Features

Pilotage History Part 1

PILOTAGE HISTORY Harry Hignett

View the original pdf illustrated article from the magazine:

pilotmag.co.uk/userfiles/Pilotmag%20278%20(Jul%2004).pdf

The majority of serving UK pilots have joined the service since the implementation of the 1987 Pilotage Act and many are probably largely unaware of the origins of the UKMPA. June marked the 120th anniversary of the UKMPA (originally the UKPA) and for the 1984 centenary Manchester pilot Harry Hignett (now retired) wrote a book detailing the history of the UKPA. Read the rest of this entry »

Piloting Concorde!

LONDON PILOTS PILOT CONCORDE!

World exclusive photo scoop for the PILOT magazine

View the original illustrated pdf magazine article (Page 10):

https://www.pilotmag.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/Pilotmag-278-Finalweb.pdf

On 19th April the last commissioned British Airways Concorde made its final journey to the Museum of Flight in East Fortune, East Lothian, Scotland. Due to the fact that there was no runway near to the museum capable of accepting Concorde the decision was made to take the aircraft by barge from Isleworth near Heathrow to Scotland under tow. The barge chosen for the voyage was the recently launched Terra Marique owned by R Wynn which has been largely funded by the government to assist the transport of abnormal loads by water, and to reduce congestion on the roads. The Concorde was to be its .rst major test and with the world’s media watching it was essential that everything went smoothly. Three London pilots, John Reid, John Freestone and Peter Widd are authorised London “bridge” pilots and although they were all involved in the planning John Reid, being on duty at the time of the trials became the lead pilot and therefore very much the hidden hero behind the success of the operation. Isleworth is right at the uppermost reaches of the tidal Thames and being beyond the limit of the London pilotage district also required the use of a London Waterman for the upper two miles. Navigation this far up the Thames has two major problems for pilots to contend with, namely the lack of water and low bridges. There were several critical bridges on the passage where the barge would be experiencing a minimum under keel and air draft clearance and this involved careful tidal and air draft calculations and required the up river passage to be staged over three tides. Early trials with the Terra Marique revealed that although the .tted with four thrusters these were ineffective in the strong tidal flow of the river and it was therefore decided to use two small river tugs: Bennett’s Steven B and the Port of London Authority’s Impulse. Further trials also revealed control problems when navigating with the tide so the decision was taken to undertake all under bridge towage against the flood tide for maximum control. The Steven B is a pusher tug and because the

barge had a stern door it was necessary to lash it up to the bow and to push the barge

stern first. In the month leading up to the passage John Reid worked closely with R

Wynn, Bennett’s, Chris Livett (Waterman) and the PLA and it is to the credit to all

involved that the passage was finally executed without a hitch although not without a few raised heartbeats resulting from a 45 minute delay in departure which made the Albert Bridge transit extremely critical. Many observers and the media were disappointed that once loaded onto the barge Concorde was actually placed on a hydraulic platform which lowered the aircraft out of sight (her lowest ever altitude?) of the many spectators lining the banks of the Thames. However, in the interests of permitting our politicians to have an excuse to visit the bar on the terrace the pilots had to plan for a one hour pause in the passage off the Houses of Parliament in order that Concorde could be raised up for a short period by way of a farewell salute. With no press permitted on either the barge or

the tug, John Reid took conduct of the pilotage and John Freestone and Peter Widd

provided essential back up by assisting in ensuring the critical alignment of the barge for

passing under the bridges. In common with most pilots they all understate their essential role but John Freestone did manage to find time to take some excellent and unique photographs during the passage. Once clear of the upper river the tow was berthed at the Littlebrook Power Station jetty just under the Dartford Bridge and handed over to the deep sea tug Argus on the 14th April with pilot Cerwyn Phillips who piloted the vessel to the outer port limits. Following a safe sea passage, Concorde was reassembled and rolled out for permanent display at the National Museum of Flight Link: (www.nms.ac.uk/ concorde/) on 19th April.

Although, as usual, the role of pilots was ignored by the media, the reputation of the

port rested totally upon pilotage skills and this passage has proven to be a very

positive PR exercise not just for the PLA but also for the concept of using UK’s

waterways rather than roads. The UKMPA are already members of the new Sea and

Water group (www.seaandwater.org) which is driving forward this European initiative in the UK.

Integrated Bridge Systems

INTEGRATED BRIDGE SYSTEMS

LINK TO THE ORIGINAL ILLUSTRATED PDF MAGAZINE ARTICLE:

pilotmag.co.uk/userfiles/Pilotmag%20277%20(Apr%2004).pdf

With the development of increasingly sophisticated electronic bridge equipment the general trend has been for the various elements to be located around the available space on the bridge rather than in any logical layout. This has usually resulted in good quality equipment being rendered inefficient and impractical to use. It is a sad reflection on the maritime industry that very little notice has ever been taken of the requirements of the end user and new ships continue to be accepted by owners with expensive equipment located in inefficient and inappropriate locations. In response to feedback on this subject, the Nautical Institute hosted a major seminar at the SeaTrade exhibition at the Excel Centre in London’s Docklands in September 2003. Entitled “Integrated Bridge Systems and the Human Element” the seminar sought to bring together the manufacturers, shipping companies and end users with the hope that co-operation between the three could result in the maritime industry finally accepting that rather than being randomly placed on board because it was mandatory to carry it, modern bridge equipment should be an effective enhancement to the safety of a vessel especially if well designed and located! Naturally, pilots are at the front end of the user group and IMPA was an official partner to the seminar. One of the challenges facing Integrated Bridge Systems (IBS) is to accommodate user requirements in different situations. For example the requirements of a pilot are different to those of a watchkeeper away from land and a good system should be effective for all user requirements. The aims of the seminar were:

• Identify best practices for the use and implementation of existing and new technology.
• Identify the training needs associated with the implementation of new equipment for future watchkeeping.
• Document the basic principles of operation and the key issues of concern, for use in industry-wide technical and regulatory committees.
• Explore options for developing a system of user feedback for future design and implementation.

A BRIEF HISTORY

The modern wheelhouse basically originated with the advent of the steamship where for the first time the helmsman and deck officer were brought together into an enclosed space integrating the functions of navigation, steering, engine control and communications in the early years of the twentieth century. The equipment was basic, consisting of a wheel, engine telegraph, communication voice pipes and signal flags and lamps. The navigation area was a separate “chartroom” off the wheelhouse with no forward view. This basic layout survived virtually unchanged until the 1970’s when some radical companies adopted the idea of integrating the chartroom into an enlarged wheelhouse usually behind the helmsman. Some tradition was maintained in that this chartroom space was curtained off from the main wheelhouse at night and was thus still a separate area. I was recently amazed to pilot a six month old 100, 000 tonne tanker which had been built with this traditional layout in a miniscule wheelhouse. It was mainly on the continent that around this time the Germans, Scandinavians and Dutch introduced an open bridge with a logical layout of navigation equipment mainly being driven by the requirements of a sole watchkeeping officer and (officially) a lookout! The French went one stage further and also integrated the engine console into the bridge space. In the 1980’s these same continental operators undertook the most revolutionary step since the installation of bridge window and installed a radical element called a chair for the watchkeeper. Not only that but they also designed a console layout that enabled the watchkeeper to actually sit on the chair and reach essential equipment without getting up. The radar had a motorised foot operated control that enabled it to be lowered out of the line of sight through the bridge window. Concerns that a usually overworked and thus exhausted watchkeeper would fall asleep if he sat down in a comfortable chair were soon realised so a watch alarm arrangement was introduced to keep him awake. On-going groundings have revealed not just the practice of switching these alarms off but also the common practice (quietly endorsed by the shipowner to save overtime costs) of no lookout being posted on the bridge at night as per requirements. Because of this phenomena of an exhausted watchkeeper falling asleep in a chair many companies have refused to fit such a luxury item in their wheelhouse, preferring to rely on the tried and trusted fact that without a chair the watchkeeper will lean on the bridge front and when he falls asleep his head will hit the bridge window and he will wake up!! So, as we progress into the 21st century we find that during the last century there has been very little change in the mindset of the ship owner with respect to the human element looking after his investment. The majority of companies still believe that ships should be manned by the cheapest possible officers using the cheapest and minimum requirement of equipment. The same watchkeeper is expected to operate, and interpret the information from, this equipment with a minimum (or non existent) training in a state of fatigue induced by long and irregular shift patterns

THE EQUIPMENT

When I was an apprentice back in the 1960s radar was still not compulsory on board ships but much discussion was taking place over how it could enhance a vessel’s passage times in reduced visibility and the economic benefits resulted in most companies purchasing them. One factor that was emphasised by the ship board users was that all radars should have standard controls in order that an officer could transfer from any ship to another and immediately be familiar with the controls and functions. Well, as we all know although some key symbols were standardised the layout of the various controls was left to the whim of the manufacturers and as additional functions were introduced the result was a vast array of different control panels many of which defied all logic and lost sight of the requirements of the end user. The ideals of the 1960’s were finally lost altogether when the simple VRM EBL control knobs were replaced by a rollerball frustratingly inefficient to use. Feedback from irate users has now seen this basic function restored but only as a more expensive “optional extra” which is rarely fitted by the ever cost conscious owner! Anyway, having decided to fit a radar, the usual location for this equipment was on the port side of the bridge to balance the location of the engine room telegraph on the starboard side. The other piece of equipment gaining prominence at that time was the VHF set which in the 1970’s rapidly became the preferred mode of intership and port communications finally replacing the Aldis lamp and signal flags. These sets were usually located as far as possible from the radar and telegraph. It is to the shame of our industry that non standard, user unfriendly equipment is now being incorporated into non standard and user unfriendly “integrated” bridge systems!

INTEGRATION

As previously mentioned the reduction in officer manning and an increase in equipment led to a requirement for a certain element of integration and in the 1970’s and 1980’s companies and manufacturers came up with the bridge console. Hence we witnessed the introduction of a long console plonked in the middle of the wheelhouse with engine controls on the right, the autopilot and helm controls in the middle and the radar on the left. The VHF was rarely integrated into this unit being usually placed on the sides of the chartroom enclosure, still located to the rear of the bridge. This layout is still to be found on newbuilds especially on vessels constructed in the far east which despite being at the forefront of microtechnology for domestic equipment rigidly sticks to 1970’s style equipment and layouts even to the extent of encasing modern daylight radars (with a preference for traditional green on black displays which cannot be seen in sunlight) in traditionally styled pale green housings. Yet another of the world’s great unsolved mysteries! Still, from a pilots’ point of view such ships tend to be entirely reliable and predictable and we don’t have to stay on board for long. A variation on the same theme was to place this console right to the front of the bridge under the windows. Again this is still a popular layout with all its associated problems of cleaning the inside of the windows and condensation running down off the windows onto the console equipment. A unique risk associated with this layout was brought home to me when I was second mate. One quiet afternoon in the Mediterranean the engine suddenly coughed and died. Alarms duly rang and engineers were unable to restart it. A process of elimination brought an irate chief engineer to the bridge to confront the concerned Captain as to why the emergency engine stop had been pressed. The Captain turned his ire on me as the watchkeeper who had been innocently keeping a look out and enjoying the sun on the bridge wing. I in turn looked at my dutiful lookout who was still kneeling on top of the console calmly cleaning the inside of the bridge windows. He had accidentally knelt on the main engine emergency stop button!! Fortunately we were well away from land and there was no other shipping around. The console was rapidly modified with a Perspex cover for the emergency stop button!! Despite far too many examples of poor layout, full integration is being realised and the best examples are to be found on ferries and modern N. European and Scandinavian vessels. On these the watchkeeper has all the information and equipment he requires in view or to hand from the armchair which can be slid out of the way when not required. Radar, ECDIS, engine monitoring, autopilot, VHF with a duplicate manning position are all incorporated and the seat is normally set high so that the direct line of sight is over the top of the console with almost an all round view from the conning position. The visual information can therefore be rapidly compared to the “virtual” information from the ECDIS and radar. Brilliant, or is it? Whilst it is a delight to pilot such vessels it is necessary to bend down to adjust controls and there is a danger at night of light pollution from all the screens reducing night vision. The wheelhouse, rather than being in total darkness is often illuminated by soft red lighting. It is all too easy to be lulled into a false sense of security and miss a small light from a badly lit yacht or small vessel not detected by the digitised radar display which is increasingly set to provide a “clean” image with the auto function eliminating all “clutter” which of course in choppy or rainy conditions can also eliminate small targets. The most serious case of integration lulling watchkeepers into a false sense of security was the grounding of the passenger ship Royal Majesty where a failure of the aerial connection to the GPS set resulted in the GPS calculating the position by means of dead reckoning. For a period of 34 hours successive watchkeepers diligently plotted the GPS DR position cosseted in their splendid modern integrated bridge until reality arrived with dramatic but fortunately non fatal disaster. The officers were criticised for over reliance on the automated features of their integrated bridge but the company in turn was criticised for not giving the officers training in integrated bridge operations. Integration was mentioned as a factor in the enquiry but the question needs to be asked would the grounding have occurred with the same officers had a traditional bridge been fitted to the vessel? It is not certain but in my opinion it is probable that without integration the discrepancy between the radar image and GPS positions being obtained would have resulted in concern leading to double checking of the position by separate means. It can be seen from the aforementioned that in reality integration is frequently far removed from the images presented in glossy manufacturers brochures. However, what is of equal concern is that some of those brochures are still unashamedly advertising poor design layouts and I have downloaded an example from the Internet.

THE NI SEMINAR

I was very disappointed that I was unable to be released from my piloting roster to attend this seminar but I have copies of most of the papers presented and the Institute’s own official report issued following the event. The presentations were made by a wide variety of representatives from the maritime sector including those concerned with the technical aspects of integrating and licensing of new equipment. Running to a vast number of pages the papers paint a very revealing image of the current state of the process along with many personal opinions and recommendations but the basic message is that since the technology exists it should be placed on board ships and integrated into a format that provides the primary information required in a manner that is easily assimilated by the watchkeeper. All the contributors were unanimous in the opinion that any data produced by equipment was useless unless the recipient had received comprehensive training in its interpretation and application. So, we are not talking about rocket science here! What we are dealing with is forcing often reluctant ship owners to invest not just in the equipment but also in the “human element” and that is proving to be a major stumbling block. IMO have made great progress in gaining basic agreement on the principles of integration and the new SOLAS Chapter V provides best practice guidelines for wheelhouse layout and equipment specifications. The problem with the IMO is that progress is painfully slow since it relies on full agreement of all members with all the varied interests that this entails. However, the process does work but a prime example of the problems is provided by the introduction of AIS and its installation and use on board ships. Wisdom originally perceived that the installation of a new and relatively untested technology should be gradually introduced over a period of several years. The USA, having decided that AIS would be a valuable tool in the “war against terror” managed to accelerate the implementation time and it will be now compulsory for all vessels over 300 grt to be fitted with AIS by the end of this year. AIS is now appearing on an increasing number of vessels but how is it being integrated? The answer is not at all. Although there are many companies offering full integration of AIS into ECDIS and radar displays over 80% of owners are opting to fit the minimum requirement of an alpha numeric unit similar in size and design to a GPS unit and these have been condemned as useless for any purpose for which AIS is designed. I have dealt with these AIS problems in detail in previous issues and they are available on my website at www. pilotmag.co.uk. As for the ships’ watchkeepers the overwhelming majority have not received any information or training in their use. The primary use of AIS by watchkeepers in my experience is to identify other vessels and contacting them by VHF either to confirm or contravene the COLREGS! The other main usage is to send text messages to other ships. Both of these uses contravene good bridge practice and the general consensus is that there will be a major AIS assisted collision being investigated in the near future! There is however one valuable aspect of shipboard AIS and that is the provision of a standard pilot plug demanded by IMPA which enables a pilot to plug into the unit and use the data on his portable pilot unit if his port uses it. This facility is a great step forward and it is a credit to IMPA that they have managed to make the provision of this plug a compulsory part of the specification. The down side of this feature is that the information is dependent upon the ship’s AIS being correctly installed and calibrated since any defects on the vessel’s AIS will also be suffered by the pilot user.

THE SEMINAR REPORT

The Nautical Institute’s report following the seminar contains submissions from those who presented papers and the conclusion drawn from these are that there is some very high quality equipment available but that its integration into the bridge is frequently haphazard and with a vast difference between the methods of extracting the required information much of the required information is not always presented to the end user in a clear format. This of course confirms what users would have reported had they been fully consulted by owners and their requirements passed on to the manufacturers as happens in the rest of the transport industry! These shortfalls are being gradually addressed. The IMO working group 13 is tasked with examining the presentation of navigation related information with a view to removing current inconsistencies and with developing a new generation of composite navigation display that integrates information derived from two or more systems. There is also a requirement to clarify the difference between an Integrated Navigation System (INS) and an Integrated Bridge System (IBS) since both terms are currently loosely applied. The suggested clarification by a manufacturer was:

• INS is a system that integrates information from several navigational aids

• IBS integrates information from a variety if different shipboard data sources.

This may include passage execution but only if combined with an INS. The integration of information should:

• Use all available sources

• Automatically verify the validity and integrity of data

• Ensure fail-safe redundancy

• Support unambiguous situation awareness

• Automatically provide (and prioritise) alarms for arising hazards

• Be user friendly.

The users’ requirements were detailed by a ship owner representative who identified a need for intelligent systems that would be pro-active in alerting a watchkeeper that the vessel was running into danger. In recognition that a watchkeeper is unable to perform multiple tasks when under pressure the alarms should be prioritised to a “need to know” sequence. I suppose an example of this would be that if an anti collision warning was sounding then other distractions such as engine alarms or the telephone ring would be suppressed until the watchkeeper had acknowledged this alarm. In general the opinions of those attending the seminar can be summarised by concerns being expressed that too much information can be counter productive and a vast array of screens will detract from the ideal of looking out of the window and thus obtaining an overall situational awareness. The standardisation of control systems was considered to be a necessity with users being faced with, keyboards, joysticks, trackballs, menus etc. but history suggests that this is probably a utopian dream! The functions essential for navigation are not always logically available and equipment is often embellished by the manufacturer to present the minimum requirement in the best commercial light. Equipment should be simple to use and understand with essential basic safety information readily available. There was unanimous agreement that training in the use of complex systems was essential but sadly lacking. A few top companies did ensure that all their officers were sent on training courses and given familiarisation time on “hand-over” but these were the exception.

CONCLUSIONS

This seminar served to highlight the fact that information is currently provided to a watchkeeper in a generally inefficient, non prioritised manner from an array of badly laid out equipment. The most serious consequence of this is that there is evidence that such equipment is reducing safety on navigation. A recent press report on accident trends by a leading PI Club stated “…recent reports on several collisions and casualties suggest that computerisation of bridges (integrated bridges, GPS, ECDIS etc) may have been one of the contributing underlying causes.” The PI club points to numerous recent examples whereby mariners have made expensive and even tragic mistakes despite having been provided with all this technology. Investigations indicated that the “humantechnology” interface revealed many shortcomings. The report concluded that “evidence suggests that despite improvements in technology and of training through various STCW conventions, the majority of collisions continue to occur due to a failure of the bridge team to follow simple principles of bridge watchkeeping and violations of the collision regulations.” This leads neatly to the common sense viewpoint made by our own Geoff Taylor to the seminar in the following (slightly edited) presentation which all pilots will fully endorse. “In a previous paper to the first of these seminars, I made reference to the Transitorless Flat Panel Display Screen or Bridge Window! In all that we have spoken of let us not throw away the natural tools we have at hand. On the ship’s bridge there remains the basic IBS/INS consisting of the mark one eyeball and the afore-mentioned bridge window and integrating their transmitted images uses the most sophisticated and versatile computer known to man, the human brain. These though simple and long available tools must not be discarded or even put to one side for all of the perceived benefits of technology. The harnessing through proper training and hard earned experience of hi-tech equipment to generate clearly defined and easily used decision support information will give us all a safer and better future. It is essential in our profession to bear in mind at all times that the tools we use to perform our tasks are decision support systems and NOT decision makers in themselves We should all welcome IBS/INS for the joined up process of support it can offer but it should never be forgotten that the decisions arrived at can and must continue to be accessed through the time honoured practice of good seamanship supported by the exercise of sound judgment”. Sums it all up really!

JCB

The IMO have produced a full set of guidelines for bridge layout in MSC circular 982. Running to 33 pages it is available for download in pdf format from the IMO website page 106 -112 on the MSC section or the direct link ( if you are an accurate copier!!) is: http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D1878/982.pdf

AIS Update

AIS UPDATE

As you aware I have been following the development and implementation of AIS with close interest and the units have been compulsory on new builds since July 2003 and on tankers during their first safety equipment survey following that date. This year will see a flurry of fitting to all vessels over 300grt prior to the December 2004 deadline. This rapid implementation of new and relatively untried technology represents the fastest introduction of a compulsory system ever to pass through the IMO and voices of caution have largely been ignored.

A Peculiar Problem!

In my previous articles (viewable on my website pilotmag.wpengine.com) I identified areas which I felt may cause problems in the future and some of these such as correlation of AIS and radar targets due to differing propagation media are becoming apparent, leading to software problems on integrated systems. One problem that I hadn’t envisaged, which was reported in a major feature in Fairplay magazine in September, was that the US Coast Guard (USCG) were currently not authorised to use one of the AIS channels (87) because that frequency had previously been sold off in a auction to a private company, MariTEL. At that time there was a stalemate in negotiations with MariTel who were requesting around $200 million in compensation for closing down their CH87 coastal infrastructure which was being developed to permit internet accessibility for small craft. The USCG, having insufficient funds to repurchase the frequency at that price were apparently accusing MariTEL of being unpatriotic! Intriguingly that article indicated that the matter was set to be resolved by the US Federal Communications Commission last November in an attempt to avoid lengthy and costly litigation. At the time of going to press the latest news is that the matter has not been resolved. MariTel have increased their compensation claim to $270 million and the case is heading to the courts!

The War on Terror?

Reflecting some of my own concerns there are some senior figures in the Maritime world now questioning the suitability of an open frequency AIS in a world on a heightened terrorist alert. It is widely acknowledged that with the vastly increased security in the airline industry, the next major terrorist attack could involve merchant shipping. The availability of vessels’ identities, tracking and cargo data to any person equipped with an AIS unit creates the potential to produce the very nightmare scenario that the US authorities are so desperately trying to avoid.

User Survey

Despite the recent introduction of AIS the Tees and Southampton pilots undertook a survey in July for presentation at the AIS Seminar hosted by the Nautical Institute last September. The complete results of this survey are on the magazine website (pilotmag.wpengine.com) but the basic findings were that shipowners are wary of large investment in the technology until they have had a chance to monitor its effectiveness. The Tees / Southampton survey revealed integration as per the following pie chart.

As to Masters’ and watch keepers views 84% were positive but the perceived usefulness of the equipment was in the identification of other shipping in order to establish VHF contact!

The survey also confirmed my own observations that no Master or officer has received any formal training in the use and function of AIS but 42% of the survey’s respondents had considered the instruction manual and installation technician’s information sufficient.

Feedback Required

In a separate and unique initiative being coordinated by the Nautical Institute, the

manufacturers of AIS units, in recognition of the embryonic nature of AIS, are seeking feedback from mariners in order to identify any unforeseen technical problems to enable them to improve performance in future units. Pilots are amongst the best placed to identify shortcomings on the large variety of ships that they serve and by the nature of their operating in congested waters and in close proximity to other vessels. This is a rare chance for pilots to enhance their professional reputations and influence the development of technology. Participation is important and reports should be sent via the dedicated “AIS Forum” section of the NI website at:

www.nautinst.org/ais/index.htm

116th Annual Conference

116th UKMPA ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Crown Plaza Hotel, Liverpool

I have noticed many members, who do not attend the annual conference, do not fully realise what goes on unless they read the detailed minutes which, as the one who writes them, I fully appreciate does require some stamina to fully digest! Whereas I do not intend to return to the old Pilot magazine format of filling most of the year’s content with conference proceedings, it is a very important part of our organisation’s activities and a forum for pilots to debate the varied issues affecting districts around the country. Equally importantly the conference is a social event where pilots can get together and swing the lantern!

 

The 2003 Conference was hosted by the Liverpool pilots and was held in the Crowne Plaza Hotel within a new development on the site of the old Princes dock in the shadow of the Liver building.

The conference was opened by the UKMPA PRESIDENT: Lord Tony Berkeley

Agenda Items discussed reveal the full extent of the valuable work undertaken by pilots and members of the Section Committee on behalf of members. This work is unpaid and mostly undertaken in their spare time. The following is a list of topics along with those involved in them.

RETIRING CHAIRMAN:

Norman McKinney (Belfast pilot)

PNPF: Richard Williamson (Boston pilot & Deputy Chairman of the Board of Trustees)

PNCP: Mike Kitchen (London Pilot and Chairman)

TREASURER: John Pretswell, (Forth Pilot, Secretary and Treasurer)

UKMPA RULES: John Pretswell

INSURANCES: John Pretswell

IMPA: Geoff Taylor (Tees & Vice

Chairman of IMPA)

LES CATE: (Incoming Chairman, Vice President EMPA, Southampton Pilot) MCA: (Les Cate)

MAIB: (Les Cate)

ITF: (Les Cate)

TECHNICAL & TRAINING: John Wright (Tees)

In addition to the above presentations given by pilots, the following are brief notes on topics given by associated speakers:

T&G LEGAL: Fergus Whitty, (T&G Legal Director)

WORKING TIME DIRECTIVE AND PILOTS

This had come into force for pilots in August 2003 and was basically a Health & Safety directive designed to ensure that all workers, regardless of whether they were employed or self employed, received adequate rest. Although not contained within a specific group pilots were included under what is termed the Horizontal Amending Directive (HAD).

The directive lays down the following basic criteria for safe working / rest:

·        Max 48 hour week

·        20 minute break every 6 hours of work

·        11 hours uninterrupted rest between each working day

·        1 day off per week

Fergus warned that such criteria would be likely to trigger unscrupulous employers to attempt to pressurise workers into waiving their rights under the WTD and advised delegates of some of the ploys that may be used such as re-defining “working time”, advising workers that they needed to sign “opt out” agreements, offering a new “collective agreement” and above all withholding information on “compensatory rest”. The current “opt out” rules permitted individual workers to elect to work over the 48 hour limit but there was no opt out from the night work provisions, 4 weeks annual holiday or the daily and weekly rest periods.

Fergus then went on to define “Working Time” and of particular relevance to pilots is an interpretation made by the European Court of Justice which has clarified the situation for workers on-call. Basically if a worker is at his place of work he is officially “working” even if only on stand by and that definition applies even if he has facilities for rest.

If a worker is on stand by at home or “comparatively free” away from his work place then this is not counted as “working time”.

Employers cannot designate periods of inactivity at work as “rest breaks”.

Fergus then defined “night work” and stated that of relevance to pilots there was an absolute limit of 8 hours for “night work” if the “work involves special hazards … or mental strain”.

Again if any of the provisions of the night work regulations are set aside then adequate “compensatory rest” must be provided.

To summarise the situation for pilots Fergus warned delegates to be aware that employers may use the directive to introduce changes to established practices but pilots’ had powerful negotiating tools by means of the negotiated agreement and the “compensatory rest” provisions.  In the subsequent Q&A session the main questions revolved around work patterns in different districts. In the opinion of Fergus, any established roster systems would be compliant so long as both the port and pilots were agreed that they were safe and any breaches of the criteria were covered by “compensatory rest”. He did however warn delegates that if a district were subject to an outside audit then recommendations could be made to review breaches.

LEGAL: Michael Nott (UKMPA retained legal advisor)

During the past year Michael had been involved with matters in the following ports:

Wisbech

Falmouth

London

Poole

1987 PILOTAGE ACT

MN was of the opinion that there was now an urgent need to address the shortcomings of this Act. Since an Act of Parliament could only be changed by another Act, MN was of the opinion that there was now an urgent need for this to be undertaken. The wheels could be set in motion by a Private Members Bill and Lord Tony Berkeley had offered to sponsor the Bill and Fergus Whitty had offered his services to progress it.

Q&A

In the subsequent discussions Michael detailed the process for a Bill to become law but noting that it was a very slow process which would involve a lot of work for Section committee and Fergus Whitty.  Other questions referred to the rights to self employment under clause 4 with several districts having received varying legal interpretations. MN was of the opinion that C4 offered no protection and needed to be amended.

Graham Hutchinson (Manchester) had been dismissed from the Clyde in 1996 and during his case against the Clyde, supported by the UKMPA & the T&G.  Graham had been dismissed without reason and despite everybody stating that the Clyde could not do that, they had and they had got away with it. During his hearing the Act had been described an “unnecessary and restrictive piece of legislation” and the senior judge, in summing up the case had stated that the Clyde had acted wrongly but since the Pilotage Act offered no protection to the pilot he could not rule against the CHA.  MN agreed that such cases proved the inadequacies and ambiguities of the Act. Another problem was that any disputes over the Act required costly court proceedings and MN felt strongly that any new Act must include a disputes procedure.

GUEST SPEAKERS: In addition to the above speakers the conference welcomed guest speakers:

NICK CUTMORE: (Secretary General of IMPA)

Nick explained the following areas where IMPA had been active:

·        Working with the IMO on a revision of resolution A485.

·        The joint EMPA / IMPA safety campaign which had had quite an impact on the ship owners and the IMO. There was considerable concern at the high level of defects and failures that pilots encounter on a regular basis.

·        Work was on-going with the shipping industry on bitt failures and AIS reliability.

Such involvement raised the profile of pilots as professionals with valuable relevant experience especially within IMO.  Nick was pleased to announce that IMPA membership was growing the finances were sound and he hoped to see UKMPA members at the IMPA conference 2004 in Istanbul (28th June-2nd July). (See page13)

MIKE POWELL: Director, Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting Programme

(CHIRP) Director Mike Powell provided an overview of the CHIRP initiative which was based on the aviation industry model. The idea was that any individual could confidentially raise issues of concern to an independent reporting body who would then bring it to the attention of the regulators and management with the original reporter remaining anonymous. Whereas the MCA and MAIB were regulatory and investigative bodies, who were generally reactive to incidents, it was intended that CHIRP should underpin those organisations by providing the “precursor” information from those working within the industry who were best placed to identify potentially dangerous / disastrous situations. CHIRP was therefore interested in gaining information on bad practices and minor incidents which may lead to major incidents. The anonymity of any reporter was guaranteed.

Mike then detailed the status of CHIRP as a charitable, non profit making trust with an executive board of trustees who provided the governance. The organisation had a three year contract funded by the DfT but no one from the DfT sat on the board. Members of this executive board consisted of members from the MCA, OCIMF, NI and aviation industry experts.  There is also an advisory board made up from various maritime experts which was still being finalised and Les Cate had accepted an invitation to join this board.  The advisory panel would collate reports and would be largely responsible for deciding what action should be taken over the reports and would monitor the effectiveness of the response and CHIRP itself. The organisation would also have a small permanent staff who would be the only ones who would know the identity of the reporter.

The reporting programme would cover all sectors of the maritime community from serving mariners on both domestic and foreign ships along with other sectors including, ports, classification societies, charterers and insurers through to equipment manufacturers and installers.

When and what do you report?

·        When you wish others to be made aware of a situation

·        When other reporting procedures do not work or are not available

·        All other avenues have been exhausted

The procedure for dealing with a report involved:

·        Report received

·        CHIRP contacts reporter. This initial contact would continue until the reporter was confident that the process would protect their identity. This process in the aviation industry had meant that not one reporter had ever been identified in 21 years of operation.

·        The report is then sent to the organisation concerned

·        Organisation responds

·        Response transmitted to reporter

·        Process repeated as required to satisfaction of reporter / organisation. This process ensures malicious reporting is eliminated.

·        Action to be taken over report discussed and agreed to achieve most positive result

·        Reporter advised of outcome

·        Assess outcome to ensure that it’s been effective.

·        At the close of the process the only document referring to the identity of the reporter is returned and no records of that reporter are kept in any manner within CHIRP.

·        The storage technique of data within CHIRP ensures that no examination of a collection of reports could identify any reporter.

The main questions from delegates raised concerns over confidentiality and anonymity of the reporter to which Mike detailed the protection methodology.

TONY WOODLEY: General Secretary T&G

Guest speaker Tony Woodley, in a passionate presentation, explained to delegates that although new to the position as General Secretary the key issues to be faced in the future were old ones and in particular employment legislation and pensions. He expressed frustration with the current erosion of rights and a genuine desire to right many of the wrongs that had been inflicted upon workers and he saw it as his duty to try to deliver more protection for jobs, workers rights and pensions. The fight against bad employers and legislation that supported bad employers were key areas where he

intended to focus his efforts and there was an urgent need to fight for the legal rights of the work force.

TW then quoted several recent cases highlighting current abuses of employees which had exposed existing legislation as inadequate. The existing laws resulted in workers paying the price for Globalisation and supported the rights of shareholders over those of the workforce. Whilst on one hand the Government was signing up to much EU legislation they had consistently refused to sign up to EU employment legislation and the recently passed UK employment Act offered no real protection for workers and would be illegal under EU rules. TW was realistic that such laws could not be overturned but he wished to use his position to persuade Government that rather than protecting employers, protection of workers rights was a vote winner rather than a vote loser.

Turning to pensions TW was firmly of the opinion that the existing pension regime needed to be reformed. Restoring a link between RPI and pensions was essential for pensioners and the £6 billion required to restore the link could be found if the Government could be persuaded of the political advantages. Recent Governments had not just ignored the State pension sector. During recent years 65% of occupational pension final salary schemes had been terminated or closed to new entrants by employers. These employers pleaded hard times but during the 15 years of good times of surpluses they had robbed funds of £19 billion with pension holidays and the Government, which now claimed it was powerless to act, had also robbed the funds by introducing taxes on fund surpluses. The action of closing funds to new members had introduced new problems in that with no new members the pension funds were not receiving new money to support them and the workforce now had differing terms and conditions. Unless the Union fought for justice and rights on this matter then the closure of all final salary pension schemes was inevitable. The promotion of “stakeholder” schemes removed responsibility for pensions to employees whose pensions were then at the mercy of “market forces”.  TW was passionate in his belief that every worker had a right to a pension and he had been lobbying hard at the Labour conference and had raised a motion to make pension contributions compulsory and to introduce legislation forcing employers to make pension provisions for workers. Despite coming under extreme pressure to remove the word “compulsory” the vote had been won and TW was working to progress the motion into legislation.

Tony reassure delegates that he was not a militant but was frustrated at the lack of

focus of unions in tackling the core injustices in the workplace and of facing demoralised work forces. Prior to becoming General Secretary he had worked with the government and had achieved recognition on key points and obtained money to keep factories open and was proud that many of these were now operating profitably. It was this spirit that motivated him to keep on educating whatever Government was in power to the advantages of providing workers with the rights they deserved. TW was encouraged by the large interest and commitment to fighting for rights shown by the UKMPA by the presence of so many delegates at the conference. It was that commitment that he was determined to revive in other sectors around the country in order to generate confidence to use Union membership to improve conditions for all.

LOUISE ELLMAN MP: (Liverpool Riverside)

& Member of the Transport Select Committee (TSC).

Norman McKinney introduced Louise Ellman MP who had kindly agreed to address the conference at the invitation of the Liverpool pilots.

Louise opened her speech by acknowledging that since becoming an MP she had become aware of how little people knew about how Government worked and the role that MPs undertook. Likewise, since becoming a member of the TSC she in turn had become aware of many aspects of transportation that previously had been outside her sphere of knowledge. Pilots and pilotage had been such a case and she regretted the fact that there was such a low public awareness of the critical role that pilots played in the safety of shipping.  Interest in shipping was only aroused for the wrong reasons following a disaster.  Through meetings with the Liverpool pilots she had been made aware of the critical role that pilots played in the safety of shipping and consequently the economic development & prosperity of Britain as a trading nation.

Liverpool had a rich maritime tradition and had grown up around seafaring and looking at the present and future, the river and its trades held the key to its prosperity.  The port of Liverpool was now enjoying the highest level of tonnage handled in its history and the award to Liverpool as culture capital in 2008 was an ideal moment to bring inward investment and regeneration. Louise welcomed the news that cruise liners were to return to the port which in turn would increase tourism and its associated inward investment.

Underlying all of this was the need to ensure the safety of shipping and in this pilots were the key element.

Louise concluded by emphasising that she was aware of the many issues being debated at this conference and many of the problems being faced by the UKMPA and she was willing to be fully involved in helping pilots in any manner that she was able and in particular in maintaining professional standards.

LES CATE addressed the Conference as the new Chairman:

Following his election as new chairman, Les addressed the conference by paying tribute to Norman McKinney reminding the delegates of all the issues that Norman had dealt with and concluded by wishing Norman a long and happy retirement, stating that Norman had served the Association “above and beyond the call of duty and deserves our heartfelt gratitude and appreciation”.

The sentiment was supported by the

assembled delegates who provided Norman with a standing ovation. Norman replied by thanking the delegates for their warm send off. He had undertaken the role of chairman to the best of his abilities and he hoped that he had built on the principles established by the founders. He wished the Section Committee and all members success in the future.

The above resume of the conference is a very skeletal account of the proceedings.  Some pilots have questioned as to what their subscription provides. I would urge those doubters to take the time to read the conference minutes along with the reports included in the agenda papers. The defeat of the EU ports directive is just one example of where the UKMPA has had an effect which even alone would be worth the subscription. The dedication of those committed to fighting for all our rights not only deserves recognition but the full support of all pilots. It is acknowledged that the subscription can seem large to pilots from a small port but it is no coincidence that the UKMPA is the first organisation that pilots from such ports turn to when their future is under threat.  Michael Nott’s report reveals how the UKMPA has achieved successful resolutions to problems in such ports.

IMMERSION AND HYPOTHERMIA

Although this is a very grim topic to feature in the magazine the reality is that as pilots we daily face the risk of immersion frequently in conditions of extreme cold. The following article has been written by retired Liverpool Pilot Don Twells who has been a senior instructor with the British Red Cross specialising in Immersion and Hypothermia. Don has sent this for publication because he feels that pilots and pilot boat crews should be aware of the latest information on the subject. As one who hasn’t attended a First Aid course for many years my own recollection of dealing with immersion and hypothermia is not only very hazy but also well out of date. The explanations and techniques, especially those learned following the Fastnet disaster, could well save a life should the “unthinkable” happen.

DROWNING

Some 500 deaths per year occur from drowning in England and Wales alone. Approximately 19% occur in the sea, 71% in inland waters and swimming pools and a further 10% drown in their own baths. Many of the victims are competent swimmers and die within 1 metre of safety. Among adults, alcohol is a contributory factor.

PHYSIOLOGY OF DROWNING

Sudden immersion in cold water causes a sharp intake of breath resulting in panic breathing and frequent submersion. This compounds the respiratory distress and the victim, having compromised their buoyancy, may begin to sink, at the same time swallowing (not inhaling) large volumes of water. Water does not enter the lungs, it is prevented from so doing by a combination of repeat swallowing and laryngeal spasm eventually resulting in hypoxia, loss of consciousness and ultimately death. Water usually only enters the lungs at the point of death when the larynx becomes relaxed.

TYPES OF DROWNING

Near Drowning – The casualty is rescued just before the point of death. Dry Drowning – As the drowning person sinks and unconsciousness deepens they continue to try and breathe thus water flows through the pharynx stimulating the reflex which triggers the larynx and epiglottis to close off and protect the trachea, diverting water into the stomach. Due to acute hypoxia the casualty will have died before water enters the lungs. Fresh Water Drowning – If a sufficient volume of water enters the lungs it will cause an interference with the process of external respiration by preventing the passage of gases between the alveoli and the pulmonary capillaries. Haemodilution is created by the rapid absorption of the water into the blood which in turn grossly distorts the pH value of the blood. This may result in cardiac arrest some 2-4 minutes after rescue. Salt Water Drowning – In these circumstances the opposite occurs. Salt water entering the lungs is more solute than blood; therefore water is drawn into the alveoli from the blood stream increasing the volume of fluid in the lungs. This increases the viscosity of the blood and more sluggish circulation eventually slows the heart rate to the point where cardiac arrest occurs. This can occur 8-10 minutes after rescue. Types of protective clothing should include a face piece to prevent salt water splashing on the lips. Secondary drowning – Should a drowning victim be successfully rescued and resuscitated they may appear to have fully recovered. However, if water has entered the body, this can cause irritation to the pulmonary lining of the lungs which in turn leads to a clear secretion filling the lungs. death can occur up to 72 hours later.

MAMMALIAN DIVING REFLEX

Another feature of some drowning mainly in the young is the mammalian diving reflex. This primitive and little understood reflex is activated in circumstances where the victim is suddenly plunged into very cold water face first. The most immediate effect is the almost total shutdown of the respiratory, circulatory and nervous systems to the point of suspended animation and apparent death. Victims have been known to make a complete recovery after 38 minutes submerged and 16 hours resuscitation. It must be understood that a casualty when first immersed in cold water will behave very oddly. They may refuse rescue and indicate that they are swimming to the USA etc. They often will swim away from a boat or other means of rescue.

FIRST AID TREATMENT FOR DROWNING

• Establish Airway.
• If required commence resuscitation.
• Never perform abdominal thrust. (This will transfer water from stomach to lungs)
• Check pulse twice in different places. (Particularly if hypothermia is present).
• Never apply direct heat to a hypothermic victim.
• If a thermal blanket or exposure bag is available, remove wet clothing and place casualty inside.
NEVER GIVE UP ON A DROWNING PERSON – resuscitation should be continued until hospitalisation.

IMMERSION AND DROWNING

Immersion injuries and drowning are medical conditions which can affect a person who, deliberately or accidentally, goes into the water. They account for most deaths in water and for many of those occurring after rescue. Immersion injuries are due to the physical characteristics of water and its effects on the human body. The important characteristics of water are density, thermal capacity and thermal conductivity. These three together govern how immersion affects our heart, circulation and metabolism. If we remove heat loss from the equation and put a man into a swimming pool containing water at body temperature 37.C he will neither gain nor lose heat. Before entering the water much of his 5 litres of blood volume will have collected in the veins in his legs due to gravity. The water’s density is approximately the same as that of the swimmer’s body. In water he is weightless and the hydrostatic effect of water around the legs pushes the blood pooled in his veins back into the trunk, especially, the heart. The more blood the heart contains, the greater the cardiac output. The relationship between heart volume and cardiac output provides the reason for laying people down who have fainted or are in shock. This drains the blood from the veins in the legs and back to the heart thus increasing cardiac output. The increase in the return of venous blood from the legs to the heart during immersion also causes the hydrostatic pressure in the heart chambers and major blood vessels to increase. Effectively there is now too much blood in the heart. On land about 1 litre of blood was not being used, it had collected in the legs. When the swimmer is in the water the blood returns to the heart. The heart senses this surplus and gets rid of it by the increase of urine production in the kidneys. This process continues until cardiac output and pressures in the circulation return to normal. If the swimmer remains in the water long enough to lose a large amount of urine, when removed from the water the total blood volume will be much lower than before immersion. On standing up blood will again pool in the legs. Suddenly blood volume in the heart will be drastically reduced. Blood pressure and cardiac output will be reduced and blood flow to the vital organs will also decrease. The effects of immersion are increased still more if the water is cold. Water conducts heat 25 times more efficiently than air and can hold 1000 times without proper insulation, is therefore very rapid. The body responds to heat loss by constricting blood vessels, diverting blood away from the limbs and back to the trunk. The constriction of veins in the limbs exaggerates the effect of immersion on limb venous blood return and hence cardiac output, blood pressure and urine production. Cold also causes restriction of the blood vessels which carry blood away from the heart. When these arteries are constricted the heart has to work harder to overcome the increased resistance to flow. As a result the heart needs a greater oxygen supply because it is doing more work. If the heart does not receive this oxygen it can fail or stop completely. This is why cardiac deaths and other heart problems are much more common in winter than in summer. Both immersion and cold reduce the amount of blood in the limbs particularly the legs and increase the volume in the trunk. When the casualty is rescued, blood pools in the legs and causes blood pressure and cardiac output to fall below normal. This is the reason why during the Fastnet Race a few years ago so many persons died. Some stayed with their damaged yachts and they survived. Those that went into the water died, in most cases the casualties were alive when the helicopter arrived. They were able to talk and assist the winchman to put the lifting harness on. However as soon as they were lifted clear of the water, blood drained back to their dangling legs. Casualties went into shock, dying before they could be hauled into the helicopter. Rescue Helicopters now use horizontal stretchers and lift all casualties from the water in a horizontal stretcher and keep them horizontal until hospitalisation. The lesson to be learned from this is that even after swimming for pleasure never come out of the water and start running around or playing games. Instead sit quietly and allow the blood volume to readjust. 30 minutes should be sufficient.

FIRST AID TREATMENT OF IMMERSION

Whether an immersion victim lives or dies more often than not depends upon the first aid given by his rescuers, rather than the intensive care he receives subsequently after hospitalisation. For this reason it is essential that all those who may be engaged in the rescue of such victims should be absolutely clear on the correct first aid treatment to administer. In recent years medical research has identified several factors which may result in death, either during immersion or just after rescue. An understanding of these may assist the doctor in the medical management of the post immersion patient. In practice: 1. Is the casualty breathing, and is there a pulse present in a large artery (Carotid)? If not, clear the airway and begin Resuscitation. 2. Having ensured that adequate ventilation and heart action are present, try to prevent further heat loss by the use of windproof garments or blankets wrapped around the casualty. 3. Lift the casualty from the water in a horizontal position and keep the casualty in a horizontal position at all times and transport to the nearest medical care. NOTE In all first aid we do not now check for a pulse at the pressure points. Circulation or not is determined by observing the skin colour of face and lips.

HYPOTHERMIA

Hypothermia is the condition when heat is lost from the body core. Normal body temperature is 37ºC. Hypothermia occurs when the body temperature falls to 35ºC. If the body core temperature falls below 26ºC. then recovery is most unlikely and death is probable. The ability of the body to resist cold depends on age, health, fitness and psyche. Alcohol, some drugs and illness will all reduce the resistance to hypothermia. It is worth remembering that unusual behaviour may be evident i.e. a hypothermic person may complain of being too hot and will begin removing clothing. This must be discouraged.

SYMPTOMS – MILD HYPOTHERMIA

37ºC to 36ºC – Normal shivering has begun.
36ºC to 35ºC – Cold sensation, goose pimples, unable to perform complex tasks with hands, shivering can be mild to severe, hands are numb.

MODERATE HYPOTHERMIA

35ºC to 34ºC – Shivering is intense, muscle unco-ordination becomes apparent, movements are slow and laboured, stumbling pace is evident, mild confusion. Test by making the casualty walk for 30ft in a straight line. If unable to do so the casualty is hypothermic.
34ºC to 32ºC – Violent shivering persists, difficulty with speech, sluggish thinking, amnesia appears, gross muscle movements sluggish, unable to use hands, stumbles frequently and signs of depression.

SEVERE HYPOTHERMIA

32ºC to 30ºC – Shivering stops, exposed skin turns blue or puffy, muscle coordination very poor, inability to walk, confusion, incoherent irrational behaviour, but may be able to maintain posture and appearance of awareness. 30ºC to 27ºC – Muscle rigidity, semiconscious state, stupor, loss of awareness of others, pulse and respiratory rate decreases, possible heart fibrillation. 27ºC to 25ºC – Unconscious, heart and respiration erratic, pulse may not be detected. 25ºC to 24ºC – pulmonary oedema, cardiac and respiratory failure, death. Death may occur long before this temperature is reached.

FIRST AID TREATMENT:

Hypothermia The basic principles of re-warming are to conserve heat that they already have and to replace the body fuel they are burning up to generate that heat. If a person is shivering they have the ability to re-warm themselves at a rate of 2ºC per hour.
Mild to moderate Hypothermia Heat loss must be reduced by additional layers of clothing, increased physical activity and removing the person away from the elements. It is essential to keep a hypothermic person hydrated and fuelled. Carbohydrates will quickly be released into the blood stream for a sudden heat surge. These are the best to use for a quick energy intake especially in mild cases. Food intake should include hot liquids, sugars, proteins and fats but only in mild cases. Alcohol and tobacco (Nicotine) are to be avoided. Some external methods of providing heat should be carried out Body to body warming in a thermal blanket or similar.
Severe Hypothermia Heat loss must be reduced. Use of thermal blankets, bivvy bags, sleeping bags must be encouraged. In such insulated conditions casualties can re-warm themselves more efficiently than external warming. Food and fluids should not be given if hospitalisation is close by. However where the casualty occurs in isolation warm sugar water may be given. Note that the function of the stomach will have shut down and therefore solids should not be administered. This warm sugar solution may be given every 15 minutes. This will be absorbed directly into the blood stream, thus providing internal heat for the casualty.
• DO NOT RUB THE EXTREMITIES. (This will increase circulation and move the cold blood from the extremities to the vital organs)
• DO NOT GIVE ALCOHOL.
• DO NOT TRY TO HEAT THE EXTREMITIES ARTIFICIALLY. (This will also increase circulation)
• DO NOT PLACE THE CASUALTY’S LIMBS IN CONTACT WITH THEIR BODY.

Don Twells

Donald F. Twells 1934 – 2004

Died 15th June 2004

Don was born on 21st March, 1934. He was educated at Prescott Grammar School and joined HMS Conway in September 1949 at the age of 15, where he was an excellent student and cross country runner. On leaving the ‘The Conway’ he sailed with Clan Line before joining the Liverpool Pilot Service in 1952 and served as an apprentice on the pilot vessels for 7 years. In 1959 Donald gained his 3rd Class Licence and became 1st Class in 1963. He worked as pilot until 1988, when the Government made changes to pilotage and he started a new job with the Mersey Docks & Harbour Co. in the VTS. During his time as a pilot he worked as a representative and as one of the small team organising social events.

Outside of pilotage, Donald will be particularly remembered for the 28 years work he did setting up and running the local Sea Scouts, where he passed on his knowledge of boat management and comradeship with enthusiasm and good humour. He became Assistant District Commissioner; was awarded a medal of merit for outstanding service and a silver acorn for especially distinguished service. Through his interest in first aid he became an expert on exposure recovery and hypothermia. Somehow, he also found time for his garden of which he was very proud, and which he opened to the public on occasions, and became the President of the local Horticultural Society.

Donald was a devoted family man and leaves behind his wife Norma and three sons. Donald will be truly missed and fondly remembered for the way in which he embraced life to the full.

Andy Malcolm,

Retired Liverpool Pilot

AIS and VTS – Is the pilots’ message finally getting through?

As you are aware I have been following the developments of AIS closely in our magazine, not least because there are many promoters of AIS who have made no secret of the “ideal” that it will eventually become the platform for so called “Remote Pilotage” from VTS centres. This is despite increasing evidence that AIS is not the perfect tracking system originally anticipated. Our hard working Section Committee, in co-operation with EMPA and IMPA have possibly managed to kill off the contradictive term “remote pilotage” but other interests have sought to revive the concept under such headings as “Sea Traffic Controller” or “Enhanced Navigational Assistance”! Again, pilots attending the various seminars and conferences have generally managed to convince Brussels that VTS is incapable of being used to take over the “conduct” of vessels in port approaches and pilotage is being seen as an enhancement to safety in sensitive coastal waters. In particular EU officials are increasingly tending to support the concept of compulsory pilotage in waterways adjacent to Sights of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI). Such moves are obviously generating fierce opposition lobbying from ship owners, especially on the short sea trade sector. At this point it is relevant to mention that some pilots, who do not bother too much about what goes on outside their own district, question the cost of UKMPA membership (less than one tankfull of petrol per month!) and the answer is that much of it goes into representations to counter this anti pilot lobbying, which is often made by those in ignorance of what a pilot actually does. Such representations are not futile as some defeatists feel and it is frequently the case that when a pilot stands up and spells out how things actually are in the real world of commercial shipping they gradually win converts. Any committee member will tell you that when they get up in a room full of “suits” and state that yesterday they were actually on board a ship it will usually grab the attention of the attendees since pilots are often the only serving mariners present. Bearing in mind that these members are usually attending in their spare time the results in relation to expenditure are remarkable value! One highly influential person who has become a firm supporter of pilots and their skills is Michael Grey from Lloyds List who has written several articles supporting pilots and explaining their value. This brings me neatly back to the topic of VTS and AIS since this was recently the subject of an excellent article by Michael Grey in his Viewpoint column. Referring to the proponents of AIS he questions their enthusiasm in no uncertain terms. The following is an edited extract from his article which puts forward the common sense view. “Put in simple terms, it is the advent of AIS which has caused such a focus on getting the pilot off the bridge of a ship and into the air-conditioned ambience of the Vessel Traffic System tower. “Shore-based pilotage” it is termed, although (in that the process is divided between ship and VTS) it is, strictly speaking, neither shore based, nor pilotage. But if every ship on the VTS screen is going to be pleasingly identifiable to the “controller” watching it, that is a major breakthrough. That, at least in theory, would enable the person in the tower to rap out “Ship A – hard a starboard and slow ahead”, with a confidence that has been hitherto impossible. In the old days, our controller might have been speaking with such authority to a lump of floating debris bobbing in the tide, or to the fairway buoy. Thus, so this argument develops, pilotage can be centralised into the VTS tower and a lot of bolshie pilots and expensive pilot boats, not to mention a helicopter or two, can be paid off. Do these enthusiasts really understand what a pilot actually does, both in terms of the local knowledge that he brings with him, and the ship handling expertise which is only really vouchsafed to people who drive ferries and regular traders? How is marine safety being enhanced, when an exhausted shipmaster, who has spent the previous umpteen hours glued to a radar, when he was not thinking about all the paperwork he has neglected, finds he is required to undertake his own pilotage, helped by a remote (if friendly) voice over the VHF, who has prefaced any remarks with a clause politely declining any liability for advice given? How can anyone, other than a pilot on the spot, realise that the man at the wheel barely knows the difference between port and starboard, and the third mate, speaking no language known to mankind, nods vigorously when he means “no”? In an era of massive liabilities and total intolerance of any form of error, are we really ready for an “advance” which is so far a step backwards that it represents a major threat to marine safety? Forget about pilots’ jobs, or a new career of “sea traffic controller”. Professional mariners should unite and reject something which is fundamentally so potentially dangerous”. Reinforcing those arguments, a recent article in the BIMCO magazine also questioned the rush to embrace the utopian dream of VTS control of shipping via the platform of AIS. The following extract again serves to support the pilots’ arguments: “It might be a good idea in theory, but to both pilots and to hard pressed shipmasters who are not as over the moon at undertaking their own pilotage and ship handling as some might suggest, there remain plenty of unanswered questions. Once again it is a case of equipment manufacturers running the agenda, persuading owners that they have the answers to questions that are actually beyond technical problems. In the case of a fine day, in a simple pilotage with a small amount of traffic and a Master very confident in his own ship handling abilities and a competent bridge team, shore-based pilotage might possibly work. But with the same ship, on a filthy night with poor visibility and a man short on the bridge, the Master might greatly welcome the proximity of a competent pilot on the bridge. The pilot, after all, is an expert in this particular port and unlike a shipmaster of a deep sea ship, who rarely manoeuvres his ship, ship handling is the pilot’s speciality. Pilots cost money, and owners wish it was rather less, but shipmasters are exceedingly put upon, with practically every week bringing some new extension to their manifold duties. The use of a competent pilot does not mean that the Master can forget his own role, rather that he is enabled to operate with a slightly reduced burden. The absence of a pilot, with a large ship swinging off a quay, with tugs in attendance and unpredictable tidal effects, can be the preliminary to an expensive mistake, with plates damaged and quay squashed. Sure, pilots make mistakes, too, but they will usually make them less frequently. There is a certain air of the “One Man Bridge Operation” syndrome about the concept of shore-based pilotage. The equipment manufacturers say it is OK, so it must be. It is worth remembering that equipment manufacturers speak with forked tongues, driven by the need to sell their equipment. It is also well worth asking the port management proposing this interesting new facility of shore based pilotage, whether the port will be carrying the entire liability for any accident that may occur in pilotage waters.” These excellent articles are both based on professional awareness and sound common sense. Your elected representatives at the UKMPA are making such arguments on our behalf at every opportunity, so next time you wonder where your subscription goes you should remember these articles.

JCB

PILOTING FPSO BONGA

FPSO BONGA

One important aspect of pilotage work is the programming of vessels. In most ports the duty pilot routinely makes planning decisions for agents and it is all taken in the pilot’s stride as part of his duties but the responsibilities of this task are considerable and the repercussions of making a mistake are always at the back of a pilot’s mind when making critical decisions. Every once in a while the duty pilot receives a request to plan a passage for a vessel totally out of the ordinary and since such a passage will frequently involve a high media presence it is all the more important that things go right on the day. Last year the Tyne pilots received one such request for bringing in a large oilfield storage and extraction vessel for fitting out. The following is an account from John Hart Burn of the process from planning to arrival.

Link to the original pdf illustrated article here:

Over the years, the River Tyne has been very much involved in the energy business. At first this meant of course coal, from this there arose a rapidly increasing coastal shipping trade in coal and similarly a short sea export trade. The River Tyne was destined to become a focus of shipping trade routes which in turn also led it to become a large shipbuilding and repair centre.

Coal reached a peak in the 1930s but all good things come to an end and in the 1950s, in the dying days of coal, miners from Harton Colliery were operating at coal-faces some seven miles out under theNorth Sea. In the meantime the search for new energy sources had moved even further out into theNorth Seafor oil and gas. The River Tyne played a full part in support of survey, drilling and service vessels. Later came the construction of rigs, platforms and modules with which to exploit these fields.

The North Seafields have now peaked with only smaller, less productive fields, lying in deeper waters remaining to be exploited.  The traditional method of production through platforms has progressively given way to the Floating Production, Storage and Offloading Unit or FPSO for short. These vessels are positioned over well heads, the oil being drawn up through flexible pipes into the vessel for storage and certain processing before being offloaded into tankers. These FPSOs may be moved by towing from one field to another relatively easily. Many of the first vessels of this type were conversions from existing large tankers and the Tyne got its fair share of this work. Nowadays the vessels are increasingly being built in the Far East and then towed to Europe for fitting out. The largest so far is the Bonga, a vessel designed for the Nigerian oil fields which arrived in theTyne in November 2002 for fitting out.

During 2001, Tyne Pilots Ltd (TPL) were advised by AMEC Wallsend that a bare hull was being built inKoreafor Shell and designed for work on the Bonga field offNigeria. With a length of 305 metres, beam 75 metres and a DWT of 300,000 an arrival draft of about 5 metres was agreed to suit the available depth alongside the berth. Vessels of such length are not able to be swung within the Port so AMEC were given a choice of whether they wished the vessel to enter head first or stern first. AMEC opted for stern first which one suspects was down to the belief, in PR and Publicity Departments, that such a vessel, expected to proceed to sea in a blaze of glory, doesn’t look quite so good being dragged stern first!

The draft presented no problem, there being sufficient water right into the berth at all states of tide. However, with large, slow moving vessels or structures it is preferable to conduct an inward river transit with the aid of the flood tide. However, in common with many break-water ports, the Tyneexperiences tidal sets across its entrance generated by the tidal stream at sea. That resulting from the South going flood stream is greatly magnified as the breakwaters are neared and this is due to the configuration of the coastline to the North and to the North Breakwater itself. Whenever  operationally possible, with such a vessel or structure, entry is arranged for slack water off the Bar which occurs at one and a half hours after low water in the Harbour. As to swell conditions this was set at 3 to 4 feet which was the requirement of the tug Masters making fast and for the head and stern sea tugs to change ends and reconnect

to bridles. It was also a requirement for the use of the boarding method, this being by way of a pilot ladder rigged over the transom and then by staircase. With a windage area in excess of some 75000sq.ft and a comparatively light draught then a wind speed of 10 to 15 knots from any direction was given as a maximum.

Towage requirement was for six tugs. The two sea tugs to take the ends with four additional tugs, one at each corner. It was advised that the two sea tugs would be required to be of a kind which would be suitably manoeuvrable for the bends of the river and of not less than 120 ton bollard pull. The shoulder and quarter tugs to be of roughly equal bollard pull but to aggregate to 200 ton to satisfy insurance requirements. As all tow lines would be secured from the main deck then the effective bollard pull of the tugs would be very much reduced from their rated pull.  An additional two local tugs, Yarm Cross and Flying Spindrift would escort the vessel as an insurance against breakdowns.  Air draught on the inward transit was not a problem and the arrival date was estimated to be August/September 2002.

TPL advised that there would be three pilots involved: One pilot on the Bonga with one each on the two sea-going tugs to act as second pilots to him. It is the convention on theTyne for the pilot on board the tow to be in charge.

It was not until early 2002 that TPL heard again from the fitting-out yard to enquire about pilots being sent to the South Shieldssimulator for training. This apparently was for the pilots to be able to handle a vessel such as Bonga! It had escaped the attention of the enquirer that as far back as the seventies Tyne Pilots were involved with the launching, sailing, trials and drydocking of vessels of over 325 metres LOA and 50 metres beam!

It was therefore intimated to the fitting-out yard that such training would not be necessary. Having already paid tens of thousands to the Simulator, the yard were not best pleased. It appears that the Port, fired with enthusiasm by a company also charging tens of thousands to devise a risk management system to comply with the Port Marine Safety Code, had directed that a simulation exercise was required. Like Paul on the road to wherever it was, TPL pilots underwent an immediate change of heart upon realising that

simulation was going to be immensely more rewarding than actually doing the job itself. As it was not possible to determine which pilots might be involved in the actual job then all TPL pilots trained assiduously on as many days as could be arranged at the

simulator!! As Bonga proceeded towards the Tyne, the ETA dropped back and back. Six weeks of ideal weather were lost. The very day she put in an appearance the weather broke. After running out of neap tides with no improvement in sight she proceeded to Rotterdam for shelter. Whilst laying by in that port I believe she was struck by another vessel and required dry-docking.  Once again on her return to the Tyne the weather broke and it was not until the last day of the then neaps and with immense pressures mounting to get her in, that Saturday November 16th opened with perfect conditions. At 0600 the Bonga and her attendant sea-going tugs were boarded some two and a half miles to the N East. Pilots involved were Ralph Sloane on the Bonga, John Hart Burn on the lead tug Smit Singapore and George Winter on the trailing tug Pacific Banner. By 0615 the four harbour tugs were made fast and the Bonga proceeded towards the breakwaters crossing the Bar at 0830. The four mile river transit was completed by 1030 making an average of about two and a half knots from boarding position to berth. From start to finish Smit Singapore was steered in auto and at no time was more than 25 ton bollard pull called for. The operation went perfectly with the pilot on Bonga not using the harbour tugs until in the vicinity of the berth. As usual, the pilots on the sea-going tugs could report having been given every support from the Masters whilst handling these vessels during transit.  Most of the Masters in these vessels have been associated with similar operations here in the past, are well used to the way in which TPL pilots operate and relationships are good. It should be noted that each pilot was accompanied by a trainee pilot and the trainee on board of Bonga was very helpful to the pilot during the berthing operation.

Due to the obstructions overside of Bonga the berth had been furnished with two dolphins which meant that positioning would be fairly critical. Whilst the sea-going tugs held the vessel in position the inboard harbour tugs were released and utilised to ‘push up’. However, since all the moorings had to come from winches ahore the operation took an inordinate amount of time. It was not until 1330 that the sea-going tugs could be released, the harbour tugs being involved for some considerable time afterwards. The job was finally completed without incident and to the satisfaction of the owners and the yard.

Soon after arrival the appearance of Bonga began to change rapidly. The fitting out commenced with the placing of many prefabricated modules on board. The lifting was accomplished by Smit’s Taks Asian Hercules which I believe is their biggest selfpropelled floating crane. One of the lifts was her personal best at about 2,800 tons. There was a pilot on board the crane for all moves and lifting operations.

At time of writing the outward passage has already been provisionally planned and despite over 20,000 tons being placed on board she will be sailing with only 5.8 metre draught. Air draught has increased to 95 metres so there is no possibility of negotiating the overhead power cables which are situated at about one mile down-river from the berth and they will have to be removed. These conductors form part of the National Grid and though provision was made when they were erected for a temporary removal, such removal is subject to a one year notice period. Although at a height of just over 87 metres above Chart Datum at lowest point of the catenary these lines have presented many problems in the past for vessels and structures wishing to pass beneath them. On occasions, surveyors have been required to monitor the heights of the conductors during a transit owing to the fact that demand surges cause heating, expansion and consequent drooping of the catenaries. Additional to the straight-forward physical clearance there also needs to be an electrical clearance.  Owing to the windage area having increased to over 118,000sq.ft.  the maximum wind speed from any direction has now been set to 10 knots. Maximum swell height of 4 to 5ft is being maintained particularly as the landing provision offered is the same as that on arrival.

Tidal requirement is once again for neap tides with the vessel leaving the berth at two hours before high water.

Tug requirement remains the same as for the inward transit. It is understood however that SNEPCO (Shell Nigeria) have engaged a different towage company so it is not yet known which sea-going tugs may be chartered.

Once again TPL pilots have been assiduously simulating and it is expected that once again the media will announce that the simulator did the job ! JH Burn

Update from John H Burn: 5/10/03

Due to strong winds the departure for Nigeriahas been cancelled until 17th October. A five day weather window has been demanded by the insurance company for departure from the Tyne and the tow down through the English Channel. As with operations off the Port there is of course the same problem in the Channel with depth of water. The catenary of the tow is such that in event of bad weather it needs to be of such length as to be in danger of snagging the bottom. It is uncertain as to which tugs will be in attendance for the job but for the two ends for the river transit the Maersk Logger and the Far Saltire are presently in Port. For the four corners it was to be Ormsby Cross and Aydon Cross (which are the two largest in the Tees) plus the Kincraig from Cromarty Firth and the Rowangarth from the Tyne. Plus two Tyne tugs Flying Spindrift and Yarm Cross in attendance for breakdowns. Waiting offshore are the ocean going tugs Wolraad Woltemade (S Africa) and the Smit Rotterdam which will be undertaking the sea tow toNigeria.

 

2006:

The BONGA was successfully positioned in the Shell Bonga field off the Nigerian coast and is now fully operational. Full details of this facility can be found at the following link:

www.ship-technology.com/projects/bonga/

Rights of EU citizens,Legal Opinion

LEGAL OPINION: The Pilotage (Recognition of Qualifications and Experience) Regulations 2003

Statutory Instrument 2003/1230 establishes a framework for the recognition of European pilots qualifications and experience by UK Competent Harbour Authorities (CHAs), by amendment of the Pilotage Act 1987.

A new schedule (A1) appears in the Pilotage Act which explains the procedure to be adopted by CHAs in determining whether an applicant for appointment as a UK pilot has the relevant qualifications and/or experience.

Qualified Applicants – Applicants’ rights, CHAs discretion

Section 2 applies where a CHA has determined a requirement for its pilots to have some formal qualification (for example a UK Master’s Certificate of Competency). As this is the case in practically all CHAs, section 2 is likely to be the most commonly relied upon provision. Under this section a CHA is required to compare an applicant’s European qualification against the Authority’s UK qualification benchmark.

Section ((2(2)) is uncontroversial and deals with the case where the applicant’s qualifications correspond to or exceed the required level. In these circumstances the CHA is prevented from refusing to authorise the applicant, (or refusing to consider his application) simply on the basis that he does not hold the required formal qualifications. Simply stated, and with the advent of STCW, somewhat obviously, a CHA has to recognise a Class 1 Certificate issued in any European country as being equivalent to the UK version.

The applicant may, however, still be refused authorisation by the relevant CHA if he fails to complete the required training programme, is unsuccessful in the examinations or is otherwise deemed by the CHA not to be suitably qualified to act as a pilot.  Section 2(3) is rather more contentious, providing that where the applicant’s formal qualifications show a level of knowledge and skill substantially below the level required by the authority (say a Class 2 rather than a Class 1), the CHA is required to allow the applicant to undergo an adaptation period or an aptitude test to demonstrate that he has acquired the knowledge and skills which were lacking. The following points are of note:

_ The Schedule uses mandatory not discretionary

language (“shall” not “may”) granting the applicant a right to an adaptation period/test.

_ The Schedule does not specify a minimum or

maximum period for adaptation, and one must assume that it is for the CHA to determine under their statutory powers conferred by Section 3 of the Pilotage Act.

_ This Section’s reference to the applicant’s level of

knowledge and skill being “substantially” below that required by the authority implies that there is no minimum standard of qualification envisaged.

_ The Schedule only appears to require a CHA to

facilitate adaptation or a test. No doubt the CHAs will have noticed there is nothing in the Schedule, which imposes a requirement for them to pay for these facilities.

_ If the CHA fails to deal with an application

promptly (within four months), or do not make provision for an aptitude test or adaptation period, the applicant may appeal to the Secretary of State.

“Adaptation period”

In the context of the Schedule “adaptation period” means a period in which the applicant acts as a pilot under the supervision of an authorised pilot, in much the same way as trainee pilots have previously been trained.

“Aptitude tests”

An “aptitude test” means a test of the applicant’s professional knowledge to act as a pilot. Again, it would appear that the CHA retains the sole discretion as to whether an applicant has been successful in this test.

The individual applicant may elect whether he wishes to submit to a test or undergo an adaptation period.

Recognition of Experience

The Instrument makes provision for the recognition by a CHA of relevant experience in Pilotage gained in an EEA State other than the UK (Schedule A1 s.5). This section only applies where the CHA requires a candidate to demonstrate general commercial or professional knowledge and ability gleaned from having previously worked in Pilotage. It may, therefore, apply additionally to section 2 or, where a CHA does not require formal qualifications of its pilots, as a separate and distinct provision.

Presumably so as not to constrain the CHAs discretion, the section does not state in what capacity the applicant needs to have been working in order to gain the relevant experience, nor indeed does it define the phrase “working in Pilotage”. In practice it is likely that ‘relevant’ will mean just that, but the prospect remains of an applicant who has never worked as a pilot (but has worked in Pilotage) being able to challenge a CHAs decision not to offer authorisation.

What is not covered

A notable deficiency in the Statutory Instrument is that it only applies to nationals of European States other than the United Kingdom, holding non-UK qualifications. It does not apply to holders (European or UK) of UK qualifications that fall below the standard required by the CHA, nor does it apply to UK nationals who hold European qualifications.

Kevin Austin

High – Lift rudder update

HIGH LIFT RUDDERS UPDATE

Following the July feature on rudders where I speculated as to the name of the British inventor of the articulated rudder, retired Great Yarmouth pilot Alan Osgood informs me that there is a model of an articulated rudder in the Science Museum in London invented by Mr. Henry Lumley. The rudder was trialed in HMS Bullfinch in 1862!

So, I feel that in memory of this visionary, when confronted with a vessel with an articulated rudder we have a duty to inform the Master that he doesn’t have a “Becker” rudder but a “Lumley”!

 

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