Integrated Bridge Systems

April 1st, 2004 by JCB
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INTEGRATED BRIDGE SYSTEMS

LINK TO THE ORIGINAL ILLUSTRATED PDF MAGAZINE ARTICLE:

pilotmag.co.uk/userfiles/Pilotmag%20277%20(Apr%2004).pdf

With the development of increasingly sophisticated electronic bridge equipment the general trend has been for the various elements to be located around the available space on the bridge rather than in any logical layout. This has usually resulted in good quality equipment being rendered inefficient and impractical to use. It is a sad reflection on the maritime industry that very little notice has ever been taken of the requirements of the end user and new ships continue to be accepted by owners with expensive equipment located in inefficient and inappropriate locations. In response to feedback on this subject, the Nautical Institute hosted a major seminar at the SeaTrade exhibition at the Excel Centre in London’s Docklands in September 2003. Entitled “Integrated Bridge Systems and the Human Element” the seminar sought to bring together the manufacturers, shipping companies and end users with the hope that co-operation between the three could result in the maritime industry finally accepting that rather than being randomly placed on board because it was mandatory to carry it, modern bridge equipment should be an effective enhancement to the safety of a vessel especially if well designed and located! Naturally, pilots are at the front end of the user group and IMPA was an official partner to the seminar. One of the challenges facing Integrated Bridge Systems (IBS) is to accommodate user requirements in different situations. For example the requirements of a pilot are different to those of a watchkeeper away from land and a good system should be effective for all user requirements. The aims of the seminar were:

• Identify best practices for the use and implementation of existing and new technology.
• Identify the training needs associated with the implementation of new equipment for future watchkeeping.
• Document the basic principles of operation and the key issues of concern, for use in industry-wide technical and regulatory committees.
• Explore options for developing a system of user feedback for future design and implementation.

A BRIEF HISTORY

The modern wheelhouse basically originated with the advent of the steamship where for the first time the helmsman and deck officer were brought together into an enclosed space integrating the functions of navigation, steering, engine control and communications in the early years of the twentieth century. The equipment was basic, consisting of a wheel, engine telegraph, communication voice pipes and signal flags and lamps. The navigation area was a separate “chartroom” off the wheelhouse with no forward view. This basic layout survived virtually unchanged until the 1970’s when some radical companies adopted the idea of integrating the chartroom into an enlarged wheelhouse usually behind the helmsman. Some tradition was maintained in that this chartroom space was curtained off from the main wheelhouse at night and was thus still a separate area. I was recently amazed to pilot a six month old 100, 000 tonne tanker which had been built with this traditional layout in a miniscule wheelhouse. It was mainly on the continent that around this time the Germans, Scandinavians and Dutch introduced an open bridge with a logical layout of navigation equipment mainly being driven by the requirements of a sole watchkeeping officer and (officially) a lookout! The French went one stage further and also integrated the engine console into the bridge space. In the 1980’s these same continental operators undertook the most revolutionary step since the installation of bridge window and installed a radical element called a chair for the watchkeeper. Not only that but they also designed a console layout that enabled the watchkeeper to actually sit on the chair and reach essential equipment without getting up. The radar had a motorised foot operated control that enabled it to be lowered out of the line of sight through the bridge window. Concerns that a usually overworked and thus exhausted watchkeeper would fall asleep if he sat down in a comfortable chair were soon realised so a watch alarm arrangement was introduced to keep him awake. On-going groundings have revealed not just the practice of switching these alarms off but also the common practice (quietly endorsed by the shipowner to save overtime costs) of no lookout being posted on the bridge at night as per requirements. Because of this phenomena of an exhausted watchkeeper falling asleep in a chair many companies have refused to fit such a luxury item in their wheelhouse, preferring to rely on the tried and trusted fact that without a chair the watchkeeper will lean on the bridge front and when he falls asleep his head will hit the bridge window and he will wake up!! So, as we progress into the 21st century we find that during the last century there has been very little change in the mindset of the ship owner with respect to the human element looking after his investment. The majority of companies still believe that ships should be manned by the cheapest possible officers using the cheapest and minimum requirement of equipment. The same watchkeeper is expected to operate, and interpret the information from, this equipment with a minimum (or non existent) training in a state of fatigue induced by long and irregular shift patterns

THE EQUIPMENT

When I was an apprentice back in the 1960s radar was still not compulsory on board ships but much discussion was taking place over how it could enhance a vessel’s passage times in reduced visibility and the economic benefits resulted in most companies purchasing them. One factor that was emphasised by the ship board users was that all radars should have standard controls in order that an officer could transfer from any ship to another and immediately be familiar with the controls and functions. Well, as we all know although some key symbols were standardised the layout of the various controls was left to the whim of the manufacturers and as additional functions were introduced the result was a vast array of different control panels many of which defied all logic and lost sight of the requirements of the end user. The ideals of the 1960’s were finally lost altogether when the simple VRM EBL control knobs were replaced by a rollerball frustratingly inefficient to use. Feedback from irate users has now seen this basic function restored but only as a more expensive “optional extra” which is rarely fitted by the ever cost conscious owner! Anyway, having decided to fit a radar, the usual location for this equipment was on the port side of the bridge to balance the location of the engine room telegraph on the starboard side. The other piece of equipment gaining prominence at that time was the VHF set which in the 1970’s rapidly became the preferred mode of intership and port communications finally replacing the Aldis lamp and signal flags. These sets were usually located as far as possible from the radar and telegraph. It is to the shame of our industry that non standard, user unfriendly equipment is now being incorporated into non standard and user unfriendly “integrated” bridge systems!

INTEGRATION

As previously mentioned the reduction in officer manning and an increase in equipment led to a requirement for a certain element of integration and in the 1970’s and 1980’s companies and manufacturers came up with the bridge console. Hence we witnessed the introduction of a long console plonked in the middle of the wheelhouse with engine controls on the right, the autopilot and helm controls in the middle and the radar on the left. The VHF was rarely integrated into this unit being usually placed on the sides of the chartroom enclosure, still located to the rear of the bridge. This layout is still to be found on newbuilds especially on vessels constructed in the far east which despite being at the forefront of microtechnology for domestic equipment rigidly sticks to 1970’s style equipment and layouts even to the extent of encasing modern daylight radars (with a preference for traditional green on black displays which cannot be seen in sunlight) in traditionally styled pale green housings. Yet another of the world’s great unsolved mysteries! Still, from a pilots’ point of view such ships tend to be entirely reliable and predictable and we don’t have to stay on board for long. A variation on the same theme was to place this console right to the front of the bridge under the windows. Again this is still a popular layout with all its associated problems of cleaning the inside of the windows and condensation running down off the windows onto the console equipment. A unique risk associated with this layout was brought home to me when I was second mate. One quiet afternoon in the Mediterranean the engine suddenly coughed and died. Alarms duly rang and engineers were unable to restart it. A process of elimination brought an irate chief engineer to the bridge to confront the concerned Captain as to why the emergency engine stop had been pressed. The Captain turned his ire on me as the watchkeeper who had been innocently keeping a look out and enjoying the sun on the bridge wing. I in turn looked at my dutiful lookout who was still kneeling on top of the console calmly cleaning the inside of the bridge windows. He had accidentally knelt on the main engine emergency stop button!! Fortunately we were well away from land and there was no other shipping around. The console was rapidly modified with a Perspex cover for the emergency stop button!! Despite far too many examples of poor layout, full integration is being realised and the best examples are to be found on ferries and modern N. European and Scandinavian vessels. On these the watchkeeper has all the information and equipment he requires in view or to hand from the armchair which can be slid out of the way when not required. Radar, ECDIS, engine monitoring, autopilot, VHF with a duplicate manning position are all incorporated and the seat is normally set high so that the direct line of sight is over the top of the console with almost an all round view from the conning position. The visual information can therefore be rapidly compared to the “virtual” information from the ECDIS and radar. Brilliant, or is it? Whilst it is a delight to pilot such vessels it is necessary to bend down to adjust controls and there is a danger at night of light pollution from all the screens reducing night vision. The wheelhouse, rather than being in total darkness is often illuminated by soft red lighting. It is all too easy to be lulled into a false sense of security and miss a small light from a badly lit yacht or small vessel not detected by the digitised radar display which is increasingly set to provide a “clean” image with the auto function eliminating all “clutter” which of course in choppy or rainy conditions can also eliminate small targets. The most serious case of integration lulling watchkeepers into a false sense of security was the grounding of the passenger ship Royal Majesty where a failure of the aerial connection to the GPS set resulted in the GPS calculating the position by means of dead reckoning. For a period of 34 hours successive watchkeepers diligently plotted the GPS DR position cosseted in their splendid modern integrated bridge until reality arrived with dramatic but fortunately non fatal disaster. The officers were criticised for over reliance on the automated features of their integrated bridge but the company in turn was criticised for not giving the officers training in integrated bridge operations. Integration was mentioned as a factor in the enquiry but the question needs to be asked would the grounding have occurred with the same officers had a traditional bridge been fitted to the vessel? It is not certain but in my opinion it is probable that without integration the discrepancy between the radar image and GPS positions being obtained would have resulted in concern leading to double checking of the position by separate means. It can be seen from the aforementioned that in reality integration is frequently far removed from the images presented in glossy manufacturers brochures. However, what is of equal concern is that some of those brochures are still unashamedly advertising poor design layouts and I have downloaded an example from the Internet.

THE NI SEMINAR

I was very disappointed that I was unable to be released from my piloting roster to attend this seminar but I have copies of most of the papers presented and the Institute’s own official report issued following the event. The presentations were made by a wide variety of representatives from the maritime sector including those concerned with the technical aspects of integrating and licensing of new equipment. Running to a vast number of pages the papers paint a very revealing image of the current state of the process along with many personal opinions and recommendations but the basic message is that since the technology exists it should be placed on board ships and integrated into a format that provides the primary information required in a manner that is easily assimilated by the watchkeeper. All the contributors were unanimous in the opinion that any data produced by equipment was useless unless the recipient had received comprehensive training in its interpretation and application. So, we are not talking about rocket science here! What we are dealing with is forcing often reluctant ship owners to invest not just in the equipment but also in the “human element” and that is proving to be a major stumbling block. IMO have made great progress in gaining basic agreement on the principles of integration and the new SOLAS Chapter V provides best practice guidelines for wheelhouse layout and equipment specifications. The problem with the IMO is that progress is painfully slow since it relies on full agreement of all members with all the varied interests that this entails. However, the process does work but a prime example of the problems is provided by the introduction of AIS and its installation and use on board ships. Wisdom originally perceived that the installation of a new and relatively untested technology should be gradually introduced over a period of several years. The USA, having decided that AIS would be a valuable tool in the “war against terror” managed to accelerate the implementation time and it will be now compulsory for all vessels over 300 grt to be fitted with AIS by the end of this year. AIS is now appearing on an increasing number of vessels but how is it being integrated? The answer is not at all. Although there are many companies offering full integration of AIS into ECDIS and radar displays over 80% of owners are opting to fit the minimum requirement of an alpha numeric unit similar in size and design to a GPS unit and these have been condemned as useless for any purpose for which AIS is designed. I have dealt with these AIS problems in detail in previous issues and they are available on my website at www. pilotmag.co.uk. As for the ships’ watchkeepers the overwhelming majority have not received any information or training in their use. The primary use of AIS by watchkeepers in my experience is to identify other vessels and contacting them by VHF either to confirm or contravene the COLREGS! The other main usage is to send text messages to other ships. Both of these uses contravene good bridge practice and the general consensus is that there will be a major AIS assisted collision being investigated in the near future! There is however one valuable aspect of shipboard AIS and that is the provision of a standard pilot plug demanded by IMPA which enables a pilot to plug into the unit and use the data on his portable pilot unit if his port uses it. This facility is a great step forward and it is a credit to IMPA that they have managed to make the provision of this plug a compulsory part of the specification. The down side of this feature is that the information is dependent upon the ship’s AIS being correctly installed and calibrated since any defects on the vessel’s AIS will also be suffered by the pilot user.

THE SEMINAR REPORT

The Nautical Institute’s report following the seminar contains submissions from those who presented papers and the conclusion drawn from these are that there is some very high quality equipment available but that its integration into the bridge is frequently haphazard and with a vast difference between the methods of extracting the required information much of the required information is not always presented to the end user in a clear format. This of course confirms what users would have reported had they been fully consulted by owners and their requirements passed on to the manufacturers as happens in the rest of the transport industry! These shortfalls are being gradually addressed. The IMO working group 13 is tasked with examining the presentation of navigation related information with a view to removing current inconsistencies and with developing a new generation of composite navigation display that integrates information derived from two or more systems. There is also a requirement to clarify the difference between an Integrated Navigation System (INS) and an Integrated Bridge System (IBS) since both terms are currently loosely applied. The suggested clarification by a manufacturer was:

• INS is a system that integrates information from several navigational aids

• IBS integrates information from a variety if different shipboard data sources.

This may include passage execution but only if combined with an INS. The integration of information should:

• Use all available sources

• Automatically verify the validity and integrity of data

• Ensure fail-safe redundancy

• Support unambiguous situation awareness

• Automatically provide (and prioritise) alarms for arising hazards

• Be user friendly.

The users’ requirements were detailed by a ship owner representative who identified a need for intelligent systems that would be pro-active in alerting a watchkeeper that the vessel was running into danger. In recognition that a watchkeeper is unable to perform multiple tasks when under pressure the alarms should be prioritised to a “need to know” sequence. I suppose an example of this would be that if an anti collision warning was sounding then other distractions such as engine alarms or the telephone ring would be suppressed until the watchkeeper had acknowledged this alarm. In general the opinions of those attending the seminar can be summarised by concerns being expressed that too much information can be counter productive and a vast array of screens will detract from the ideal of looking out of the window and thus obtaining an overall situational awareness. The standardisation of control systems was considered to be a necessity with users being faced with, keyboards, joysticks, trackballs, menus etc. but history suggests that this is probably a utopian dream! The functions essential for navigation are not always logically available and equipment is often embellished by the manufacturer to present the minimum requirement in the best commercial light. Equipment should be simple to use and understand with essential basic safety information readily available. There was unanimous agreement that training in the use of complex systems was essential but sadly lacking. A few top companies did ensure that all their officers were sent on training courses and given familiarisation time on “hand-over” but these were the exception.

CONCLUSIONS

This seminar served to highlight the fact that information is currently provided to a watchkeeper in a generally inefficient, non prioritised manner from an array of badly laid out equipment. The most serious consequence of this is that there is evidence that such equipment is reducing safety on navigation. A recent press report on accident trends by a leading PI Club stated “…recent reports on several collisions and casualties suggest that computerisation of bridges (integrated bridges, GPS, ECDIS etc) may have been one of the contributing underlying causes.” The PI club points to numerous recent examples whereby mariners have made expensive and even tragic mistakes despite having been provided with all this technology. Investigations indicated that the “humantechnology” interface revealed many shortcomings. The report concluded that “evidence suggests that despite improvements in technology and of training through various STCW conventions, the majority of collisions continue to occur due to a failure of the bridge team to follow simple principles of bridge watchkeeping and violations of the collision regulations.” This leads neatly to the common sense viewpoint made by our own Geoff Taylor to the seminar in the following (slightly edited) presentation which all pilots will fully endorse. “In a previous paper to the first of these seminars, I made reference to the Transitorless Flat Panel Display Screen or Bridge Window! In all that we have spoken of let us not throw away the natural tools we have at hand. On the ship’s bridge there remains the basic IBS/INS consisting of the mark one eyeball and the afore-mentioned bridge window and integrating their transmitted images uses the most sophisticated and versatile computer known to man, the human brain. These though simple and long available tools must not be discarded or even put to one side for all of the perceived benefits of technology. The harnessing through proper training and hard earned experience of hi-tech equipment to generate clearly defined and easily used decision support information will give us all a safer and better future. It is essential in our profession to bear in mind at all times that the tools we use to perform our tasks are decision support systems and NOT decision makers in themselves We should all welcome IBS/INS for the joined up process of support it can offer but it should never be forgotten that the decisions arrived at can and must continue to be accessed through the time honoured practice of good seamanship supported by the exercise of sound judgment”. Sums it all up really!

JCB

The IMO have produced a full set of guidelines for bridge layout in MSC circular 982. Running to 33 pages it is available for download in pdf format from the IMO website page 106 -112 on the MSC section or the direct link ( if you are an accurate copier!!) is: http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D1878/982.pdf