had served their time in the last steel bulk carriers such as the Kilmallie, Port Jackson, William Mitchell, Lawhill, Grace Harwar, Herzogin
Cecilie, Pamir, Parma, Passat, Olivebank etc. We also had, until their own sections were formed, Australians, New Zealanders and Americans in the British section. Irving Johnson, an American, made a film on board the four-masted barque Peking on passage from Hamburg, round Cape Horn to Talcahuano in Chile in 1929/30. This is a classic account of a large square-rigger’ sailing 8,000 tons of ship and cargo “where we want her to go, not necessarily where she wants to go”. The heavy weather photography is the best ever recorded, her decks are full of water, four men at the wheel and 00 canvas storm sails blown out. On arrival in Talcuahano the use of the local tug is turned down and Captain Jiihrs “beat the ship up the harbour like a yacht”. He then carried out a running moor under sail, a manoeuvre which Laiesz masters had carried out on many occasions. I can recall doing a running moor in Gravesend Reach (for an extra charge on the A form of course) with a powered ship – it was not easy to get it right the first time. AICH have held 52 International Congresses in ports as far apart as Sydney and Helsinki, the latter congress was partially held on board the new gas turbine powered Finnjet running between Helsinki and Travemunde. The contrast between travelling in luxury at 32 knots with our apprenticeship days was vivid. Fortunately the managing owner of Finnlines at the time, Heikki Holma, was also President of the Finnish AICH, he had sailed in their small barque Favell in the 1930s. Three international congresses have been held in the UK, at Southampton in 1967, Greenwich in 1978 and Bristol in 1990. These were all well attended and it was a pleasure to see and hear Cape Horners hauling on ropes and singing sea shanties on the Cutty Sark. In 2000 at Mariehamn, home port of the last sailing ship owner, Gustaf Erikson, it was decided at the Federal Council meeting, that as AICH members were ageing and declining in numbers, that the Amicale should be wound up in 2003. The Cutty Sark Tall Ships Race visit to the Aland Islands coincided with this congress and it was a pleasure to see the training ships and their crews mingling with ancient mariners. The perfectly preserved four-masted barque Pommern, (built on the Clyde in 1903 and moored permanently in Mariehamn, unchanged since the day she was put into service), towered over the largest of the training ships – described by one hide-bound German Cape Horner as “motor ships decorated with sails”. Two years were required to satisfy and complete the acres of paper-work required by French bureaucracy to wind up an official organisation such as this and it is with thanks to our International Secretary Captain Roger Ghys (ex-Master of the Belgium sail training ship Mercator), and his band of helpers that all was accomplished in that time.
On May 14 2003 in St Malo where it was born in 1937 AICH was formally wound up with some sadness but in a true spirit of Cape Horn. All our financial assets were used to celebrate this last congress, we went out in a splendid fashion, my wife Kate, our son Matthew and I will remember those days for a long time. Cape Horn is not dead in the UK we had formed International Association of Cape Horners (IACH) some years ago to carry forward that tradition. IACH is made up of those who have sailed round Cape Horn under sail alone, we have very strict rules concerning the manner in which this is done. The fact remains that no one can sail round Cape Horn as those large sailing ships did –everyone has to satisfy some acronymic requirement or other – but the challenge, tradition and rite of passage remain.
Martin Lee
I have listed those AICH British members who were Pilots, there may be others.
Captain Bruce Bell. Southampton. Two roundings in the Mountstewart 1920/22.
Captain Hector Blemings, Gravesend Channel. Three roundings:
Wray Castle 1916/19 and Terpsichore (as second mate) 1919/22.
Captain Harry Fountain, Boston. One rounding, Monkbarns 1921.
Captain Douglas Galloway, Wellington. One rounding, Penang 1938.
Captain Victor Harbord. Humber. Five roundings, Beechbank 1907/11
Captain Andrew Keyworth, Lyttelton. One rounding, Pamir 1947.
Captain Francis Kirk, Southampton. One rounding, Monkbarns 1921.
Captain M. Lee, Orwell,Thames and Medway. One rounding, Passat 1948. President of AICH/IACH since 1982.
Captain William Liley, River Thames. One rounding, Carradale 1913.
Captain L. Peverley. Gravesend Channel. Five roundings: Robert Duncan 1905/10, Bengairn 1910/11, Beechbank 1911/12 (2nd Mate), Kilmallie 1912/13 (Mate).
Captain John Simpson. Forth. Three roundings, Garthsnaid 1919/22.
Captain William Sutherland. Gravesend Channel. One rounding, Archibald Russell 1932. President AICH 1980-1982.
117th Conference
117th CONFERENCE
Eastbourne : 17th-18th November 2004
PRE CONFERENCE SESSION
PNPF (Richard Williamson, Boston
As a SC deputy for Region 2 and PNPF trustee, Richard provided delegates with an
overview of the fund, the investment policy and its performance. He answered questions on Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT) and the role of trustees. Richard was followed by the PNPF Secretary, Debbie Marten whose report appears separately.
PNPF and the Pilots’ National committee for Pensions (PNCP) (Joe Wilson,
Joe advised delegates that whilst looking for ways in which to keep costs down the
SC had looked at the relevance of the PNCP for UKMPA members. Joe explained that since the 1995 Pensions Act had incorporated safeguards and rights for pension fund members and pensioners and pension advice was available for all UKMPA members through the specialist pensions department of the T&G. SC had considered that the funds currently allocated to the PNCP for meetings would be more constructively used in permitting an alternate trustee to attend trustee meetings. A debate on this issue saw presentations from Mike Kitchen, Chairman PNCP and Dan Macmillan, the pensioners’ representative on the PNCP who both provided the conference with arguments as to why the PNCP should be retained. A subsequent vote saw delegates vote in favour of the disbanding of the PNCP by 24 votes to 22.
Further to this debate, PNCP chairman Mike Kitchen has written a letter to the magazine which appears on page 14.
MAIN CONFERENCE
Delegates stood in order to observe one minute’s silence in memory of the President of EMPA, Gianfranco Gasperini and other deceased colleagues.
The UKMPA President, Lord
infrastructure could cope. The lack of interest by MP’s in shipping meant that there was no ports’ strategy from the Government and this was holding up development. There was therefore a danger that the
Chairman’s Report (Les Cate)
An updated report appears on page 6.
Secretary/Treasurer’s Report (John Pretswell)
John opened his report by detailing the membership which at 30th September 2004 stood at 493 members from 47 Districts. This figure represented a reduction of 8 over 2003. Neath had withdrawn from membership.
Dundee had reduced from 5 pilots to 3 but the other two pilots had transferred to
John then referred delegates to the printed “Financial Statement and Budget Proposals” contained within the conference papers and available to members from their local Secretary. He then detailed the Budget / Expenditure figures for 2004.
2005 budget:
John explained that there had been a change to the insurance cover offered by Navigators & General which, had resulted in N&G removing the 50,000 cover altogether and increasing the premiums payable on the 100,000 cover.
On the basis of the revised insurance figures John had calculated a 2005 subscription rate of £105.
When this was put to the vote the delegates were unable to accept this without a remit from their membership. Paul Haysom, who was now responsible for the insurance brief was seeking quotes from other insurers and Drew Smith had possibly identified an alternative provider who might provide £50,000 cover The Chairman therefore suggested that delegates accept the budget with a reservation on the subscription element that could be revised downwards should a cheaper alternative premium quote be achieved.
This was accepted unanimously by delegates (see page 11).
CHIRP (Confidential Hazard Incident Reporting Programme) (Mike Powell, Maritime Director)
Mike provided an overview of the CHIRP program which was witnessing an increasing number of reports as seafarers became aware of its existence. Of the 121 reports received since the start of the programme in July 2003 two thirds had been processed and 57 had resulted in action being taken to address the issues raised and this was a positive indicator that the programme was working. The quarterly newsletter “Feedback” now had a circulation of 140,000 worldwide.
The top issues had been:
· Control of navigation
· Hazards
· SMS
· Fatigue: This is a major area of concern since reports indicate widespread abuse of official records being completed to indicate compliance but actual hours being dangerously in excess of those permitted.
· Technical processes (ie design of equipment, quality of manuals etc)
The top pilotage issues had been:
· Deep draft navigation in the Dover Straits. The reports from
N Sea pilots on this had been well received by the MCA and
CNIS
· PEC: This had been the topic least well received by the shipping industry!
· Bridge Team Management (or rather lack of BTM). This was an area where CHIRP encouraged reports and it was a relatively easy matter for CHIRP to raise with the company concerned.
· Mobile phone usage.
· ISPS and access issues
Mike concluded by acknowledging that pilots were in a good position to submit reports and CHIRP welcomed such reports.
Q&A
Were the reports received so far indicative of insufficient manning on board?
Yes. But because of the manipulation of official logs to indicate compliance it was almost impossible to address. Those reporting fatigue were concerned about their jobs but CHIRP was seeking ways to resolve this.
Is it not possible for the SMS auditors to identify the falsification of working hours records since there were probably many occasions where such records would indicate that the logged compliance would have been impossible?
Again yes, but the majority of SMS auditors would not have the time or the training to undertake the detailed cross referencing of data to be able to identify non compliance. Unfortunately all the evidence of groundings and collisions meant that everyone was aware that there was a major problem but no one was prepared to break ranks and address it. The issue of safe manning was on the international agenda for next year and CHIRP would be contributing their data to the debate.
Health & Safety (Susan Murray, T&GWU)
Susan provided delegates with some background information of the T&G’s H&S function. Susan herself worked within the legal department and her main experience had been gained from compensation claims.
The department provided union response to HSC consultations and encouraged involvement and communication from safety officers within the various companies with T&G representatives. They were also involved in many consultation forums and advisory groups.
The departments remit is very large and Susan had been very interested in the issues of fatigue and the falsification of documents revealed by CHIRP. Of particular relevance to pilots was the issue of Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) and the T&G had produced a free book and advice leaflets on H&S and PPE for safety officers.
The Employment Act 2002 (Fergus Whitty, T&GWU legal director)
Fergus provided a detailed presentation on the new Act which gave unions cause for deep concern in that it had ignored the ACAS Code for handling disputes and had, in the view of Fergus, enhanced the powers of employers in dismissing employees and weakened workers rights to a fair hearing under certain circumstances. Part of the
driving force behind the new legislation had been to reduce the number of dispute claims being handled by tribunals by 40,000 per year by seeking to have disputes resolved
internally. Only if these internal discussions fail can the matter be referred to an external tribunal. The procedures for an external reference are very specific and in detailing some of these Fergus stressed the point that it was very important that correct procedures were be strictly adhered to otherwise any dispute could be declared invalid or out of time. There is no requirement for the employer to inform the employee of these procedures! Fergus went on to explain the detail of the new Act and how the procedures failed to offer protection to an employee. The conclusions from the T&GWU were that on the positive side it was a good idea to hold internal meetings and set out the complaint to the employer before a claim was made to a tribunal.
On the negative side the T&GWU felt that:
· The (old) ACAS Code should form part of the legal disciplinary process
· It was absolutely wrong to dismiss an employee without an investigation
· Wrong for employers not to have to detail the consequences of failure to follow correct procedures
· Wrong for employers not to have to advise on rights of an employee to be accompanied.
Port Marine Safety Code
(Simon Gooder, Ports liaison manager member of the Navigation Safety Branch of the MCA)
Simon opened this presentation by providing brief details of his background. Following service in the RN where he had become a navigation specialist he had served from 1995 – 2003 as the Deputy Queen’s HM at
Following the introduction of the PMSC in December 2001 an implementation review had been held in 2003 and this had led to the following:
· The MCA adopting responsibility for the operational aspects of the Code
· The DfT retaining responsibility for the policy and legislative aspects of the Code The MCA ensure compliance, follow up any incidents and chase up any ports revealing a reluctance to comply. They also act to develop and support the standards accompanying the Code.
One new area being subjected to national standards and guidelines was that of PEC holders.
Simon considered the PMSC to be an evolving document with standards being introduced and it was hoped that by examining the weight of evidence the PMSC could be progressed to ensure enhancement of port safety and introducing the concept of “Assured Compliance”. The UKMPA was actively involved as a stakeholder is this process.
Q&A
During the Q&A session Simon confirmed that the PMSC was currently a voluntary code which was not supported by any legislation.
The point was raised that in the case of a breach of the Act rather than the Code then this Act was law and therefore a plaintiff should be able to take the case to a court. A legal opinion from the floor was that any interested party could present information to a court to commence a prosecution.
The Humber Dispute
(David Devey, Liverpool pilot & Barrie Youde, Ex Liverpool pilot and Barrister)
David Updated delegates on the latest situation regarding HPL members and the
Technical & Training Committee Report
(
John referred delegates to the written report within the conference papers which detailed the work undertaken by the committee on the following topics:
· Personal Protection Clothing & Equipment
· Pilot Transfer Equipment & Pilot Boarding Arrangements
· Pilot Boarding and Landing Code of Practice
· Electronic Aids
· RNLI Technical Liaison
·
MCA, IMO & MAIB Report
(Don Cockrill,
Don referred delegates to the reports on his activities included in the conference papers. Adding to those reports Don reminded delegates of the need to ensure that all the non delegate members throughout the districts were kept fully aware of the activities of the MCA and DfT who, despite being the bodies responsible for safety were also subject to commercial pressures and would invariably succumb to commercial interests over safety issues and avoid any policy which may incur a cost to the shipowner. The current statements from the Chamber of Shipping questioning the need for PEC standards was a prime example of how the agenda could be manipulated to the detriment of pilotage and its skills. The ports’ representatives were equally dismissive of the need to specify training and standards for pilots.
VTS Policy Group
Some had questioned as to why the UKMPA needed to be involved with this group but having attended some of their meetings Don was in no doubt that this was a very powerful lobby group with great influence within the MCA and the DfT and although a token gesture of removing references to “shore based pilotage” within VTS literature had been made, the concept had been reincarnated under the heading of “Navigational Assistance” and plans for promoting such assistance were still firmly on the agenda.
EMPA (Les Cate, Chairman & Vice President EMPA)
During the last year, in order to participate in EU projects and to be eligible for EU funding it was necessary for EMPA to become a “Non Profit Association” and EMPA is now officially known as EMPA vzw.
Full details of the amendments to the previous structure are contained within the conference papers.
Maritime Navigation & Information Services: MARNIS Project
This 5 year EU project got underway in September and will shape the ports VTM and pilotage. EMPA is a partner in this project and its objectives are as follows:
· Improvement of safety and the protection of the environment;
· Improvement of security of vessels, coasts and ports;
· Improvement of efficiency and reliability of information flows;
· Furtherance of the economy of sea transport;
· Improvement of the efficiency of legal and organisational aspects regarding enforcing of rules and regulations in the
“European maritime zone”
When completed it will form part of the White Paper entitled:
European Transport Policy 2010: Time to decide
Ports Directive
Les concluded the EMPA report by explaining the work of the Council of Presidents and how they were in consultation as to how best to fight and once again defeat the revived Port Services Directive.
DfT
(James Wheedon, Responsible for Port safety & pilotage policy)
James opened this session by explaining the structure of his department and detailed the various responsibilities and the tie-in with the MCA and Trinity House There was no policy change with respect to the PMSC despite the delegation of monitoring compliance to the MCA and the code remained without legislation and thus, being voluntary, Ministers had no need to impose an external audit on HA’s. The MCA would however be required to prove to ministers that standards are maintained and progressed.
James acknowledged that the NOS had become stagnated under PSSL but that the MCA, as the responsible body for progressing NOS, would have to work with PSSL because PSSL had access to the Maritime Skills Allowance Fund. It was probable that funding for the various groups to progress NOS work would come from the MSAF.
The MCA would also be responsible for the technical and operational aspects of the Code but would work together with the Ports Division of DfT to develop policies and initiatives. Currently work was progressing on a new section of the PMSC dealing with Incident management and expanding the code to include conservancy as well as introducing NOS for hydrographers. With respect to the future supply of pilots the DfT felt that the traditional route of Master’s FG certificate was not sustainable and new routes into positions for maritime professionals working ashore would need to be found. A document covering this, entitled “
The DfT recognised that there had been concerns raised over abuse of
A question was asked as to why there was still no legislation to ensure that a CHA complies with the wish of Government and why did the DfT continue to advise ministers that it doesn’t feel that it is necessary to enforce CHA’s to comply with the PMSC? The code does actually have reserve power for the Secretary of State to intervene if there was evidence that a CHA was acting unsafely. This would consist of visiting the CHA and reminding them of their responsibilities under the Code, but James confirmed that there were no legal measures that could be invoked by the SoS. In response to the second part of the question James stated that the DfT couldn’t advise a minister to do something that was not within his powers.
Les Cate stated that he had understood from Andrew Burr that the SoS had reserve powers of intervention and asked why these hadn’t been used. James replied that he did not believe that there were any powers that could be invoked by the SoS but he acknowledged that supporting legislation would be desirable although with the limitations on parliamentary time the chances of a new bill were not great.
IMPA (Geoff Taylor, Tees and Senior Vice President IMPA)
During the last year IMPA had been involved in the following:
IMO Resolution A960
This resolution, drawn up by IMPA as a joint project with the IMO, had been formally adopted by IMO during the year and laid out clear guidelines for pilotage. This resolution represented a considerable achievement for IMPA and it should be supported by all pilots (see report in PILOT 279).
Mandatory Pilotage in International Waters
This was a new concept since until now only voluntary pilotage could be offered in international waters. However
Maritime Safety Commission (MSC)
Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC)
Potentially
There were also many other sub groups and IMPA tried to ensure that pilots were represented at any forum where pilotage interests were being discussed. In addition to the importance for pilots, attendance at these sessions also provided a vital link between the shore representatives / officials and the real world on board ships since the pilots were frequently the only serving mariners present.
The other areas where IMPA had been involved included:
Integrated Bridge design, standards for mooring lines, Marking / testing bitts and fairleads, standards for new radars, common symbology for navigational equipment.
With respect to on-going work, pilot boarding was being progressed. The poor quality and sighting of AIS units on ships had been acknowledged. Several IMPA members were involved in training and standards and the ETCS project being run by EMPA dovetailed well with similar initiatives around the World. One new project had been to establish a long overdue dialogue with the P&I Clubs. Although these were run by ship owners there was the obvious common interest of safety of shipping. So far the Clubs had acknowledged the common ground and in particular IMPA was being successful in challenging the widely circulated statistic that “pilot error” was responsible for 30% of claims. Surveys had revealed that 99.96% of voyages were successfully concluded so only 30% of 0.04% of incidents occurred in pilotage waters which were acknowledged to be the highest risk areas. With 95% of world trade being moved by ship this was an admirable safety record. Pilots were effectively professional “risk managers” who statistically achieved nearly 100% successful operations. It was therefore impossible to comprehend why, especially in the
One final very important area of lobbying was the proposed EU Directive criminalising seafarers. Although in its early stages, this directive on marine pollution would include pilots with criminal liability in the case of a pollution incident.
IMPA Congress at Istanbul
This had been very well attended and very successful. Three
resolutions were passed
1. Commending to Governments, pilotage authorities and pilots the contents of IMO Resolution A960.
2. Publicise the result of the G8 summit which encouraged the IMO as the appropriate body to develop mandatory pilotage in narrow and congested waterways by means of “strictly regulated systems”.
3. VTS and Pilots: “VTS is not pilotage, nor is it a substitute for pilotage and shore based pilotage cannot be a substitute for pilotage performed by a pilot on board.”
PENSIONS (Peter Smith, T&GWU National Pensions Officer)
Peter Smith detailed the provisions of the new Pensions Bill and explained that unfortunately this was a Bill with no coherent policies with many complex anomalies some of which Peter listed. The Financial Assistance and Pension Protection Fund elements to help those deprived of their pensions were totally inadequate and would be means tested to provide undefined “Meaningful Assistance”.
The Bill also did not address the various ploys that employers had adopted to reduce pension provisions which had resulted in 65,000 employees losing out on their pension entitlement. It was hoped that the proposed new Pensions Regulator would be able to use legislation to prevent employers from breaching pension provision agreements.
Overall the TUC were concerned that the new Act would not provide the necessary protection for employees but it was possible that a proposed EU Directive may help.
Peter concluded by reminding delegates that the T&G was available to assist in protecting members’ pension entitlements and that no matter how secure a scheme may seem vigilance was required.
Les Cate closed this session by advising delegates that Peter Smith and his department within the T&G could fill any gap left by the loss of the PNCP.
Legal (Mark Foden, Blake, Lapthorn and Linnel)
Mark, having taken over the legal assistance from Michael Nott, opened his presentation by detailing the work that BLL had been involved with on behalf of the UKMPA.
Poole & Gloucester:
Advice had been given on new provision of service contracts for the self employed pilots and the final documents checked before these were signed.
The employment department had also checked contracts on behalf of employed pilots from other districts.
Milford
Following the issue of a new incident report form by the HA, BLL had worked with N&G on the disclosure of information aspect of the form. This sought to retain some control by the pilot involved over disclosure to 3rd parties other than statutory bodies.
Alcohol & Drug testing:
Advice had been provided on the provisions of the new legislation covering this in order to clarify who could test pilots and under what circumstances.
Review of the 1987 Pilotage Act:
BLL would be working closely with the Section Committee as the review progressed and this would probably result in a “position paper” being circulated to members.
This article represents a brief resume of the conference to provide members with an overview of the many areas in which the UKMPA is active.
Pilotage History Part 2
PILOTAGE HISTORY ~ Part 2
Harry Hignett
View the original pdf illustrated magazine article:
pilotmag.co.uk/userfiles/Pilotmag%20279%20(Oct%2004).pdf
The Francis Henderson, built by Murdock and Murray in 1896, the first steam pilot
vessel for the Liverpool Pilot Service. From an original painting by J Witham.
In part 1 we learned how the situation for pilots over the centuries had resulted in
legislation covering compulsory pilotage being introduced but as a result of poor
drafting much of this legislation was open to abuse and offered poor protection for
pilots. By the end of the 19th Century, pilots were subjected to competition from
exemptions to pilotage being offered to vessels and sadly in some cases from other
pilots! The founding of the UKPA in 1884 had focused unity of purpose and achieved
a significant result by stimulating the 1889 Merchant shipping Act (Pilotage). Whilst
many of the pilots’ requirements had been incorporated into the is Act it was still full
of loopholes and this was compounded by apathy by Trinity House in tackling pilotage
exemption abuses. The 1889 pilotage Act was incorporated into the 1894 Merchant
Shipping Act but having achieved few further gains pilots became despondent.
1901 – 1941
1900 was a time of falling membership and low attendances at conferences. The UKPA membership fell to around 700 in contrast to a decade earlier when the numbers were about 1,200. Although the total number of pilots entered in the annual returns of the BoT was about 2,300, many were part-time pilots at very small ports.
The complaints against “aliens” obtaining pilotage exemption certificates were a very strong card in the hands of the Association. The Foreign Office insisted that there were treaty arrangements between countries that made such arrangements inevitable, however there was a serious flaw in this argument in that foreign masters could pilot their vessels at each end of the voyage but British masters could not. In 1902 B J Foster (Hull) rose at the Plymouth Conference to announce that the holder of a pilotage certificate for the Humber was a commissioned officer in the German Navy and claimed he would get promotion because of that qualification. It was stated that alien pilotage had increased 200% under the 1889 Pilotage Act and that all members of the 1888 Select Committee on Pilotage who had not been against alien pilotage, “were now aware of the damage done and entirely against the principle”.
Legal matters concerning pilots were handled by the Association’s barrister and the cases were becoming ever more complex, as the quirks of legal decisions arose. In 1902 a Clyde pilot had to pay £1,071 damages even though he had not been found in any way negligent or to blame for an accident. The ship-owners had gone bankrupt and the costs had been set against the pilots! For many decades the pilots had assumed that the signing of the bond for £100 gave them protection from liability for damages but it was then found that for an unknown reason, this condition applied only to Trinity House pilots. In 1902 at Barrow, a local official suspended a pilot for a very dubious infringement of the rules. The pilots took the matter to the County Court and proved that the official had no powers to suspend anyone. The official turned to Trinity House Pilotage authority, which, without further inquiry, agreed to suspend the pilot. The case was taken to the High Court and the Trinity House’s action declared illegal. However the pilot was required to pay part of the court costs and his own expenses amounting to some £100.
In 1908 Clyde pilot, J McKinley, was accused of navigating a vessel in a dangerous manner when pilot of ss Maracas inward-bound He met HMS Harrier outward-bound in visibility of about 11/2 miles; there was no collision, but the commander of the naval vessel made a complaint about the navigation of Maracas. The Sheriff, trying the case without assessors, said that it was a very clear case and stated, “I should say that the risk having been placed there by the Maracas, it was only averted by the prompt action of those in charge of the Harrier who succeeded in preventing what might have been a very serious disaster”. He found the case proved and fined McKinley £25 with £10 costs.
The incensed delegates to the 1908 Conference six months later were
unanimous in a demand for an appeal to a higher court at the expense of the Association. The appeal was dismissed, so the Association petitioned the King who passed it to his Scottish Secretary who merely passed it to the same High Court, not surprisingly with the same result. Commander Cawley, at the 1909 Conference said that he would try to appeal to His Majesty in person. However he drew attention to the depletion of the Management Fund in providing legal advice in the many and wide-spread court proceedings against pilots and in obtaining assistance in Parliamentary matters.
Following representations from Commander Cawley, all the members of the 1889 Select Committee agreed to assist the Association and Sir John Puleston arranged for a deputation from the UKPA to meet the president of the Board of Trade (Winston Churchill). Led by Commander Cawley and Michael Joyce MP (Limerick pilot), the Association Officers were introduced to Churchill and members of his staff. Churchill listened carefully to all the arguments placed before him. Given his ideas at the time (he was campaigning for the formation of MI5 to act against enemy agents), alien pilotage was a strong point in the Association’s favour, as was also the court proceedings against McKinley. Churchill promptly signed the order for a Departmental Committee on Pilotage to begin work in 1909.
In 1908, the Counsel to the Association had died, and he was succeeded by a Bristol solicitor, Sandford D Cole. Cole was a very competent person, who became a member of the Departmental Committee. From this Committee arose the Pilotage act 1913, encompassing much of what the pilots required:- freedom from illegal pilotage, a restriction on the issue of pilotage certificates, better rules generally and mandatory representation on pilotage committees.
The Pilotage Act 1913 and After
The implementation of the 1913 Pilotage Act was interrupted in many ports by the outbreak of war and there is no record of the activities of the Association for a couple of years. Many pilots entered the armed forces and several lost their lives on land and sea. Those who remained in the pilotage services braved torpedoes and mines: most received Mercantile Marine and War Medals. Some were decorated for specific acts of bravery.
After the end of the War the Association’s Solicitor, John Inskip, in conjunction with Michael Joyce, suggested that a Committee of Members of Parliament sympathetic to the pilots’ cause should be formed with a view to having assistance whenever legislation or matters affecting pilots was passing through Parliament. Inskip introduced the Officers of the UKPA to his brother, Thomas Inskip, KCMP, who agreed to assist. Thomas Inskip was to become Attorney General in several later governments and eventually a Cabinet Minister. A ten-member Committee was formed to continue discussions but the introduction of new pilotage orders did not go smoothly. Inskip, in one of his reports as Secretary in the early twenties, said he had attended ten inquiries in one year. And in six years there were more than twenty inquiries, not all brought about by the same type of objection. For example, in the Forth, the ship owners objected to the new ‘pooling’ arrangements, claiming that the pilots would become lazy, inefficient and incompetent.
During the War the subscriptions had been raised from 1/- per month to 1/6d and again in 1919 to 2/-. However the cost of correspondence, telephone calls, printing of agendas, minutes and expenses of travel were all putting the finances under pressure. A total of 24/- annually would not cover the amount required for long.
“THE PILOT”, appeared for the first time in 1920 through which membership increased from about 1,000 to almost 1,300 in 1921. The magazine proved to be the most efficient way of increasing the pilots’ awareness of problems, and indicating how difficulties could be avoided or averted by adopting better procedures. In 1923 the MP for Hull, Lt Cmdr Peter Kenworthy (Independent), who had been helpful in supporting the Humber pilots as a member of the House of Commons Pilotage Committee, agreed to become President when Michael Joyce retired but in 1924 he was forced to resign due to illhealth. Like Joyce he had seldom missed an Executive Committee meeting, once slipping away from a crucial debate in the House, to attend a conference. Peter Kenworthy was succeeded by Lord Apsley, MP for Southampton, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minster of Transport and a person known for his sympathies with seafarers in general. Refusing all fees, he was of invaluable assistance in the years to come.
Around this time there was unrest at Bristol, stemming from the introduction of steam pilot cutters which although having been in use at other ports since the turn of the century, were not popular with pilots from Pill. New bye-laws did not meet the pilots’ demands and they objected to the Board of Trade who ordered a local inquiry. The Bristol pilots told the Executive Committee of their intention to join a dockworkers’ union and that they could not remain members of the UKPA on the grounds that the Association represented licensed pilots who were unable to strike.
During the immediate post-war years, many cases of maladministration of pilotage affairs appeared with Dundee the best example. The pilots there were paid a weekly salary of £4 by the Authority, together with such further amounts as the Authority cared to distribute from the surplus earnings after they had met their own requirements. But there was a legal dispute between the Anchor Line and Dundee Harbour Board where the pilotage funds had been used to defray costs that had little or nothing to do with pilotage. In 1925 there were eight inquiries and the local branches were subsidised by £21 for each inquiry. Over a decade the Association’s finances were in a deficit of £212 which was eating into the accumulated funds and the larger ports were subsidising the smaller. At the 1925 Conference, John Inskip impressed upon members that there were always to be two funds established in each district: a Pilot Fund for administration and a Pilot Benefit Fund for disablement and retirement pensions. He took pains to explain and distinguish between the two types of funds that made it imperative and legally necessary to maintain them separate and distinct.
During the late 1920s, the cost of living was falling, the shipowners pressed for reductions in pilots’ earnings and in 1929 attacked the Liverpool pilots directly. Until then the local inquiries had been ‘round the table’ affairs with no formal structure. At Liverpool the authority agreed with the pilots that a reduction of 10% was warranted. The Chamber of Shipping, however, brought in their own counsel who used formal procedures, leaving the UKPA somewhat short in its planning. The pilots lost the case in that the previously agreed reduction was increased to 15%. During the same Inquiry the shipowners managed to include another principle into the reckoning, namely that of having pilots’ earnings set between the pay of the master and mate of the average vessel using the pilot.
There was a deputation to the Board of Trade making a point on the use of formal procedures at inquiries. The pilots, with members of the Parliamentary Committee, made known their strong case of injustice. Whenever there had been an objection to a by-law or dispute between the authorities, pilots or shipowners, the BoT found it easy to institute an inquiry. These were formal affairs and thereby expensive for pilots. Between 1925 and 1930, following the Liverpool example there was a series of applications for reductions in pilotage rates or incomes, mostly demanding cuts of 15-20 per cent but the Association managed to hold most of the cuts to 10%. There were other problems, not least in the matter of membership. Inskip, agreed with the Thames River Pilots’ Association to pay two guineas to one of their members who unsuccessfully took a case to court. He later learned that the man concerned was not a member: In fact only 73 of the 125 pilots of that district were members. There were other membership abuses such as, in a couple of inquiries, the local pilots suddenly had 100% membership several months before the inquiries took place so in 1935 a rule was introduced and passed that before the Association assisted a local branch, there had to be a substantial membership at least three years before any assistance was granted.
In 1935 the shipowners began attacking pilot cutters and methods of boarding to reduce costs. They demanded that the Liverpool pilot station at Point Lynas be closed and the cutter withdrawn. The Inquiry lasted seven days, four in Liverpool and three in London. Six counsel were engaged, of which two were briefed by the Association. There was a principle involved and Sir John thought it worth the fight. The Liverpool pilots won the case. But the expenses paid by the Association were over £1,300; the Liverpool Pilots’ Association returned £100 of this to the UKPA in appreciation of the support.
History does repeat itself especially at Barrow-in-Furness. A pilot there was docking ss Orion in 1935, when, without warning, a dockmaster ordered the headrope to be moved. The vessel sheered away from the lock wall and was damaged, for which the pilot was brought before the local Trinity House Commissioners and suspended. The evidence had been given in his absence and was later read over to him.
When Sir John looked into the matter he found that one of the Trinity House Sub-
Commissioners was a servant of the owners of the vessel. He wrote immediately to
Trinity House, who restored the licence and re-opened the proceedings.
In 1934 the Executive Committee, following consultation with branches, produced a seven-point policy for discussion in the branches related to the financial regulation of the pilot funds and associated costs such as cutters etc.
During the 1938 Conference on the Mersey, Liverpool pilots announced that they had 435 exemption certificates in force in their district, with a high average number of vessels on each certificate. One certificate had 114 vessels entered and although many of the vessels no longer existed over 29 vessels on one certificate was considered ridiculous.
WW2
War was impending and many members of the UKPA were commissioned officers in the Royal Naval Reserve. For the first two years of the War, Inskip carried on almost single-handed and there were no meetings. Many senior members of the districts were called into administrative matters to become involved in the re-organisation of war-time pilot services. The UKPA still continued to function but they had consult by letter or phone. Matters dealt with included the insurance of cutters during hostilities, employment of pilots during lack of shipping, registering apprentices to preclude conscription, the new compulsory pilotage order for war purposes, food rationing, clothing, liability for fire-watch duties or Home Guard stand-by.
Membership in 1938/9 was nearly 1,200 but there was to be a change. In 1942 the Secretary told the Executive Committee that 25 members of the Manchester Pilots’ Association had not renewed their subscriptions and had apparently joined the Transport & General Workers Union due to closer contact between the pilots, tug crews, canal operating staffs and dockworkers. Certainly the latter had received increases of more than 40% and some pilots were now receiving less than a dockworker.
A couple of months later, 112 Liverpool pilots, led by Lewis Jones, a former member of the Executive Committee also resigned Association membership to join the TGWU. The withdrawal of the Liverpool pilots was particularly galling for the Association members, in view of the costly support given in defending the retention of the Point Lynas Pilot Station a few years earlier.
From 1942 the Executive Committee met regularly every quarter, and in making plans for the future, the seven-point programme was resurrected, re-drawn and discussed at an informal conference in the summer of 1944. Shortly after the conference it was learned the Lord Apsley had been killed in action. The post-War political changes led to difficulties in finding a new president or indeed any parliamentary representation.
The General Election of 1945 was called at the same time and the Conservatives were in disarray. The senior Labour Members of Parliament had insufficient time to represent the Association and newer members were unwilling to take up the reins. In the UKPA debates it was found that the subscriptions would have to be increased from £2 16s per annum to £3. In 1949 at Hull the local authority decided to appoint pilots as choice pilots whether or not the particular pilot was willing to take the work. The Association decided to take interest in the choice pilotage situation and circulated 48 of the 60 ports: only 12 replied.
Discussions towards a standard for pilots’ earnings began to bear fruit in the early 1950s. In 1956 there was a Ministry of Transport Inquiry chaired by Sir Robert Letch. The “Letch Report” resulted in a structure for pilots’ earnings which lasted to the end of the century. Although not without criticism, as a basis for discussion, it simplified negotiations for half a century.
Modern Times
From 1960 onwards the UKPA turned its attention to pensions and gathered details of the many and varied schemes around the UKPA ports. Several ports had no official pension scheme: the smaller ports were particularly badly off. Charges were another area of variance and the mid-1960s were a time of impending change with a new method of tonnage measurement affecting pilotage charges. Every vessel had two sets of tonnages and only when a certain “delta” mark on the vessel (similar to the Plimsoll mark) was immersed would the higher tonnage charges apply. Pilots were very concerned over changes that were being used to curb incomes and many felt that it was time for direct action. In 1968 a new General Secretary and Legal Advisor, Edgar Eden, a barrister warned against any precipitate action on the part of the pilots fearing that if they disturbed the balance of the Letch Report, there could be action from the ship owners who would love to overthrow Letch and make pilots salaried employees.
Industrial Action
On 26th January 1971, after due notice being given to all sectors of the shipping industry, more than 1,400 pilots met in Birmingham Town Hall effectively bringing UK’s ports to a standstill for 24 hours. For the next couple of months the pilots’ representatives pursued a target of 20% increase in pilotage incomes and the final result was an increase of 16%.
The Pilots’ National Pension Fund came into being in 1971 and within a decade 99% of pilots were members and contributors. During the 1970s other issues were addressed including London pilots who became concerned about health issues, and in 1978 brought certain facts to the notice of the UKPA. As always finance was an issue and it became increasingly difficult for the UKPA to operate as a stand-alone group and it was therefore decided to seek affiliation with a larger union. In 1979 the UKPA and TGWU began steps to merge. Following the successful merger the membership increased and by the 1984 centenary of the UKPA it exceeded 99% of the total number of pilots in the UK.
1984 – The Present (by JCB)
All good things must come to an end and in 1984, in what represented a U-turn in the Thatcherite policies of encouraging free enterprise the Government decided to revolutionise pilotage and transfer responsibility for pilotage from Trinity House and other local pilotage commissioners to the ports by means of a new Pilotage Act. The UKPA found itself fighting for survival and much time and effort was expended in trying to ensure that the proposed legislation preserved the essential rights for pilots. Unfortunately, once the Bill was in the hands of the politicians, the UKPA lost control of the content and the resulting 1987 Pilotage Act effectively granted ports total power over pilots without any accountability. The Act also resulted in a division of UKPA membership between employed and self employed districts.
Whereas in some instances the pilots
(usually self employed) enjoyed a good
working relationship with their port (now
known as the Competent Harbour
Authority CHA) in many ports the
relationship was poor. In Liverpool the majority of pilots were bitterly opposed to being employees of the port and after much difficult negotiation were able to reverse their employment status to become self employed. The other major conflict was on the Humber where the CHA, Associated British Ports, sought to force employment onto the self employed pilots. That dispute, along with its tragic outcome has been well documented within these pages.
The most dramatic development post 1987 was the Sea Empress disaster which starkly revealed the lack of accountability of a CHA for the powers over pilotage that had been transferred to them. In 1997 the new Labour Government was sufficiently concerned by this lack of accountability to launch an enquiry which in turn led to the Department for Transport drawing up a Port Marine Safety Code. The UKPA were deeply involved in drafting this code and established a good working relationship with the DfT. Once published, pilots were concerned that whilst the PMSC provided a good framework for port safety, without legislation to underpin it, the document lacked teeth. Meetings commenced with the Government with a view to drafting legislation but these came to an abrupt halt as the situation on the Humber deteriorated into a serious dispute. At the same time the British Ports Industries Training (BPIT) forum, which had been working closely with the UKMPA in producing a set of standards and qualification requirements for UK pilots was also disbanded to be replaced by a body operated by the UK ports industry called Port Skills and Safety (PSS). PSS promptly excluded the T&G and hence the UKMPA from representation and subsequently became a dormant organisation. In 2003, the President of the UKMPA Lord Tony Berkeley made approaches to the shipping minister which resulted in meetings being resumed, both sides being fully in agreement that the safety of shipping and the environment is a priority. Regular meetings are now being held and the following report detailing the work of the Chairman and section Committee indicates that constructive progress is once again being made.
Piloting Concorde!
LONDON PILOTS PILOT CONCORDE!
World exclusive photo scoop for the PILOT magazine
View the original illustrated pdf magazine article (Page 10):
pilotmag.co.uk/userfiles/Pilotmag%20278%20(Jul%2004).pdf
On 19th April the last commissioned British Airways Concorde made its final journey to the Museum of Flight in East Fortune, East Lothian, Scotland. Due to the fact that there was no runway near to the museum capable of accepting Concorde the decision was made to take the aircraft by barge from Isleworth near Heathrow to Scotland under tow. The barge chosen for the voyage was the recently launched Terra Marique owned by R Wynn which has been largely funded by the government to assist the transport of abnormal loads by water, and to reduce congestion on the roads. The Concorde was to be its .rst major test and with the world’s media watching it was essential that everything went smoothly. Three London pilots, John Reid, John Freestone and Peter Widd are authorised London “bridge” pilots and although they were all involved in the planning John Reid, being on duty at the time of the trials became the lead pilot and therefore very much the hidden hero behind the success of the operation. Isleworth is right at the uppermost reaches of the tidal Thames and being beyond the limit of the London pilotage district also required the use of a London Waterman for the upper two miles. Navigation this far up the Thames has two major problems for pilots to contend with, namely the lack of water and low bridges. There were several critical bridges on the passage where the barge would be experiencing a minimum under keel and air draft clearance and this involved careful tidal and air draft calculations and required the up river passage to be staged over three tides. Early trials with the Terra Marique revealed that although the .tted with four thrusters these were ineffective in the strong tidal flow of the river and it was therefore decided to use two small river tugs: Bennett’s Steven B and the Port of London Authority’s Impulse. Further trials also revealed control problems when navigating with the tide so the decision was taken to undertake all under bridge towage against the flood tide for maximum control. The Steven B is a pusher tug and because the
barge had a stern door it was necessary to lash it up to the bow and to push the barge
stern first. In the month leading up to the passage John Reid worked closely with R
Wynn, Bennett’s, Chris Livett (Waterman) and the PLA and it is to the credit to all
involved that the passage was finally executed without a hitch although not without a few raised heartbeats resulting from a 45 minute delay in departure which made the Albert Bridge transit extremely critical. Many observers and the media were disappointed that once loaded onto the barge Concorde was actually placed on a hydraulic platform which lowered the aircraft out of sight (her lowest ever altitude?) of the many spectators lining the banks of the Thames. However, in the interests of permitting our politicians to have an excuse to visit the bar on the terrace the pilots had to plan for a one hour pause in the passage off the Houses of Parliament in order that Concorde could be raised up for a short period by way of a farewell salute. With no press permitted on either the barge or
the tug, John Reid took conduct of the pilotage and John Freestone and Peter Widd
provided essential back up by assisting in ensuring the critical alignment of the barge for
passing under the bridges. In common with most pilots they all understate their essential role but John Freestone did manage to find time to take some excellent and unique photographs during the passage. Once clear of the upper river the tow was berthed at the Littlebrook Power Station jetty just under the Dartford Bridge and handed over to the deep sea tug Argus on the 14th April with pilot Cerwyn Phillips who piloted the vessel to the outer port limits. Following a safe sea passage, Concorde was reassembled and rolled out for permanent display at the National Museum of Flight Link: (www.nms.ac.uk/ concorde/) on 19th April.
Although, as usual, the role of pilots was ignored by the media, the reputation of the
port rested totally upon pilotage skills and this passage has proven to be a very
positive PR exercise not just for the PLA but also for the concept of using UK’s
waterways rather than roads. The UKMPA are already members of the new Sea and
Water group (www.seaandwater.org) which is driving forward this European initiative in the UK.
Pilotage History Part 1
PILOTAGE HISTORY Harry Hignett
View the original pdf illustrated article from the magazine:
pilotmag.co.uk/userfiles/Pilotmag%20278%20(Jul%2004).pdf
The majority of serving UK pilots have joined the service since the implementation of the 1987 Pilotage Act and many are probably largely unaware of the origins of the UKMPA. June marked the 120th anniversary of the UKMPA (originally the UKPA) and for the 1984 centenary Manchester pilot Harry Hignett (now retired) wrote a book detailing the history of the UKPA. Long since out of print this book is now unknown to the majority of pilots but it contains much interesting research. Harry has recently updated this original work but having failed to .nd a publisher for the book he has permitted me to place it on my website for all to access. As an introduction Harry has kindly agreed to provide an edited version for inclusion in the magazine which I will be running over two issues.
PART 1: ANTIQUITY TO 1900
Although pilotage will have been undertaken since vessels first started trading and
ancient texts such as Homer’s Iliad from the 7th century BC make vague references
to pilots one of the most precise early written descriptions of a pilot’s work was
around 64 AD.
“The passage is difficult because of the shoals at the mouth of the river. Because of
this, the native .shermen in the King’s service go up the coast to Syrastrene (Surat) to meet the ships. And they steer them straight and true from the mouth of the bay between the shoals with their crews and they tow them to fixed stations going up with the flood and lying through the ebb at anchorages and in basins. These
basins are deeper places in the river as far as the port, which lies about 10 stadia up
from the mouth.”
In this extract we can recognise the work of an estuary or river pilot from the earliest times until the steamship arrived onto the maritime scene.
In the UK one of the earliest records is from the 12th Century. Godric was born in Norfolk in 1069 and became a Chapman (travelling salesman carrying his own wares). He turned to carrying them not only using the inland waterways but also on coasting vessels along the coast and across the North Sea to Denmark. He made the trip so often that he eventually became a ship owner at one time owning four ships. A “colourful” character he was actually referred to by some as a pirate before he turned his energies to religious fervour and sub-sequently gave all his considerable wealth to charity! Such was his skill of navigation that he was asked to pilot vessels and he became famous not only for his pilotage skills but also for his ability to forecast the weather. Giving up his pilotage career around 1110 he became a hermit and was later canonised becoming St. Godric of Finchale (near Durham). He died in 1170 at the amazing age of 101, and his hermitage became Finchale Priory where his tomb (despite being pillaged many centuries ago) can still be visited. Later references to pilots are for London and include a 1387 reference to a “Pilot of the Black Deeps” (Thames Estuary). Other London records from a log-book reveal that pilotage charges on the Thames in the 1400’s were as follows:
to the losmanne who sailed me into the Temse . . . 10s 6d
to the man who led the shippe through the bridge . . . . . 8d
to the man who led the shippe into the dock . . . . . . . . . . 6d
The first organisation of UK pilotage was established by Trinity House and in 1457 the Trinity House of Hull was an exclusive maritime organization which in 1512 passed an ordinance restricting pilotage between Hull and the mouth of the Humber to members of Hull Trinity House. The founding of the Corporation of Trinity House on the Thames was in 1514. There were initially, 40 members (mostly pilots), 8 assistants, four wardens and the master. For the first fifty years the Corporation was, to all intents and purposes, exclusively concerned with pilotage, and most of the senior members were important naval officials, shipmasters or both.
The Cinque Ports pilotage was formally inaugurated in 1527 in Dover and before the end of the sixteenth century there was strife between the Dover pilots and their Trinity House counterparts because, when they disembarked off the Cinque Ports, the Corporation pilots attempted to pilot inward bound ships. However, the boating services were provided by relatives and friends of the Dover pilots and they were naturally reluctant to offend the Cinque Ports pilots. The Corporation pilots therefore had to travel home by land, a journey of at least two days via Canterbury to Gravesend and thence by boat to Deptford. Naturally the Cinque Ports pilots found similar difficulty in obtaining vessels to pilot from the Thames outwards. One may criticise one-way pilotage as being wasteful and inefficient, but ships in the days of sail arrived in great numbers according to the winds and travelling in company against pirates and enemy ships. Pilots near a pilot station remained at home on stand-by. So began the Thames pilotage system; Trinity House outwards, Cinque Ports inwards.
The Cinque Ports Pilotage Act of 1717 was the first parliamentary legislation covering pilotage. The Dover pilots now had something that Trinity House had not and the Elder Brethren applied for their own legislation. The next Pilotage Act, passed in 1732, confirmed the provisions of the 1717 Act and, gave exemption to the Trinity Houses of Hull, and Newcastle wherever their respective jurisdictions overlapped.
In the mid 1700’s establishing longitude at sea was difficult and many shipmasters feared to approach the Isles of Scilly, with rocks that made the area a noted graveyard for ships. The fishermen of the Scillies began to take up pilotage, meeting the vessels well out of sight of land and guiding them past the Isles up the channel and by 1800 they conducted ships to all parts of the British Isles and the coasts of France and Belgium. The successful application of parliamentary legislation led to several local Pilotage Acts, including those for Boston, Lincs, in 1774 and Hull in 1800 which were older established ports. In the late 18th century new industrial ports such as Swansea appeared receiving its first pilotage regulations in 1791.
The first comprehensive Pilotage Act was placed on the stature book in 1808, “An
Act for the better regulation of Pilots and of the Pilotage of Ships and vessels
navigating the British seas”. Its most important provisions were the establishment
of compulsory pilotage in all districts where licensed pilots were
available and the authority was given to the Deptford Trinity House to form
pilotage districts where it was deemed necessary to control pilots and regulate
pilotage. Almost immediately 35 Trinity House “outports” appeared around the
coast of Britain. The 1808 Act was replaced in 1812 but re-enacted most of
the provisions of its predecessor and gave the Trinity Houses of Hull and Newcastle
the powers they had exercised previously and also in “any ports or harbours or
places within the limits of their respective jurisdictions”. All licensed pilots were required, in an entirely new section, to execute a bond for their good behaviour in the sum of £100. This requirement has been carried through to the present day with the amount unchanged.
An important section of the Act attempted to define the responsibility and
rights of the ship owner, master, and owner or consignee of the cargo, with regard to
any damage to ship, goods or persons occurring through “neglect, default, incompetency or incapacity of any pilot taken under the provisions of the Act.”
Another Pilotage Act was passed in 1825 and prolonged the existing situation, without easing the litigation then giving the industry extra worries.
In 1835 a Royal Commission was instituted to look into the “existing laws,
regulations, and practises under which pilots are appointed, governed and paid in
the British Channel and the several approaches to the Port of London, and
also in the navigation connected with the other principal ports in the United
Kingdom.” It was the first major inquiry into pilotage and one of the main items in the findings and report of the Commission was the recommendation that there should be a central body to control all pilotage affairs. Alas the ensuing Pilotage Act of 1836 did not include this far-reaching proposal. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 included and consolidated most of the existing legislation on pilotage, as did the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894. Further inquiries arose in 1860, 1870 and 1880: that of 1870 being particularly significant being specifically instituted to study compulsory pilotage since it developed into a major study of all aspects of pilotage lasting three months. However, its findings were ignored by Parliament. At the end of the 19th century it was again obvious that the existing legislation was outdated and inadequate and, after a searching inquiry in 1910/11, the Pilotage Act of 1913 came into being.
The Nineteenth Century: The Coming of Steam
The years from 1800 to 1914 were the most difficult any pilots have had to face.
Iron ships and screw propulsion appeared mid-century, improving standards and
speeds but pilots had to handle ships up to eight times larger, with single screw
propulsion. When shipowners realised that ships were no longer dependent on wind
and tides they suggested that pilots were no longer as important and proposed
reductions in pilotage tariffs. The 19th Century opened peacefully but by 1803
Britain and France were once again at war which continued until the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. There followed a period of peace in Britain for nearly the next 100 years but it was anything but peace and contentment for pilots. The Pilotage Act of 1808 promoted a wider regulation of pilotage than previously, but the 1812 Act included an extra paragraph:
“No owner or master of any ship shall be answerable for any loss or damage for, or by reason of, any neglect, default or incompetence of any pilot taken on board of any such ship under or in pursuance of the provisions of this Act.”
A somewhat simple idea, but the interpretation of this clause by the courts brought chaos for shipowners and pilots alike and fortunes for the lawyers in the Admiralty Courts. The clause granted absolute freedom from claims for any damage done to other vessels or property to ships under compulsory pilotage. i.e. if ship ‘A’ under compulsory pilotage collided with ship ‘B’, a barge or any other vessel not subject to compulsory pilotage, ship ‘A’ was free from liability even when, under normal circumstances she would be at fault. Under this clause ship ‘A’ was also free from liability for damages after striking a shore installation. In 1824 another Pilotage Act replaced the 1812 Act, a section of which made it possible for a non-British vessel to enter or leave British ports without pilots.
Modern administration
During the early part of the 19th century British vessel entering and leaving the Tyne enjoyed preferential rates of pilotage. The advantage over foreign vessels was ended by the 1824 Act that gave equal treatment to foreign vessel wherever their governments gave similar treatment to British vessels. To compensate the Tyne pilots for the loss they would have sustained they were to be paid, by the Treasury, “Reciprocity Money”, viz. the difference between the old and the new tariffs for foreign vessels. Newcastle Trinity House claimed the full difference for all vessels entering the Tyne although many never went above the entrance, but the pilots were paid only on the ships they piloted. The unclaimed pilotage was then allocated to the Superannuation Fund, although the pilots disputed the right of Newcastle Trinity House to retain the money and demanded a full distribution of the amounts involved. The Newcastle authority refused and was unwilling or unable to account for the money.
In 1861 the Treasury discontinued Reciprocity Money, but as compensation the pilots were to receive, for a ten-year period, a sum equal to the Reciprocity Money paid in 1861 of which only 50% was handed to the pilots. The pilots commenced legal proceedings against the Elder Brethren who in turn sent for the pilots’ leaders, senior pilots, John Hutchinson and Robert Blair. The two pilots refused to attend and were threatened with dismissal. Newcastle Trinity House then began to examine and license local fishermen. The two pilots then went to London, to the Board of trade and Parliament. In 1863 an order by Parliament forced Trinity House to publish the accounts that showed a balance of more than £20,000 although further unclaimed pilotage of over £3,207 was not shown in the accounts. A long legal battle with Trinity House at Newcastle ensued from which the pilots emerged successful and a new body, the Tyne Pilotage Commissioners, was formed in 1865. It was proved that Trinity House had withheld over £24,000 from the pilots whose average wage at that time was about £180 per annum; the Elder Brethren claimed £3,500 for expenses incurred in opposing the Parliamentary Bills and other legal proceedings. Of the pilots, Hutchinson and Blair, they were to become founder members of the UKPA almost twenty years later.
An inquiry into pilotage in 1835, was the first to open up the subject in depth,
covering all major British ports and found that to make pilotage entirely optional
would “hold out a boon to the foolhardy” recommending that certain exceptions to compulsory pilotage be made for vessel in the short sea trades. The Commissioners suggestion that there was a need for a central body to control local authorities was ignored. About this time the pilots of the east coast ports were badly hit by Parliamentary legislation giving preferential taxes to the Canadian trades. Timber from the Baltic abruptly dropped to a minimum. Pilots of the west coasts such as Liverpool and Bristol found their incomes rising, just another example of the wild swings and variations of incomes due to political decisions.
A further Act in 1840 covered many aspects of pilotage and continued exemptions from compulsory pilotage to non-British vessels flying the flags of countries having so-called reciprocal treaties with Britain. Several decades later the Board of Trade was to use this provision against British pilots even to the extent of allowing complete falsehoods to be used about exemptions for British-flag vessels in continental ports.
In 1853 an Act of Parliament dissolved the Court of Loadmanage of the Cinque Ports and it effectively became a Trinity House Outport. One of the conditions was that the pilots could retain their licenses which were issued for the district from Dungeness to London Bridge and vice-versa. It was this condition that was to prove so disastrous for the Cinque Port pilots some thirty years later.
At the 1888 Inquiry into Pilotage, it was stated that on the Thames there was
bribery and corruption and that a few pilots had obtained more “choice” work
than they could handle and farmed it out making considerable income in additions
to their ordinary fees. Trinity House seemed to meet the situation with complete inaction.
The Parliamentary Select Committee of 1870
The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 collected all the pilotage laws then in force and re-enacted them into part V. In 1860 ship owners, still affected by the freedom from liability of compulsory piloted vessels, again attacked the principle of compulsory pilotage at the meeting of the Parliamentary Select Committee into Shipping. The Committee recommended its abolition but Parliament took no action. In 1870 the Parliamentary Select Committee again examined pilotage with terms of reference that were much the same as the previous committees. But this was the most comprehensive Inquiry ever with witnesses from all sections of the shipping industry, port authorities and Government Departments. The Deputy Master of Trinity House and the Principal of the Marine Department of the BoT, each spent days explaining the vagaries of the several pilotage systems.
In the decade1871-81 there was great unrest among pilots especially in the Bristol Channel since towards the end of the 1850’s the ports of Cardiff, Newport and Gloucester had begun a campaign to remove the superiority claimed by Bristol Corporation in the matter of pilotage since the 16th century. Their efforts were rewarded in 1861 by the passing of an Act that gave them independence in their own pilotage affairs. This had the effect of disturbing the pilotage income of the Bristol pilots and caused a number of them to move across the Channel to take licenses at Cardiff.
In the last half of the 19th century the UK shipping industry was subject to severe cycles of economic booms and depressions of the British overseas trades. The improvement in steam propulsion bringing larger vessels tended to reduce incomes and bring disorder to working routines and rotas of pilots. But the underlying cause of the pilots’ apprehension was still the clause in the 1812 Pilotage Act relating to the freedom of liability for vessels subject to compulsory pilotage and it was also the cause of about seven major Governmental inquiries into pilotage. This clause can be said to have led indirectly to the formation of the United Kingdom Pilots’ Association.
The Origins of the United
Kingdom Pilots’ Association
It was the situation in the Bristol Channel, particularly at Bristol that brought together all the parties most likely to form a core of a national body since a series of events there as a result of the change in the nature of maritime traffic and trade, in particular a growth of the new South Wales industrial ports. In the 1870’s Samuel Plimsoll, campaigning for increased safety for British ships and seamen, called together a number of interested parties: MPs, shipowners and mariners. Known as the Plimsoll Committee, the secretary was Plimsoll’s brother-in-law Roger Moore, a Bristol toilet-soap manufacturer. One of those consulted by Plimsoll’s Committee was Captain George Cawley, an experienced shipmaster, and part owner of a steamship, who later left the sea to take a post ashore. A few months after being appointed pilot master at Cardiff he had been drawn into a serious dispute between the 84 pilots there and the port management. A channel dredged through notorious banks, the Cefyn-y-wrack shoal, in the approaches to Cardiff docks, silted up. In March 1878 pilot John Howe, refused to take the Royal Minstrel to sea with a draft of 24 ft 8 inches. The dockmaster said that there was 25 ft of water over the shoal at the time. A month later, David Samuel also refused to pilot a ship to sea in similar circumstances. The charterer of both vessels complained that his ships had been neaped and thereby delayed three days. Both pilots were suspended. The Cardiff pilots wanted a strike. But Cawley resigning in disgust, advised the pilots to lobby for support from Plimsoll’s Committee.
Within a month Plimsoll had visited Cardiff, and verified the pilots’ complaints. A few weeks later, he raised the matter in Parliament causing the Board of Trade to ask the Cardiff authorities to explain their actions. There was enough of an outcry for a local inquiry to be set up in 1879 and two seats were subsequently allocated for the pilots on the new Pilotage Board. Across the water the 37 pilots at Bristol were also unhappy about the actions or inactions of their pilotage authority. With 37 apprentices and 74 Westernmen (time-served apprentices), any fall in traffic affected the whole village of Pill – a village of watermen and pilots on the River Avon about a mile from its confluence with the Severn. The traditional working routine could mean a loss of income of disastrous proportions if “choice” (appropriate) pilotage appeared. The pilots did not work a “turn” or “rota” system, but sailed in competition the first pilot to board an incoming vessel normally given the work and he would also claim the outward pilotage. In November 1880, however, a firm of Bristol shipowners, the Great Western Shipping Company, with a very successful line across the North Atlantic, built several larger steam vessels to cope with the trade and resolved to have their own “choice” Bristol pilots. The masters were instructed to take only the pilots displaying the prearranged signal. Three pilots were covertly selected and informed of the date and time of arrival of the ships.
In December the same year one of these “choice” pilots, on the way to sail his cutter from Pill Creek, encountered some 50 women and boys and was tarred and feathered. A week later the Westernmen went on strike – licensed pilots could not. The “choice” pilots tried in vain to get boat- men at Ilfracombe, (some 30 miles down the coast) to take them to a couple of inward-bound ships. Returning to Pill they were blocked from taking their cutter to sea by a chain made fast to a bollard which had been organised by the owner of the local inn, Captain Henry Langdon (then current secretary of the Bristol Pilots’ Association).
At the suggestion of Roger Moore, Tamlin, with Edward Edwards of Cardiff, met representatives of the Bristol Pilots’ Association, Craddy (chairman), Langdon and Joseph Browne at the Waterloo Hotel, Pill. Initially a Bristol Channel Pilots’ Association was envisaged, but those present encompassed pilots from other districts, and they suggested forming a British Association There were favourable responses from all the major pilot districts around the British Coasts. In October 1883 a meeting at Bristol, of representatives from the largest ports decided to form a national body using the services of the Bristol Pilots’ Association. Plimsoll was approached to be chairman, but being heavily involved in Parliament refused and suggested Captain George Cawley.
The Early Years
The Inaugural Conference opened on 11th June 1884 in the Athenæum Hall, Bristol. Supported by a few remarks from Bedford Pim, the 30 delegates from a total of 18 UK ports approved the selection of Captain George Cawley, Lt RNR, as president. Observers from Spain and Denmark also attended. Roger Moore represented the American Pilots’ Association.
Henry Langdon, as Secretary, stated there were 3,168 pilots in the British Isles and in 1883 they piloted 168,418 vessels for an income of £427,532; the association hoped to redress wrongs, repeal bad laws and obtain proper representation.
The subscriptions were agreed at 12 shillings per year. Towards the end of the
Conference, which lasted two days, Cawley reminded the delegates, to be
careful to maintain a watch that no further attack on compulsory pilotage should be made.
The Second Conference was held in London in 1885 with 50 delegates – 20 more than attended the previous year –and representing 28 ports. The Secretary’s report gave the membership as being between 1,200 and 1,300 out of a possible 2,955 licensed pilots many of whom were earning less than £30 per annum.
Liverpool, the venue for the third Conference was in the throes of a severe depression, but its maritime system and connections were unsurpassed in efficiency but not economy. Cawley informed members that just before the Conference, he learned that two Poole pilots had been suspended for six months for attending the previous year’s conference without permission even though their colleagues had carried out the work in their absence. In the following year, 1887, at South Shields the Committee introduced two new officers, JT Board, solicitor and A Northmore Jones, barrister. In future the legal work would be separate from the day-to-day work of the Association. In a debate, Bristol pilots explained that as the average age of their pilots was 54 their pension funds needed supplementing, they were promoting a Parliamentary Bill to amend the local Act. Robert Blair (Tyne) said that the main problem in the Tyne was that 30 of the 161 pilots took two thirds of the gross pilotage income. Again this was due to the effects of “choice” pilotage. At the sixth Conference, in London the members looked back with satisfaction at the development of the UKPA which had been formed to protect the principle of compulsory pilotage, to ensure that pilots had proper representation on pilotage bodies and to maintain a watch on the funds which pilots were expected to contribute to.
The 1889 Pilotage Bill was about to pass through Parliament and each clause was debated with great thoroughness and enthusiasm. Alien pilotage and pilotage exemption certificates were again points of irritation. In another direction many pilots tried to have a clause inserted to make the towage of vessels without pilots illegal. Thus the pattern of the work of the UKPA was set in the first six years. When the Merchant Shipping Act (Pilotage) 1889 came into force the members found that more then half of their wishes had been incorporated in its provisions. The moderate success provided a guide to their future actions. The new Act, however, was not without loopholes.
In the early 1890’s Trinity House came in for strong criticism for its apathy in many respects of pilotage administration.
It was said that their pilots were required to produce certificates from magistrates or
clergymen that they were “well affected to the Sovereign and her Government”, but
a foreign subject could be handed a pilotage certificate at his will.
1895 – 1900
In South Wales, Llanelli pilots were threatened with abolition of compulsory pilotage. Initially they had approached the Association for advice, but an offer of legal aid had not been taken up and, at the Cardiff Conference in 1895, there was a note of discord. Three times the Llanelli representatives were asked in open session to comment. They felt that Mr Northmore Jones could be placed under “social influence” and therefore they felt his services should not be used. Apparently Northmore Jones’ services were taken up a couple of years later, for the Association had fought the challenge to compulsory pilotage at Llanelli and were preparing to ward off yet another attack. In the years immediately before the end of the 19th century incomes were an ever present topic and the Executive Committee were at pains to search every corner to find arguments for the negotiations. In 1898 they suggested that as pilots were also quarantine officers, they should receive an allowance from the State. This idea was to be taken up by their MPs. The passing of the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act, which incorporated the pilotage provisions of the 1889 Act, unfortunately did little for pilots and this was reflected in attendances at conferences which began to decrease even though incomes were declining.
Pilots’ incomes at the turn of the Century pilotage incomes averaged about £300 per annum.
Integrated Bridge Systems
INTEGRATED BRIDGE SYSTEMS
LINK TO THE ORIGINAL ILLUSTRATED PDF MAGAZINE ARTICLE:
pilotmag.co.uk/userfiles/Pilotmag%20277%20(Apr%2004).pdf
With the development of increasingly sophisticated electronic bridge equipment the general trend has been for the various elements to be located around the available space on the bridge rather than in any logical layout. This has usually resulted in good quality equipment being rendered inefficient and impractical to use. It is a sad reflection on the maritime industry that very little notice has ever been taken of the requirements of the end user and new ships continue to be accepted by owners with expensive equipment located in inefficient and inappropriate locations. In response to feedback on this subject, the Nautical Institute hosted a major seminar at the SeaTrade exhibition at the Excel Centre in London’s Docklands in September 2003. Entitled “Integrated Bridge Systems and the Human Element” the seminar sought to bring together the manufacturers, shipping companies and end users with the hope that co-operation between the three could result in the maritime industry finally accepting that rather than being randomly placed on board because it was mandatory to carry it, modern bridge equipment should be an effective enhancement to the safety of a vessel especially if well designed and located! Naturally, pilots are at the front end of the user group and IMPA was an official partner to the seminar. One of the challenges facing Integrated Bridge Systems (IBS) is to accommodate user requirements in different situations. For example the requirements of a pilot are different to those of a watchkeeper away from land and a good system should be effective for all user requirements. The aims of the seminar were:
• Identify best practices for the use and implementation of existing and new technology.
• Identify the training needs associated with the implementation of new equipment for future watchkeeping.
• Document the basic principles of operation and the key issues of concern, for use in industry-wide technical and regulatory committees.
• Explore options for developing a system of user feedback for future design and implementation.
A BRIEF HISTORY
The modern wheelhouse basically originated with the advent of the steamship where for the first time the helmsman and deck officer were brought together into an enclosed space integrating the functions of navigation, steering, engine control and communications in the early years of the twentieth century. The equipment was basic, consisting of a wheel, engine telegraph, communication voice pipes and signal flags and lamps. The navigation area was a separate “chartroom” off the wheelhouse with no forward view. This basic layout survived virtually unchanged until the 1970’s when some radical companies adopted the idea of integrating the chartroom into an enlarged wheelhouse usually behind the helmsman. Some tradition was maintained in that this chartroom space was curtained off from the main wheelhouse at night and was thus still a separate area. I was recently amazed to pilot a six month old 100, 000 tonne tanker which had been built with this traditional layout in a miniscule wheelhouse. It was mainly on the continent that around this time the Germans, Scandinavians and Dutch introduced an open bridge with a logical layout of navigation equipment mainly being driven by the requirements of a sole watchkeeping officer and (officially) a lookout! The French went one stage further and also integrated the engine console into the bridge space. In the 1980’s these same continental operators undertook the most revolutionary step since the installation of bridge window and installed a radical element called a chair for the watchkeeper. Not only that but they also designed a console layout that enabled the watchkeeper to actually sit on the chair and reach essential equipment without getting up. The radar had a motorised foot operated control that enabled it to be lowered out of the line of sight through the bridge window. Concerns that a usually overworked and thus exhausted watchkeeper would fall asleep if he sat down in a comfortable chair were soon realised so a watch alarm arrangement was introduced to keep him awake. On-going groundings have revealed not just the practice of switching these alarms off but also the common practice (quietly endorsed by the shipowner to save overtime costs) of no lookout being posted on the bridge at night as per requirements. Because of this phenomena of an exhausted watchkeeper falling asleep in a chair many companies have refused to fit such a luxury item in their wheelhouse, preferring to rely on the tried and trusted fact that without a chair the watchkeeper will lean on the bridge front and when he falls asleep his head will hit the bridge window and he will wake up!! So, as we progress into the 21st century we find that during the last century there has been very little change in the mindset of the ship owner with respect to the human element looking after his investment. The majority of companies still believe that ships should be manned by the cheapest possible officers using the cheapest and minimum requirement of equipment. The same watchkeeper is expected to operate, and interpret the information from, this equipment with a minimum (or non existent) training in a state of fatigue induced by long and irregular shift patterns
THE EQUIPMENT
When I was an apprentice back in the 1960s radar was still not compulsory on board ships but much discussion was taking place over how it could enhance a vessel’s passage times in reduced visibility and the economic benefits resulted in most companies purchasing them. One factor that was emphasised by the ship board users was that all radars should have standard controls in order that an officer could transfer from any ship to another and immediately be familiar with the controls and functions. Well, as we all know although some key symbols were standardised the layout of the various controls was left to the whim of the manufacturers and as additional functions were introduced the result was a vast array of different control panels many of which defied all logic and lost sight of the requirements of the end user. The ideals of the 1960’s were finally lost altogether when the simple VRM EBL control knobs were replaced by a rollerball frustratingly inefficient to use. Feedback from irate users has now seen this basic function restored but only as a more expensive “optional extra” which is rarely fitted by the ever cost conscious owner! Anyway, having decided to fit a radar, the usual location for this equipment was on the port side of the bridge to balance the location of the engine room telegraph on the starboard side. The other piece of equipment gaining prominence at that time was the VHF set which in the 1970’s rapidly became the preferred mode of intership and port communications finally replacing the Aldis lamp and signal flags. These sets were usually located as far as possible from the radar and telegraph. It is to the shame of our industry that non standard, user unfriendly equipment is now being incorporated into non standard and user unfriendly “integrated” bridge systems!
INTEGRATION
As previously mentioned the reduction in officer manning and an increase in equipment led to a requirement for a certain element of integration and in the 1970’s and 1980’s companies and manufacturers came up with the bridge console. Hence we witnessed the introduction of a long console plonked in the middle of the wheelhouse with engine controls on the right, the autopilot and helm controls in the middle and the radar on the left. The VHF was rarely integrated into this unit being usually placed on the sides of the chartroom enclosure, still located to the rear of the bridge. This layout is still to be found on newbuilds especially on vessels constructed in the far east which despite being at the forefront of microtechnology for domestic equipment rigidly sticks to 1970’s style equipment and layouts even to the extent of encasing modern daylight radars (with a preference for traditional green on black displays which cannot be seen in sunlight) in traditionally styled pale green housings. Yet another of the world’s great unsolved mysteries! Still, from a pilots’ point of view such ships tend to be entirely reliable and predictable and we don’t have to stay on board for long. A variation on the same theme was to place this console right to the front of the bridge under the windows. Again this is still a popular layout with all its associated problems of cleaning the inside of the windows and condensation running down off the windows onto the console equipment. A unique risk associated with this layout was brought home to me when I was second mate. One quiet afternoon in the Mediterranean the engine suddenly coughed and died. Alarms duly rang and engineers were unable to restart it. A process of elimination brought an irate chief engineer to the bridge to confront the concerned Captain as to why the emergency engine stop had been pressed. The Captain turned his ire on me as the watchkeeper who had been innocently keeping a look out and enjoying the sun on the bridge wing. I in turn looked at my dutiful lookout who was still kneeling on top of the console calmly cleaning the inside of the bridge windows. He had accidentally knelt on the main engine emergency stop button!! Fortunately we were well away from land and there was no other shipping around. The console was rapidly modified with a Perspex cover for the emergency stop button!! Despite far too many examples of poor layout, full integration is being realised and the best examples are to be found on ferries and modern N. European and Scandinavian vessels. On these the watchkeeper has all the information and equipment he requires in view or to hand from the armchair which can be slid out of the way when not required. Radar, ECDIS, engine monitoring, autopilot, VHF with a duplicate manning position are all incorporated and the seat is normally set high so that the direct line of sight is over the top of the console with almost an all round view from the conning position. The visual information can therefore be rapidly compared to the “virtual” information from the ECDIS and radar. Brilliant, or is it? Whilst it is a delight to pilot such vessels it is necessary to bend down to adjust controls and there is a danger at night of light pollution from all the screens reducing night vision. The wheelhouse, rather than being in total darkness is often illuminated by soft red lighting. It is all too easy to be lulled into a false sense of security and miss a small light from a badly lit yacht or small vessel not detected by the digitised radar display which is increasingly set to provide a “clean” image with the auto function eliminating all “clutter” which of course in choppy or rainy conditions can also eliminate small targets. The most serious case of integration lulling watchkeepers into a false sense of security was the grounding of the passenger ship Royal Majesty where a failure of the aerial connection to the GPS set resulted in the GPS calculating the position by means of dead reckoning. For a period of 34 hours successive watchkeepers diligently plotted the GPS DR position cosseted in their splendid modern integrated bridge until reality arrived with dramatic but fortunately non fatal disaster. The officers were criticised for over reliance on the automated features of their integrated bridge but the company in turn was criticised for not giving the officers training in integrated bridge operations. Integration was mentioned as a factor in the enquiry but the question needs to be asked would the grounding have occurred with the same officers had a traditional bridge been fitted to the vessel? It is not certain but in my opinion it is probable that without integration the discrepancy between the radar image and GPS positions being obtained would have resulted in concern leading to double checking of the position by separate means. It can be seen from the aforementioned that in reality integration is frequently far removed from the images presented in glossy manufacturers brochures. However, what is of equal concern is that some of those brochures are still unashamedly advertising poor design layouts and I have downloaded an example from the Internet.
THE NI SEMINAR
I was very disappointed that I was unable to be released from my piloting roster to attend this seminar but I have copies of most of the papers presented and the Institute’s own official report issued following the event. The presentations were made by a wide variety of representatives from the maritime sector including those concerned with the technical aspects of integrating and licensing of new equipment. Running to a vast number of pages the papers paint a very revealing image of the current state of the process along with many personal opinions and recommendations but the basic message is that since the technology exists it should be placed on board ships and integrated into a format that provides the primary information required in a manner that is easily assimilated by the watchkeeper. All the contributors were unanimous in the opinion that any data produced by equipment was useless unless the recipient had received comprehensive training in its interpretation and application. So, we are not talking about rocket science here! What we are dealing with is forcing often reluctant ship owners to invest not just in the equipment but also in the “human element” and that is proving to be a major stumbling block. IMO have made great progress in gaining basic agreement on the principles of integration and the new SOLAS Chapter V provides best practice guidelines for wheelhouse layout and equipment specifications. The problem with the IMO is that progress is painfully slow since it relies on full agreement of all members with all the varied interests that this entails. However, the process does work but a prime example of the problems is provided by the introduction of AIS and its installation and use on board ships. Wisdom originally perceived that the installation of a new and relatively untested technology should be gradually introduced over a period of several years. The USA, having decided that AIS would be a valuable tool in the “war against terror” managed to accelerate the implementation time and it will be now compulsory for all vessels over 300 grt to be fitted with AIS by the end of this year. AIS is now appearing on an increasing number of vessels but how is it being integrated? The answer is not at all. Although there are many companies offering full integration of AIS into ECDIS and radar displays over 80% of owners are opting to fit the minimum requirement of an alpha numeric unit similar in size and design to a GPS unit and these have been condemned as useless for any purpose for which AIS is designed. I have dealt with these AIS problems in detail in previous issues and they are available on my website at www. pilotmag.co.uk. As for the ships’ watchkeepers the overwhelming majority have not received any information or training in their use. The primary use of AIS by watchkeepers in my experience is to identify other vessels and contacting them by VHF either to confirm or contravene the COLREGS! The other main usage is to send text messages to other ships. Both of these uses contravene good bridge practice and the general consensus is that there will be a major AIS assisted collision being investigated in the near future! There is however one valuable aspect of shipboard AIS and that is the provision of a standard pilot plug demanded by IMPA which enables a pilot to plug into the unit and use the data on his portable pilot unit if his port uses it. This facility is a great step forward and it is a credit to IMPA that they have managed to make the provision of this plug a compulsory part of the specification. The down side of this feature is that the information is dependent upon the ship’s AIS being correctly installed and calibrated since any defects on the vessel’s AIS will also be suffered by the pilot user.
THE SEMINAR REPORT
The Nautical Institute’s report following the seminar contains submissions from those who presented papers and the conclusion drawn from these are that there is some very high quality equipment available but that its integration into the bridge is frequently haphazard and with a vast difference between the methods of extracting the required information much of the required information is not always presented to the end user in a clear format. This of course confirms what users would have reported had they been fully consulted by owners and their requirements passed on to the manufacturers as happens in the rest of the transport industry! These shortfalls are being gradually addressed. The IMO working group 13 is tasked with examining the presentation of navigation related information with a view to removing current inconsistencies and with developing a new generation of composite navigation display that integrates information derived from two or more systems. There is also a requirement to clarify the difference between an Integrated Navigation System (INS) and an Integrated Bridge System (IBS) since both terms are currently loosely applied. The suggested clarification by a manufacturer was:
• INS is a system that integrates information from several navigational aids
• IBS integrates information from a variety if different shipboard data sources.
This may include passage execution but only if combined with an INS. The integration of information should:
• Use all available sources
• Automatically verify the validity and integrity of data
• Ensure fail-safe redundancy
• Support unambiguous situation awareness
• Automatically provide (and prioritise) alarms for arising hazards
• Be user friendly.
The users’ requirements were detailed by a ship owner representative who identified a need for intelligent systems that would be pro-active in alerting a watchkeeper that the vessel was running into danger. In recognition that a watchkeeper is unable to perform multiple tasks when under pressure the alarms should be prioritised to a “need to know” sequence. I suppose an example of this would be that if an anti collision warning was sounding then other distractions such as engine alarms or the telephone ring would be suppressed until the watchkeeper had acknowledged this alarm. In general the opinions of those attending the seminar can be summarised by concerns being expressed that too much information can be counter productive and a vast array of screens will detract from the ideal of looking out of the window and thus obtaining an overall situational awareness. The standardisation of control systems was considered to be a necessity with users being faced with, keyboards, joysticks, trackballs, menus etc. but history suggests that this is probably a utopian dream! The functions essential for navigation are not always logically available and equipment is often embellished by the manufacturer to present the minimum requirement in the best commercial light. Equipment should be simple to use and understand with essential basic safety information readily available. There was unanimous agreement that training in the use of complex systems was essential but sadly lacking. A few top companies did ensure that all their officers were sent on training courses and given familiarisation time on “hand-over” but these were the exception.
CONCLUSIONS
This seminar served to highlight the fact that information is currently provided to a watchkeeper in a generally inefficient, non prioritised manner from an array of badly laid out equipment. The most serious consequence of this is that there is evidence that such equipment is reducing safety on navigation. A recent press report on accident trends by a leading PI Club stated “…recent reports on several collisions and casualties suggest that computerisation of bridges (integrated bridges, GPS, ECDIS etc) may have been one of the contributing underlying causes.” The PI club points to numerous recent examples whereby mariners have made expensive and even tragic mistakes despite having been provided with all this technology. Investigations indicated that the “humantechnology” interface revealed many shortcomings. The report concluded that “evidence suggests that despite improvements in technology and of training through various STCW conventions, the majority of collisions continue to occur due to a failure of the bridge team to follow simple principles of bridge watchkeeping and violations of the collision regulations.” This leads neatly to the common sense viewpoint made by our own Geoff Taylor to the seminar in the following (slightly edited) presentation which all pilots will fully endorse. “In a previous paper to the first of these seminars, I made reference to the Transitorless Flat Panel Display Screen or Bridge Window! In all that we have spoken of let us not throw away the natural tools we have at hand. On the ship’s bridge there remains the basic IBS/INS consisting of the mark one eyeball and the afore-mentioned bridge window and integrating their transmitted images uses the most sophisticated and versatile computer known to man, the human brain. These though simple and long available tools must not be discarded or even put to one side for all of the perceived benefits of technology. The harnessing through proper training and hard earned experience of hi-tech equipment to generate clearly defined and easily used decision support information will give us all a safer and better future. It is essential in our profession to bear in mind at all times that the tools we use to perform our tasks are decision support systems and NOT decision makers in themselves We should all welcome IBS/INS for the joined up process of support it can offer but it should never be forgotten that the decisions arrived at can and must continue to be accessed through the time honoured practice of good seamanship supported by the exercise of sound judgment”. Sums it all up really!
JCB
The IMO have produced a full set of guidelines for bridge layout in MSC circular 982. Running to 33 pages it is available for download in pdf format from the IMO website page 106 -112 on the MSC section or the direct link ( if you are an accurate copier!!) is: http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D1878/982.pdf
116th Annual Conference
116th UKMPA ANNUAL CONFERENCE
Crown Plaza Hotel,
I have noticed many members, who do not attend the annual conference, do not fully realise what goes on unless they read the detailed minutes which, as the one who writes them, I fully appreciate does require some stamina to fully digest! Whereas I do not intend to return to the old Pilot magazine format of filling most of the year’s content with conference proceedings, it is a very important part of our organisation’s activities and a forum for pilots to debate the varied issues affecting districts around the country. Equally importantly the conference is a social event where pilots can get together and swing the lantern!
The 2003 Conference was hosted by the
The conference was opened by the UKMPA PRESIDENT: Lord
Agenda Items discussed reveal the full extent of the valuable work undertaken by pilots and members of the Section Committee on behalf of members. This work is unpaid and mostly undertaken in their spare time. The following is a list of topics along with those involved in them.
RETIRING CHAIRMAN:
Norman McKinney (
PNPF: Richard Williamson (
PNCP: Mike Kitchen (
TREASURER: John Pretswell, (
UKMPA RULES: John Pretswell
INSURANCES: John Pretswell
IMPA: Geoff Taylor (Tees & Vice
Chairman of IMPA)
LES CATE: (Incoming Chairman, Vice President EMPA,
MAIB: (Les Cate)
ITF: (Les Cate)
TECHNICAL & TRAINING: John Wright (Tees )
In addition to the above presentations given by pilots, the following are brief notes on topics given by associated speakers:
T&G LEGAL: Fergus Whitty, (T&G Legal Director)
WORKING TIME DIRECTIVE AND PILOTS
This had come into force for pilots in August 2003 and was basically a Health & Safety directive designed to ensure that all workers, regardless of whether they were employed or self employed, received adequate rest. Although not contained within a specific group pilots were included under what is termed the Horizontal Amending Directive (HAD).
The directive lays down the following basic criteria for safe working / rest:
· Max 48 hour week
· 20 minute break every 6 hours of work
· 11 hours uninterrupted rest between each working day
· 1 day off per week
Fergus warned that such criteria would be likely to trigger unscrupulous employers to attempt to pressurise workers into waiving their rights under the WTD and advised delegates of some of the ploys that may be used such as re-defining “working time”, advising workers that they needed to sign “opt out” agreements, offering a new “collective agreement” and above all withholding information on “compensatory rest”. The current “opt out” rules permitted individual workers to elect to work over the 48 hour limit but there was no opt out from the night work provisions, 4 weeks annual holiday or the daily and weekly rest periods.
Fergus then went on to define “Working Time” and of particular relevance to pilots is an interpretation made by the European Court of Justice which has clarified the situation for workers on-call. Basically if a worker is at his place of work he is officially “working” even if only on stand by and that definition applies even if he has facilities for rest.
If a worker is on stand by at home or “comparatively free” away from his work place then this is not counted as “working time”.
Employers cannot designate periods of inactivity at work as “rest breaks”.
Fergus then defined “night work” and stated that of relevance to pilots there was an absolute limit of 8 hours for “night work” if the “work involves special hazards … or mental strain”.
Again if any of the provisions of the night work regulations are set aside then adequate “compensatory rest” must be provided.
To summarise the situation for pilots Fergus warned delegates to be aware that employers may use the directive to introduce changes to established practices but pilots’ had powerful negotiating tools by means of the negotiated agreement and the “compensatory rest” provisions. In the subsequent Q&A session the main questions revolved around work patterns in different districts. In the opinion of Fergus, any established roster systems would be compliant so long as both the port and pilots were agreed that they were safe and any breaches of the criteria were covered by “compensatory rest”. He did however warn delegates that if a district were subject to an outside audit then recommendations could be made to review breaches.
LEGAL: Michael Nott (UKMPA retained legal advisor)
During the past year Michael had been involved with matters in the following ports:
Wisbech
1987 PILOTAGE ACT
MN was of the opinion that there was now an urgent need to address the shortcomings of this Act. Since an Act of Parliament could only be changed by another Act, MN was of the opinion that there was now an urgent need for this to be undertaken. The wheels could be set in motion by a Private Members Bill and Lord
Q&A
In the subsequent discussions Michael detailed the process for a Bill to become law but noting that it was a very slow process which would involve a lot of work for Section committee and Fergus Whitty. Other questions referred to the rights to self employment under clause 4 with several districts having received varying legal interpretations. MN was of the opinion that C4 offered no protection and needed to be amended.
Graham Hutchinson (
GUEST SPEAKERS: In addition to the above speakers the conference welcomed guest speakers:
NICK CUTMORE: (Secretary General of IMPA)
Nick explained the following areas where IMPA had been active:
· Working with the IMO on a revision of resolution A485.
· The joint EMPA / IMPA safety campaign which had had quite an impact on the ship owners and the IMO. There was considerable concern at the high level of defects and failures that pilots encounter on a regular basis.
· Work was on-going with the shipping industry on bitt failures and AIS reliability.
Such involvement raised the profile of pilots as professionals with valuable relevant experience especially within IMO. Nick was pleased to announce that IMPA membership was growing the finances were sound and he hoped to see UKMPA members at the IMPA conference 2004 in
MIKE POWELL: Director, Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting Programme
(CHIRP) Director Mike Powell provided an overview of the CHIRP initiative which was based on the aviation industry model. The idea was that any individual could confidentially raise issues of concern to an independent reporting body who would then bring it to the attention of the regulators and management with the original reporter remaining anonymous. Whereas the MCA and MAIB were regulatory and investigative bodies, who were generally reactive to incidents, it was intended that CHIRP should underpin those organisations by providing the “precursor” information from those working within the industry who were best placed to identify potentially dangerous / disastrous situations. CHIRP was therefore interested in gaining information on bad practices and minor incidents which may lead to major incidents. The anonymity of any reporter was guaranteed.
Mike then detailed the status of CHIRP as a charitable, non profit making trust with an executive board of trustees who provided the governance. The organisation had a three year contract funded by the DfT but no one from the DfT sat on the board. Members of this executive board consisted of members from the MCA, OCIMF, NI and aviation industry experts. There is also an advisory board made up from various maritime experts which was still being finalised and Les Cate had accepted an invitation to join this board. The advisory panel would collate reports and would be largely responsible for deciding what action should be taken over the reports and would monitor the effectiveness of the response and CHIRP itself. The organisation would also have a small permanent staff who would be the only ones who would know the identity of the reporter.
The reporting programme would cover all sectors of the maritime community from serving mariners on both domestic and foreign ships along with other sectors including, ports, classification societies, charterers and insurers through to equipment manufacturers and installers.
When and what do you report?
· When you wish others to be made aware of a situation
· When other reporting procedures do not work or are not available
· All other avenues have been exhausted
The procedure for dealing with a report involved:
· Report received
· CHIRP contacts reporter. This initial contact would continue until the reporter was confident that the process would protect their identity. This process in the aviation industry had meant that not one reporter had ever been identified in 21 years of operation.
· The report is then sent to the organisation concerned
· Organisation responds
· Response transmitted to reporter
· Process repeated as required to satisfaction of reporter / organisation. This process ensures malicious reporting is eliminated.
· Action to be taken over report discussed and agreed to achieve most positive result
· Reporter advised of outcome
· Assess outcome to ensure that it’s been effective.
· At the close of the process the only document referring to the identity of the reporter is returned and no records of that reporter are kept in any manner within CHIRP.
· The storage technique of data within CHIRP ensures that no examination of a collection of reports could identify any reporter.
The main questions from delegates raised concerns over confidentiality and anonymity of the reporter to which Mike detailed the protection methodology.
TONY WOODLEY: General Secretary T&G
Guest speaker Tony Woodley, in a passionate presentation, explained to delegates that although new to the position as General Secretary the key issues to be faced in the future were old ones and in particular employment legislation and pensions. He expressed frustration with the current erosion of rights and a genuine desire to right many of the wrongs that had been inflicted upon workers and he saw it as his duty to try to deliver more protection for jobs, workers rights and pensions. The fight against bad employers and legislation that supported bad employers were key areas where he
intended to focus his efforts and there was an urgent need to fight for the legal rights of the work force.
TW then quoted several recent cases highlighting current abuses of employees which had exposed existing legislation as inadequate. The existing laws resulted in workers paying the price for Globalisation and supported the rights of shareholders over those of the workforce. Whilst on one hand the Government was signing up to much EU legislation they had consistently refused to sign up to EU employment legislation and the recently passed
Turning to pensions TW was firmly of the opinion that the existing pension regime needed to be reformed. Restoring a link between RPI and pensions was essential for pensioners and the £6 billion required to restore the link could be found if the Government could be persuaded of the political advantages. Recent Governments had not just ignored the State pension sector. During recent years 65% of occupational pension final salary schemes had been terminated or closed to new entrants by employers. These employers pleaded hard times but during the 15 years of good times of surpluses they had robbed funds of £19 billion with pension holidays and the Government, which now claimed it was powerless to act, had also robbed the funds by introducing taxes on fund surpluses. The action of closing funds to new members had introduced new problems in that with no new members the pension funds were not receiving new money to support them and the workforce now had differing terms and conditions. Unless the
Tony reassure delegates that he was not a militant but was frustrated at the lack of
focus of unions in tackling the core injustices in the workplace and of facing demoralised work forces. Prior to becoming General Secretary he had worked with the government and had achieved recognition on key points and obtained money to keep factories open and was proud that many of these were now operating profitably. It was this spirit that motivated him to keep on educating whatever Government was in power to the advantages of providing workers with the rights they deserved. TW was encouraged by the large interest and commitment to fighting for rights shown by the UKMPA by the presence of so many delegates at the conference. It was that commitment that he was determined to revive in other sectors around the country in order to generate confidence to use Union membership to improve conditions for all.
LOUISE ELLMAN MP: (Liverpool Riverside)
& Member of the Transport Select Committee (TSC).
Norman McKinney introduced Louise Ellman MP who had kindly agreed to address the conference at the invitation of the
Louise opened her speech by acknowledging that since becoming an MP she had become aware of how little people knew about how Government worked and the role that MPs undertook. Likewise, since becoming a member of the TSC she in turn had become aware of many aspects of transportation that previously had been outside her sphere of knowledge. Pilots and pilotage had been such a case and she regretted the fact that there was such a low public awareness of the critical role that pilots played in the safety of shipping. Interest in shipping was only aroused for the wrong reasons following a disaster. Through meetings with the Liverpool pilots she had been made aware of the critical role that pilots played in the safety of shipping and consequently the economic development & prosperity of
Underlying all of this was the need to ensure the safety of shipping and in this pilots were the key element.
Louise concluded by emphasising that she was aware of the many issues being debated at this conference and many of the problems being faced by the UKMPA and she was willing to be fully involved in helping pilots in any manner that she was able and in particular in maintaining professional standards.
LES CATE addressed the Conference as the new Chairman:
Following his election as new chairman, Les addressed the conference by paying tribute to Norman McKinney reminding the delegates of all the issues that Norman had dealt with and concluded by wishing
The sentiment was supported by the
assembled delegates who provided
The above resume of the conference is a very skeletal account of the proceedings. Some pilots have questioned as to what their subscription provides. I would urge those doubters to take the time to read the conference minutes along with the reports included in the agenda papers. The defeat of the EU ports directive is just one example of where the UKMPA has had an effect which even alone would be worth the subscription. The dedication of those committed to fighting for all our rights not only deserves recognition but the full support of all pilots. It is acknowledged that the subscription can seem large to pilots from a small port but it is no coincidence that the UKMPA is the first organisation that pilots from such ports turn to when their future is under threat. Michael Nott’s report reveals how the UKMPA has achieved successful resolutions to problems in such ports.
AIS Update
AIS UPDATE
As you aware I have been following the development and implementation of AIS with close interest and the units have been compulsory on new builds since July 2003 and on tankers during their first safety equipment survey following that date. This year will see a flurry of fitting to all vessels over 300grt prior to the December 2004 deadline. This rapid implementation of new and relatively untried technology represents the fastest introduction of a compulsory system ever to pass through the IMO and voices of caution have largely been ignored.
A Peculiar Problem!
In my previous articles (viewable on my website www.pilotmag.co.uk) I identified areas which I felt may cause problems in the future and some of these such as correlation of AIS and radar targets due to differing propagation media are becoming apparent, leading to software problems on integrated systems. One problem that I hadn’t envisaged, which was reported in a major feature in Fairplay magazine in September, was that the US Coast Guard (USCG) were currently not authorised to use one of the AIS channels (87) because that frequency had previously been sold off in a auction to a private company, MariTEL. At that time there was a stalemate in negotiations with MariTel who were requesting around $200 million in compensation for closing down their CH87 coastal infrastructure which was being developed to permit internet accessibility for small craft. The USCG, having insufficient funds to repurchase the frequency at that price were apparently accusing MariTEL of being unpatriotic! Intriguingly that article indicated that the matter was set to be resolved by the US Federal Communications Commission last November in an attempt to avoid lengthy and costly litigation. At the time of going to press the latest news is that the matter has not been resolved. MariTel have increased their compensation claim to $270 million and the case is heading to the courts!
The War on Terror?
Reflecting some of my own concerns there are some senior figures in the Maritime world now questioning the suitability of an open frequency AIS in a world on a heightened terrorist alert. It is widely acknowledged that with the vastly increased security in the airline industry, the next major terrorist attack could involve merchant shipping. The availability of vessels’ identities, tracking and cargo data to any person equipped with an AIS unit creates the potential to produce the very nightmare scenario that the US authorities are so desperately trying to avoid.
User Survey
Despite the recent introduction of AIS the Tees and Southampton pilots undertook a survey in July for presentation at the AIS Seminar hosted by the Nautical Institute last September. The complete results of this survey are on the magazine website (www.pilotmag.co.uk) but the basic findings were that shipowners are wary of large investment in the technology until they have had a chance to monitor its effectiveness. The Tees / Southampton survey revealed integration as per the following pie chart.
As to Masters’ and watch keepers views 84% were positive but the perceived usefulness of the equipment was in the identification of other shipping in order to establish VHF contact!
The survey also confirmed my own observations that no Master or officer has received any formal training in the use and function of AIS but 42% of the survey’s respondents had considered the instruction manual and installation technician’s information sufficient.
Feedback Required
In a separate and unique initiative being coordinated by the Nautical Institute, the
manufacturers of AIS units, in recognition of the embryonic nature of AIS, are seeking feedback from mariners in order to identify any unforeseen technical problems to enable them to improve performance in future units. Pilots are amongst the best placed to identify shortcomings on the large variety of ships that they serve and by the nature of their operating in congested waters and in close proximity to other vessels. This is a rare chance for pilots to enhance their professional reputations and influence the development of technology. Participation is important and reports should be sent via the dedicated “AIS Forum” section of the NI website at:
AIS and VTS – Is the pilots’ message finally getting through?
As you are aware I have been following the developments of AIS closely in our magazine, not least because there are many promoters of AIS who have made no secret of the “ideal” that it will eventually become the platform for so called “Remote Pilotage” from VTS centres. This is despite increasing evidence that AIS is not the perfect tracking system originally anticipated. Our hard working Section Committee, in co-operation with EMPA and IMPA have possibly managed to kill off the contradictive term “remote pilotage” but other interests have sought to revive the concept under such headings as “Sea Traffic Controller” or “Enhanced Navigational Assistance”! Again, pilots attending the various seminars and conferences have generally managed to convince Brussels that VTS is incapable of being used to take over the “conduct” of vessels in port approaches and pilotage is being seen as an enhancement to safety in sensitive coastal waters. In particular EU officials are increasingly tending to support the concept of compulsory pilotage in waterways adjacent to Sights of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI). Such moves are obviously generating fierce opposition lobbying from ship owners, especially on the short sea trade sector. At this point it is relevant to mention that some pilots, who do not bother too much about what goes on outside their own district, question the cost of UKMPA membership (less than one tankfull of petrol per month!) and the answer is that much of it goes into representations to counter this anti pilot lobbying, which is often made by those in ignorance of what a pilot actually does. Such representations are not futile as some defeatists feel and it is frequently the case that when a pilot stands up and spells out how things actually are in the real world of commercial shipping they gradually win converts. Any committee member will tell you that when they get up in a room full of “suits” and state that yesterday they were actually on board a ship it will usually grab the attention of the attendees since pilots are often the only serving mariners present. Bearing in mind that these members are usually attending in their spare time the results in relation to expenditure are remarkable value! One highly influential person who has become a firm supporter of pilots and their skills is Michael Grey from Lloyds List who has written several articles supporting pilots and explaining their value. This brings me neatly back to the topic of VTS and AIS since this was recently the subject of an excellent article by Michael Grey in his Viewpoint column. Referring to the proponents of AIS he questions their enthusiasm in no uncertain terms. The following is an edited extract from his article which puts forward the common sense view. “Put in simple terms, it is the advent of AIS which has caused such a focus on getting the pilot off the bridge of a ship and into the air-conditioned ambience of the Vessel Traffic System tower. “Shore-based pilotage” it is termed, although (in that the process is divided between ship and VTS) it is, strictly speaking, neither shore based, nor pilotage. But if every ship on the VTS screen is going to be pleasingly identifiable to the “controller” watching it, that is a major breakthrough. That, at least in theory, would enable the person in the tower to rap out “Ship A – hard a starboard and slow ahead”, with a confidence that has been hitherto impossible. In the old days, our controller might have been speaking with such authority to a lump of floating debris bobbing in the tide, or to the fairway buoy. Thus, so this argument develops, pilotage can be centralised into the VTS tower and a lot of bolshie pilots and expensive pilot boats, not to mention a helicopter or two, can be paid off. Do these enthusiasts really understand what a pilot actually does, both in terms of the local knowledge that he brings with him, and the ship handling expertise which is only really vouchsafed to people who drive ferries and regular traders? How is marine safety being enhanced, when an exhausted shipmaster, who has spent the previous umpteen hours glued to a radar, when he was not thinking about all the paperwork he has neglected, finds he is required to undertake his own pilotage, helped by a remote (if friendly) voice over the VHF, who has prefaced any remarks with a clause politely declining any liability for advice given? How can anyone, other than a pilot on the spot, realise that the man at the wheel barely knows the difference between port and starboard, and the third mate, speaking no language known to mankind, nods vigorously when he means “no”? In an era of massive liabilities and total intolerance of any form of error, are we really ready for an “advance” which is so far a step backwards that it represents a major threat to marine safety? Forget about pilots’ jobs, or a new career of “sea traffic controller”. Professional mariners should unite and reject something which is fundamentally so potentially dangerous”. Reinforcing those arguments, a recent article in the BIMCO magazine also questioned the rush to embrace the utopian dream of VTS control of shipping via the platform of AIS. The following extract again serves to support the pilots’ arguments: “It might be a good idea in theory, but to both pilots and to hard pressed shipmasters who are not as over the moon at undertaking their own pilotage and ship handling as some might suggest, there remain plenty of unanswered questions. Once again it is a case of equipment manufacturers running the agenda, persuading owners that they have the answers to questions that are actually beyond technical problems. In the case of a fine day, in a simple pilotage with a small amount of traffic and a Master very confident in his own ship handling abilities and a competent bridge team, shore-based pilotage might possibly work. But with the same ship, on a filthy night with poor visibility and a man short on the bridge, the Master might greatly welcome the proximity of a competent pilot on the bridge. The pilot, after all, is an expert in this particular port and unlike a shipmaster of a deep sea ship, who rarely manoeuvres his ship, ship handling is the pilot’s speciality. Pilots cost money, and owners wish it was rather less, but shipmasters are exceedingly put upon, with practically every week bringing some new extension to their manifold duties. The use of a competent pilot does not mean that the Master can forget his own role, rather that he is enabled to operate with a slightly reduced burden. The absence of a pilot, with a large ship swinging off a quay, with tugs in attendance and unpredictable tidal effects, can be the preliminary to an expensive mistake, with plates damaged and quay squashed. Sure, pilots make mistakes, too, but they will usually make them less frequently. There is a certain air of the “One Man Bridge Operation” syndrome about the concept of shore-based pilotage. The equipment manufacturers say it is OK, so it must be. It is worth remembering that equipment manufacturers speak with forked tongues, driven by the need to sell their equipment. It is also well worth asking the port management proposing this interesting new facility of shore based pilotage, whether the port will be carrying the entire liability for any accident that may occur in pilotage waters.” These excellent articles are both based on professional awareness and sound common sense. Your elected representatives at the UKMPA are making such arguments on our behalf at every opportunity, so next time you wonder where your subscription goes you should remember these articles.
JCB
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