PEC “Any Deck Officer”? The “CSL Thames” Grounding: JCB

December 26th, 2013 by JCB
Posted in Articles, Technical and Training | No Comments »

Photo: MAIB

 

 

Unless you’ve been on another planet during the last year you’ll all be fully aware that the marine Navigation Bill (2) (MNB) received Royal assent on the 29th April and will pass into law on 1st October. Consequently, in the UK, from that date “any deck officer” will able to apply for a Pilotage Exemption Certificate (PEC). Whilst the Bill was passing through the legislative process, the UKMPA raised many professionally sound arguments against deregulating the existing PEC requirements which were generally dismissed by spurious arguments such as that the existing requirements prevented junior officers from what obtaining what was considered by the Bill’s sponsors to be an important additional “qualification” to their career progression! One major argument put forward by the UKMPA was that junior officers lacked the experience and skills required to handle a vessel in pilotage waters.

An incident where such inexperience was highlighted occurred in August 2011 in the Sound of Mull when the bulk carrier CSL Thames with an LOA of 175m and a draft of 10.6m went aground after the 3rd Mate on watch, altered course to avoid a yacht which he (erroneously) thought was on a collision course with the vessel which resulted in the vessel grounding on a rocky outcrop. At the time, although the Master was on the bridge, he was busy on the bridge computer which all pilots know is normal following departure from a berth and was also listening to music on a portable Hi-Fi where he’d pumped up the volume! The following extracts from the MAIB report into the grounding also highlight issues over ECDIS use and training.

At 0820 on 9 August 2011, CSL Thames completed loading a cargo of 28,962 tonnes of aggregates at Glensanda for discharge at Wilhelmshaven. A pilot boarded and, at 0840, the vessel departed. In addition to the pilot, the bridge was manned by the master, third officer and a helmsman. The vessel’s deepest draught was 10.63 metres. At 0848, the pilot disembarked and the master set the engine to full ahead. Visibility was good with a moderate west-north-west breeze.

At 0935, CSL Thames entered the Sound of Mull. To assist with navigation during the transit, the master used two radars and an ECDIS. The ECDIS was set with the following safety parameters: a safety contour of 10 metres; a cross-track deviation limit of 0.2 mile either side of the planned track; and an anti-grounding warning zone that covered an arc 1º either side of the vessel’s track out to a distance equivalent to 10 minutes steaming. The alarm on the ECDIS should therefore have activated if CSL Thames deviated more than 0.2 miles from her planned track, or the anti-grounding warning zone crossed a safety contour or other user-defined danger.

At 1006, with CSL Thames on a heading of 290º(T) at a speed of 12 knots, the master instructed the helmsman to engage the autopilot and then handed the con to the third officer, who stood facing the starboard radar display, with the ECDIS display to his right 

At 1010, the third officer interpreted from the ECDIS display that CSL Thames was about 1 mile from the next planned waypoint; he also estimated that a sailing vessel he could see on the starboard bow would be ahead of CSL Thames when she was steady on her new course. Intending to leave the sailing vessel to port, he decided to turn early and, by adjusting the autopilot, initiated a slow alteration of course to starboard towards the next planned course of 314º (T).At 1014 as CSL Thames’s heading was passing 308º(T), the third officer acquired on the radar an automatic identification system (AIS) target of the sailing vessel at a range of 3.6 miles and on a bearing of 318.5º(T). At 1016, with CSL Thames approaching her planned course of 314º (T), he decided to continue the alteration to starboard to place the sailing vessel onto the port bow. At 1018, CSL Thames was on a heading of 321º (T) when the third officer observed another small vessel right ahead at about 1 mile range. With the intention of leaving the small vessel to port, he continued altering course to 324º (T). 

The ECDIS anti-grounding warning zone alarm then activated on the display, but no audible alarm sounded. At 1021, the third officer sounded two long blasts on the ship’s whistle to alert the small vessel to the presence of CSL Thames and, at about 1023, the small vessel passed clear on CSL Thames’s port side. The third officer then focused his attention on the sailing vessel ahead, which was now at about 1 mile range.  At 1025, CSL Thames grounded in position 56º 34.3’N, 005º57.2’W at a speed of about 12 knots (Figure 4). The contact with the seabed lasted 16 seconds and caused the vessel to vibrate loudly. 

The report goes on to note that following a sounding check ingress of water was noted in a ballast tank and an inspection revealed a 3m long hull rupture. With the pumps able to control the ingress permission was granted for the vessel to continue on its voyage for permanent repairs to be undertaken after discharge. The following edited extracts highlight the key observations made by the MAIB regarding the use of ECDIS on this vessel:

CSL Thames was fitted with two ECDIS units that were used as the primary means of navigation, thus removing the need for paper charts to be carried. All bridge officers, including the master, had completed a generic ECDIS training course in the Philippines. This course was based on IMO Model Course 1.271

– No training or familiarisation on the type of ECDIS fitted on board CSL Thames had been provided by the ship’s management company or by previous employers. 

– The company had not provided any instructions or guidance on the use of the ECDIS fitted to CSL Thames. 

– A safety contour setting of 10 metres was inappropriate for CSL Thames’s draught of 10.63 metres. 

– Although the ECDIS anti-grounding warning zone visual alarm activated, the audible alarm, which should have alerted the third officer to the fact that CSL Thames was heading into danger, did not function. This was because the ECDIS unit was not connected to a loudspeaker or buzzer capable of sounding an audible alarm, contrary to the IMO’s performance standards. 

– Despite having attended training courses that met the standards of the IMO model course for ECDIS, CSL Thames’s master and bridge watchkeepers lacked an understanding of the ECDIS equipment’s safety features and/or their value. ECDIS provides the officer of the watch with an efficient and effective means of navigation. However, its ability to continuously provide the vessel’s current position and projected track, and to warn of approaching dangers, can lead to over-reliance and complacency. The officer of the watch still needs to monitor the vessel’s position and projected track at regular intervals and to fully understand the equipment’s safety features in order to make best use of them.

With respect to this latter point of passage monitoring the report observes:

The third officer was unaware that CSL Thames was heading into danger. He had last looked at the ECDIS display immediately before initiating CSL Thames’s turn to starboard at 1010. The ECDIS display anti-grounding warning zone alarm activated at about 1018. However, the focus of the third officer’s attention was on collision avoidance, and involved him looking ahead through the bridge windows and monitoring the radar display. 

While the third officer relied on the ECDIS as the primary means of navigation, he did not appreciate the extent to which he needed to monitor CSL Thames’s position and projected track in relation to the planned track and surrounding hazards. The ECDIS display was orientated so that the OOW had to face to starboard to look at the screen. Although this might have been ergonomically satisfactory for routine navigational watchkeeping, the third officer’s overriding priority during the period leading up to the accident was collision avoidance, which required him to look ahead. Had the ECDIS display been located in front of him, he would have
been more likely to routinely consult it when monitoring the navigational situation. 

Traditional navigational techniques require an officer of the watch to regularly plot a series of historical positions on a paper chart from which to project the vessel’s track. The ECDIS display provided the third officer with an ability to immediately identify the vessel’s current position and projected track at any time without the need for regular plotting. Furthermore, the third officer was aware the ECDIS anti-grounding warning zone feature was designed to automatically determine and alarm if the vessel was running into danger. Consequently, he felt no obligation to check the vessel’s position and projected track during the 15-minute period leading up to the grounding.

With respect to this grounding’s relevance to the PEC deregulation issue the report made the following observations regarding the bridge team management on the vessel :

 

During the period leading up to the grounding, the third officer remained confident that he was in control of the navigational situation, and felt no need to defer to the master. However, at 1021, he was sufficiently concerned about the intentions of the small vessel ahead of CSL Thames that he sounded the ship’s whistle. The master was sitting at the communications centre at the rear of the bridge and the activation of the ship’s whistle should have alerted him to the developing situation. Had he taken more interest in the navigational situation faced by the OOW, he might have been prompted to challenge the third officer’s actions, particularly as a sound signal of two long blasts has no meaning in the COLREGS in respect of collision avoidance in clear visibility. The master may then have identified that CSL Thames was running into danger and taken remedial action. 

The Sound of Mull is a regular route for coastal traffic and does not pose a challenge for small vessels. However, CSL Thames was a large vessel and required careful navigation in view of the restricted sea room and the likelihood of her encountering other traffic. The master was confident of the third officer’s abilities and, on handing him the con, was content for him to navigate alone. However, his confidence was misplaced. The third officer lacked experience and, given the navigational demands of the passage, needed the support of the master, who should have avoided sending the routine departure messages until CSL Thames was clear of the Sound.

During the MNB stitch up “consultation” period this MAIB report was submitted as an example of the dangers of de-regulating the existing PEC requirements but (if it was even read!) it was dismissed as being irrelevant since it wasn’t considered to be a PEC issue!

On a more general note, following reading this report I wasn’t alone in considering that some important elements had been overlooked  and the status of the Sound of Mull, seemingly currently considered to be “open waters”, is one area that, in my opinion, should have been investigated.  The Sound represents a boundary between the local authorities of Argyll and Bute Council on the Isle of Mull and Highland Council on the Morvern coast and yet it seems that neither Authority was concerned at what potentially could have been a serious pollution incident in their waters. This is even more puzzling since the waters around Scotland are currently being proposed as Marine Protection Areas and in 2010 the Scottish Association for Marine Science published an environmental study for the Sound which identified pollution as a risk to be considered. It seems that this body also didn’t participate in the investigation. Indeed there is no mention at all of who is responsible for shipping in the Sound of Mull. Is it actually open waters as I assume or is it under local authority jurisdiction and are there any bylaws covering navigation etc.?

The pilotage on departure took eight minutes indicating that the vessel was barely off the berth when the pilot disembarked yet  the report does not expand on this nor question whether the pilotage regulations for the area are actually fit for purpose given the sizes of ships involved and the constrictions of the waterway etc.

Then there’s the issue of draft. The report states: “CSL Thames was a large vessel and required careful navigation in view of the restricted sea room and the likelihood of her encountering other traffic”. Under such circumstances the vessel was clearly “constrained by her draft” and the Master would have been justified in displaying the deep draft signal. Again there’s no mention of this factor in the report! Returning to the actions of the 3/O much is made of the ECDIS and its location but it would only have required a sideways glance to verify the position regardless of any alarm function yet for the 15 minutes prior to the grounding no one looked at it?

The report states that the 3/O was looking out of the window and using the radar. A rocky coastline looming up ahead at 12 kts would normally invoke some sense of concern (although given the actions of Captain Schettino perhaps this no longer raises concerns on the bridge of a modern ship!) and the 3/O was using the radar. Why is there no mention of radar parallel indexing and other non-ECDIS navigation techniques?

In conclusion it seems to me to be a sad reflection on our “democratic” process for creating legislation that groundings are seemingly considered irrelevant unless they involve pollution where it takes a seagull covered in oil to stimulate our elected representatives into taking notice of maritime safety issues.

John Clandillon-Baker

Read the full report: www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/CSLThames.pdf

And Another:

Less than a year after the CSL Thames grounding, the 89m LOA feeder containership, Coastal Isle, piled into the southern tip of the Isle of Bute at full speed which caused considerable damage to the vessel. In this incident the 1st Mate was on watch but was found in his cabin after the grounding, having left the bridge some 2 hours earlier!

So is this incident of relevance to the MNB deregulation issue? Since this incident occurred outside pilotage waters the answer would seemingly be no although, as with the CSL Thames, it again raises serious questions over the lack of navigation jurisdiction through the Scottish Isles.

However, of great relevance is that the MAIB investigation uncovered a very sophisticated fraud involving the illegal issuing of Panamanian Certification of Competency (CoC). The Turkish Mate, his post grounding relief and the 2nd Mate were all found to be in possession of these fraudulent certificates which had successfully passed the scrutiny of the company and other officials. The MAIB’s report notes that an IMO study in 2001 identified 12635 fraudulent CoC’s and, with respect to the MNB deregulation issue, states that: “In order to ensure the navigational safety of the large number of non UK flagged vessels operating around the UK coast, it is imperative they are manned by competent crew members. Illegal and fraudulent certificates must be identified and weeded out as a matter of priority.” Given the Internet and computer technology now available these cases are possibly just the tip of a massive iceberg but is anyone concerned? In a press release following the MNB’s Royal Assent, Maritime UK were gushing over with joy stating: “The very positive effect of the new Act will be to reduce burdens on the ports and shipping industry and improve maritime safety.” So that’s a relief!

John Clandillon-Baker

Read the full MAIB report: www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/CoastalIsle.pdf

And yet another:

Yet another grounding has occurred in the Sound of Mull in almost the same position as the CSL Thames but on the other side of the Sound on the Argyll coast. On this occasion the vessel was the 90m LOA Fri Ocean  which went aground on the 13th June. Again there doesn’t seem to have been any concerns raised by the Scottish Authorities!

Read the MAIB report: http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/FriOcean_Report.pdf