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Features
AIS Update
Automatic Identification System (AIS)
TRANSPONDER UPDATE
To read the original illustrated article click here
It is now just over one year since AIS became mandatory for all SOLAS vessel over 300 grt and although I must admit that my prediction that the system would have difficulty in coping with the amount f traffic in port areas has been largely proven wrong there are increasing cases of ships’ units failing in a variety of functions. Read the rest of this entry »
Stolt Aspiration / Thorngarth
MT STOLT ASPIRATION / TUG THORNGARTH
MAIB REPORT
Link to the original illustrated articlae (page 10):
A consequence of changes to traditional tug operations has introduced new challenges for both tug masters and pilots. Read the rest of this entry »
118th Conference 2005
Conference 2005
The 118th Annual conference was hosted jointly by
PNPF:
Richard Williamson, Boston
Following the now standard practice of holding a pre-conference pensions session Richard provided delegates with an overview of the PNPF activities since the 2004 conference. The primary change had been that there was now a requirement for trustees to be formally trained and this training requirement was being enhanced all the time.
The rest of Richard’s report was mainly based on the written report circulated to delegates and he covered the following topics:
PNPF Trust Company
Changes to Personnel
Membership: There had been a large reduction in retirements following a tightening of the ill health retirement rules which had brought them into line with industry norms. This had benefited the fund.
Review of the Equity Market
Investments and returns
Fund Value
Triennial Valuation
Having explained all the above with respect to the fund, Richard explained that although under the old Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) the fund was fully funded, the triennial valuation now used a range of different parameters and this had indicated an on-going deficit. The PNPF was addressing this by:
Raising the retirement age from 60-65 (rather than raise contributions).
Adjusting the investment strategy which had resulted in 10% of the fund being invested in a “Hedge” fund managed by Goldman Sachs.
Had held discussions with the fund’s “Participating Bodies” and the UKMPA as to how to deal with the deficit.
Richard concluded his report by providing delegates with an explanation of Hedge funds and reassured the delegates that he was personally convinced that the fund would continue to provide on-going pensions to members.
OPENING SPEECH:
Michael Grey , Lloyd’s List
UKMPA Chairman Les Cate formally opened the conference and delegates observed one minute’s silence in memory of EMPA President Gianfranco Gasperini, IMPA President Hein Merhkens and past UKMPA president Sir James Callaghan, all of whom had died during the past year.
Michael went on to express the concern that over zealous officials, the blame culture and the lack of respect shown to professionals such as Masters and pilots was causing young recruits to abandon a career at sea in an industry already suffering from an acute shortage of skilled professionals. He personally felt that the hope that technology would provide a solution was misguided since there was no alternative to “hands-on” experienced professionals although it was essential that pilots adopted and were trained in the use of any technology that would enhance safety.
Michael then formally opened the conference to warm applause from the delegates.
BUDGET REPORT AND FINANCIAL STATEMENT:
Treasurer: John Pretswell (Forth )
John opened by detailing the membership which currently stood at 486.
These figures represented a reduction of 7 since 2004. He then detailed the income and expenditure items for 2005 from which he had drawn up the budget proposals for 2006. Questions were asked about the legal expenditure which were passed to the Chairman who explained which elements had been funded by the T&G and which matters were being dealt with by the UKMPA through Blake Lapthorn Linnel (BLL) and Barrie Youde and he also explained the reason why the three different legal teams were engaged on the issues currently being dealt with.
DfT:
Phil Carey, Head of Ports Division
EU DIRECTIVE: The UK Government had not welcomed the return of this Directive since in many ways it was a worse document than the earlier version that had been rejected in 2003.
PORTS POLICY REVIEW: This would be
getting under way early in 2006. The last policy review in 2000 acknowledged the principle of a market led port industry with the Government as regulator but the DfT needed to respond to new developments such as the reclassification of trust ports and the large increase in container movements. Small ports could be supported as part of local regeneration or, if no longer handling trade could be better used for redevelopment. The review would not commence until the outstanding container terminal planning applications had been dealt with early in 2006. Once the review commenced the UKMPA would be fully involved with the consultation in particular with respect to safety and security issues. SECURITY: This was a separate issue with which the department was involved by ensuring that ports were up to date with security issues.
SAFETY: The
INCIDENT MANAGEMENT: This was
another area of policy which was being dealt with by the Department following MAIB reports and procedures were being drawn up based on MAIB recommendations.
CHIRP: The DfT had confirmed funding for CHIRP for a further three years.
PILOTAGE: Two general items were outstanding and these were pilot boarding and the Working Time Directive.
NOS: The new shipping Minister, Dr. Stephen Ladyman was actively supporting the maritime sector and promoting standards for shipping and the skills agenda.
PORT SAFETY BILL: Further to this the DfT were continuing to press for Parliamentary time to amend the Pilotage Act and to underpin the PMSC.
During the subsequent Q&A session
MCA, MAIB & IMO:
Don Cockrill (London
Don expressed frustration that after all the work on the PMSC, the only action taken in support of the Code by the DfT and MCA had been to produce the requirement for the CHA’s to submit a “Statement of Compliance” and it remained to be seen as to whether or not even this would result in improved compliance. From the experience of the areas in which he wasm involved Don was of the opinion that there was a deliberate policy of excluding pilots from the policy discussions by the ports and shipping industries.
Due to a shortage of time Don referred delegates to the written reports contained within the delegates conference pack.
LEGAL:
Fergus Whitty, Legal Director T&G
The theme for this year’s address to conference by Fergus Whitty was Age Discrimination, which was to be subject of the “Employment Equality Regulations” to be implemented in October 2006. After October 2006 any discrimination based on age would only be acceptable if it was justified and certain criteria and case histories for this were explained to the delegates.
Employers would in future have to specify a “Normal Retirement Age” (NRA) and there were procedures to be followed by both employers and employees with respect to this. The employer had to explain to an employee that they had the right to request to continue working after the NRA and once the new legislation was implemented the employee would have a right to “request” to stay on after the NRA and the employer would have a legal “duty to consider” such requests.
Q&A: In the ensuing Q&A session Fergus defined NRA as that determined by the employers pension fund. Also the legislation would not normally affect those pilots who were self employed unless they were operating under a contract to supply the service where advice would need to be sought.
Fergus also provided clarification over specifying age limits for certain jobs which used to be a common factor of pilotage.
This would be very difficult and if felt
necessary then the policy would need to
comply with the “justification”
requirements.
A point was made by Chris Hughes
(Europilots) concerning the fact that although self employed the conditions of his authorisation by Trinity House stated a maximum age of 67. How would the legislation affect this?
Fergus agreed that this was a very valid point which he would seek to clarify since the legislation would not appear to cover such an anomaly.
IMPA:
Nick Cutmore (Secretary IMPA)
Nick presented the report on behalf of Geoff Taylor who was unable to present the report in person due to illness.
Geoff’s report opened by paying tribute to Hein Mehrkens who had sadly died during 2005. As Senior Vice President Geoff had been nominated as Acting President to serve out the remaining term of Hein’s Presidency to November 2006 and he had been honoured to accept this. Two key issues which IMPA were currently involved in were the EU Ports directive and also the ESMARALDA project which once again meant that arguments previously used in questioning bodies such as IALA over “Remote pilotage” would need to be revived to challenge the new phraseology of “remote access”.
The matter of compulsory pilotage in the Torres Straits had caused some dilemma for IMPA in that the administration of the proposed pilotage service would be using competitive pilotage services which was against IMPA principles. Negotiations with
IMPA had achieved a success in formally removing references to shore based pilotage from the IALA VTS manual. Geoff was pleased to report that IMPA membership was continuing to grow and it now had over 8,000 members. The finances were in good order but costs were high and pilots should all recognise that especially at IMO the IMPA representatives were dealing with many from the highest level of member Governments and were often pitched against other vested interests with very large budgets!
During the last year IMPA had had meetings with three different P&I Clubs and these had been very constructive for both sides. The Congress of Canadian pilots had been well attended by many influential international representatives.
TECHNICAL & TRAINING, ECTS,
MarNIS
An updated report is on p.9
PRESIDENT’S ADDRESS:
Lord Tony Berkeley
President Lord
LEGAL:
Mark Foden, Blake Lapthorn Linnell (BLL)
Mark detailed the work undertaken by BLL on behalf of pilots during 2005. This included reviewing contracts for both employed and self employed pilots, unfair dismissal and with the
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY
Section 22(1) of the 1987 Pilotage Act had provided valuable protection for pilots and had thus kept the number of claims against them low. This legal protection was now being challenged and Mark was of the opinion that it was only a matter of time before a test case claim was made against an individual pilot. This section of the Act just covers civil liability for negligence but not criminal misconduct which is covered under Section 21.
In the case of a negligence claim against a pilot although 22(1) provides a maximum personal financial liability of £1000 the pilot would also be likely to have his authorisation suspended or removed and he would then be responsible for his own legal defence costs in fighting the suspension and potentially the costs of the claimant. The limitation also only applies when a pilot is undertaking his duties as a pilot. It does NOT apply to criminal cases which may be brought following an incident under the other Acts such as the Water Resources Act or if manslaughter charges are brought following a fatality in which a pilot may be implicated. It was for this reason that Mark was of the opinion that pilots needed to ensure that they had adequate insurance cover.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE 1987 PILOTAGE ACT:
Joe Wilson (Tees), Barrie
(Solicitor, Hill Dickinson)
James Weedon (DfT)
Joe detailed the proposed amendments and new Sections that it was hoped could be included in a new Pilotage Act. The document provoked considerable discussion amongst the delegates and James Weedon (DfT) was able to clarify some of the points on procedure and Barrie Youde was able to clarify some of the legal phraseology and explain the legal reasoning behind some of the proposed amendments. Following the discussion it was agreed that SC members would hold a meeting with the DfT on procedures and that the document would be placed on the members’ only section of the UKMPA website for members to consult and comment.
CHIRP:
Mike Powell (Director)
CHIRP had been subjected to several reviews by various departments during 2005 and this had delayed work on some investigations. The good news was that funding had been approved for a further three years. Since its inception, CHIRP had received 221 reports and about 100 of these had been progressed into action. About 70% were from the commercial merchant sector and the other 30% fishing and leisure. The “Maritime Feedback” newsletter now has a circulation of 140,000 and there was increasing interest from abroad where around 30,000 were currently sent to 47 countries. Mike detailed the many areas where CHIRP had been involved and he explained the processes which had resulted in changes being implemented by (sometimes reluctant) management. With respect to reports from pilots, reports concerning PEC issues had reduced but there were increasing reports concerning VTS. There had also been reports concerning the unfamiliarity and complexity of some new bridge equipment along with poor bridge team management problems and there had also been reports concerning fatigue induced by pilots’ rosters. During the subsequent discussion many different points were covered and Mike was able to clarify specific aspects of the CHIRP process to delegates.
MAIB:
Stephen Mayer (Chief Executive)
The MAIB investigated any accident involving a British registered vessel world wide and any accidents involving any vessel in
The MAIB operates under the Merchant Shipping Act and the investigators have considerable powers which exceed those of the police and they can interview anyone, board vessels, enter property and seize documents in connection with an enquiry. There is no right to silence and lawyers may be excluded. In return for these powers there is a strict confidentiality placed upon the investigation.
The MAIB is now receiving around 2500 accident reports per year and it decides which accidents should be investigated although the Secretary of State may request an investigation into an incident which the MAIB had decided not to. The benefits of an MAIB investigation over an internal HA or P&I investigation was that there was no vested interest in the outcome and therefore the recommendations were valuable in determining the effectiveness of existing legislation and helped to underpin proposed legislation and also identifying areas of concern which may currently lack legislation. The key areas of concern at the moment are:
Fishing: Statistically now the most dangerous profession and existing legislation is largely ineffective Leisure: Is unregulated
Commercial: Fatigue
This area of fatigue has been of great concern to the MAIB especially on the 2 watch system using the Master & Mate used on the short sea trade. The awareness campaign by the MAIB has resulted in the matter now being formally tabled for inclusion at IMO in 2006. The MAIB recommendation is for a minimum of 2 watch keepers in addition to the Master. Although there was widespread support for this there was a small group of opponents but the MAIB will not let the matter be sidelined. This positive action was applauded by the delegates. In addition to fatigue the second key area of concern was complacency and the MAIB found it regrettable that there were still far too many accidents resulting from complacent attitudes by Masters. Stephen concluded his presentation by explaining that accidents usually resulted from a failure of more than one element of safety and provided some graphic examples which revealed such failures which could have been avoided by an awareness of risk through formal risk assessments by the bridge team.
INSURANCES:
Paul Haysom, Ken Pound, Drew Smith
Following the withdrawal of cover by Navigators & General in 2004, Paul Haysom had arranged for a provisional policy with Royal & Sun Alliance (RSA) to cover members during 2005. A change in rules by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) meant that the UKMPA could no longer provide a ‘group’ policy but a similar policy with extended provisions had been arranged with RSA which offered a discount on premiums for members but in future each individual would be individually named. For this reason and also for the convenience of submitting the premium for tax relief it had been decided to separate the insurance premiums from the general subscription.
The topic of insurances generated considerable debate amongst the delegates and the Drew Smith (Circle Insurance) and Ken Pound (Ropners) were able to answer the main points. The new policy now covers a member from the commencement of the pilotage act until the completion and also provides cover against pollution incidents. Two cover options are available for £250,000 and £500,000 and individual members are free to choose whichever cover they prefer.
In answer to the question as to whether or not the RSA policy was necessary, the Section Committee had examined and discussed this in detail, in particular with respect to employed pilots, prior to recommending it for a conference vote. The argument that an employed pilot was covered by his HA’s insurance had been proven not to be the case and with the growing ‘blame culture’ and evidence that the validity of £1000 limitation of liability under the Pilotage Act may be subjected to a legal challenge the Section Committee were in agreement that additional cover was essential for all pilots. Following the discussion the adoption of the new policy and the separation of the insurance premiums from the general subscription was put to a vote where the proposal was carried by 45 votes in favour, 10 abstentions and no votes against.
Since the conference it has been confirmed that all members will receive an individual policy and tax receipt for their premium payment.
BELFAST
Liam Magee
Liam updated the delegates on the latest news of the
KRISTIAN PEDERSON:
Dave Devey
Dave explained to delegates the arguments that ABP had used to dismiss Kristian for “gross misconduct”. At a preliminary hearing the T&G lawyer had managed to provide the all the relevant facts in support of Kristian and the outcome was that the adjudicator had referred the case to a full tribunal hearing. Having been involved in the Humber,
HUMBER :
Dave Devey
The
Parliamentary Questions
Lord
The NOS agenda is seemingly being driven by PSSL and other bodies which have excluded the UKMPA from participating and I am seeking clarification from the DfT over the policy and explaining the necessity of pilots to be involved in matters which directly affected them.
The second question asked was a result of the situation at
Lord Berkeley asked: “Whether the use
of a simulator at
Lord Davies replied: “It is for the CHA
to determine the qualifications and experience required of maritime pilots in
Whilst the answer had been predictable this PMQ had been tabled in order to ensure that ports were aware that their compliance with the 1987 Act, PMSC and IMO 960 was being monitored at Government level.
1987 Pilotage Act
The UKMPA’s proposed amendments to the Act have been submitted to James Weedon (Policy Advisor Ports Division) of the DfT. A “scoping paper” would now be presented to the Ports Division and if accepted would form a new Port Safety Bill. The UKMPA team working on the amendments are: Joe Wilson, Dave Devey and
Legal
Blake Lapthorn Lovell was representing several pilotage districts. The cost of up to two hours for each district has been met by the T&G but any time over that is charged to the UKMPA and during the past year those legal costs had been considerable.
Europe
The Ports Directive was finally rejected on 18th January by a vote of MEPs by the following voting:
532 against – 120 for – 25 abstentions In the plenary there were calls for starting from scratch with a new white paper on Ports. Alternatively, the Services Directive that will be discussed next month in the parliament could call for Transport to be included in it. It will not go away it would seem.
I am pleased to tell you that the ESMERALDA document has not been accepted by the EU. Rumour has it that a new Ports document has surfaced called EFFORT written by a Professor from a
Thanks to those pilots who contacted their MEPs. Pilotage was mentioned by MEPs from the NW, Tees,
Les Cate
Stolt Tern Grounding
STOLT TERN
To read the original illustrated pdf article click on Back Issues: October 2005
I have decided to make the MAIB report into the grounding of the Stolt Tern the feature subject this quarter because the report covers many of the issues currently high on the UKMPA agenda. Read the rest of this entry »
Watchkeeper Fatigue
WATCHKEEPER FATIGUE
Although pilots in the
For many years pilots, whilst acknowledging that modern on-board equipment has made navigation in pilotage waters safer, have argued that compulsory pilotage should not be reduced because as new technology has been introduced the consequent reduction
in manning has more than cancelled out any safety advantages achieved by such technology. This argument has of course been fiercely opposed by the shipping
industry and some ports who always perceive compulsory pilotage as an expensive and outdated anachronism! However, the statistics cannot be disputed and fatigue amongst seafarers is now a major cause of groundings and collisions and at last there is a spotlight being shone upon shipboard practices which is revealing a murky world of
unethical practices which until now have prevented the reality of seafarer fatigue from being exposed to the public gaze. Much of the focusing of this spotlight has been undertaken by the MAIB who are to be congratulated in their persistence over the last few years in placing the issue on the agenda at maritime forums and this perseverance is now at last producing recognition that a serious problem exists.
The results of a specialist survey undertaken by the MAIB, in conjunction with Qinetiq Centre for Human Sciences, into the six on / six-off watch system operated by deck officers on many vessels make for frightening reading.
Such is the concern of the MAIB over this issue, they have taken the unprecedented step of including a special report on their survey in the Safety Digest 1/2005 One aspect of this survey looked in detail at 19 groundings where the on-board watch patterns were identi.ed and the statistics from those 19 groundings revealed two key facts:
· 68% of the vessels were operating a 2 watch system
· 100% of the groundings between 0000 – 0600 were on vessels operating a two watch system.
Using an assessment programme based on one used for aircrews the MAIB survey model analysed the typical working pattern of an officer on a 12-6 watch on a 2,000grt ship. Even when not subjected to extra duties in the off watch period the model indicated that “dangerous” levels of fatigue were reached after as little as two to three weeks.
The MAIB report states that the “…survey serves to reinforce the MAIB’s long-held belief that fatigue, brought on by minimal manning and arduous watchkeeping and operational routines, is endemic at sea, especially in the short sea trade”. The report also states that:
A number of the accidents in the study were caused as a direct result of a lone watchkeeper falling asleep, but fatigue was a factor in many more of them. Long before a watchkeeper has reached the stage where he cannot keep his eyes open, fatigue is affecting his performance. It can cause the following:
· Inability to concentrate, including being less vigilant than usual
· Diminished decision-making ability including:
· Misjudging distance, speed, time etc
· Overlooking information required for complex decisions
· Failing to anticipate danger
· Poor memory, including forgetting to complete a task or part of a task
· Slow response, including responding slowly to normal, abnormal or emergency situations
· Reduced competence in interpersonal dealings
· Attitude change, including:
· Being too willing to take risks
· Displaying a “don’t care” attitude
· Disregarding warning signs
The data used in the safety study, especially that associated with grounding accidents, indicated a strong link between fatigue and watchkeeping arrangements. In its “Lessons” summary the report includes the following two specific recommendations:
· Minimum safe manning levels need to be increased so that each seagoing
vessel of over 500gt has at least a master and two bridge watchkeeping officers.
· Masters and owners should ensure that a vessel does not leave harbour unless all the watchkeepers, including the master where appropriate, are well rested.
NUMAST has taken up the issue and been running a major campaign recently to highlight the problem. Further to data received from the MAIB survey, NUMAST are supporting research by
THE EU WORKING TIME DIRECTIVE?
In order to address the problem of fatigue at sea the EU included seafarers in the WTD in July 2003. Despite much resistance from shipowners the directive rules that seafarers should work no more than 14 hours in any 24 with a maximum of 72 hours in any seven day period. They are entitled to 10 hours rest in any 24 hour period with rest of 77 hours in any seven day period. The rest period may be divided into two periods but must include at least one period of 6 hours and the interval between consecutive rest periods must be no longer than 14 hours.
Having worked the 12 -6 watch myself as Second Mate in the 1970’s for 4 -6 weeks at a stretch my observations are that these WTD working rules, if adhered to, would result in a reasonably safe watchkeeping regime. The problem is that the rules are not being adhered to and up until now no one has really shown any interest in enforcement. Indeed, evidence seems to indicate that whilst all companies now issue instructions to their Masters that working hours must be compliant with the WTD some companies unofficially, actively discourage the Master to actually follow the regulations. The compliance instructions obviously remove the potential for liability from the Owners but leave the Master literally between the rocks and a hard place! The Master is always under pressure to sail and regrettably there is evidence to support the claims that if a master delays his ship for the purposes of resting the crew he will rapidly be replaced by a Master who is prepared to interpret the regulations in a more “flexible” manner! From a practical point of view there are frequently pressures on berth availability which may force a master to sail anyway and anchoring is not really a solution since normally an anchor watch will need to be kept so the vessel might just as well be on passage.
There are of course exceptions and I have piloted many coasters where the owners request the master to ensure that the crew are sufficiently rested in accordance with regulations and will never query his decision to remain alongside a berth for rest. I have also piloted other small vessels where, although the vessel is not subject to compulsory pilotage a master has taken a pilot in order to catch up on rest for
himself. It is of course an appalling situation where such good practices are undermined by a significant number of operators who whilst writing instructions on compliance will penalise or threaten a master who actually seeks to operate within the law. The
situation is also not helped by the practice by some companies of offering the master additional payment for self piloting his vessel thus providing a financial incentive to
stay on the bridge although he may be dangerously fatigued. Most VTS centres will have records of desperate attempts to alert non-piloted vessels that are standing into danger. Although it is obvious that these navigational errors are a result of the master or
watchkeeper falling asleep there is always an excuse other than fatigue provided by the master and some of these can be very imaginative and occasionally amusing. Insects of various varieties and grades of malevolence are a popular reason for causing
distractions to the OOW but in all cases the watchkeeper is always effusive with thanks when alerted to the danger! Unfortunately
outside areas covered by VTS (and occasionally within) the OOW fails to awake and the results are yet another wreck on the coast or a collision. It is the investigations into these incidents that has revealed the problems of fatigue
INSPECTIONS & ISM
The point is often argued that vessels need to show records of compliance with the WTD as part of their ISM procedures and it is true that “official” records of inspections will reveal that vessels are complying with the WTD and that there is no problem. How can this happen? Well, “flogging the log” is still a thriving practice and I have had masters admit to me that they keep one set of records for the inspectors and another for the office for the overtime! I have also heard a story of a company sending a computer program to cover shipboard ISM requirements and in the section for recording working hours, if hours in excess of those permitted by the WTD were entered, the program refused to accept “illegal” data and requested that the operator enter correct data!!
IS THE PROBLEM BEING EXAGGERATED?
The reason that a formal survey is being undertaken is a direct result of the hidden picture revealed by MAIB investigations. A survey by NUMAST amongst its members, who one would expect to be working on fully compliant vessels, revealed the following statistics:
2% of masters and officers were clocking up 16 or more hours per
day
2.4% worked in excess of 100 hrs per week.
29% did not regularly obtain 10hrs rest in 24
12% failed to get at least 6 hrs unbroken rest in 24
27% worked 15 or more hours continuously
20% spent 4 or more hours on additional duties.
50% felt that their working hours presented a potential threat to their personal health and safety 30% felt that working hours presented a danger to safe operations on board.
Obviously, being statistics, these figures need to be put in context since they represent those who responded to the survey. NUMAST does not detail the respondents as a percentage of the membership but it is obvious that those who are working non compliant hours are more likely to respond than those who are on fully compliant vessels. Despite this the survey does reveal a disturbing picture of non compliance with the WTD and another important finding of the survey was that only 7% stated that their hours had reduced in the last 5 – 10 years where a massive 51% reported an increase in working hours over that period.
Could these results be put down to members disgruntled with their lot and therefore be unrepresentative?
The following represents the findings of a researcher who spent fourteen days on board a 3500dwt mini bulker, with only two watchkeepers, during which time the vessel visited ports in
“Both men were working six hours on, six hours off on a four months-on/two months-off work/leave pattern. The standard working arrangement for the deck officers was therefore 12 hours a day, seven days a week for four months without a break. Whilst such a working schedule appears patently excessive by onshore standards, 84 hours a week is actually very much the best case scenario for seafarers working a six-on/six-off two man watch. The captain in particular would frequently work from the start to the finish of a port visit without sleep, a stretch of as long as 24 hours. With only two officers to cover a 24 hour watch there was no ‘slack’ in the system – if one of the officers was unfit to work the other officer was forced to cover, putting an immense burden of duty on both seafarers.’
The researcher said it was clear that excessive job demands had been woven into the culture onboard ship. The deck officers on the vessel were expected to work 12 hours a day – which failed to account for the fact that one or two hours of paperwork would routinely have to be done in supposedly ‘off-duty time.”
The study identified a number of factors which come together to make working on a mini-bulker particularly demanding:
· Short port stays, leaving no time for rest or recovery before heading back out to sea
· Frequent port visits
· Changing cargo types placing extra demand on the crew to prepare the ship accordingly
· Only two officers to cover a 24-hour watch
· Longer pilotage
· Unpredictability of tramping’ from port-to-port, which can be stressful and makes planning sleep and rest periods difficult
“In terms of understanding seafarers fatigue, therefore, where working hours might often appear the obvious culprit a more sophisticated approach is required’ which sees excessive working hours as potentially symptomatic of a poor solution to the port versus-
sea ‘crewing conundrum’,” the report concluded. As the researcher left the ship at the end of the study, the master appealed to him to highlight their conditions. “Something’s going wrong,” were his parting words.
SHOULD PORTS BE INVOLVED IN THE DEBATE?
The ports are obviously reluctant to become involved in this issue. Already, the owners of small vessels feel port charges such as pilotage more than larger vessels and ports have addressed this either by subsidising the charges applicable to small vessels from the revenue obtained from the larger vessels or by excluding small vessels from compulsory pilotage altogether. Regular traders will usually be issued with a pilotage exemption certi.cate. The factor of fatigue is not addressed because if the master declares compliance with international and local regulations then the attitude is that the vessel will be manned in accordance with regulations so fatigue management is a matter for the Master and therefore not relevant to a vessel’s visit to the port. But, is this a neat excuse for avoiding the issue? Under the
WHAT CAN PILOTS DO?
Whilst piloting a vessel, if a pilot becomes aware that fatigue may be a problem the pilot can be placed in an awkward position if the Master tells him in con.dence that he is suffering from fatigue.The Master/Pilot relationship could be weakened if the pilot immediately reports the fatigue to the Harbour Master but there is a duty to report the matter in the interests of safety. The port may .nd it impossible to take any action if the Harbour Master visits the vessel and the Master shows false documents indicating compliance with rest regulations. Likewise if the MCA are called to inspect the vessel, again the Master may be reluctant to reveal a true picture and have the vessel detained. In such a case the best solution would appear to be to obtain as many details as possible from the Master and report the matter to CHIRP. By using the RISAP inter pilot reporting facility other ports can be alerted to the problem and if suf.cient data is obtained then the con.dential and anonymous CHIRP process would probably be able to confront the owners without jeopardising the Master’s position. In the case of exempt vessels the problem is more dif.cult but if a vessel appears to be displaying symptoms of being under the command of a fatigued PEC holder then the HM and the MCA should de.nitely be informed.
CONCLUSION
The fact that this issue is now receiving serious attention is welcome but it is not going to be easy to change the status quo and already pressure is growing to prevent the matter being raised at the IMO. The current situation is summarised in the following edited
extracts from a Lloyds List feature (2nd June) entitled “go on, stop on”
“There is no doubt in the minds of the MAIB inspectors who have ploughed through the causes of some 1,600 accidents over a 10-year period that “poor manning levels and fatigue were major causal factors in collisions and groundings”.
“It is an anachronism in the 21st century”, Admiral Stephen Meyer points out, “that seafarers are falsifying their timesheets to prove that they are working ONLY a 98-hour week. And many of these seafarers work every week, without a break, for between four and nine months before getting leave”.
There is equally no doubt that the operation of ships with a Master and mate alternating 6-hour watches is a recipe for disaster, even though it is a practice that has been widely used in the short sea trades, often, and illegally, without even a lookout during hours of darkness.
There is conclusive research to point to the rapid onset of fatigue aboard ships operated in such a fashion. There is, in fact, no reason for such a way of working to be perpetuated, and the MAIB has made it clear that it considers this way of ship operation is downright dangerous.
It is also interesting to note that the MAIB is regarded with great respect for its independence and could form a “model” for other casualty investigation systems in both European countries and elsewhere.
But issues of fatigue and manning levels cannot be confronted at a national level. The International Maritime Organization needs to take the matter forward as a matter of urgency.
Which makes it quite mysterious that a
JCB
Lee, Martin
MARTIN LEE
Last “Grand Mat’’ of the AICH (UK branch)
View the original illustrated pdf article:
http://www.pilotmag.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/pilotmag-281-final.pdf
It is with sadness that I have to report the passing away of retired Trinity House (latterly Medway) pilot Martin Lee. Many will remember Martin for his enthusiasm for the “wind ships”, one of the last of which was the Passat where Martin served much of his apprenticeship in the late 1940s. As one of a dwindling number of true “Cape Horners” who had sailed around Cape Horn in a commercial sailing ship not fitted with an engine Martin became the last “Grand Mat” of the UK branch of the L’Amicale Internationale des Capitaines au Long-Cours Cap Horniers (AICH) and had the sad task of formally winding up that Association as a result of the dwindling membership in 2003.
The evocative cartoon in the June 2004 edition of The Pilot concerning a sailing ship running at a fair speed into harbour is reminiscent of some of the manoeuvres which sailing ship masters, pilots and crews had to make in the 1930s and 1940s. Their vessels were all in the region of 3,500 to 5,000 tons deadweight, had no motive
power except their sails, no bow thrusts and two large (up to 3 tons) anchors forward. There were one or two exceptions such as the German four-masted barque Magdalene Vinnen / Kommodore Johnson (now the Russian Sedov) which, in those days had a small auxiliary diesel engine for helping in calm conditions but not much use for manoeuvring in any tide or breeze. Some vessels still had their stern anchor hawse-pipes and gear which had been used in Chilean and Peruvian anchorage ports. Erikson (Gustaf Erikson of Mariehamn in the Finnish Aland Islands) masters were
expected, like most Scandinavian masters, to avoid the use of expensive tugs when-ever possible. Incidentally G Erikson have recently sold their last reefer ship and are no longer ship owners in the accepted sense.
Pilots will readily understand the reference to a kick astern when there is no such thing available. Ports such as Port Lincoln, Wallaroo and Bunbury in Australia where ships berthed alongside were places where the master was expected to berth and unberth his ship unaided. I have a copy of the port charges for various Erikson vessels at Port Lincoln in the 1930s The four-masted barque Passat in February 1937 incurred a total of £299 13s 6d harbour dues including £63 pilotage, boatmen and mooring £12.
These charges were for berthing, shifting to and from the ballast grounds and sailing when loaded. There are no tug charges. These vessels had to have a minimum of 300 tons of solid ballast in port and over 1,300 tons for a deep sea voyage this stuff was manhandled by the crew and required shifting the ship with half the cargo loaded out to the ballast ground and dumping the material over the side before returning for cargo
completion. Berthing one of these ships required the right conditions and a great deal of skill and hard work, it could be lengthy business – it took us most of the day and a great deal of sweat and shouting to get the Passat alongside the long, winding jetty in Bunbury with no assistance. We had arrived on 4 September 1947 in ballast from East London. In East London we were head out on the south side of the Buffalo River and when the tug and pilot arrived there was an offshore breeze. Captain Hagerstrand was a man of few words, he never spoke to us in English but conversed well in that language with others; he also rarely swore. The date was 14 April 1947, I was standing by the big double wheels ready for action, the master said “we don’t need the tug, we will sail the ship out to sea.” As he spoke there was a rain squall and the wind shifted to a fresh on the berth breeze. The air then became blue with a mixture of Swedish, Finnish and English oaths – we had to take the tug to get us off the berth. The voyage was 4,331 miles in a time of 20 days 17 hours at an average speed of 8.7 knots, this compares favourably with tramp steamers making passages at 7 knots and consuming large amounts of fuel. On arrival off Bunbury the pilot came on board and said that the tug was away in Fremantle but we could use the local dredger to help us alongside. The master weighed it all up, we dropped the starboard anchor off the end of
the jetty, swung head to wind, the gallant dredger took a line aft and at the first tow pulled her bitts out of the deck. I did not hear any language from amidships but we eventually hove her alongside with hand capstans with no further assistance. We loaded a full cargo (4,700 tons) of jarrah wood railway sleepers for Port Swettenham (now Port Klang) in Malaya, the ship was down to her marks and we sailed on 17 October 1947 with a fair wind off the berth. We had mastheaded the upper tops’ls before sailing so a good spread of canvas was immediately available and sailed quietly away with no tug and no fuss. Mooring at a single buoy in Port Swettenham was a different story, we took two
harbour tugs. We then proceeded, with sand ballast, to Port Victoria in the Spencer Gulf in South Australia to load grain in the traditional manner. Arriving there on 2 March 1948 we found the four-masted barques Lawhill and Viking loading in Hardwicke Bay. Port Victoria is an anchorage port with poor holding ground,
some Erikson masters who had been in the trade for years, detested the place and wrote of the ‘merry-go-round’ of dragging anchors round the bay. We put two anchors down and kept good anchor watches, sometimes a spanker was set and a spring attached to the weather anchor to make a lee for the ketches bringing bagged barley out.
Sailing ships had larger anchors and cables, as required by the classification societies, but, without the benefit of a kick ahead. The shores of Wardang Island in Hardwicke Bay have the remnants of several square-riggers which did not survive the ‘merry-go-round’.
Large square-rigged ships loaded phosphates and guano in remote places such as Astove Island, Nosse Be and other delightful places in the 1920s and 1930s. There were no tugs available there and great skill was required to get these ships into position in a restricted area where there was sufficient depth for anchors to hold. The four-masted barque Olivebank was chartered to load guano for Auckland, at Assumption Island, N of Madagascar, in 1928. She shipped 84 men from Mahe to do the loading and anchored in 80 fathoms, a ship’s length off the island. Two days later her anchors slipped off the ledge into precipitous depths and it took her two weeks to get back and anchor in 12 fathoms forward and 84 fathoms aft with the vessel 80 metres off the land. Captain Troberg had had enough of guano sailing after this! When the Pamir was seized in Wellington in 1941 she had just arrived from Assumption. Two pilots had leapt on board as she approached in a southerly gale and sailed her through the narrow harbour entrance off Pencarrow – she stayed under the NZ flag for a further 8 years sailing across the Pacific to NW America and Canada, with one voyage to London in 1948.
As a River Medway (ex-Thames) pilot I sailed the replica Golden Hind from Upnor to Tower Pier in the 1970s. This was (is) a small ship, she had an underpowered engine set on the starboard side. We sailed up the Thames on a rising tide for an ETA at Tower Bridge and arrived on time with cannon blazing and under full sail. I had already explained to Captain Adrian Small (we had been apprentices together on the Passat) that the next bridge does not open. We still had a following wind and flood tide and there was much shouting as we rounded the Belfast with sails flogging and finally made our way to Tower Pier. As her temporary master and pilot we shifted her a few times in the Upper Pool (always in the middle of the night of course), she had been fitted with under water buoyancy bulges which were invisible from the deck. Making the entrance lock at St Catherine’s could be quite interesting; we actually sailed in stern first on one occasion as the wind was so strong from ahead.
In 1996 and 1997 after a change of direction from piloting to other matters I spent two hurricane seasons in the Caribbean as a master on the four-masted barquentine Star Clipper. This vessel and her sister ship Star Flyer were built in Belgium in the early 1990s, their hull size was similar to that of the German ‘P’ ships –
106m x 14.7m. There the similarity ends, they carry up to 174 passengers in five-star luxury, have two swimming pools a main engine and bow thrust and comply with the very strict USCG requirements for cruise ships as well as the myriad of other needs with strange labels. Their square sails on the fore-mast are controlled by a push-button system, eg ‘lower tops’l out and lower tops’l in’. A magic device that would have amazed any watchkeeper on a proper sailing vessel. Their rigging mistakes are the massive main and mizzen fisherman sails set high up. They have to come in quickly in squalls and often jam in their tracks causing heavy heeling and ominous crashes from the galley and bar.
We sailed whenever possible and carried out manoeuvres such as getting under way from an anchorage under sail alone, tacking, wearing, boxing and other crew heavy (assisted by passengers) work. She was not the easiest ship to handle with her windage
aloft and a not too powerful engine. We did manage a Mediterranean moor in St Georges when both berths were occupied, two anchors down and backed up to the space between the two ships putting crossed stern lines ashore. Approaching Castries (St. Lucia), after sending an ETA for the pilot for 0600, there was no sign of the boat so, of course, we berthed the ship head in quite successfully – he came along later to apologise and get his note signed !
Hurricane Iris was avoided by staying alongside in Barbados until the newly joined passengers sent a delegation to say that they had paid for a sailing cruise and demanded to sail. The weather was moderating with fewer large seas over the breakwater, we had the hurricane movement forecast, ordered the tug and sailed round the breakwater into a heavy swell causing much sea-sickness – still they had paid for it. The difficulty then was to find a sheltered anchorage for a visit ashore but every place was occupied by other ships. Soufrierre Bay was tried but we rolled heavily and motored away. This was not exactly sailing ship stuff but was an experience of a different kind.
In this brave new world of endless lists of acronyms and the minutiae of bureaucracy there seems to be little said about the nuts and bolts of shiphandling etc. When the first generation of car carriers made their appearance at Sheerness’s new car terminal they were a conglomerate of cobbled together ex bulk carriers and passenger ships. On one occasion one of these hybrid monsters had been advised to wait for the strong N’ly wind to moderate. Early in the morning I boarded her in the Little Nore area (this was in the days of Trinity House Pilots). She was a huge slab sided thing and we had three tugs standing by, the wind was moderating as we wandered into the harbour, and then shifted to the ENE, which was fine on our port bow for the berth. It was a tight squeeze (this was the original car berth at the end of No. 3 Sheerness), after mooring up the senior tug master called up and said “you sailed that ship alongside”. This was a compliment which I have always been proud of – in fact those vessels have much the same windage as a four-masted barque under full sail and can, in a way, be treated as such. The links between ship handling and seamanship in the 1930s and 1940s in unpowered ships and the 21st century vessel may be tenuous in terms of motive power but pilots will always have to deal competently with situations demanding a skilful response and perhaps the bean counters are not fully aware of this.
AMICALE INTERNATIONAL CAP HORNIERS
THE BRITISH SECTION
In May 1937 a group of retired French sailing ship masters held a banquet in St Malo to honour Professor George Delarney, chair of the Department of Navigation. They there and then formed the “Association Amicale des Capitaines au Long Cours Cap Horniers”, AICH. Their aims are the same today, “to promote and strengthen the ties of comradeship which bind together a unique body of men and women who embody the distinction of having sailed round Cape Horn in a commercial sailing vessel, and to keep alive in various ways memories of the stout ships that regularly sailed on voyages of exceptional difficulty and peril, and of the endurance, courage and skill of the sailors who manned them”.
There were various classes of membership; Albatross, who had commanded a sailing ship round Cape Horn, Mollyhawk, who had served in a sailing ship round Cape Horn and was subsequently a master mariner, Cape Pigeon, who had rounded Cape Horn in a sailing ship but was not directly involved in the handling of the ship. There were also sympathisers (Friends) who had furthered the interests of the Association. The first Congress was held in St Malo in 1938, this was entirely French and, in 1948, a similar congress was held. It was decided then, by the AICH council that membership should be extended to other countries thus establishing it as an international organisation with affiliated national sections. The first to join were the Belgians in 1949, followed by Sweden in 1953 and Germany in 1955.
Germany has always had a large membership as their four-masted barques Padua/ Kruzenshtern, Priwall, Peking, Passat, Magdalene Vinnen/ Kommodore Johnson/ Sedov and L’Avenir /Admiral Karpfanger in the 1920s and 30s carried at least 40 trainees on every ocean-going voyage as well as having apprentices on board the Erikson square-riggers.
In 1957 the British section of AICH was formed by Cdr CLA Woollard, the inaugural AGM was held on the HQS Wellington in London. Captain H Treaby Heale was elected as Chairman and the committee included M Lee. Finland and the Aland Islands formed two separate sections in 1961, they had the greatest number of Albatrosses, thirty in all, their square-riggers were still sailing round Cape Horn in 1949 when the Pamir and Passat made the last commercial unpowered voyages. Other countries such as Holland, America, Australia, New Zealand and Chile also became members.
Alan Villiers, the author of many books on sailing ships and our last Albatross, wrote of visiting the Bournemouth branch of the British section in 1971: “eight wonderful old boys, most of them octogenarians, except one aged 92, all with the stamp of the sea
still on their open faces, the snap of command in their speech. The talk was of great ships long gone, the hardness of the life and the astonishing way it worked out. All had been apprentices, most had been second mates in sail, all had their masters certificates before
they went into steam. They’d been senior masters in Royal Mail, Cunard and Union Castle, Trinity House Pilots, marine superintendents or surveyors, London dock masters, insurance appraisers – the cream of the profession”. The British section, at its
peak, had surviving Cape Horners from the clipper ships Thermopylae, Blackadder and Cymba. Most of them had served their time in the last steel bulk carriers such as the Kilmallie, Port Jackson, William Mitchell, Lawhill, Grace Harwar, Herzogin
Cecilie, Pamir, Parma, Passat, Olivebank etc. We also had, until their own sections were formed, Australians, New Zealanders and Americans in the British section. Irving Johnson, an American, made a film on board the four-masted barque Peking on passage from Hamburg, round Cape Horn to Talcahuano in Chile in 1929/30. This is a classic account of a large square-rigger’ sailing 8,000 tons of ship and cargo “where we want her to go, not necessarily where she wants to go”. The heavy weather photography is the best ever recorded, her decks are full of water, four men at the wheel and 00 canvas storm sails blown out. On arrival in Talcuahano the use of the local tug is turned down and Captain Jiihrs “beat the ship up the harbour like a yacht”. He then carried out a running moor under sail, a manoeuvre which Laiesz masters had carried out on many occasions. I can recall doing a running moor in Gravesend Reach (for an extra charge on the A form of course) with a powered ship – it was not easy to get it right the first time. AICH have held 52 International Congresses in ports as far apart as Sydney and Helsinki, the latter congress was partially held on board the new gas turbine powered Finnjet running between Helsinki and Travemunde. The contrast between travelling in luxury at 32 knots with our apprenticeship days was vivid. Fortunately the managing owner of Finnlines at the time, Heikki Holma, was also President of the Finnish AICH, he had sailed in their small barque Favell in the 1930s. Three international congresses have been held in the UK, at Southampton in 1967, Greenwich in 1978 and Bristol in 1990. These were all well attended and it was a pleasure to see and hear Cape Horners hauling on ropes and singing sea shanties on the Cutty Sark. In 2000 at Mariehamn, home port of the last sailing ship owner, Gustaf Erikson, it was decided at the Federal Council meeting, that as AICH members were ageing and declining in numbers, that the Amicale should be wound up in 2003. The Cutty Sark Tall Ships Race visit to the Aland Islands coincided with this congress and it was a pleasure to see the training ships and their crews mingling with ancient mariners. The perfectly preserved four-masted barque Pommern, (built on the Clyde in 1903 and moored permanently in Mariehamn, unchanged since the day she was put into service), towered over the largest of the training ships – described by one hide-bound German Cape Horner as “motor ships decorated with sails”. Two years were required to satisfy and complete the acres of paper-work required by French bureaucracy to wind up an official organisation such as this and it is with thanks to our International Secretary Captain Roger Ghys (ex-Master of the Belgium sail training ship Mercator), and his band of helpers that all was accomplished in that time.
On May 14 2003 in St Malo where it was born in 1937 AICH was formally wound up with some sadness but in a true spirit of Cape Horn. All our financial assets were used to celebrate this last congress, we went out in a splendid fashion, my wife Kate, our son Matthew and I will remember those days for a long time. Cape Horn is not dead in the UK we had formed International Association of Cape Horners (IACH) some years ago to carry forward that tradition. IACH is made up of those who have sailed round Cape Horn under sail alone, we have very strict rules concerning the manner in which this is done. The fact remains that no one can sail round Cape Horn as those large sailing ships did –everyone has to satisfy some acronymic requirement or other – but the challenge, tradition and rite of passage remain.
Martin Lee
I have listed those AICH British members who were Pilots, there may be others.
Captain Bruce Bell. Southampton. Two roundings in the Mountstewart 1920/22.
Captain Hector Blemings, Gravesend Channel. Three roundings:
Wray Castle 1916/19 and Terpsichore (as second mate) 1919/22.
Captain Harry Fountain, Boston. One rounding, Monkbarns 1921.
Captain Douglas Galloway, Wellington. One rounding, Penang 1938.
Captain Victor Harbord. Humber. Five roundings, Beechbank 1907/11
Captain Andrew Keyworth, Lyttelton. One rounding, Pamir 1947.
Captain Francis Kirk, Southampton. One rounding, Monkbarns 1921.
Captain M. Lee, Orwell,Thames and Medway. One rounding, Passat 1948. President of AICH/IACH since 1982.
Captain William Liley, River Thames. One rounding, Carradale 1913.
Captain L. Peverley. Gravesend Channel. Five roundings: Robert Duncan 1905/10, Bengairn 1910/11, Beechbank 1911/12 (2nd Mate), Kilmallie 1912/13 (Mate).
Captain John Simpson. Forth. Three roundings, Garthsnaid 1919/22.
Captain William Sutherland. Gravesend Channel. One rounding, Archibald Russell 1932. President AICH 1980-1982.
117th Conference
117th CONFERENCE
Eastbourne : 17th-18th November 2004
PRE CONFERENCE SESSION
PNPF (Richard Williamson, Boston
As a SC deputy for Region 2 and PNPF trustee, Richard provided delegates with an
overview of the fund, the investment policy and its performance. He answered questions on Advanced Corporation Tax (ACT) and the role of trustees. Richard was followed by the PNPF Secretary, Debbie Marten whose report appears separately.
PNPF and the Pilots’ National committee for Pensions (PNCP) (Joe Wilson,
Joe advised delegates that whilst looking for ways in which to keep costs down the
SC had looked at the relevance of the PNCP for UKMPA members. Joe explained that since the 1995 Pensions Act had incorporated safeguards and rights for pension fund members and pensioners and pension advice was available for all UKMPA members through the specialist pensions department of the T&G. SC had considered that the funds currently allocated to the PNCP for meetings would be more constructively used in permitting an alternate trustee to attend trustee meetings. A debate on this issue saw presentations from Mike Kitchen, Chairman PNCP and Dan Macmillan, the pensioners’ representative on the PNCP who both provided the conference with arguments as to why the PNCP should be retained. A subsequent vote saw delegates vote in favour of the disbanding of the PNCP by 24 votes to 22.
Further to this debate, PNCP chairman Mike Kitchen has written a letter to the magazine which appears on page 14.
MAIN CONFERENCE
Delegates stood in order to observe one minute’s silence in memory of the President of EMPA, Gianfranco Gasperini and other deceased colleagues.
The UKMPA President, Lord
infrastructure could cope. The lack of interest by MP’s in shipping meant that there was no ports’ strategy from the Government and this was holding up development. There was therefore a danger that the
Chairman’s Report (Les Cate)
An updated report appears on page 6.
Secretary/Treasurer’s Report (John Pretswell)
John opened his report by detailing the membership which at 30th September 2004 stood at 493 members from 47 Districts. This figure represented a reduction of 8 over 2003. Neath had withdrawn from membership.
Dundee had reduced from 5 pilots to 3 but the other two pilots had transferred to
John then referred delegates to the printed “Financial Statement and Budget Proposals” contained within the conference papers and available to members from their local Secretary. He then detailed the Budget / Expenditure figures for 2004.
2005 budget:
John explained that there had been a change to the insurance cover offered by Navigators & General which, had resulted in N&G removing the 50,000 cover altogether and increasing the premiums payable on the 100,000 cover.
On the basis of the revised insurance figures John had calculated a 2005 subscription rate of £105.
When this was put to the vote the delegates were unable to accept this without a remit from their membership. Paul Haysom, who was now responsible for the insurance brief was seeking quotes from other insurers and Drew Smith had possibly identified an alternative provider who might provide £50,000 cover The Chairman therefore suggested that delegates accept the budget with a reservation on the subscription element that could be revised downwards should a cheaper alternative premium quote be achieved.
This was accepted unanimously by delegates (see page 11).
CHIRP (Confidential Hazard Incident Reporting Programme) (Mike Powell, Maritime Director)
Mike provided an overview of the CHIRP program which was witnessing an increasing number of reports as seafarers became aware of its existence. Of the 121 reports received since the start of the programme in July 2003 two thirds had been processed and 57 had resulted in action being taken to address the issues raised and this was a positive indicator that the programme was working. The quarterly newsletter “Feedback” now had a circulation of 140,000 worldwide.
The top issues had been:
· Control of navigation
· Hazards
· SMS
· Fatigue: This is a major area of concern since reports indicate widespread abuse of official records being completed to indicate compliance but actual hours being dangerously in excess of those permitted.
· Technical processes (ie design of equipment, quality of manuals etc)
The top pilotage issues had been:
· Deep draft navigation in the Dover Straits. The reports from
N Sea pilots on this had been well received by the MCA and
CNIS
· PEC: This had been the topic least well received by the shipping industry!
· Bridge Team Management (or rather lack of BTM). This was an area where CHIRP encouraged reports and it was a relatively easy matter for CHIRP to raise with the company concerned.
· Mobile phone usage.
· ISPS and access issues
Mike concluded by acknowledging that pilots were in a good position to submit reports and CHIRP welcomed such reports.
Q&A
Were the reports received so far indicative of insufficient manning on board?
Yes. But because of the manipulation of official logs to indicate compliance it was almost impossible to address. Those reporting fatigue were concerned about their jobs but CHIRP was seeking ways to resolve this.
Is it not possible for the SMS auditors to identify the falsification of working hours records since there were probably many occasions where such records would indicate that the logged compliance would have been impossible?
Again yes, but the majority of SMS auditors would not have the time or the training to undertake the detailed cross referencing of data to be able to identify non compliance. Unfortunately all the evidence of groundings and collisions meant that everyone was aware that there was a major problem but no one was prepared to break ranks and address it. The issue of safe manning was on the international agenda for next year and CHIRP would be contributing their data to the debate.
Health & Safety (Susan Murray, T&GWU)
Susan provided delegates with some background information of the T&G’s H&S function. Susan herself worked within the legal department and her main experience had been gained from compensation claims.
The department provided union response to HSC consultations and encouraged involvement and communication from safety officers within the various companies with T&G representatives. They were also involved in many consultation forums and advisory groups.
The departments remit is very large and Susan had been very interested in the issues of fatigue and the falsification of documents revealed by CHIRP. Of particular relevance to pilots was the issue of Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) and the T&G had produced a free book and advice leaflets on H&S and PPE for safety officers.
The Employment Act 2002 (Fergus Whitty, T&GWU legal director)
Fergus provided a detailed presentation on the new Act which gave unions cause for deep concern in that it had ignored the ACAS Code for handling disputes and had, in the view of Fergus, enhanced the powers of employers in dismissing employees and weakened workers rights to a fair hearing under certain circumstances. Part of the
driving force behind the new legislation had been to reduce the number of dispute claims being handled by tribunals by 40,000 per year by seeking to have disputes resolved
internally. Only if these internal discussions fail can the matter be referred to an external tribunal. The procedures for an external reference are very specific and in detailing some of these Fergus stressed the point that it was very important that correct procedures were be strictly adhered to otherwise any dispute could be declared invalid or out of time. There is no requirement for the employer to inform the employee of these procedures! Fergus went on to explain the detail of the new Act and how the procedures failed to offer protection to an employee. The conclusions from the T&GWU were that on the positive side it was a good idea to hold internal meetings and set out the complaint to the employer before a claim was made to a tribunal.
On the negative side the T&GWU felt that:
· The (old) ACAS Code should form part of the legal disciplinary process
· It was absolutely wrong to dismiss an employee without an investigation
· Wrong for employers not to have to detail the consequences of failure to follow correct procedures
· Wrong for employers not to have to advise on rights of an employee to be accompanied.
Port Marine Safety Code
(Simon Gooder, Ports liaison manager member of the Navigation Safety Branch of the MCA)
Simon opened this presentation by providing brief details of his background. Following service in the RN where he had become a navigation specialist he had served from 1995 – 2003 as the Deputy Queen’s HM at
Following the introduction of the PMSC in December 2001 an implementation review had been held in 2003 and this had led to the following:
· The MCA adopting responsibility for the operational aspects of the Code
· The DfT retaining responsibility for the policy and legislative aspects of the Code The MCA ensure compliance, follow up any incidents and chase up any ports revealing a reluctance to comply. They also act to develop and support the standards accompanying the Code.
One new area being subjected to national standards and guidelines was that of PEC holders.
Simon considered the PMSC to be an evolving document with standards being introduced and it was hoped that by examining the weight of evidence the PMSC could be progressed to ensure enhancement of port safety and introducing the concept of “Assured Compliance”. The UKMPA was actively involved as a stakeholder is this process.
Q&A
During the Q&A session Simon confirmed that the PMSC was currently a voluntary code which was not supported by any legislation.
The point was raised that in the case of a breach of the Act rather than the Code then this Act was law and therefore a plaintiff should be able to take the case to a court. A legal opinion from the floor was that any interested party could present information to a court to commence a prosecution.
The Humber Dispute
(David Devey, Liverpool pilot & Barrie Youde, Ex Liverpool pilot and Barrister)
David Updated delegates on the latest situation regarding HPL members and the
Technical & Training Committee Report
(
John referred delegates to the written report within the conference papers which detailed the work undertaken by the committee on the following topics:
· Personal Protection Clothing & Equipment
· Pilot Transfer Equipment & Pilot Boarding Arrangements
· Pilot Boarding and Landing Code of Practice
· Electronic Aids
· RNLI Technical Liaison
·
MCA, IMO & MAIB Report
(Don Cockrill,
Don referred delegates to the reports on his activities included in the conference papers. Adding to those reports Don reminded delegates of the need to ensure that all the non delegate members throughout the districts were kept fully aware of the activities of the MCA and DfT who, despite being the bodies responsible for safety were also subject to commercial pressures and would invariably succumb to commercial interests over safety issues and avoid any policy which may incur a cost to the shipowner. The current statements from the Chamber of Shipping questioning the need for PEC standards was a prime example of how the agenda could be manipulated to the detriment of pilotage and its skills. The ports’ representatives were equally dismissive of the need to specify training and standards for pilots.
VTS Policy Group
Some had questioned as to why the UKMPA needed to be involved with this group but having attended some of their meetings Don was in no doubt that this was a very powerful lobby group with great influence within the MCA and the DfT and although a token gesture of removing references to “shore based pilotage” within VTS literature had been made, the concept had been reincarnated under the heading of “Navigational Assistance” and plans for promoting such assistance were still firmly on the agenda.
EMPA (Les Cate, Chairman & Vice President EMPA)
During the last year, in order to participate in EU projects and to be eligible for EU funding it was necessary for EMPA to become a “Non Profit Association” and EMPA is now officially known as EMPA vzw.
Full details of the amendments to the previous structure are contained within the conference papers.
Maritime Navigation & Information Services: MARNIS Project
This 5 year EU project got underway in September and will shape the ports VTM and pilotage. EMPA is a partner in this project and its objectives are as follows:
· Improvement of safety and the protection of the environment;
· Improvement of security of vessels, coasts and ports;
· Improvement of efficiency and reliability of information flows;
· Furtherance of the economy of sea transport;
· Improvement of the efficiency of legal and organisational aspects regarding enforcing of rules and regulations in the
“European maritime zone”
When completed it will form part of the White Paper entitled:
European Transport Policy 2010: Time to decide
Ports Directive
Les concluded the EMPA report by explaining the work of the Council of Presidents and how they were in consultation as to how best to fight and once again defeat the revived Port Services Directive.
DfT
(James Wheedon, Responsible for Port safety & pilotage policy)
James opened this session by explaining the structure of his department and detailed the various responsibilities and the tie-in with the MCA and Trinity House There was no policy change with respect to the PMSC despite the delegation of monitoring compliance to the MCA and the code remained without legislation and thus, being voluntary, Ministers had no need to impose an external audit on HA’s. The MCA would however be required to prove to ministers that standards are maintained and progressed.
James acknowledged that the NOS had become stagnated under PSSL but that the MCA, as the responsible body for progressing NOS, would have to work with PSSL because PSSL had access to the Maritime Skills Allowance Fund. It was probable that funding for the various groups to progress NOS work would come from the MSAF.
The MCA would also be responsible for the technical and operational aspects of the Code but would work together with the Ports Division of DfT to develop policies and initiatives. Currently work was progressing on a new section of the PMSC dealing with Incident management and expanding the code to include conservancy as well as introducing NOS for hydrographers. With respect to the future supply of pilots the DfT felt that the traditional route of Master’s FG certificate was not sustainable and new routes into positions for maritime professionals working ashore would need to be found. A document covering this, entitled “
The DfT recognised that there had been concerns raised over abuse of
A question was asked as to why there was still no legislation to ensure that a CHA complies with the wish of Government and why did the DfT continue to advise ministers that it doesn’t feel that it is necessary to enforce CHA’s to comply with the PMSC? The code does actually have reserve power for the Secretary of State to intervene if there was evidence that a CHA was acting unsafely. This would consist of visiting the CHA and reminding them of their responsibilities under the Code, but James confirmed that there were no legal measures that could be invoked by the SoS. In response to the second part of the question James stated that the DfT couldn’t advise a minister to do something that was not within his powers.
Les Cate stated that he had understood from Andrew Burr that the SoS had reserve powers of intervention and asked why these hadn’t been used. James replied that he did not believe that there were any powers that could be invoked by the SoS but he acknowledged that supporting legislation would be desirable although with the limitations on parliamentary time the chances of a new bill were not great.
IMPA (Geoff Taylor, Tees and Senior Vice President IMPA)
During the last year IMPA had been involved in the following:
IMO Resolution A960
This resolution, drawn up by IMPA as a joint project with the IMO, had been formally adopted by IMO during the year and laid out clear guidelines for pilotage. This resolution represented a considerable achievement for IMPA and it should be supported by all pilots (see report in PILOT 279).
Mandatory Pilotage in International Waters
This was a new concept since until now only voluntary pilotage could be offered in international waters. However
Maritime Safety Commission (MSC)
Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC)
Potentially
There were also many other sub groups and IMPA tried to ensure that pilots were represented at any forum where pilotage interests were being discussed. In addition to the importance for pilots, attendance at these sessions also provided a vital link between the shore representatives / officials and the real world on board ships since the pilots were frequently the only serving mariners present.
The other areas where IMPA had been involved included:
Integrated Bridge design, standards for mooring lines, Marking / testing bitts and fairleads, standards for new radars, common symbology for navigational equipment.
With respect to on-going work, pilot boarding was being progressed. The poor quality and sighting of AIS units on ships had been acknowledged. Several IMPA members were involved in training and standards and the ETCS project being run by EMPA dovetailed well with similar initiatives around the World. One new project had been to establish a long overdue dialogue with the P&I Clubs. Although these were run by ship owners there was the obvious common interest of safety of shipping. So far the Clubs had acknowledged the common ground and in particular IMPA was being successful in challenging the widely circulated statistic that “pilot error” was responsible for 30% of claims. Surveys had revealed that 99.96% of voyages were successfully concluded so only 30% of 0.04% of incidents occurred in pilotage waters which were acknowledged to be the highest risk areas. With 95% of world trade being moved by ship this was an admirable safety record. Pilots were effectively professional “risk managers” who statistically achieved nearly 100% successful operations. It was therefore impossible to comprehend why, especially in the
One final very important area of lobbying was the proposed EU Directive criminalising seafarers. Although in its early stages, this directive on marine pollution would include pilots with criminal liability in the case of a pollution incident.
IMPA Congress at Istanbul
This had been very well attended and very successful. Three
resolutions were passed
1. Commending to Governments, pilotage authorities and pilots the contents of IMO Resolution A960.
2. Publicise the result of the G8 summit which encouraged the IMO as the appropriate body to develop mandatory pilotage in narrow and congested waterways by means of “strictly regulated systems”.
3. VTS and Pilots: “VTS is not pilotage, nor is it a substitute for pilotage and shore based pilotage cannot be a substitute for pilotage performed by a pilot on board.”
PENSIONS (Peter Smith, T&GWU National Pensions Officer)
Peter Smith detailed the provisions of the new Pensions Bill and explained that unfortunately this was a Bill with no coherent policies with many complex anomalies some of which Peter listed. The Financial Assistance and Pension Protection Fund elements to help those deprived of their pensions were totally inadequate and would be means tested to provide undefined “Meaningful Assistance”.
The Bill also did not address the various ploys that employers had adopted to reduce pension provisions which had resulted in 65,000 employees losing out on their pension entitlement. It was hoped that the proposed new Pensions Regulator would be able to use legislation to prevent employers from breaching pension provision agreements.
Overall the TUC were concerned that the new Act would not provide the necessary protection for employees but it was possible that a proposed EU Directive may help.
Peter concluded by reminding delegates that the T&G was available to assist in protecting members’ pension entitlements and that no matter how secure a scheme may seem vigilance was required.
Les Cate closed this session by advising delegates that Peter Smith and his department within the T&G could fill any gap left by the loss of the PNCP.
Legal (Mark Foden, Blake, Lapthorn and Linnel)
Mark, having taken over the legal assistance from Michael Nott, opened his presentation by detailing the work that BLL had been involved with on behalf of the UKMPA.
Poole & Gloucester:
Advice had been given on new provision of service contracts for the self employed pilots and the final documents checked before these were signed.
The employment department had also checked contracts on behalf of employed pilots from other districts.
Milford
Following the issue of a new incident report form by the HA, BLL had worked with N&G on the disclosure of information aspect of the form. This sought to retain some control by the pilot involved over disclosure to 3rd parties other than statutory bodies.
Alcohol & Drug testing:
Advice had been provided on the provisions of the new legislation covering this in order to clarify who could test pilots and under what circumstances.
Review of the 1987 Pilotage Act:
BLL would be working closely with the Section Committee as the review progressed and this would probably result in a “position paper” being circulated to members.
This article represents a brief resume of the conference to provide members with an overview of the many areas in which the UKMPA is active.
Pilotage History Part 2
PILOTAGE HISTORY ~ Part 2
Harry Hignett
View the original pdf illustrated magazine article:
pilotmag.co.uk/userfiles/Pilotmag%20279%20(Oct%2004).pdf
The Francis Henderson, built by Murdock and Murray in 1896, the first steam pilot
vessel for the Liverpool Pilot Service. From an original painting by J Witham.
In part 1 we learned how the situation for pilots over the centuries had resulted in
legislation covering compulsory pilotage being introduced but as a result of poor
drafting much of this legislation was open to abuse and offered poor protection for
pilots. By the end of the 19th Century, pilots were subjected to competition from
exemptions to pilotage being offered to vessels and sadly in some cases from other
pilots! The founding of the UKPA in 1884 had focused unity of purpose and achieved
a significant result by stimulating the 1889 Merchant shipping Act (Pilotage). Whilst
many of the pilots’ requirements had been incorporated into the is Act it was still full
of loopholes and this was compounded by apathy by Trinity House in tackling pilotage
exemption abuses. The 1889 pilotage Act was incorporated into the 1894 Merchant
Shipping Act but having achieved few further gains pilots became despondent.
1901 – 1941
1900 was a time of falling membership and low attendances at conferences. The UKPA membership fell to around 700 in contrast to a decade earlier when the numbers were about 1,200. Although the total number of pilots entered in the annual returns of the BoT was about 2,300, many were part-time pilots at very small ports.
The complaints against “aliens” obtaining pilotage exemption certificates were a very strong card in the hands of the Association. The Foreign Office insisted that there were treaty arrangements between countries that made such arrangements inevitable, however there was a serious flaw in this argument in that foreign masters could pilot their vessels at each end of the voyage but British masters could not. In 1902 B J Foster (Hull) rose at the Plymouth Conference to announce that the holder of a pilotage certificate for the Humber was a commissioned officer in the German Navy and claimed he would get promotion because of that qualification. It was stated that alien pilotage had increased 200% under the 1889 Pilotage Act and that all members of the 1888 Select Committee on Pilotage who had not been against alien pilotage, “were now aware of the damage done and entirely against the principle”.
Legal matters concerning pilots were handled by the Association’s barrister and the cases were becoming ever more complex, as the quirks of legal decisions arose. In 1902 a Clyde pilot had to pay £1,071 damages even though he had not been found in any way negligent or to blame for an accident. The ship-owners had gone bankrupt and the costs had been set against the pilots! For many decades the pilots had assumed that the signing of the bond for £100 gave them protection from liability for damages but it was then found that for an unknown reason, this condition applied only to Trinity House pilots. In 1902 at Barrow, a local official suspended a pilot for a very dubious infringement of the rules. The pilots took the matter to the County Court and proved that the official had no powers to suspend anyone. The official turned to Trinity House Pilotage authority, which, without further inquiry, agreed to suspend the pilot. The case was taken to the High Court and the Trinity House’s action declared illegal. However the pilot was required to pay part of the court costs and his own expenses amounting to some £100.
In 1908 Clyde pilot, J McKinley, was accused of navigating a vessel in a dangerous manner when pilot of ss Maracas inward-bound He met HMS Harrier outward-bound in visibility of about 11/2 miles; there was no collision, but the commander of the naval vessel made a complaint about the navigation of Maracas. The Sheriff, trying the case without assessors, said that it was a very clear case and stated, “I should say that the risk having been placed there by the Maracas, it was only averted by the prompt action of those in charge of the Harrier who succeeded in preventing what might have been a very serious disaster”. He found the case proved and fined McKinley £25 with £10 costs.
The incensed delegates to the 1908 Conference six months later were
unanimous in a demand for an appeal to a higher court at the expense of the Association. The appeal was dismissed, so the Association petitioned the King who passed it to his Scottish Secretary who merely passed it to the same High Court, not surprisingly with the same result. Commander Cawley, at the 1909 Conference said that he would try to appeal to His Majesty in person. However he drew attention to the depletion of the Management Fund in providing legal advice in the many and wide-spread court proceedings against pilots and in obtaining assistance in Parliamentary matters.
Following representations from Commander Cawley, all the members of the 1889 Select Committee agreed to assist the Association and Sir John Puleston arranged for a deputation from the UKPA to meet the president of the Board of Trade (Winston Churchill). Led by Commander Cawley and Michael Joyce MP (Limerick pilot), the Association Officers were introduced to Churchill and members of his staff. Churchill listened carefully to all the arguments placed before him. Given his ideas at the time (he was campaigning for the formation of MI5 to act against enemy agents), alien pilotage was a strong point in the Association’s favour, as was also the court proceedings against McKinley. Churchill promptly signed the order for a Departmental Committee on Pilotage to begin work in 1909.
In 1908, the Counsel to the Association had died, and he was succeeded by a Bristol solicitor, Sandford D Cole. Cole was a very competent person, who became a member of the Departmental Committee. From this Committee arose the Pilotage act 1913, encompassing much of what the pilots required:- freedom from illegal pilotage, a restriction on the issue of pilotage certificates, better rules generally and mandatory representation on pilotage committees.
The Pilotage Act 1913 and After
The implementation of the 1913 Pilotage Act was interrupted in many ports by the outbreak of war and there is no record of the activities of the Association for a couple of years. Many pilots entered the armed forces and several lost their lives on land and sea. Those who remained in the pilotage services braved torpedoes and mines: most received Mercantile Marine and War Medals. Some were decorated for specific acts of bravery.
After the end of the War the Association’s Solicitor, John Inskip, in conjunction with Michael Joyce, suggested that a Committee of Members of Parliament sympathetic to the pilots’ cause should be formed with a view to having assistance whenever legislation or matters affecting pilots was passing through Parliament. Inskip introduced the Officers of the UKPA to his brother, Thomas Inskip, KCMP, who agreed to assist. Thomas Inskip was to become Attorney General in several later governments and eventually a Cabinet Minister. A ten-member Committee was formed to continue discussions but the introduction of new pilotage orders did not go smoothly. Inskip, in one of his reports as Secretary in the early twenties, said he had attended ten inquiries in one year. And in six years there were more than twenty inquiries, not all brought about by the same type of objection. For example, in the Forth, the ship owners objected to the new ‘pooling’ arrangements, claiming that the pilots would become lazy, inefficient and incompetent.
During the War the subscriptions had been raised from 1/- per month to 1/6d and again in 1919 to 2/-. However the cost of correspondence, telephone calls, printing of agendas, minutes and expenses of travel were all putting the finances under pressure. A total of 24/- annually would not cover the amount required for long.
“THE PILOT”, appeared for the first time in 1920 through which membership increased from about 1,000 to almost 1,300 in 1921. The magazine proved to be the most efficient way of increasing the pilots’ awareness of problems, and indicating how difficulties could be avoided or averted by adopting better procedures. In 1923 the MP for Hull, Lt Cmdr Peter Kenworthy (Independent), who had been helpful in supporting the Humber pilots as a member of the House of Commons Pilotage Committee, agreed to become President when Michael Joyce retired but in 1924 he was forced to resign due to illhealth. Like Joyce he had seldom missed an Executive Committee meeting, once slipping away from a crucial debate in the House, to attend a conference. Peter Kenworthy was succeeded by Lord Apsley, MP for Southampton, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minster of Transport and a person known for his sympathies with seafarers in general. Refusing all fees, he was of invaluable assistance in the years to come.
Around this time there was unrest at Bristol, stemming from the introduction of steam pilot cutters which although having been in use at other ports since the turn of the century, were not popular with pilots from Pill. New bye-laws did not meet the pilots’ demands and they objected to the Board of Trade who ordered a local inquiry. The Bristol pilots told the Executive Committee of their intention to join a dockworkers’ union and that they could not remain members of the UKPA on the grounds that the Association represented licensed pilots who were unable to strike.
During the immediate post-war years, many cases of maladministration of pilotage affairs appeared with Dundee the best example. The pilots there were paid a weekly salary of £4 by the Authority, together with such further amounts as the Authority cared to distribute from the surplus earnings after they had met their own requirements. But there was a legal dispute between the Anchor Line and Dundee Harbour Board where the pilotage funds had been used to defray costs that had little or nothing to do with pilotage. In 1925 there were eight inquiries and the local branches were subsidised by £21 for each inquiry. Over a decade the Association’s finances were in a deficit of £212 which was eating into the accumulated funds and the larger ports were subsidising the smaller. At the 1925 Conference, John Inskip impressed upon members that there were always to be two funds established in each district: a Pilot Fund for administration and a Pilot Benefit Fund for disablement and retirement pensions. He took pains to explain and distinguish between the two types of funds that made it imperative and legally necessary to maintain them separate and distinct.
During the late 1920s, the cost of living was falling, the shipowners pressed for reductions in pilots’ earnings and in 1929 attacked the Liverpool pilots directly. Until then the local inquiries had been ‘round the table’ affairs with no formal structure. At Liverpool the authority agreed with the pilots that a reduction of 10% was warranted. The Chamber of Shipping, however, brought in their own counsel who used formal procedures, leaving the UKPA somewhat short in its planning. The pilots lost the case in that the previously agreed reduction was increased to 15%. During the same Inquiry the shipowners managed to include another principle into the reckoning, namely that of having pilots’ earnings set between the pay of the master and mate of the average vessel using the pilot.
There was a deputation to the Board of Trade making a point on the use of formal procedures at inquiries. The pilots, with members of the Parliamentary Committee, made known their strong case of injustice. Whenever there had been an objection to a by-law or dispute between the authorities, pilots or shipowners, the BoT found it easy to institute an inquiry. These were formal affairs and thereby expensive for pilots. Between 1925 and 1930, following the Liverpool example there was a series of applications for reductions in pilotage rates or incomes, mostly demanding cuts of 15-20 per cent but the Association managed to hold most of the cuts to 10%. There were other problems, not least in the matter of membership. Inskip, agreed with the Thames River Pilots’ Association to pay two guineas to one of their members who unsuccessfully took a case to court. He later learned that the man concerned was not a member: In fact only 73 of the 125 pilots of that district were members. There were other membership abuses such as, in a couple of inquiries, the local pilots suddenly had 100% membership several months before the inquiries took place so in 1935 a rule was introduced and passed that before the Association assisted a local branch, there had to be a substantial membership at least three years before any assistance was granted.
In 1935 the shipowners began attacking pilot cutters and methods of boarding to reduce costs. They demanded that the Liverpool pilot station at Point Lynas be closed and the cutter withdrawn. The Inquiry lasted seven days, four in Liverpool and three in London. Six counsel were engaged, of which two were briefed by the Association. There was a principle involved and Sir John thought it worth the fight. The Liverpool pilots won the case. But the expenses paid by the Association were over £1,300; the Liverpool Pilots’ Association returned £100 of this to the UKPA in appreciation of the support.
History does repeat itself especially at Barrow-in-Furness. A pilot there was docking ss Orion in 1935, when, without warning, a dockmaster ordered the headrope to be moved. The vessel sheered away from the lock wall and was damaged, for which the pilot was brought before the local Trinity House Commissioners and suspended. The evidence had been given in his absence and was later read over to him.
When Sir John looked into the matter he found that one of the Trinity House Sub-
Commissioners was a servant of the owners of the vessel. He wrote immediately to
Trinity House, who restored the licence and re-opened the proceedings.
In 1934 the Executive Committee, following consultation with branches, produced a seven-point policy for discussion in the branches related to the financial regulation of the pilot funds and associated costs such as cutters etc.
During the 1938 Conference on the Mersey, Liverpool pilots announced that they had 435 exemption certificates in force in their district, with a high average number of vessels on each certificate. One certificate had 114 vessels entered and although many of the vessels no longer existed over 29 vessels on one certificate was considered ridiculous.
WW2
War was impending and many members of the UKPA were commissioned officers in the Royal Naval Reserve. For the first two years of the War, Inskip carried on almost single-handed and there were no meetings. Many senior members of the districts were called into administrative matters to become involved in the re-organisation of war-time pilot services. The UKPA still continued to function but they had consult by letter or phone. Matters dealt with included the insurance of cutters during hostilities, employment of pilots during lack of shipping, registering apprentices to preclude conscription, the new compulsory pilotage order for war purposes, food rationing, clothing, liability for fire-watch duties or Home Guard stand-by.
Membership in 1938/9 was nearly 1,200 but there was to be a change. In 1942 the Secretary told the Executive Committee that 25 members of the Manchester Pilots’ Association had not renewed their subscriptions and had apparently joined the Transport & General Workers Union due to closer contact between the pilots, tug crews, canal operating staffs and dockworkers. Certainly the latter had received increases of more than 40% and some pilots were now receiving less than a dockworker.
A couple of months later, 112 Liverpool pilots, led by Lewis Jones, a former member of the Executive Committee also resigned Association membership to join the TGWU. The withdrawal of the Liverpool pilots was particularly galling for the Association members, in view of the costly support given in defending the retention of the Point Lynas Pilot Station a few years earlier.
From 1942 the Executive Committee met regularly every quarter, and in making plans for the future, the seven-point programme was resurrected, re-drawn and discussed at an informal conference in the summer of 1944. Shortly after the conference it was learned the Lord Apsley had been killed in action. The post-War political changes led to difficulties in finding a new president or indeed any parliamentary representation.
The General Election of 1945 was called at the same time and the Conservatives were in disarray. The senior Labour Members of Parliament had insufficient time to represent the Association and newer members were unwilling to take up the reins. In the UKPA debates it was found that the subscriptions would have to be increased from £2 16s per annum to £3. In 1949 at Hull the local authority decided to appoint pilots as choice pilots whether or not the particular pilot was willing to take the work. The Association decided to take interest in the choice pilotage situation and circulated 48 of the 60 ports: only 12 replied.
Discussions towards a standard for pilots’ earnings began to bear fruit in the early 1950s. In 1956 there was a Ministry of Transport Inquiry chaired by Sir Robert Letch. The “Letch Report” resulted in a structure for pilots’ earnings which lasted to the end of the century. Although not without criticism, as a basis for discussion, it simplified negotiations for half a century.
Modern Times
From 1960 onwards the UKPA turned its attention to pensions and gathered details of the many and varied schemes around the UKPA ports. Several ports had no official pension scheme: the smaller ports were particularly badly off. Charges were another area of variance and the mid-1960s were a time of impending change with a new method of tonnage measurement affecting pilotage charges. Every vessel had two sets of tonnages and only when a certain “delta” mark on the vessel (similar to the Plimsoll mark) was immersed would the higher tonnage charges apply. Pilots were very concerned over changes that were being used to curb incomes and many felt that it was time for direct action. In 1968 a new General Secretary and Legal Advisor, Edgar Eden, a barrister warned against any precipitate action on the part of the pilots fearing that if they disturbed the balance of the Letch Report, there could be action from the ship owners who would love to overthrow Letch and make pilots salaried employees.
Industrial Action
On 26th January 1971, after due notice being given to all sectors of the shipping industry, more than 1,400 pilots met in Birmingham Town Hall effectively bringing UK’s ports to a standstill for 24 hours. For the next couple of months the pilots’ representatives pursued a target of 20% increase in pilotage incomes and the final result was an increase of 16%.
The Pilots’ National Pension Fund came into being in 1971 and within a decade 99% of pilots were members and contributors. During the 1970s other issues were addressed including London pilots who became concerned about health issues, and in 1978 brought certain facts to the notice of the UKPA. As always finance was an issue and it became increasingly difficult for the UKPA to operate as a stand-alone group and it was therefore decided to seek affiliation with a larger union. In 1979 the UKPA and TGWU began steps to merge. Following the successful merger the membership increased and by the 1984 centenary of the UKPA it exceeded 99% of the total number of pilots in the UK.
1984 – The Present (by JCB)
All good things must come to an end and in 1984, in what represented a U-turn in the Thatcherite policies of encouraging free enterprise the Government decided to revolutionise pilotage and transfer responsibility for pilotage from Trinity House and other local pilotage commissioners to the ports by means of a new Pilotage Act. The UKPA found itself fighting for survival and much time and effort was expended in trying to ensure that the proposed legislation preserved the essential rights for pilots. Unfortunately, once the Bill was in the hands of the politicians, the UKPA lost control of the content and the resulting 1987 Pilotage Act effectively granted ports total power over pilots without any accountability. The Act also resulted in a division of UKPA membership between employed and self employed districts.
Whereas in some instances the pilots
(usually self employed) enjoyed a good
working relationship with their port (now
known as the Competent Harbour
Authority CHA) in many ports the
relationship was poor. In Liverpool the majority of pilots were bitterly opposed to being employees of the port and after much difficult negotiation were able to reverse their employment status to become self employed. The other major conflict was on the Humber where the CHA, Associated British Ports, sought to force employment onto the self employed pilots. That dispute, along with its tragic outcome has been well documented within these pages.
The most dramatic development post 1987 was the Sea Empress disaster which starkly revealed the lack of accountability of a CHA for the powers over pilotage that had been transferred to them. In 1997 the new Labour Government was sufficiently concerned by this lack of accountability to launch an enquiry which in turn led to the Department for Transport drawing up a Port Marine Safety Code. The UKPA were deeply involved in drafting this code and established a good working relationship with the DfT. Once published, pilots were concerned that whilst the PMSC provided a good framework for port safety, without legislation to underpin it, the document lacked teeth. Meetings commenced with the Government with a view to drafting legislation but these came to an abrupt halt as the situation on the Humber deteriorated into a serious dispute. At the same time the British Ports Industries Training (BPIT) forum, which had been working closely with the UKMPA in producing a set of standards and qualification requirements for UK pilots was also disbanded to be replaced by a body operated by the UK ports industry called Port Skills and Safety (PSS). PSS promptly excluded the T&G and hence the UKMPA from representation and subsequently became a dormant organisation. In 2003, the President of the UKMPA Lord Tony Berkeley made approaches to the shipping minister which resulted in meetings being resumed, both sides being fully in agreement that the safety of shipping and the environment is a priority. Regular meetings are now being held and the following report detailing the work of the Chairman and section Committee indicates that constructive progress is once again being made.
Piloting Concorde!
LONDON PILOTS PILOT CONCORDE!
World exclusive photo scoop for the PILOT magazine
View the original illustrated pdf magazine article (Page 10):
pilotmag.co.uk/userfiles/Pilotmag%20278%20(Jul%2004).pdf
On 19th April the last commissioned British Airways Concorde made its final journey to the Museum of Flight in East Fortune, East Lothian, Scotland. Due to the fact that there was no runway near to the museum capable of accepting Concorde the decision was made to take the aircraft by barge from Isleworth near Heathrow to Scotland under tow. The barge chosen for the voyage was the recently launched Terra Marique owned by R Wynn which has been largely funded by the government to assist the transport of abnormal loads by water, and to reduce congestion on the roads. The Concorde was to be its .rst major test and with the world’s media watching it was essential that everything went smoothly. Three London pilots, John Reid, John Freestone and Peter Widd are authorised London “bridge” pilots and although they were all involved in the planning John Reid, being on duty at the time of the trials became the lead pilot and therefore very much the hidden hero behind the success of the operation. Isleworth is right at the uppermost reaches of the tidal Thames and being beyond the limit of the London pilotage district also required the use of a London Waterman for the upper two miles. Navigation this far up the Thames has two major problems for pilots to contend with, namely the lack of water and low bridges. There were several critical bridges on the passage where the barge would be experiencing a minimum under keel and air draft clearance and this involved careful tidal and air draft calculations and required the up river passage to be staged over three tides. Early trials with the Terra Marique revealed that although the .tted with four thrusters these were ineffective in the strong tidal flow of the river and it was therefore decided to use two small river tugs: Bennett’s Steven B and the Port of London Authority’s Impulse. Further trials also revealed control problems when navigating with the tide so the decision was taken to undertake all under bridge towage against the flood tide for maximum control. The Steven B is a pusher tug and because the
barge had a stern door it was necessary to lash it up to the bow and to push the barge
stern first. In the month leading up to the passage John Reid worked closely with R
Wynn, Bennett’s, Chris Livett (Waterman) and the PLA and it is to the credit to all
involved that the passage was finally executed without a hitch although not without a few raised heartbeats resulting from a 45 minute delay in departure which made the Albert Bridge transit extremely critical. Many observers and the media were disappointed that once loaded onto the barge Concorde was actually placed on a hydraulic platform which lowered the aircraft out of sight (her lowest ever altitude?) of the many spectators lining the banks of the Thames. However, in the interests of permitting our politicians to have an excuse to visit the bar on the terrace the pilots had to plan for a one hour pause in the passage off the Houses of Parliament in order that Concorde could be raised up for a short period by way of a farewell salute. With no press permitted on either the barge or
the tug, John Reid took conduct of the pilotage and John Freestone and Peter Widd
provided essential back up by assisting in ensuring the critical alignment of the barge for
passing under the bridges. In common with most pilots they all understate their essential role but John Freestone did manage to find time to take some excellent and unique photographs during the passage. Once clear of the upper river the tow was berthed at the Littlebrook Power Station jetty just under the Dartford Bridge and handed over to the deep sea tug Argus on the 14th April with pilot Cerwyn Phillips who piloted the vessel to the outer port limits. Following a safe sea passage, Concorde was reassembled and rolled out for permanent display at the National Museum of Flight Link: (www.nms.ac.uk/ concorde/) on 19th April.
Although, as usual, the role of pilots was ignored by the media, the reputation of the
port rested totally upon pilotage skills and this passage has proven to be a very
positive PR exercise not just for the PLA but also for the concept of using UK’s
waterways rather than roads. The UKMPA are already members of the new Sea and
Water group (www.seaandwater.org) which is driving forward this European initiative in the UK.
Pilotage History Part 1
PILOTAGE HISTORY Harry Hignett
View the original pdf illustrated article from the magazine:
pilotmag.co.uk/userfiles/Pilotmag%20278%20(Jul%2004).pdf
The majority of serving UK pilots have joined the service since the implementation of the 1987 Pilotage Act and many are probably largely unaware of the origins of the UKMPA. June marked the 120th anniversary of the UKMPA (originally the UKPA) and for the 1984 centenary Manchester pilot Harry Hignett (now retired) wrote a book detailing the history of the UKPA. Long since out of print this book is now unknown to the majority of pilots but it contains much interesting research. Harry has recently updated this original work but having failed to .nd a publisher for the book he has permitted me to place it on my website for all to access. As an introduction Harry has kindly agreed to provide an edited version for inclusion in the magazine which I will be running over two issues.
PART 1: ANTIQUITY TO 1900
Although pilotage will have been undertaken since vessels first started trading and
ancient texts such as Homer’s Iliad from the 7th century BC make vague references
to pilots one of the most precise early written descriptions of a pilot’s work was
around 64 AD.
“The passage is difficult because of the shoals at the mouth of the river. Because of
this, the native .shermen in the King’s service go up the coast to Syrastrene (Surat) to meet the ships. And they steer them straight and true from the mouth of the bay between the shoals with their crews and they tow them to fixed stations going up with the flood and lying through the ebb at anchorages and in basins. These
basins are deeper places in the river as far as the port, which lies about 10 stadia up
from the mouth.”
In this extract we can recognise the work of an estuary or river pilot from the earliest times until the steamship arrived onto the maritime scene.
In the UK one of the earliest records is from the 12th Century. Godric was born in Norfolk in 1069 and became a Chapman (travelling salesman carrying his own wares). He turned to carrying them not only using the inland waterways but also on coasting vessels along the coast and across the North Sea to Denmark. He made the trip so often that he eventually became a ship owner at one time owning four ships. A “colourful” character he was actually referred to by some as a pirate before he turned his energies to religious fervour and sub-sequently gave all his considerable wealth to charity! Such was his skill of navigation that he was asked to pilot vessels and he became famous not only for his pilotage skills but also for his ability to forecast the weather. Giving up his pilotage career around 1110 he became a hermit and was later canonised becoming St. Godric of Finchale (near Durham). He died in 1170 at the amazing age of 101, and his hermitage became Finchale Priory where his tomb (despite being pillaged many centuries ago) can still be visited. Later references to pilots are for London and include a 1387 reference to a “Pilot of the Black Deeps” (Thames Estuary). Other London records from a log-book reveal that pilotage charges on the Thames in the 1400’s were as follows:
to the losmanne who sailed me into the Temse . . . 10s 6d
to the man who led the shippe through the bridge . . . . . 8d
to the man who led the shippe into the dock . . . . . . . . . . 6d
The first organisation of UK pilotage was established by Trinity House and in 1457 the Trinity House of Hull was an exclusive maritime organization which in 1512 passed an ordinance restricting pilotage between Hull and the mouth of the Humber to members of Hull Trinity House. The founding of the Corporation of Trinity House on the Thames was in 1514. There were initially, 40 members (mostly pilots), 8 assistants, four wardens and the master. For the first fifty years the Corporation was, to all intents and purposes, exclusively concerned with pilotage, and most of the senior members were important naval officials, shipmasters or both.
The Cinque Ports pilotage was formally inaugurated in 1527 in Dover and before the end of the sixteenth century there was strife between the Dover pilots and their Trinity House counterparts because, when they disembarked off the Cinque Ports, the Corporation pilots attempted to pilot inward bound ships. However, the boating services were provided by relatives and friends of the Dover pilots and they were naturally reluctant to offend the Cinque Ports pilots. The Corporation pilots therefore had to travel home by land, a journey of at least two days via Canterbury to Gravesend and thence by boat to Deptford. Naturally the Cinque Ports pilots found similar difficulty in obtaining vessels to pilot from the Thames outwards. One may criticise one-way pilotage as being wasteful and inefficient, but ships in the days of sail arrived in great numbers according to the winds and travelling in company against pirates and enemy ships. Pilots near a pilot station remained at home on stand-by. So began the Thames pilotage system; Trinity House outwards, Cinque Ports inwards.
The Cinque Ports Pilotage Act of 1717 was the first parliamentary legislation covering pilotage. The Dover pilots now had something that Trinity House had not and the Elder Brethren applied for their own legislation. The next Pilotage Act, passed in 1732, confirmed the provisions of the 1717 Act and, gave exemption to the Trinity Houses of Hull, and Newcastle wherever their respective jurisdictions overlapped.
In the mid 1700’s establishing longitude at sea was difficult and many shipmasters feared to approach the Isles of Scilly, with rocks that made the area a noted graveyard for ships. The fishermen of the Scillies began to take up pilotage, meeting the vessels well out of sight of land and guiding them past the Isles up the channel and by 1800 they conducted ships to all parts of the British Isles and the coasts of France and Belgium. The successful application of parliamentary legislation led to several local Pilotage Acts, including those for Boston, Lincs, in 1774 and Hull in 1800 which were older established ports. In the late 18th century new industrial ports such as Swansea appeared receiving its first pilotage regulations in 1791.
The first comprehensive Pilotage Act was placed on the stature book in 1808, “An
Act for the better regulation of Pilots and of the Pilotage of Ships and vessels
navigating the British seas”. Its most important provisions were the establishment
of compulsory pilotage in all districts where licensed pilots were
available and the authority was given to the Deptford Trinity House to form
pilotage districts where it was deemed necessary to control pilots and regulate
pilotage. Almost immediately 35 Trinity House “outports” appeared around the
coast of Britain. The 1808 Act was replaced in 1812 but re-enacted most of
the provisions of its predecessor and gave the Trinity Houses of Hull and Newcastle
the powers they had exercised previously and also in “any ports or harbours or
places within the limits of their respective jurisdictions”. All licensed pilots were required, in an entirely new section, to execute a bond for their good behaviour in the sum of £100. This requirement has been carried through to the present day with the amount unchanged.
An important section of the Act attempted to define the responsibility and
rights of the ship owner, master, and owner or consignee of the cargo, with regard to
any damage to ship, goods or persons occurring through “neglect, default, incompetency or incapacity of any pilot taken under the provisions of the Act.”
Another Pilotage Act was passed in 1825 and prolonged the existing situation, without easing the litigation then giving the industry extra worries.
In 1835 a Royal Commission was instituted to look into the “existing laws,
regulations, and practises under which pilots are appointed, governed and paid in
the British Channel and the several approaches to the Port of London, and
also in the navigation connected with the other principal ports in the United
Kingdom.” It was the first major inquiry into pilotage and one of the main items in the findings and report of the Commission was the recommendation that there should be a central body to control all pilotage affairs. Alas the ensuing Pilotage Act of 1836 did not include this far-reaching proposal. The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 included and consolidated most of the existing legislation on pilotage, as did the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894. Further inquiries arose in 1860, 1870 and 1880: that of 1870 being particularly significant being specifically instituted to study compulsory pilotage since it developed into a major study of all aspects of pilotage lasting three months. However, its findings were ignored by Parliament. At the end of the 19th century it was again obvious that the existing legislation was outdated and inadequate and, after a searching inquiry in 1910/11, the Pilotage Act of 1913 came into being.
The Nineteenth Century: The Coming of Steam
The years from 1800 to 1914 were the most difficult any pilots have had to face.
Iron ships and screw propulsion appeared mid-century, improving standards and
speeds but pilots had to handle ships up to eight times larger, with single screw
propulsion. When shipowners realised that ships were no longer dependent on wind
and tides they suggested that pilots were no longer as important and proposed
reductions in pilotage tariffs. The 19th Century opened peacefully but by 1803
Britain and France were once again at war which continued until the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. There followed a period of peace in Britain for nearly the next 100 years but it was anything but peace and contentment for pilots. The Pilotage Act of 1808 promoted a wider regulation of pilotage than previously, but the 1812 Act included an extra paragraph:
“No owner or master of any ship shall be answerable for any loss or damage for, or by reason of, any neglect, default or incompetence of any pilot taken on board of any such ship under or in pursuance of the provisions of this Act.”
A somewhat simple idea, but the interpretation of this clause by the courts brought chaos for shipowners and pilots alike and fortunes for the lawyers in the Admiralty Courts. The clause granted absolute freedom from claims for any damage done to other vessels or property to ships under compulsory pilotage. i.e. if ship ‘A’ under compulsory pilotage collided with ship ‘B’, a barge or any other vessel not subject to compulsory pilotage, ship ‘A’ was free from liability even when, under normal circumstances she would be at fault. Under this clause ship ‘A’ was also free from liability for damages after striking a shore installation. In 1824 another Pilotage Act replaced the 1812 Act, a section of which made it possible for a non-British vessel to enter or leave British ports without pilots.
Modern administration
During the early part of the 19th century British vessel entering and leaving the Tyne enjoyed preferential rates of pilotage. The advantage over foreign vessels was ended by the 1824 Act that gave equal treatment to foreign vessel wherever their governments gave similar treatment to British vessels. To compensate the Tyne pilots for the loss they would have sustained they were to be paid, by the Treasury, “Reciprocity Money”, viz. the difference between the old and the new tariffs for foreign vessels. Newcastle Trinity House claimed the full difference for all vessels entering the Tyne although many never went above the entrance, but the pilots were paid only on the ships they piloted. The unclaimed pilotage was then allocated to the Superannuation Fund, although the pilots disputed the right of Newcastle Trinity House to retain the money and demanded a full distribution of the amounts involved. The Newcastle authority refused and was unwilling or unable to account for the money.
In 1861 the Treasury discontinued Reciprocity Money, but as compensation the pilots were to receive, for a ten-year period, a sum equal to the Reciprocity Money paid in 1861 of which only 50% was handed to the pilots. The pilots commenced legal proceedings against the Elder Brethren who in turn sent for the pilots’ leaders, senior pilots, John Hutchinson and Robert Blair. The two pilots refused to attend and were threatened with dismissal. Newcastle Trinity House then began to examine and license local fishermen. The two pilots then went to London, to the Board of trade and Parliament. In 1863 an order by Parliament forced Trinity House to publish the accounts that showed a balance of more than £20,000 although further unclaimed pilotage of over £3,207 was not shown in the accounts. A long legal battle with Trinity House at Newcastle ensued from which the pilots emerged successful and a new body, the Tyne Pilotage Commissioners, was formed in 1865. It was proved that Trinity House had withheld over £24,000 from the pilots whose average wage at that time was about £180 per annum; the Elder Brethren claimed £3,500 for expenses incurred in opposing the Parliamentary Bills and other legal proceedings. Of the pilots, Hutchinson and Blair, they were to become founder members of the UKPA almost twenty years later.
An inquiry into pilotage in 1835, was the first to open up the subject in depth,
covering all major British ports and found that to make pilotage entirely optional
would “hold out a boon to the foolhardy” recommending that certain exceptions to compulsory pilotage be made for vessel in the short sea trades. The Commissioners suggestion that there was a need for a central body to control local authorities was ignored. About this time the pilots of the east coast ports were badly hit by Parliamentary legislation giving preferential taxes to the Canadian trades. Timber from the Baltic abruptly dropped to a minimum. Pilots of the west coasts such as Liverpool and Bristol found their incomes rising, just another example of the wild swings and variations of incomes due to political decisions.
A further Act in 1840 covered many aspects of pilotage and continued exemptions from compulsory pilotage to non-British vessels flying the flags of countries having so-called reciprocal treaties with Britain. Several decades later the Board of Trade was to use this provision against British pilots even to the extent of allowing complete falsehoods to be used about exemptions for British-flag vessels in continental ports.
In 1853 an Act of Parliament dissolved the Court of Loadmanage of the Cinque Ports and it effectively became a Trinity House Outport. One of the conditions was that the pilots could retain their licenses which were issued for the district from Dungeness to London Bridge and vice-versa. It was this condition that was to prove so disastrous for the Cinque Port pilots some thirty years later.
At the 1888 Inquiry into Pilotage, it was stated that on the Thames there was
bribery and corruption and that a few pilots had obtained more “choice” work
than they could handle and farmed it out making considerable income in additions
to their ordinary fees. Trinity House seemed to meet the situation with complete inaction.
The Parliamentary Select Committee of 1870
The Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 collected all the pilotage laws then in force and re-enacted them into part V. In 1860 ship owners, still affected by the freedom from liability of compulsory piloted vessels, again attacked the principle of compulsory pilotage at the meeting of the Parliamentary Select Committee into Shipping. The Committee recommended its abolition but Parliament took no action. In 1870 the Parliamentary Select Committee again examined pilotage with terms of reference that were much the same as the previous committees. But this was the most comprehensive Inquiry ever with witnesses from all sections of the shipping industry, port authorities and Government Departments. The Deputy Master of Trinity House and the Principal of the Marine Department of the BoT, each spent days explaining the vagaries of the several pilotage systems.
In the decade1871-81 there was great unrest among pilots especially in the Bristol Channel since towards the end of the 1850’s the ports of Cardiff, Newport and Gloucester had begun a campaign to remove the superiority claimed by Bristol Corporation in the matter of pilotage since the 16th century. Their efforts were rewarded in 1861 by the passing of an Act that gave them independence in their own pilotage affairs. This had the effect of disturbing the pilotage income of the Bristol pilots and caused a number of them to move across the Channel to take licenses at Cardiff.
In the last half of the 19th century the UK shipping industry was subject to severe cycles of economic booms and depressions of the British overseas trades. The improvement in steam propulsion bringing larger vessels tended to reduce incomes and bring disorder to working routines and rotas of pilots. But the underlying cause of the pilots’ apprehension was still the clause in the 1812 Pilotage Act relating to the freedom of liability for vessels subject to compulsory pilotage and it was also the cause of about seven major Governmental inquiries into pilotage. This clause can be said to have led indirectly to the formation of the United Kingdom Pilots’ Association.
The Origins of the United
Kingdom Pilots’ Association
It was the situation in the Bristol Channel, particularly at Bristol that brought together all the parties most likely to form a core of a national body since a series of events there as a result of the change in the nature of maritime traffic and trade, in particular a growth of the new South Wales industrial ports. In the 1870’s Samuel Plimsoll, campaigning for increased safety for British ships and seamen, called together a number of interested parties: MPs, shipowners and mariners. Known as the Plimsoll Committee, the secretary was Plimsoll’s brother-in-law Roger Moore, a Bristol toilet-soap manufacturer. One of those consulted by Plimsoll’s Committee was Captain George Cawley, an experienced shipmaster, and part owner of a steamship, who later left the sea to take a post ashore. A few months after being appointed pilot master at Cardiff he had been drawn into a serious dispute between the 84 pilots there and the port management. A channel dredged through notorious banks, the Cefyn-y-wrack shoal, in the approaches to Cardiff docks, silted up. In March 1878 pilot John Howe, refused to take the Royal Minstrel to sea with a draft of 24 ft 8 inches. The dockmaster said that there was 25 ft of water over the shoal at the time. A month later, David Samuel also refused to pilot a ship to sea in similar circumstances. The charterer of both vessels complained that his ships had been neaped and thereby delayed three days. Both pilots were suspended. The Cardiff pilots wanted a strike. But Cawley resigning in disgust, advised the pilots to lobby for support from Plimsoll’s Committee.
Within a month Plimsoll had visited Cardiff, and verified the pilots’ complaints. A few weeks later, he raised the matter in Parliament causing the Board of Trade to ask the Cardiff authorities to explain their actions. There was enough of an outcry for a local inquiry to be set up in 1879 and two seats were subsequently allocated for the pilots on the new Pilotage Board. Across the water the 37 pilots at Bristol were also unhappy about the actions or inactions of their pilotage authority. With 37 apprentices and 74 Westernmen (time-served apprentices), any fall in traffic affected the whole village of Pill – a village of watermen and pilots on the River Avon about a mile from its confluence with the Severn. The traditional working routine could mean a loss of income of disastrous proportions if “choice” (appropriate) pilotage appeared. The pilots did not work a “turn” or “rota” system, but sailed in competition the first pilot to board an incoming vessel normally given the work and he would also claim the outward pilotage. In November 1880, however, a firm of Bristol shipowners, the Great Western Shipping Company, with a very successful line across the North Atlantic, built several larger steam vessels to cope with the trade and resolved to have their own “choice” Bristol pilots. The masters were instructed to take only the pilots displaying the prearranged signal. Three pilots were covertly selected and informed of the date and time of arrival of the ships.
In December the same year one of these “choice” pilots, on the way to sail his cutter from Pill Creek, encountered some 50 women and boys and was tarred and feathered. A week later the Westernmen went on strike – licensed pilots could not. The “choice” pilots tried in vain to get boat- men at Ilfracombe, (some 30 miles down the coast) to take them to a couple of inward-bound ships. Returning to Pill they were blocked from taking their cutter to sea by a chain made fast to a bollard which had been organised by the owner of the local inn, Captain Henry Langdon (then current secretary of the Bristol Pilots’ Association).
At the suggestion of Roger Moore, Tamlin, with Edward Edwards of Cardiff, met representatives of the Bristol Pilots’ Association, Craddy (chairman), Langdon and Joseph Browne at the Waterloo Hotel, Pill. Initially a Bristol Channel Pilots’ Association was envisaged, but those present encompassed pilots from other districts, and they suggested forming a British Association There were favourable responses from all the major pilot districts around the British Coasts. In October 1883 a meeting at Bristol, of representatives from the largest ports decided to form a national body using the services of the Bristol Pilots’ Association. Plimsoll was approached to be chairman, but being heavily involved in Parliament refused and suggested Captain George Cawley.
The Early Years
The Inaugural Conference opened on 11th June 1884 in the Athenæum Hall, Bristol. Supported by a few remarks from Bedford Pim, the 30 delegates from a total of 18 UK ports approved the selection of Captain George Cawley, Lt RNR, as president. Observers from Spain and Denmark also attended. Roger Moore represented the American Pilots’ Association.
Henry Langdon, as Secretary, stated there were 3,168 pilots in the British Isles and in 1883 they piloted 168,418 vessels for an income of £427,532; the association hoped to redress wrongs, repeal bad laws and obtain proper representation.
The subscriptions were agreed at 12 shillings per year. Towards the end of the
Conference, which lasted two days, Cawley reminded the delegates, to be
careful to maintain a watch that no further attack on compulsory pilotage should be made.
The Second Conference was held in London in 1885 with 50 delegates – 20 more than attended the previous year –and representing 28 ports. The Secretary’s report gave the membership as being between 1,200 and 1,300 out of a possible 2,955 licensed pilots many of whom were earning less than £30 per annum.
Liverpool, the venue for the third Conference was in the throes of a severe depression, but its maritime system and connections were unsurpassed in efficiency but not economy. Cawley informed members that just before the Conference, he learned that two Poole pilots had been suspended for six months for attending the previous year’s conference without permission even though their colleagues had carried out the work in their absence. In the following year, 1887, at South Shields the Committee introduced two new officers, JT Board, solicitor and A Northmore Jones, barrister. In future the legal work would be separate from the day-to-day work of the Association. In a debate, Bristol pilots explained that as the average age of their pilots was 54 their pension funds needed supplementing, they were promoting a Parliamentary Bill to amend the local Act. Robert Blair (Tyne) said that the main problem in the Tyne was that 30 of the 161 pilots took two thirds of the gross pilotage income. Again this was due to the effects of “choice” pilotage. At the sixth Conference, in London the members looked back with satisfaction at the development of the UKPA which had been formed to protect the principle of compulsory pilotage, to ensure that pilots had proper representation on pilotage bodies and to maintain a watch on the funds which pilots were expected to contribute to.
The 1889 Pilotage Bill was about to pass through Parliament and each clause was debated with great thoroughness and enthusiasm. Alien pilotage and pilotage exemption certificates were again points of irritation. In another direction many pilots tried to have a clause inserted to make the towage of vessels without pilots illegal. Thus the pattern of the work of the UKPA was set in the first six years. When the Merchant Shipping Act (Pilotage) 1889 came into force the members found that more then half of their wishes had been incorporated in its provisions. The moderate success provided a guide to their future actions. The new Act, however, was not without loopholes.
In the early 1890’s Trinity House came in for strong criticism for its apathy in many respects of pilotage administration.
It was said that their pilots were required to produce certificates from magistrates or
clergymen that they were “well affected to the Sovereign and her Government”, but
a foreign subject could be handed a pilotage certificate at his will.
1895 – 1900
In South Wales, Llanelli pilots were threatened with abolition of compulsory pilotage. Initially they had approached the Association for advice, but an offer of legal aid had not been taken up and, at the Cardiff Conference in 1895, there was a note of discord. Three times the Llanelli representatives were asked in open session to comment. They felt that Mr Northmore Jones could be placed under “social influence” and therefore they felt his services should not be used. Apparently Northmore Jones’ services were taken up a couple of years later, for the Association had fought the challenge to compulsory pilotage at Llanelli and were preparing to ward off yet another attack. In the years immediately before the end of the 19th century incomes were an ever present topic and the Executive Committee were at pains to search every corner to find arguments for the negotiations. In 1898 they suggested that as pilots were also quarantine officers, they should receive an allowance from the State. This idea was to be taken up by their MPs. The passing of the 1894 Merchant Shipping Act, which incorporated the pilotage provisions of the 1889 Act, unfortunately did little for pilots and this was reflected in attendances at conferences which began to decrease even though incomes were declining.
Pilots’ incomes at the turn of the Century pilotage incomes averaged about £300 per annum.
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